



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

1 May 1986

*Dear Charles*

Tokyo Summit: Soviet Nuclear Accident

At the Prime Minister's meeting this morning,  
Sir Geoffrey Howe undertook to provide a brief on Chernobyl  
for the Prime Minister's use in Tokyo. I enclose six copies,  
which may be used in bilaterals as well as in formal sessions.

*Yours ever*

*R N Culshaw*

(R N Culshaw)  
Private Secretary

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TOKYO ECONOMIC SUMMIT : SOVIET NUCLEAR ACCIDENT

LINE TO TAKE

1. We hope agreement can be reached on the following elements for a declaration:

- (a) express sympathy with the families and relatives of the victims.
- (b) Express deep concern at the Soviet Union's failure to give early warning and (even now) adequate information on this catastrophe which is seriously affecting neighbouring countries.
- (c) Request the Soviet Union to give a prompt and full account of what happened at Chernobyl and why.
- (d) Affirm the importance and viability of nuclear power programmes run with proper regard for safety.

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- (e) Initiate international discussions aimed at the mandatory disclosure of information on nuclear accidents with cross-border effects.

2. Doubt desirability of FRG suggestion that Soviet Union should be asked to close down all similar reactors until safety has been strengthened.



## BACKGROUND

1. Chernobyl is the most serious nuclear accident to date. The Soviet government have so far provided meagre information, nowhere near what is needed. Full and prompt reporting on developments is essential, both to enable neighbouring countries to react appropriately and, in the longer term, to ensure that lessons are learned. The appropriate international body is the International Atomic Energy Agency, which has so far gone no further than adopting procedures for voluntary disclosure.

2. The FRG proposal would involve shutting off half the Soviet nuclear generating capacity and would be bound to be rejected on grounds of impracticality or of unwarranted interference in internal affairs, or both. We may however need to look at variations of the proposal, eg seeking assurances from the Soviet Union that these reactors will be modified in accordance with the lessons learned.





ECONOMIC SUMMIT, TOKYO: HEADS OF GOVERNMENT DINNER ON 6 MAY:  
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

UK Objectives

- i) to get agreement that the Rambouillet draft statement on international terrorism should be strengthened.
- ii) to get a working group established tonight (Personal Representatives or Political Directors) to produce a revised draft statement tomorrow morning.
- iii) not to discuss UK draft text over dinner unless all Heads of Government ask to see it.

Japanese Objectives

- i) to avoid re-opening Rambouillet texts.
- ii) to avoid disunity.

US and Canadian Objectives

- i) to get strongest statement attainable.
- ii) to avoid losing what was achieved at Rambouillet.

French Objectives

- i) to avoid going beyond Rambouillet statement.
- ii) to avoid being cast in the role of blocking fight against terrorism.

/Talking Points





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TOKYO ECONOMIC SUMMIT: INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

TALKING POINTS FOR HEADS OF GOVERNMENT DINNER

1. Rambouillet draft statement on international terrorism falls very far short of what is needed at this meeting.

Let me explain why:

2. Terrorism on our agenda since 1978.

We have made a number of positive steps towards more effective action:

- 1978: Bonn declaration on aircraft hijacking;
- 1980: Venice declaration on taking of diplomatic hostages;
- 1981: Ottawa statement on terrorism.
- 1984: London declaration.

3. All these contained substantive agreement on action in field of immediate concern.

London Declaration in particular related to state-supported terrorism and supported five specific proposals:

- Closer co-operation between political and security organisations;
- scrutiny by each of us of gaps in legislation exploited by terrorists;
- reduction in size of diplomatic missions;
- review of sales of weapons to States supporting terrorism;
- consultation over expulsion of known terrorists.

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4. Since 1984, scale of State supported terrorism has dramatically increased and became major threat to security:

- recent crisis over Libya a direct result;
- brought US initially to break off diplomatic relations and impose wide-ranging sanctions and ultimately provoked attack on terrorist targets in Libya in self-defence;
- brought European Twelve to implement stringent measures in April this year, in fields covered by London Declaration.

5. Against this background, Rambouillet draft statement could bring less credit to Tokyo Summit than we would wish:

- only specific agreements it contains are to extend Bonn declaration to cover all terrorism affecting civil aviation and to promote action against terrorism in international organisations.
- Cannot believe that you find this adequate either, given recent events.

6. We all recall how Rambouillet draft came to be drawn up:

- problem of reaching agreement on extension of work of experts in absence of mandate from Heads of Government;
- Rambouillet meeting of 18 April intended to finalise this phase of work;
- but must now recognise that it now looks very out-of-date.

7. Must avoid disunity on this question at Tokyo: would give victory to terrorists.

But do not see why living up to our past decisions need provoke disunity.





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8. Believe we could improve Rambouillet draft statement by adding following two elements:

- (i) - enumeration of measures we all regard as essential for strategy against terrorism, deriving from 1984 London Declaration or other previous statements from Economic Summits: viz

<u>Measures</u>	<u>Derivation</u>
- refusal to sell arms to states supporting terrorism.	London 1984: "review of sale of arms";
- limits on size of diplomatic missions from states supporting terrorism.	London 1984: "use of powers in matters such as size of diplomatic missions";
- denial of entry to persons involved in terrorism	London 1984: "consultation over exclusion or expulsion";
- improved extradition procedures	Bonn 1978: "action against States refusing to extradite";
- stricter visa requirements	London 1984: "scrutiny of gaps in legislation";
- closest possible co-operation between police and security organisations	London 1984: "closer co-operation and co-ordination between police and security organisations".

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(ii) commitment by each of us:

- to implement the above measures fully within our own jurisdictions and to work in the appropriate bodies ... to ensure that similar measures are accepted and acted upon by as many other governments as possible.

9. These two elements would not involve any new degree of institutionalisation of this forum.

- Nor do they involve commitment to national measures going beyond what I believe we are all in practice doing already
- But they do make clear that we are not taking a step backwards.

Decision also needed about fields in which experts should be invited to review progress and make further recommendations:

My suggestions would be:

- international maritime transport;
- visa policies
- extradition procedures.

These are all areas where discussions within this group would we believe be useful on the principles involved. We would accept that, as for economic issues, this would not be a forum in which to take decisions but for consultation and co-ordination.

10. Hope that colleagues can agree that we should ask our Personal Representatives (Political Directors) to meet tonight to work out a strengthened statement on the lines I have suggested:

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- We have a draft we could circulate when they meet.
- We could look at the results and come to a final judgment when we meet tomorrow morning.

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