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
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SECRETARY OF STATE'S MEETING WITH WEINBERGER: 9 SEPTEMBER
SUMMARY

- 1. A DISTURBING INSIGHT INTO RIGHT-WING ATTITUDES ON ARMS
 CONTROL.
 DETAIL
- 2. WITH WEINBERGER THE SECRETARY OF STATE RAISED GLENN/TRAFICANT, ARGENTINA, AND LIBYA, AND ON ALL THREE RECEIVED REASSURING ANSWERS. THE ADMINISTRATION WOULD FIGHT BOTH AMENDMENTS ON THE HILL: THE PENTAGON WOULD CONTINUE TO RESIST PRESSURES ELSEWHERE IN WASHINGTON FOR RENEWED US ARMS SALES TO ARGENTINA: AND ABSOLUTE PROOF OF LIBYAN RESPONSIBILITY FOR ANY RENEWED TERRORIST ACTIVITY WOULD BE A PREREQUISITE FOR ANY REPETITION OF THE APRIL RAID. WEINBERGER CONFIRMED IN TERMS THAT THE US AS YET SAW NO EVIDENCE WHATSOEVER OF A LIBYAN HAND BEHIND THE KARACHI HI-JACKING. 3. THE BULK OF THE DISCUSSION WAS HOWEVER ON EAST/WEST RELATIONS, AND PARTICULARLY ARMS CONTROL: AND WAS NOT AT ALL REASSURING. WEINBERGER MAINTAINED THAT, WHILE THE PRESIDENT WANTED DEEP REDUCTIONS IN OFFENSIVE SYSTEMS, AND A GLOBAL ZERO/ ZERO OUTCOME ON INF, THERE WAS NO SIGN - EG IN THE KARPOV/NITZE TALKS IN MOSCOW IN AUGUST AND IN WASHINGTON ON 5/6 SEPTEMBER -THAT THE RUSSIANS WERE PREPARED TO DO BUSINESS. PROBABLY THE SOVIET HOPE WAS THAT CONGRESS WOULD, BY UNILATERAL DISARNAMENT MEASURES, OBVIATE THE NEED FOR SOVIET CONCESSIONS. MOREOVER THE DANILOFF CASE MEANT THAT IT WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT FOR THE UNITED STATES TO STRIKE DEALS, EVEN IF THE NEGOTIATING PROSPECTS IMPROVED. THE EVIDENCE DID NOT SUGGEST THAT GORBACHEV FELT COMMITTED TO A SUMMIT.
- 4. PRESSED BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE ON THE LATEST KARPOV/NITZE TALKS, WEINBERGER (AND PERLE) ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THERE HAD IN FACT BEEN A NEW PROPOSAL ON INF (MY TELNO 2295). BUT THEY DISMISSED IT AS MINOR AND INSIGNIFICANT. THE RUSSIANS HAD INDICATED THAT THEY ENVISAGED ONLY A SHORT-TERM INTERIM AGREEMENT: THEY HAD REFUSED TO ACKNOWLEDGE THAT SOVIET INF WITHDRAWN FROM EUROPE UNDER ITS TERMS WOULD HAVE TO BE DESTROYED, RATHER THAN STOCK-PILED: THEY HAD REFUSED TO DISCUSS SRINF: AND KARPOV HAD DECLINED TO AGREE TO ANY JOINT STATEMENT OF THE POSITION REACHED. ONLY UNDER FURTHER PRESSURE DID WEINBERGER ACKNOWLEDGE THAT THE US TEAM HAD INDICATED THAT THE SOVIET PROPOSAL IN RESPECT OF EUROPE (100 LRINF WARHEADS ON EACH SIDE) MIGHT BE ACCEPTABLE IF THERE WERE A SIMILAR CEILING, ALSO OF 100, ON EACH SIDE'S RELEVANT WARHEADS NOT IN EUROPE. IT WAS CLEAR THAT HE PERSONALLY DID NOT REGARD THIS AS SATISFACTORY: HE ARGUED THAT IT NIGHT JUST BE ACCEPTABLE AS AN INTERIM STAGE EN ROUTE TO A GLOBAL ZERG/ZERO SOLUTION.

