

**CONFIDENTIAL**

CONFIDENTIAL

FM MOSCOW

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 397

OF 081450Z APRIL 86

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, PARIS, BONN, UKDEL NATO

A very interesting  
e imm date  
telegram if  
you have  
time to  
read it in  
full?  
em

**US/SOVIET RELATIONS: SUMMIT PROSPECTS**

1. MY US COLLEAGUE, HARTMAN, HAS GIVEN ME (AND THE FRENCH AND FRG AMBASSADORS) AN ACCOUNT OF RECENT US/SOVIET CONTACTS WHICH THROWS SOME LIGHT ON THE CURRENT SOVIET APPROACH TO THE SUPER-POWER RELATIONSHIP AND TO A PROSPECTIVE SUMMIT MEETING. WE SHOULD BE GRATEFUL IF HARTMAN'S CONFIDENCE COULD BE PROTECTED.

**HARTMAN'S CALL ON SHEVARDNADZE**

2. HARTMAN HAD TOLD ME ON 2 APRIL THAT, FOR THE FIRST TIME IN RECENT MONTHS, HE WAS BEING DEMIED THE URGENT CALL ON SHEVARDNADZE WHICH HE HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED TO SEEK IN ORDER TO EXPRESS GROWING US IMPATIENCE WITH THE ABSENCE OF A SOVIET RESPONSE ON POSSIBLE SUMMIT DATES. ON 3 APRIL, HE WAS TOLD THAT SHEVARDNADZE WOULD BE UNABLE TO RECEIVE HIM UNTIL 8 APRIL, I.E. AFTER DOBRYNIN'S DEPARTURE FOR WASHINGTON TO MAKE HIS FAREWELL CALLS AND TAKE LEAVE OF THE PRESIDENT. SINCE THE PURPOSE OF HARTMAN'S CALL WAS TO MAKE US DISPLEASURE KNOWN BEFORE DOBRYNIN SET OFF FOR WASHINGTON, HARTMAN WAS AUTHORIZED TO TAKE A STRONG LINE AND TO SAY THAT IF SHEVARDNADZE COULD NOT RECEIVE HIM AT ONCE SHULTZ WOULD CANCEL HIS FAREWELL LUNCH FOR DOBRYNIN. DOBRYNIN'S OTHER ENGAGEMENTS IN WASHINGTON WOULD ALSO SUFFER. THIS DID THE TRICK AND HARTMAN WAS TOLD THAT HE COULD CALL ON SHEVARDNADZE AT 2130 ON 3 APRIL.

3. HARTMAN OPENED WITH A GENERAL EXPRESSION OF US DISAPPOINTMENT WITH THE CURRENT SOVIET APPROACH TO EAST/WEST RELATIONS AND, IN PARTICULAR, WITH THE FAILURE OF THE SOVIET SIDE TO RESPOND TO AMERICAN SUGGESTIONS REGARDING THE TIMING OF THE NEXT SUMMIT MEETING IN WASHINGTON. THE US ADMINISTRATION WAS ALSO UNHAPPY WITH THE ABSENCE OF ANY SOVIET REACTION, DURING THE LAST GENEVA ROUND, TO US PROPOSALS FOR STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTIONS AND FOR THE ELIMINATION OF INF ON A GLOBAL BASIS. HARTMAN EXPRESSED US CONCERN OVER THE FACT THAT, IN THE CDE, THE SOVIET POSITION ON CBMS SEEMED TO BE MOVING BACKWARDS; AND OVER THE NEGATIVE AND UNCONSTRUCTIVE NATURE OF THE CURRENT EASTERN POSITION IN THE MBFR TALKS IN VIENNA. SHEVARDNADZE,

