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SECRET  
FM WASHINGTON  
TO PRIORITY FCO  
TELNO 117

OF 161710Z JANUARY 86  
INFO PRIORITY BONN, PARIS, UKDEL NATO, MOSCOW, MODUK (FOR DACU) *mo*

MIPT: US/SOVIET NUCLEAR AND ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS: US  
APPROACH TO GENEVA ROUND IV

1. THE PRESIDENT'S INSTRUCTIONS (ISSUED ON 14 JANUARY) TO THE US NEGOTIATORS FOR GENEVA ROUND IV INCLUDED THE FOLLOWING DETAILED POINTS (THE LIST MAY NOT BE FULLY COMPREHENSIVE):

(A) START, US NEGOTIATORS WERE INSTRUCTED TO:

(1) MAKE CLEAR TO THE RUSSIANS THAT THE US ARE PROPOSING A BAN ON THE MODERNISATION OF EXISTING HEAVY MISSILES AS WELL AS ON NEW HEAVY MISSILES (THIS IS THE POINT WHICH DIFFERENTIATES THIS ASPECT OF THE NOVEMBER PROPOSAL FROM EARLIER US PROPOSALS). US NEGOTIATORS ARE ALSO TO EXPLAIN THAT THE PROPOSED BAN ON NEW TYPES OF HEAVY MISSILE WOULD TAKE THE FORM OF A BAN ON FLIGHT TESTING (THE NEGOTIATORS HAVE NO INSTRUCTIONS ON WHAT FORM THE PROPOSED BAN ON MODERNISATION OF EXISTING HEAVY MISSILES SHOULD TAKE),

(B) SEEK A SOVIET COMMITMENT TO THE PRINCIPLE OF A 50 PCNT REDUCTION IN MAXIMUM THROW-WEIGHT. IN DOING THIS, US NEGOTIATORS WILL ATTEMPT TO BUILD ON THE CLAIM MADE BY THE RUSSIANS WHEN PRESENTING THEIR OWN PROPOSALS IN SEPTEMBER THAT THOSE PROPOSALS COULD RESULT IN A 50 PCNT REDUCTION IN SOVIET THROW-WEIGHT,

(C) INITIATE A DISCUSSION OF COUNTING RULES. NO SPECIFIC US APPROACH HAS BEEN DECIDED BY THE PRESIDENT BUT MANY OF OUR CONTACTS BELIEVE THAT THE ADMINISTRATION WILL BE LOOKING FOR AGREEMENT TO COUNT NEW SYSTEMS (AS IN SALT) AS CARRYING THE MAXIMUM NUMBER OF RVS WITH WHICH THEY HAVE BEEN TESTED. FOR EXISTING SYSTEMS, HOWEVER, WE UNDERSTAND THAT SOME HERE MAY PREFER TO SEEK AGREEMENT ON DISCRETE COUNTING RULES, SYSTEM-BY-SYSTEM. THE US NEGOTIATING TEAM IS EMPOWERED TO INITIATE A DISCUSSION OF ALCM COUNTING RULES IN THIS CONTEXT.

*Implications for us*

(B) DEFENCE/SPACE

THERE ARE NO SIGNIFICANT NEW ELEMENTS IN THE PRESIDENT'S INSTRUCTIONS. THE US TEAM IN GENEVA IS INSTRUCTED TO MAINTAIN PRESSURE FOR FULL COMPLIANCE WITH THE ABM TREATY, AND TO TRY TO ADVANCE THE DIALOGUE ON THE OFFENSE/DEFENSE RELATIONSHIP AND ON POSSIBLE TRANSITION ARRANGEMENTS. THE US TEAM WILL ALSO CONTINUE TO EXPLAIN THE SDI PROGRAMME AND GIVE GREATER DEFINITION TO THE 'OPEN LABORATORIES' IDEA BY PROPOSING MUTUAL BRIEFINGS ON RESPECTIVE STRATEGIC DEFENCE RESEARCH PROGRAMMES AND RECIPROCAL VISITS TO THE LABORATORIES INVOLVED.