- MADE IN THE KARPOV/NITZE TALKS. THE RUSSIANS WERE STILL CLINGING TO THEIR DEFINITION OF STRATEGIC SYSTEMS, AND THEIR PROPOSAL FOR CEILINGS ON NUMBERS OF QUOTE NUCLEAR CHARGES UNQUOTE INCLUDED GRAVITY BOMBS. MOREOVER THEY WERE ARGUING FOR TIGHT LIMITS ON SLCMS, WHICH THEY MUST KNOW POSED PARTICULAR PROBLEMS FOR THE US, GIVEN THE LARGE USN INVENTORY OF CONVENTIONALLY—ARMED DEFENSIVE MISSILES.
- 6. THE SECRETARY OF STATE STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE FOR THE ALLIES OF CONTINUING US OBSERVANCE OF THE RESTRICTIVE INTERPRETATION OF THE ABM TREATY, AND ASKED WHETHER THERE HAD BEEN ANY DISCUSSION, IN THE NITZE/KARPOV TALKS, OF THE EXTENSION OF THE ABMT WITHDRAWAL PERIOD, OR THE CODIFICATION OF THE RESTRICTIVE INTERPRETATION. WEINBERGER AND PERLE BRIDLED AT THIS, STATING IN TERMS THAT THERE COULD BE NO SUCH DISCUSSION, OR CODIFICATION. THE SDI PROGRAMME, WHICH WAS GOING WELL, WAS CURRENTLY BEING CONDUCTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE RESTRICTIVE INTERPRETATION, AND THIS HAD THEREFORE NOT SO FAR POSED A PROBLEM. BUT NEGOTIATED CONSTRAINTS ON SDI WERE NOT ACCEPTABLE.
- ON CW, WEINBERGER SAID THAT THE US WANTED A TOTAL BAN, WHICH WOULD BE TOTALLY VERIFIABLE: WITHOUT ONE THE US STOCKPILE MODERN-ISATION PROGRAMME WOULD HAVE TO GO AHEAD, THOUGH CONGRESS WAS MAKING DIFFICULTIES. THE SECRETARY OF STATE POINTED OUT THAT THE VERIFICATION PROVISIONS IN THE US DRAFT TREATY HAD PROVED UNNEGOTIABLE, AND COMMENDED THE ALTERNATIVE UK TEXT. PERLE THOUGHT THAT OUR ANALYSIS HAD BEEN THAT THE RUSSIANS WOULD NOT BUY IT EITHER, AND WEINBERGER NOTED THAT THEY HAD NOT SO FAR DONE SO. HE HAD DETECTED NO SIGN OF ANY SIGNIFICANT MOVEMENT IN GENEVA (AND HE CLEARLY EXPECTED NONE).
- NSPECTION REGIME MIGHT NOW BE OBTAINABLE, AND THAT IT WOULD BE IMPORTANT, IN THE END-GAME, NOT TO LET THE BEST BECOME THE ENEMY OF THE GOOD. ALLIED COORDINATION HAD BEEN, AND MUST REMAIN, GOOD. WE MUST AVOID A REPETITION OF BERNE. WEINBERGER INDICATED ASSENT, BUT PERLE COMMENTED, WITH SOME SATISFACTION, THAT IT MIGHT LE DIFFICULT FOR THE ADMINISTRATION TO CONCLUDE A DEAL ON CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES IF DANILOFF WERE STILL BEING HELD IN MOSCOW.
- 9. THIS WAS A STANDARD OSD PERFORMANCE. THE SECRETARY OF STATE WAS STRUCK BY SUCH A VIVID ILLUSTRATION OF THE PROBLEMS SHULTZ FACES IN MAINTAINING A CONSTRUCTIVE US ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATING POSITION. IT CAME OUT VERY CLEARLY THAT WEINBERGER IS NOT YET RECONCILED TO THE CONCESSIONS (NO SDI DEPLOYMENT FOR AT LEAST SEVEN AND A HALF YEARS, AND INTERIM OFFENSIVE SYSTEMS REDUCTIONS OF LESS THAN 50 PER CENT) OFFERED IN THE PRESIDENT'S JULY MESSAGE (MY TELNO 2249) AND HE IS CLEARLY NO LESS UNEASY AT THE SIGNS OF MOVEMENT ON INF.

ACLAND

FCO PASS SAVING ANKARA, ATHENS, BRUSSELS, COPENHAGEN, THE HAGUE, LISBON, LUXEMBOURG, MADRID, OSLO, OTTAWA, REYKJAVIK, UKDEL VIENNA, UKDEL STOCKHOLM.

ACLAND -

ORWBAN 6185

THIS THLEGRAM WAS NOT ADVANCED

(REPEATED AS REQUESTED)

EAST WEST & US/SOVIET RELATIONS

LIMITED

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET]

MR BRAITHWAITE

MR BARRINGTON

MR WINCHESTER

SOVIET D DEFENCE D

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PLANNING STAFF

EED NAD

WED -SAA ACDD

CSCE UNIT FID CRD NEWAD .

NEWS DEPT. INFO DEPT.

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PUSD PROTOCOL D.

PS/LADY YOUNG CHIEF CLERK

PS/MR RENTON PS/MR EGGAR PS/PUS MR DEREK THOMAS MR GOODALL

MR FERGUSSON SIR W HARDING MR RATFORD

MR DAUNT MR FEARN MR LONG

SECRET