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INFO DESKBY 070800Z THE HAGUE (FOR SECRETARY OF STATE'S PARTY)
INFO PRIORITY BONN, PARIS, MOSCOW, UKDEL NATO, MODUK (FOR DACU)

MY TELNO 1477: GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS: NEW SOVIET PROPOSALS SUMMARY

1. FURTHER INFORMATION ON SOVIET ABMT NO-WITHDRAWAL PROPOSAL OF 27 MAY. TWO FURTHER SOVIET PROPOSALS ON 3 JUNE: FOR A BAN ON ASATS AND A BAN ON THE OFFENSIVE USE OF DEFENSIVE SYSTEMS. NOT CLEAR WHETHER THE 27 MAY AND 3 JUNE PROPOSALS ARE LINKED: SUCH LINKAGE WOULD BE BAD NEWS.
 2. BUT STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS STILL CAUTIOUSLY OPTIMISTIC. AND WEINBERGER QUIETER IN PUBLIC, FOLLOWING WHITE HOUSE DISSATISFACTION WITH HIS EARLIER COMMENTS.
- DETAIL:
3. WE HAVE NOW OBTAINED MORE DETAIL ABOUT THE SOVIET PROPOSAL OF 29 MAY AS WELL AS INFORMATION ABOUT TWO ADDITIONAL SOVIET PROPOSALS MADE ON 3 JUNE.
 4. THE PROPOSAL OF 29 MAY WAS MADE IN THE COURSE OF A SOVIET STATEMENT TO A PLENARY SESSION OF THE DEFENCE AND SPACE GROUP IN GENEVA (SUCH STATEMENTS, INCLUDING THIS ONE, ARE HANDED OVER IN WRITING). THE RUSSIANS PROPOSED A COMMITMENT BY BOTH SIDES NOT TO WITHDRAW FROM THE ABM TREATY FOR QUOTE AN EXTENDED PERIOD UNQUOTE. 15 OR 20 YEAR PERIODS WERE GIVEN AS ILLUSTRATIONS OF WHAT QUOTE EXTENDED UNQUOTE COULD BE TAKEN TO MEAN. THE RUSSIANS ALSO SAID THAT A NO-WITHDRAWAL COMMITMENT COULD ONLY BE EFFECTIVE IF ACCOMPANIED BY AGREED DEFINITIONS OF TERMS RELATED TO THE ABM TREATY. THE PROPOSAL INCLUDED DEFINITIONS OF QUOTE COMPONENT UNQUOTE, QUOTE DEVELOPMENT UNQUOTE, AND QUOTE PROTOTYPE UNQUOTE (AND PERHAPS ALSO QUOTE MODEL UNQUOTE).

TREATY. THE PROPOSAL INCLUDED DEFINITIONS OF QUOTE COMPONENT UNQUOTE, QUOTE DEVELOPMENT UNQUOTE, AND QUOTE PROTOTYPE UNQUOTE (AND PERHAPS ALSO QUOTE MODEL UNQUOTE). WE HAVE NOT YET BEEN ABLE TO OBTAIN THESE DEFINITIONS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS ARE STILL BEING STUDIED BY US EXPERTS. WE GATHER THAT THEY ARE UNCLEAR BUT THAT IT LOOKS AS IF THE EFFECT OF THEIR ADOPTION WOULD BE TO BRING THE TESTING AND DEVELOPMENT OF SPACE-BASED ABM SYSTEMS AND COMPONENTS BASED ON OTHER PHYSICAL PRINCIPLES UNDER THE CENTRAL PROHIBITIONS OF THE ABM TREATY. WE UNDERSTAND THAT THEY ALSO SUGGEST THAT THE DEVELOPMENT OF PROTOTYPES (WHICH WOULD BE PROHIBITED) WOULD BE THE FIREBREAK BETWEEN PERMITTED RESEARCH AND OTHER PROHIBITED ACTIVITY.

