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FROM CABINET OFFICE LONDON
TO THE WHITEHOUSE

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S E C R E T

FOR JOHN POINDEXTER FROM CHARLES POWELL
FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF A PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER
TO PRESIDENT REAGAN ABOUT THE FORTHCOMING MEETING IN REYKJAVIK.

BEGINS

DEAR RON,

YOU WERE KIND ENOUGH TO SAY THAT YOU WOULD BE SEEKING MY VIEWS ON YOUR FORTHCOMING MEETING WITH MR. GORBACHEV IN REYKJAVIK. SINCE I SHALL BE AWAY FROM LONDON THIS WEEK ATTENDING OUR ANNUAL PARTY CONFERENCE, I THOUGHT THAT I WOULD LET YOU HAVE MY THOUGHTS STRAIGHTAWAY.

I AM SURE YOU WERE RIGHT TO TAKE UP GORBACHEV'S PROPOSAL FOR A MEETING. HE CLEARLY FEELS THE NEED TO FORM A FIRST-HAND PERSONAL ASSESSMENT OF WHAT MIGHT BE ACHIEVED AT A SUMMIT. ONLY YOU CAN GIVE HIM THAT. AND HAVING HANDLED HIM SO SKILFULLY IN GENEVA, YOU HAVE ESTABLISHED A VERY STRONG POSITION FOR DEALING WITH HIM IN FUTURE.

ALTHOUGH WE MUST NOT LOOK AT RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION JUST IN TERMS OF ARMS CONTROL, IT SEEMS INEVITABLE THAT THE ISSUES OF ARMS REDUCTIONS AND NUCLEAR TESTS WILL TAKE UP A GREAT DEAL OF THE TIME AT YOUR MEETING. I AM PUZZLED WHY GORBACHEV IS PRESSING SO HARD FOR A COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY WHEN HE MUST KNOW THAT HE IS NOT GOING TO ACHIEVE IT, GIVEN YOUR POSITION. BUT HE WILL WANT TO REGISTER AT LEAST SOME PROGRESS IN THE AREA OF NUCLEAR TESTING IF HE IS NOT TO LOSE FACE. I HOPE THEREFORE THAT YOU WILL FOLLOW UP WHAT YOU SAID IN YOUR SPEECH TO THE UNITED NATIONS A FORTNIGHT AGO: THAT IS, PRESS FOR RATIFICATION OF THE THRESHOLD TEST BAN AND PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS TREATIES, WHILE BEING PREPARED TO LOOK AT FURTHER LIMITS ON TESTING IN PARALLEL WITH CUTS IN OFFENSIVE FORCES.

INF SEEMS TO OFFER THE BEST PROSPECT FOR AGREEMENT ON ARMS REDUCTIONS. SOVIET WILLINGNESS TO ELIMINATE ALL REFERENCE TO BRITISH AND FRENCH FORCES IS A GREAT STEP FORWARD AND, OF COURSE, A CONDITION FOR OUR ENDORSING ANY AGREEMENT. WHEN IT COMES TO THE CEILING FOR US AND SOVIET LRINF IN EUROPE, I WANT YOU TO KNOW THAT WE WOULD ACCEPT AN AGREEMENT BASED ON ANY EQUAL CEILING IN EUROPE, ALWAYS PROVIDED THAT THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THIS AND THE ASIAN CEILING IS NOT EXCESSIVE, AND THAT OTHER ALLIANCE CONDITIONS, INCLUDING THE IMPORTANT PROVISIO ON SRINF, ARE MET.

MY VIEWS ON THE HANDLING OF THE ABM TREATY, AND THE LINK WITH THE SDI, REMAIN AS IN MY MESSAGE OF LAST FEBRUARY. THE KEY IS TO PROVIDE THE RUSSIANS WITH REASSURANCE THAT THERE WILL BE NO SUDDEN BREAK-OUT FROM THE RESEARCH STAGE, WHILE PRESERVING YOUR RIGHT TO CONDUCT RESEARCH WITHIN THE ABM TREATY. THE PROPOSALS WHICH YOU PUT TO GORBACHEV IN YOUR MESSAGE OF LAST JULY WERE HELPFUL IN THIS RESPECT. IN THIS NEXT PHASE, I EXPECT YOU SHOULD BE ABLE TO NARROW THE GAP ON THE LENGTH OF THE PERIOD OF NOTICE FOR WITHDRAWAL FROM THE TREATY. I WOULD SUGGEST YOU CONCENTRATE ON TRYING TO REFINE YOUR RESPECTIVE UNDERSTANDINGS ON WHAT THE ABM TREATY DOES AND DOES NOT ALLOW IN THE WAY OF RESEARCH.