/STRESSING

**CONFIDENTIAL**



STRESSING THAT HE HAD PERSONALLY REVIEWED IN DETAIL ALL CURRENT SOVIET POSITIONS IN THE VARIOUS EAST/WEST NEGOTIATING FORA, RESPONDED WITH A SIMILAR CATALOGUE OF SOVIET CONCERNS: THE ABSENCE OF A US REPLY TO GORBACHEV'S LATEST PROPOSALS ON AN INF AGREEMENT AND ON NUCLEAR TESTING, UNACCEPTABLE OPERATIONS BY THE US NAVY IN THE BLACK SEA, UNWARRANTED US MEASURES AGAINST THE SOVIET DELEGATION IN NEW YORK, THE US ATTEMPT TO PROVOKE LIBYA - AND THEREBY TEST SOVIET METTLE - IN THE GULF OF SIRTE AND THE SHARPER LEVEL OF RHETORIC EMANATING FROM WASHINGTON. THAT SAID, SHEVARDNADZE CONFIRMED THAT GORBACHEV'S PROPOSAL FOR A MEETING WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN IN EUROPE TO DISCUSS A NUCLEAR TEST BAN WAS NOT INTENDED TO REPLACE THE EXISTING AGREEMENT ON A SUMMIT MEETING IN WASHINGTON. SHEVARDNADZE SAID THAT DOBRYNIN WOULD BE TAKING WITH HIM TO WASHINGTON PROPOSALS CONCERNING PREPARATORY MEETINGS BETWEEN HIMSELF AND SECRETARY SHULTZ PRIOR TO A SUMMIT SEMICOLON AND AN ACCOUNT OF THE SOVIET VIEW OF 'WHAT WOULD BE NECESSARY' FOR A SUMMIT MEETING. HE SUGGESTED THAT HARTMAN SHOULD CALL ON HIM AGAIN AFTER DOBRYNIN'S RETURN TO MOSCOW FOR A FURTHER DISCUSSION.

CALL ON GORBACHEV BY US CONGRESSMEN

4. ON 4 APRIL, GORBACHEV RECEIVED CONGRESSMEN FASCELL (D) (CHAIRMAN OF THE HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE) AND BROOMFIELD (R) (MY TELNO 389). LIKE HARTMAN'S CALL ON SHEVARDNADZE, THIS MEETING TOO WAS PRECEDED BY A CONTRETEMPS. THE CONGRESSMEN WERE INFORMED ON THE EVE OF THE CALL THAT ONLY TWO PEOPLE, THE CONGRESSMEN THEMSELVES, WOULD BE PERMITTED TO SEE GORBACHEV, I.E. THAT HARTMAN WOULD BE EXCLUDED. FASCELL AND BROOMFIELD RESPONDED ROBUSTLY AND SAID THAT IN THIS CASE THERE WOULD BE NO MEETING. HARTMAN AND THEIR CHIEF AIDE ACCOMPANIED THE CONGRESSMEN TO THE KREMLIN WHERE THEY WERE AGAIN INFORMED THAT ONLY THE CONGRESSMEN WOULD BE RECEIVED. HARTMAN THEREUPON SENT WORD TO CHERNYAEV (GORBACHEV'S NEW FOREIGN POLICY ADVISER) THAT, IF THE SOVIET SIDE MAINTAINED THIS POSITION, DOBRYNIN WOULD NOT BE RECEIVED BY PRESIDENT REAGAN IN WASHINGTON. ONCE AGAIN THIS FIRM RESPONSE WAS SUCCESSFUL AND AFTER GORBACHEV HIMSELF HAD BEEN CONSULTED, BOTH HARTMAN AND THE CONGRESSIONAL AIDE WERE ADMITTED. (THESE TWO EPISODES ARE INSTRUCTIVE).

5. THE MEETING WITH GORBACHEV LASTED FOR TWO AND A HALF HOURS: NEITHER SIDE SPOKE FROM PREPARED TEXTS. GORBACHEV BEGAN BY SAYING THAT THE FUNDAMENTAL QUESTION WAS THAT OF WHETHER THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION WOULD ACCEPT EACH OTHER: THE SOVIET UNION WAS PREPARED TO ACCEPT THE UNITED STATES AS IT WAS BUT THE REVERSE DID NOT APPEAR TO BE THE CASE. FASCELL REPLIED THAT, ALTHOUGH THERE WERE MANY ASPECTS OF SOVIET POLICY WHICH WORRIED AMERICANS, THE AMERICAN PEOPLE ACCEPTED THE SOVIET UNION AND THE RIGHT