5. THE SOVIET PROPOSAL APPARENTLY INDICATED THAT NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS WOULD BE ADEQUATE TO VERIFY COMPLIANCE WITH THE PROPOSED AGREEMENT. BUT IT ALSO SEEMS TO HAVE DRAWN A DISTINCTION BETWEEN RESEARCH CONDUCTED INSIDE AND OUTSIDE RESEARCH FACILITIES, AND TO HAVE ACKNOWLEDGED A POSSIBLE REQUIREMENT FOR ON-SITE INSPECTION TO MONITOR INSIDE RESEARCH (THIS REINFORCES THE IMPLICATION OF THE NO-WITHDRAWAL PROPOSAL AND ACCOMPANYING DEFINITIONS THAT AT LEAST SOME KINDS OF RESEARCH WOULD BE PERMITTED). THE RUSSIANS SAID THAT VERIFICATION ARRANGEMENTS MUST APPLY TO PRIVATE US FIRMS AS WELL AS GOVERNMENT-OWNED FACILITIES, AND TO FOREIGN ORGANISATIONS AND FIRMS INVOLVED IN SDI-RELATED WORK.

6. THE RUSSIANS PRESENTED THEIR PROPOSALS AS A RESPONSE TO US OBJECTIONS TO EARLIER SOVIET PROPOSALS FOR A BAN ON SPACE-STRIKE ARMS.

7. THE SOVIET INDICATION THAT US ACCEPTANCE OF THIS PROPOSAL WOULD OPEN THE DOOR TO DEEP REDUCTIONS IN OFFENSIVE SYSTEMS WAS APPARENTLY MADE IN A POST-PLenary SESSION (IE NOT IN WRITING). WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE SOVIET NEGOTIATORS SAID THAT US ACCEPTANCE OF THE NO-WITHDRAWAL PROPOSAL WOULD QUOTE IN ITSELF BE SUFFICIENT

UNQUOTE FOR AGREEMENT TO BE REACHED ON 50 PER CENT REDUCTIONS IN (UNDEFINED) OFFENSIVE SYSTEMS.

8. IN A FURTHER DEVELOPMENT SINCE 27 MAY, THE SOVIET NEGOTIATING TEAM IN GENEVA MADE TWO FURTHER PROPOSALS IN PLENARY SESSION ON 3 JUNE:

- (A) A PROPOSAL TO BEGIN NEGOTIATIONS ON A BAN ON ASAT SYSTEMS SEMI-COLON AND
- (B) A PROPOSAL TO OPEN NEGOTIATIONS ON A BAN ON THE OFFENSIVE USES OF DEFENSIVE SYSTEMS. THIS PROPOSED BAN APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN DEFINED AS A BAN ON SPACE-BASED SYSTEMS CAPABLE OF ATTACKING TARGETS ON EARTH AND IN THE ATMOSPHERE (IE EXCLUDING ALL GROUND-BASED SYSTEMS, AND SPACE-BASED SYSTEMS CAPABLE ONLY OF ATTACKING TARGETS IN SPACE.

9. IN POST-PLenary SESSION ON 3 JUNE, THE SOVIET NEGOTIATORS REFUSED, DESPITE REQUESTS FROM THE US NEGOTIATORS, (A) TO SAY WHETHER THE TWO NEW SOVIET PROPOSALS WERE LINKED TO THE PROPOSAL OF 27 MAY (IE WHETHER AGREEMENT COULD BE REACHED ON ANY ONE OF THE SOVIET PROPOSALS WITHOUT AGREEMENT BEING REACHED ON OTHERS SEMI-COLON AND (B) TO CONFIRM THAT US ACCEPTANCE OF THE PROPOSAL OF 27 MAY (AND ONE OR BOTH OF THE SOVIET PROPOSALS OF 3 JUNE QUERY) WOULD MAKE POSSIBLE DEEP REDUCTIONS IN OFFENSIVE SYSTEMS AS SUGGESTED BY THE RUSSIANS ON 27 MAY.

