FM MOSCOW
TO DESKBY 091600Z F C 0
TELNO 1065
OF 091430Z SEPTEMBER 86
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON
INFO PRIORITY BONN, PARIS, UKDEL NATO

WASHINGTON FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY

MY TELNO 1062 (NOT TO ALL) : DANILOFF : COMMENT

SUMMARY

1. EVEN IF THE KGB BELIEVED DANILOFF GUILTY, THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP MUST HAVE SEEN THE DAMAGE THE AFFAIR WOULD DO TO THEIR PEACE AND HUMANITARIAN IMAGE AND TO SUMMIT PROSPECTS. THEY APPEAR TO HAVE DECIDED THAT INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY CONCERNS HAVE HIGHER PRIORITY. THE INFLUENCE OF THE KGB SHOWN TO REMAIN STRONG. THE RUSSIANS MAY WELL HAVE MISCALCULATED, PAUCITY OF LADDERS TO CLIMB DOWN. POSSIBLE ACTION BY BRITAIN.

DETAIL

- 2. NOW THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN HAS WRITTEN TO GORBACHEV AND MADE A PUBLIC STATEMENT STRONGLY CRITICAL OF THE SOVIET ACTION THE ARREST AND CHARGING OF DANILOFF HAS BECOME AN IMPORTANT ELEMENT IN US/SOVIET RELATIONS AND THE PROSPECTS FOR A SUMMIT.
- 3. IF THE KGB BELIEVE, AND HAVE TOLD GORBACHEV, THAT THEY HAVE CAUGHT A GENUINE AMERICAN SPY THE ARREST TAKES ON A LESS EXTRAORDINARY ASPECT. BUT THE COINCIDENCE WITH THE ZAKHAROV CASE SUGGESTS THAT WHAT THE KGB DID WAS SIMPLY TO FRAME THE MOST PLAUSIBLE CANDIDATE. IN EITHER CASE QUESTIONS ARISE BOTH OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY PRIORITIES AND OF THE STANDING OF THE KGB AND THE SECURITY ORGANS IN GORBACHEV'S RUSSIA.
- 4. MOST WESTERN OBSERVERS HERE ACCEPT THAT DANILOFF IS INNOCENT AND BELIEVE THAT THIS CRUDE SOVIET ACTION WILL DAMAGE THE SOVIET IMAGE AND CREDIBILITY AT A TIME WHEN THEY ARE PUTTING THE FINAL TOUCHES TO THEIR WORLD WIDE PEACE INITIATIVES, IN THE LEAD UP TO A POTENTIAL SUMMIT AND TO THE VIENNA CSCE REVIEW MEETING. EVEN IF THE RUSSIANS BELIEVED THAT THEY COULD TRADE DANILOFF FOR ZAKHAROV, THE AFFAIR COULD STILL HARDLY FAIL TO CAST A STRONG SHADOW OVER SUMMIT PREPARATIONS. THE RUSSIANS MAY NOT HAVE EXPECTED SUCH A SHARP AMERICAN REACTION, PARTICULARLY IF THE KGB REALLY THOUGHT IT WAS A FAIR COP. BUT THERE IS SOME SPECULATION THAT THE RUSSIANS, HAVING DECIDED THAT THEY WOULD NOT GET ANYTHING WORTHWHILE FROM A SUMMIT WERE CONTENT TO GIVE TOP PRIORITY TO STRICT SECURITY VIGILANCE, A CONSTANT HALLMARK OF THE GORBACHEV ERA, EVEN

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THE BRITISH ROLE

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MARSHALL

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PLANNING STAFF

EED NAD WED ACDD

CSCE UNIT CRD NEWS DEPT.

INFO DEPT.

PUSD PROTOCOL D. PS/LADY YOUNG

PS

PS/MR RENTON
PS/MR EGGAR
PS/PUS
MR DEREK THOMAS
MR GOODALL
MR FERGUSSON
SIR W HARDING
MR RATFORD

MR DAUNT
MR FEARN
MR LONG

2

CHIEF CLERK
MR BRAITHWAITE
MR BARRINGTON
MR WINCHESTER

CONFIDENTIAL

FM MOSCOW

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
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CHIEF CLERK

MR BRAITHWAITE

MR BARRINGTON

MR WINCHESTER

SOVIET D

DEFENCE D

RD

PLANNING STAFF

EED NAD

WED ACDD

CSCE UNIT

CRD

NEWS DEPT.

INFO DEPT. FED

NED

PUSD PROTOCOL D.

PS/LADY YOUNG

PS/MR RENTON

PS/MR EGGAR

PS/PUS

MR DEREK THOMAS MR GOODALL

MR FERGUSSON

SIR W HARDING

MR RATFORD

MR DAUNT

MR. FEARN

MR. LONG