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NLRR MD9-2991 #32219

- quiet threats/pressure  
- too strong a response may alienate  
cause so

32219

BY RW NARA DATE 3/18/11

- Keep pressure on S to A pol. on terrorist support

- publicity
- they're alarmed

- Murphy talks in Damascus

- Suhebi is direct channel to Assad
- concentrated only on terrorism
- warned of consequences from US/Europe
- proposed 6 steps
  - o shut down Abu Nidal in Damascus/Bekaa
  - o control IRG in Bekaa & Iran embassy in Damascus
  - o prohibit terrorist movement from Leb into/through Syria
  - o put distance between Syrians/Libyan pilots
  - o end support for terror activities abroad by Syrian diplomats
  - o more controls on Palestinians in Damascus

-- S response was "no give." Denied terrorist connection.

Terrorism is secondary issue; want to discuss political issue.

- Need time to assess effect of our warnings

- Expect Syria will stand down on terror in Eur.
- Quietly squeezing Abu Nidal
- engage US on other issues; South Lebanon.
- avoid operational cooperation w/ Qadhafi
- some heightened activity to free foreign hostages.

- Visit showed <sup>US is</sup> we are as harsh in private as in public.

o Keep pressure on Syrians

- use of US media/ backgrounding/ public statements
- leaks hurt. We want leaks/info to come from Italy/UK.
- Close coord. w/ Europeans; get them to approach Syria individually
  - UK threw out 3 Syrian dipl., Aust. Fommi killed in Damascus
  - Fr. talk on hostages

- how to share intel w/ Europeans [FRG (Genscher) is problem]

o South Lebanon

- awaiting (E) accept principle & timetable to withdraw.
- Amal, Israel, Syria, UN reach understanding
- Tuni running out, Hizballah getting stronger in south.

\* Libya had strong econ ties to Eur, no pol. ties. Opposite is case w/ Syria.

◦ Murphy will remain sole channel to Sulejbi  
(Syria won't allow Eagleton to see).

\* UK wants to talk about Syria, too

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

32213

PRIVATE MEETING

WITH SIR PERCY CRADDOD AND SIR ANTHONY ACLAND

Wednesday, May 28, 1986

2:30 p.m.

- I am sorry I could not attend your meeting in the Situation Room. I hope it was useful for both parties.
- This is one of many meetings on terrorism we have had over the last few months here and in London with you, Sir Percy.
- The President and Prime Minister Thatcher had an excellent private session in Tokyo with terrorism leading the discussion. We are particularly grateful to the British for their help with the communique on terrorism that named Libya as a supporter of terrorism.
- Also at the Summit, Chancellor Kohl brought up an idea of a special, high-level group on terrorism akin to the Summit Sherpa group. We think the idea has merit. Has your government given further consideration to the idea?
- Mrs. Thatcher's trip to the Middle East is being well-received here. What is the assessment from your view?

~~TOP SECRET~~  
Declassify: OADR

~~TOP SECRET~~

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NLRR F02-071/3#32213

105 NARA DATE 8/4/08

32207

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

3797  
ADD-ON

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~~SECRET~~

May 19, 1986

ACTION

MEMORANDUM TO JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: PETER R. SOMMER *PS*  
SUBJECT: British Appointment Requests

You have agreed to meet with British Home Secretary, Douglas Hurd, on May 28 at 11:00 a.m. Hurd has lead responsibility within HMG on internal security with a current focus on terrorism. His Ministry, e.g., was directly responsible for British activities to preempt a terrorist act on one of the channel ferries over the past weekend.

On Mrs. Thatcher's instructions, the British have asked for a second appointment with you on terrorism. This also falls on May 28. Mrs. Thatcher has asked Sir Percy Cradock, her foreign affairs advisor, and Sir Anthony Acland, Permanent Under Secretary in the FCO and Britain's next ambassador to the U.S., to come to Washington to discuss operational aspects of terrorism. I believe this is an euphemism for any future actions we may be planning to take against Qadhafi, Syria, or others.

Apparently, the British hope either you or Armacost will chair an interagency session to review possible future actions, and to go through the events of April 14 and the problems they posed for Mrs. Thatcher. I personally believe that Armacost could chair such a session, but do think that you should meet with Cradock and Acland, given that they are coming as special emissaries.

I have explored with the British the possibility of your meeting with all three together; but given their divided responsibilities (internal security vs external implications of terrorism) the British Embassy doesn't want a joint meeting. I do, however, think it is important that you meet with Hurd as well as Cradock/Acland. It would be awkward for the British if you agreed to see one and not the others.

RECOMMENDATION

That you agree to meet with Cradock/Acland, as well as Hurd on May 28. This formula means that we will suggest that Armacost chair any interagency session required with Cradock and Acland.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_ Other \_\_\_\_\_

*PS for*  
Gillie North concurs

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Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED  
NLRR F02-0711/3 #32207  
BY RW NARA DATE 10/26/11 7400 1430

32209

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US

UK

OCJCS (LTG Moellering)	-----	MOD UK (VADM Woodward)
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OJCS/J-3 (LTG Burpee)	-----	UK Embassy (COL Whitehead)
	-----	(MAJ Holmes)

OJCS/JSOA (MGen Rice)	-----	HQ SAS (BG Wilkes)
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-----	HQ RM (SBS) (MG Thompson)
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-----	22 SAS
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-----	SBS
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Liaison: Peacetime -----  
 Crisis -----

E.O. 13526  
As Amended  
Sec. 3.3 (8)(5)(6)(8)

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DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
NLRR M09-299/1 #32209  
BY RW NARA DATE 8/3/11

From: NSHRT --CPUA  
To: NSPWR --CPUA

Date and time 05/21/86 18:53:11

NOTE FROM: Howard Teicher  
SUBJECT: syria

32208

per our discussion, here is an approach for building a coalition of pressure against syria.

- 1) compile detailed chronology of syrian involvement/sponsorship in terrorism, including primer on how syrian intelligence agencies engage in terrorism, e.g. air force intelligence, etc.
- 2) package of political-economic measures which u.s. could impose unilaterally:
  - recall ambassador
  - formally downgrade diplomatic representation
  - seek expulsion of syria from various international organizations
  - slowdown/end issuance of visas to syrians to visit u.s.
  - fail to renew visas of syrians currently in u.s.
  - economic measures:
    - apply cocom controls, trade restrictions, deny access to u.s. airports, marine terminals, etc
    - end extension of various federal credits
    - press u.s. firms to end dealings in syria, e.g oil exploration
  - invalidate u.s. passports for travel to syria
- 3) organize diplomatic campaign to press summit seven to begin process of actions against syria.
  - present info/evidence
  - outline what u.s. is prepared to do, stress no decisions yet
  - suggest others impose political restrictions plus ban on sales of defense-related goods and services.

cc: NSOLN --CPUA

- expel <sup>Syria</sup> ~~Libyan~~ diplomats from U.S.
- press Eur. to permanently cut ~~back down~~ <sup>seizure of</sup> Syrian embassies
- prohibit Syrian ships calling at US ports

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NLRR F02-071/3#32208

NOT NARA DATE 8/4/08