COMMENT

10. THE 3 JUNE DEVELOPMENTS ARE OF COURSE DISAPPOINTING TO STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS AND OTHERS ENCOURAGED BY THE 27 MAY SOVIET MOVE. A PARTICULAR WORRY IS THE SOVIET FAILURE TO CONFIRM ON 3 JUNE THE 27 MAY INDICATION (PARA 7 ABOVE) OF LINKED MOVEMENT TO

MOVE. A PARTICULAR WORRY IS THE SOVIET FAILURE TO CONFIRM ON 3 JUNE THE 27 MAY INDICATION (PARA 7 ABOVE) OF LINKED MOVEMENT TO DEEP REDUCTIONS IN OFFENSIVE SYSTEMS. SINCE THE TWO NEW 3 JUNE PROPOSALS (PARA 8 ABOVE) ARE NOT OF COURSE INHERENTLY ATTRACTIVE HERE, THERE IS AN ADDITIONAL WORRY THAT THEY MAY INDEED PROVE TO BE ADDITIONAL PARTS OF THE SOVIET ASKING PRICE FOR SUCH MOVEMENT. BUT THE STATE DEPARTMENT ARE NOT TOO DISCOURAGED, AND THE US NEGOTIATING TEAM HAS BEEN GIVEN A FREE HAND TO EXPLORE THE SOVIET PROPOSALS AND DISCUSS THE DEFINITIONS OF ABM TREATY-RELATED TERMS OFFERED BY THE RUSSIANS ON 27 MAY. HOWEVER, KARPOV RETURNED TO MOSCOW FOR CONSULTATIONS IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE 3 JUNE PLENARY SESSION, AND IT SEEMS UNLIKELY THAT THE RUSSIANS WILL BE ABLE TO OFFER MUCH CLARIFICATION OF THEIR PROPOSALS UNTIL HIS RETURN.

11. THE NEW SOVIET 3 JUNE PROPOSALS HAVE NOT YET LEAKED HERE, DESPITE THE OPPORTUNITY THEY WOULD SEEM TO OFFER TO DOD OFFICIALS AND OTHERS TO ARGUE THAT THE RUSSIANS ARE AGAIN BACK-TRACKING AND DEMONSTRATING LACK OF SERIOUSNESS AT THE NEGOTIATING TABLE. THAT THIS TEMPTATION HAS SO FAR BEEN RESISTED MAY REFLECT WHITE HOUSE DISSATISFACTION WITH WEINBERGER'S IMMEDIATE PUBLIC REJECTION OF THE SOVIET MOVE OF 27 MAY (MY TUR). THE NEW YORK TIMES OF 5 JUNE QUOTED A SENIOR WHITE HOUSE OFFICIAL AS SAYING THAT THE SOVIET 27 MAY PROPOSAL REQUIRED CAREFUL CONSIDERATION, THAT KAMPELMAN HAD BEEN GIVEN A LOT OF RUNNING ROOM TO EXPLORE IT AND THAT WEINBERGER'S REJECTION OF IT HAD BEEN QUOTE HASTY UNQUOTE. WE BELIEVE THAT THE OFFICIAL IN QUESTION WAS REGAN, AND WE HAVE HEARD THAT HE ALSO COMPLAINED PERSONALLY TO WEINBERGER. REGAN IS MUCH INVOLVED, WITH CASEY AND MEESE, IN A CURRENT GENERAL CAMPAIGN TO STOP LEAKS, BUT IT IS ENCOURAGING THAT SOME-ONE SO CLOSE TO THE PRESIDENT (AND SOME-ONE NOT NOTED FOR ENTHUSIASM FOR ARMS CONTROL) SHOULD, LIKE THE STATE DEPARTMENT, FIND THE 27 MAY PROPOSAL POTENTIALLY INTERESTING.

12. UNLESS/UNTIL THE 3 JUNE PROPOSALS LEAK, CLEARLY WE SHOULD NOT REVEAL THEM IN PUBLIC, AND NEED TO BE FAIRLY GUARDED WITH NATO/EC COLLEAGUES. BUT THE US WILL PRESUMABLY BRIEF IN NATO QUITE SOON. MEANWHILE, KAMPELMAN MAY VOLUNTEER SOME DETAILS IN LONDON ON 9 JUNE.

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