OF THE SOVIET PEOPLE TO ORGANISE THEMSELVES AS THEY WISHED, EVEN IF AMERICANS FOUND THE SOVIET SYSTEM UNCONGENIAL. GORBACHEV THEN LAUNCHED INTO A LONG SURVEY OF ALL THE PROPOSALS WHICH HE HAD ADVANCED SINCE THE GENEVA SUMMIT, INCLUDING THE "CONCESSION" OF OFFERING TO EXCLUDE UK/FRENCH SYSTEMS (APART FROM A NO-INCREASE COMMITMENT) FROM AN INF NEGOTIATION - IN ITS NEGATIVE RESPONSE THE US WAS HIDING BEHIND THE WEST EUROPEANS AND THE JAPANESE. THIS CONSTRUCTIVE SOVIET APPROACH CONTRASTED WITH THE BLACK SEA NAVAL INCIDENTS, THE "CHALLENGE" WHICH THE US HAD TRIED TO MAKE TO THE SOVIET UNION BY "TESTING THE LIBYANS" AND THE REVIVAL OF "EVIL EMPIRE" RHETORIC. ALL THIS WOULD BE UNDERSTANDABLE IF IT EMANATED ONLY FROM WEIMBERGER AS PART OF AN ENDEAVOUR TO WIN THE APPROVAL OF CONGRESS FOR MILITARY EXPENDITURE: BUT IT DID NOT, AND THE SOVIET UNION WAS SERIOUSLY CONCERNED. THE SOVIET UNION HAD NOT, NEVERTHELESS, GIVEN UP THE SEARCH FOR UNDERSTANDING, GORBACHEV SAID THAT HE WANTED A MEETING WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN BUT IT HAD TO BE A PRODUCTIVE ONE WHICH RESULTED IN DECISIONS. TIMING WAS NOT IMPORTANT AND IF IT TOOK 9 OR 11 MONTHS TO ACHIEVE SUCH A PROSPECT, THIS WOULD NOT MATTER. THE SOVIET UNION WAS SETTING NO PRE-CONDITIONS ON SPECIFIC ISSUES AND WAS PREPARED TO CONSIDER ANY PROPOSALS WHICH THE US MIGHT PUT FORWARD.

6. AFTER HALF AN HOUR ON HUMAN RIGHTS, IN WHICH THE CONGRESSMEN DID MOST OF THE TALKING AND MADE A STRONG BID TO BE ALLOWED TO MEET SAKHAROV, GORBACHEV (HAVING HEARD THEM OUT REASONABLY CALMLY) RETURNED TO WHAT HE CALLED "SERIOUS MATTERS". HE SAID THAT HE COULD NOT GO TO THE UNITED STATES WHILE THE CURRENTLY HOSTILE ATMOSPHERE PERSISTED. SECONDLY, HE REPEATED, A SUMMIT MEETING WOULD HAVE TO PRODUCE RESULTS (BY IMPLICATION IN THE FIELD OF ARMS CONTROL). FASCELL ASKED WHY THE SOVIET UNION COULD NOT ACCEPT PRESIDENT REAGAN'S INVITATION TO MONITOR ON SITE A US NUCLEAR TEST. GORBACHEV ASKED IN RETURN WHY "THE TWO PROPOSALS COULD NOT BE COMBINED". HIS MEANING WAS UNCLEAR BUT HARTMAN ASSUMES THAT GORBACHEV HAD IN MIND SOVIET



ACCEPTANCE OF A VISIT TO NEVADA, PROVIDED THE US WAS PREPARED TO ENTER INTO DISCUSSIONS EITHER ON A TESTING MORATORIUM OR ON A CTB. FASCELL AND BROOMFIELD TRIED TO IMPRESS UPON GORBACHEV THAT NEITHER THE NUCLEAR TESTING ISSUE NOR THE SDI (WHICH INTERESTINGLY, GORBACHEV HIMSELF HAD NOT ONCE MENTIONED) WOULD GENERATE ANY DOMESTIC POLITICAL PRESSURE ON PRESIDENT REAGAN. FASCELL, SPEAKING AS A DEMOCRAT, SAID THAT GORBACHEV SHOULD REALISE THAT REAGAN WAS THE MOST POPULAR PRESIDENT SINCE ROOSEVELT AND IT WAS IN GORBACHEV'S INTERESTS TO DEAL WITH A PRESIDENT WHO COULD GET AGREEMENTS THROUGH CONGRESS.

7. SEE MIFT.

CARTLEDGE

US/SOVIET ARMS CONTROL TALKS  
LIMITED PS  
ACDD PS/LADY YOUNG  
DEFENCE D  
SOVIET D PS/MR RENTON  
NEWS D PS/PUS  
NAD MR DEREK THOMAS  
EED MR GOODALL  
WED MR RATFORD  
PLANNING STAFF MR DAUNT  
RES D MR DAVID THOMAS  
INFO D MR BRAITHWAITE  
FUSD MR O'NEILL  
NED MR BARRINGTON

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION  
ARMS CONTROL TALKS

COPIES TO:  
MR BERMAN LEGAL ADVISERS

-4-  
CONFIDENTIAL