



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

29 April 1986

It is better than the original - but is still weak. I see no point

Prime Minister

This covers the alternative draft statement for the Summit on Terrorism, which you requested. It is much better.

to think better to find it to Nakarone. no

Dear Charles, advance to the French & Americans. There is a telegram with a draft message to Chirac attached.

Agree to despatch telegram?

Tokyo Economic Summit: International Terrorism

Your minute of 27 April to Sir Robert Armstrong recorded the Prime Minister's view that the statement on International Terrorism so far drafted for the Tokyo Economic Summit was rather weak. This was also very much the Foreign Secretary's first reaction. The advice that follows on how to proceed has not yet been seen by the Foreign Secretary (because of his absence at the WEU Ministerial Meeting). He may have comments to add when he sees the Prime Minister tomorrow afternoon.

Approve the new text? CDP 29/4

There are two main factors to take into account in pursuing our objectives on Terrorism in this context: the American attitude, and that of the French. You asked at the end of your minute about the US approach, and we have informally sounded out the US Political Director in Washington. Though not up-to-date with any changes in the thinking of the President's party as they travel through south-east Asia, she reports that when they left Washington the President's central aim for the Summit was to maintain and publicise Western unity. He did not want a row.

The implication of what Ms Ridgeway said was that the Americans did not want to put that unity at risk by pressing too hard with specific demands on Terrorism and Libya which the French, in particular, would find it difficult to stomach. She herself had certainly argued for playing up the value of measures taken already and leading partners forward through continuing consultation to stronger measures in future. She was not aware of any alternative or stronger text on Terrorism being prepared by US officials.

The main reason for this US caution is without doubt the line which has been taken by the French during the preparations for the Summit. Despite the increasingly clear statements from both Chirac and Mitterrand on the importance of pursuing the fight against terrorism, the French remain highly sensitive to the mechanisms used and have in particular rejected anything that appears to encroach on their national sovereignty, especially in juridical and internal security affairs, except when the limitations are clearly defined in a Treaty. Their

/representatives



representatives at the most recent preparatory meetings expressed readiness for cooperation among the Summit Seven on the basis of the Bonn Declaration to extend to the whole area of civil aviation (no longer just to hijacking), and said that French experts would in future be able to take part in informal discussions between security and police experts. But they made it clear that for the new French Government, this was the limit; and that any wider anti-terrorist measures must be taken on national authority and/or through existing international channels. Our Ambassador at Paris has so far detected no sign that Mitterrand's position on this basic point might shift during the Summit. For the French it is not a matter of procedure but of real substance.

Given these US and French positions, we have considered how best to achieve the Prime Minister's objective of a clear Summit commitment to further action against Terrorism. Our suggested solution is reflected in the enclosed revised version of the Summit Brief on Terrorism and the draft attached to it (at Annex B) of an alternative British draft of the Summit statement. This is clearer, sharper and more action-orientated in tone than the existing draft, listing a series of points for action which reflect in part the recent decisions of the Twelve and in part principles discussed as long ago as the 1984 Economic Summit in London. To get over the French difficulty, however, the commitment to carry out these measures is expressed first and foremost in terms of States working within their own national authority, and within the wider international groups to which they may belong. The question of that mandate might be given to experts of the Summit Seven is left open, in square brackets, at the end of the draft. This was the point at which the French sherpa dug his toes in at Rambouillet. It will be a matter for tactical judgement during the Summit.

If the Prime Minister considers such a text might serve her purpose, various tactical options arise. It could be kept in reserve until the Summit itself, to be tabled at an appropriate point as a means of raising the sights of the participants. But the French do not react well to being bounced. They are fearful about coming under pressure on this from President Reagan - or worse from US-inspired leaks. They would take it extremely badly to find pressure coming from us unless they had had due warning of our thoughts beforehand. HM Ambassador Paris has agreed that the most effective way to warn them would be for the Prime Minister to send a personal message to M Chirac, referring to her talks with him last weekend and giving him notice of her intentions, without specifically inviting comment (or leaving too long for the French to develop a counter-strategy). Such a message could be copied to the Elysee, to take account of Mitterrand's position as Delegation leader at the Summit. A suitable draft text for a telegram to Paris is enclosed.

/A final



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A final question is whether the British draft statement, or some other indication of our aims, should be given to all Summit partners in advance of their arrival at Tokyo. We recommend against this: it would risk cutting across US tactics as we understand them and reduce our own freedom for manoeuvre at the Summit. It would, however, seem sensible - if action is taken with the French - to let the US know of it, and the draft telegram to Paris provides for the Embassy at Washington to take appropriate action.

I am copying this letter to Stephen Boys Smith (Home Office) and Michael Stark (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever,

Colin Budd

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Private Secretary

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DRAFT TELEGRAM

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IMMEDIATE TO PARIS (DESKBY)

AND TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

TOKYO SUMMIT: TERRORISM

1. Grateful if you would pass immediate to Chirac the message from the Prime Minister in para 3 below, together with a copy of the draft text in MIFT. You should arrange for copies of the texts to be supplied to the Elysee, using whatever procedures and explanations you think most appropriate in each place to gain a favourable reaction by Mitterrand as well as Chirac to our approach.

2. For Washington: please pass copies of both texts immediate to US Political Director for information of US delegation at Tokyo, making clear the US are the only country apart from France to be given this advance warning and that we reserve our tactics on action in plenary at the Summit.

3. Text of message is as follows:

"(My dear ^{M. Chirac} Jacques), at Chequers on Saturday we spoke about the need for continued solidarity and cooperation between leading Western countries on the menace of ^Tterrorism and the latest
/threat

threat posed by Libya. Since we talked, I have looked at the draft statement on international terrorism which has been prepared for Tokyo. I must say that I find it falls a long way short of what is needed. It seems to me that both US/European relations, and general public confidence, would be better served if we could identify a set of measures we all agree to be necessary and appropriate for tackling not just the Libyan case, but all manifestations of Terrorism. Many useful elements have already been included in recent decisions of the Twelve and other competent international bodies. *Why not build on these?*

I have set out my own ideas, for convenience, in the form of an alternative public statement at the Summit. I am enclosing it with this message because I thought you should have some advance notice of my thinking on this. You will see that while the basic elements of the earlier version have been retained, it would now set out clearly the main six measures to which each of us has subscribed, and it would *also* contain a commitment both to implement these measures ourselves and to work in appropriate bodies to ensure that similar measures are acted on by as many other governments as possible. I propose to draw on these ideas in discussion at the Summit and depending how the discussion goes, I may decide to table the text. I should add that in putting it together, I

/have

have tried to take close account of what we understand to be your constraints in this forum and we have deliberately left open (in the last square-bracketed sentence) the question of the precise areas in which Summit Seven counter-terrorism experts might be asked to continue their work. My concern on that point is that we should give them a clear mandate one way or the other.