(C) INF

(1) THE MAIN ISSUE NOW PARTLY RESOLVED BY THE PRESIDENT IS THE MATTER OF DEMARCATION BETWEEN SS20S IN RANGE OF EUROPE AND THOSE ELSEWHERE. OUR UNDERSTANDING (SOMEWHAT DIFFERENT FROM THE ACCOUNT GIVEN BY US REPRESENTATIVES AT THE SCG MEETING ON 14 JANUARY -

*URDE*

UKDEL NATO TELNO 10 REFERS) IS THAT THE PRESIDENT HAS DECIDED THAT THE US NEGOTIATING TEAM IN GENEVA SHOULD TELL THE RUSSIANS THAT THE US PROPOSES A DEMARCATION LINE WHICH WOULD PLACE 270 OF THE 441 SS20 LAUNCHERS PRESENTLY DEPLOYED QUOTE WITHIN RANGE OF EUROPE UNQUOTE AND 171 IN SOVIET ASIA. BUT THERE IS NO DECISION ON THE PRECISE WAY IN WHICH SUCH A DEMARCATION LINE SHOULD BE DEFINED (LONGITUDINAL DEFINITIONS OR BASE-SPECIFIC DEFINITIONS ARE AMONG THE POSSIBILITIES UNDER DISCUSSION). US NEGOTIATORS ARE INSTRUCTED TO TRY TO PRESENT THIS DECISION AS A US CONCESSION AND TO MAKE CLEAR THAT IT IS CONTINGENT ON SOVIET ACCEPTANCE OF QUOTE PROPORTIONAL UNQUOTE REDUCTIONS IN SS20S IN SOVIET ASIA,

(II) THE US NEGOTIATING TEAM IS INSTRUCTED TO MAKE CLEAR THAT THE ADMINISTRATION CONTINUE TO ATTACH IMPORTANCE TO THE PRINCIPAL OF WARHEAD EQUALITY AS WELL AS LAUNCHER EQUALITY AND THAT, UNDER THE PRESENT US PROPOSAL, THIS WOULD INVOLVE EQUALITY IN THE 420-450 WARHEAD RANGE. (THIS ASPECT OF THE PRESIDENT'S INSTRUCTIONS CONFIRMS THAT THERE IS ONLY A LIMITED NUMBER OF GLCM/P2 MIXES WHICH THE ADMINISTRATION IS READY TO ACCEPT AND THAT THE US POSITION IS NOT TO ACCEPT A NUMBER OF P2S LESS THAN 36).

(III) US NEGOTIATORS WILL TELL THE RUSSIANS THAT MODERNISATION OF SYSTEMS COVERED BY AN INF AGREEMENT WOULD BE PERMITTED (WE UNDERSTAND THAT THERE IS NO DECISION ON WHETHER TO ACCEPT THE DEPLOYMENT OF SOVIET GLCMS ALTHOUGH THERE IS GENERAL AGREEMENT THAT ANY SOVIET GLCMS ACCEPTED IN THIS WAY WOULD HAVE TO COUNT UNDER THE OVERALL LRINF CEILING).

2. THE PRESIDENT'S INSTRUCTIONS CONTAIN NO DECISIONS ON HOW TO HANDLE VERIFICATION MATTERS IN GENEVA, THIS SEEMS CERTAIN TO BE A SUBJECT OF HEATED INTER-AGENCY DEBATE HERE OVER THE COMING WEEKS. THE KEY POINT FOR DECISION IS WHETHER THE US SHOULD SOON ADVANCE IN GENEVA DETAILED VERIFICATION PROPOSALS (OSD'S AND ACDA'S PREFERENCE), EITHER AS AN INTEGRAL PART OF ANY DRAFT START OR INF TREATIES TABLED, OR IN THE FORM OF A DETAILED VERIFICATION ANNEX, OR WHETHER THE ADMINISTRATION SHOULD CONTINUE TO CONCENTRATE ON THE SEARCH FOR AGREEMENTS ON REDUCTIONS AND TURN TO VERIFICATION REQUIREMENTS AT A LATER STAGE (STATE'S PREFERENCE, ON THE GROUNDS THAT TRYING TO ADDRESS THE FULL RANGE OF VERIFICATION PROBLEMS IN GENEVA NOW WOULD BE A RECIPE FOR SLOW PROGRESS). DECISIONS ON WHETHER OR NOT THE US SHOULD TABLE DRAFT INF AND START TREATIES IN GENEVA (AS GLITMAN IN PARTICULAR WOULD LIKE TO DO) MAY BE DELAYED UNTIL THIS BROADER VERIFICATION DEBATE IS RESOLVED.

WRIGHT

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