ON START, I COULD SUPPORT AN INTERIM AGREEMENT ON THE LINES PROPOSED BY YOUR NEGOTIATORS IN GENEVA LAST MONTH. BUT I HOPE THE OBJECTIVE OF EVEN GREATER REDUCTIONS IN STRATEGIC FORCES WILL NOT BE LOST.

I KNOW THAT YOU NEVER LET ANY MEETING WITH SOVIET LEADERS PASS WITHOUT REFERENCE TO HUMAN RIGHTS. YOU HAVE BEEN VERY SUCCESSFUL IN SECURING THE RELEASE OF SHARANSKY AND ORLOV. BUT I DO HOPE YOU WILL BRING HOME TO GORBACHEV THAT RELEASING A FEW INDIVIDUALS IS NOT NEARLY ENOUGH.

I UNDERSTAND THAT YOU PROPOSE TO RAISE SOME REGIONAL ISSUES. THE MUJAHEDIN IN AFGHANISTAN ARE COMING UNDER INCREASING PRESSURE, AND I AM INCREASINGLY CONCERNED ABOUT THEIR ABILITY TO HOLD OUT. I HOPE THAT YOU WILL AGAIN BRING STRONG PRESSURE ON GORBACHEV FOR EARLY SOVIET WITHDRAWAL.

IN THE MIDDLE EAST, WE NEED A FRESH EFFORT TO MAKE PROGRESS ON THE ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE ONCE YOUR CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS ARE OUT OF THE WAY. IT SEEMS TO ME INCREASINGLY LIKELY THAT THERE WILL HAVE TO BE AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE WITH SOVIET PARTICIPATION (BUT NO SOVIET VETO OVER NEGOTIATIONS AT IT). THE MODERATE ARAB GOVERNMENTS SEEM SET ON THIS. YOU WILL WANT TO URGE ON GORBACHEV THE NEED FOR THE SOVIET UNION TO PLAY A CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE AND TO REPAIR ITS RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL. YOU MIGHT ALSO RAISE WITH HIM THE NEED TO STEM THE FLOW OF ARMS TO IRAN.

THANK YOU FOR YOUR STAUNCH SUPPORT IN OPPOSING PUNITIVE SANCTIONS AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA. I WAS DISMAYED BY THE SENATE VOTE, BUT YOU DID EVERYTHING YOU COULD TO MAKE REASON PREVAIL.

I SEND YOU MY VERY BEST WISHES FOR THIS MEETING. YOU HAVE OUR ABSOLUTE CONFIDENCE AND TRUST.

WITH WARM REGARDS,

MARGARET

ENDS

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CDD

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

5 October 1986

Dear Resident Clerk

**US/SOVIET MEETING IN REYKJAVIK:
MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN**

Colin Budd wrote to me on 3 October enclosing a draft message from the Prime Minister to President Reagan about the forthcoming meeting in Reykjavik. I enclose a revised version with which the Prime Minister would be content. I should be grateful if you could ensure that those concerned see it early tomorrow morning and let me have any comments by 1130 on Monday 6 October so that the Prime Minister can approve it finally before she departs for Bournemouth.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to the Resident Clerk in the Ministry of Defence and to Michael Stark (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely

Suzanne Reinholdt Webb

pp (C. D. POWELL)

The Resident Clerk,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

covering SECRET

slw

SECRET

FOLLOWING FOR JOHN POINDEXTER FROM CHARLES POWELL

Following is text of a personal message from the Prime Minister to President Reagan about the forthcoming meeting in Reykjavik.

BEGINS

Dear Ron,

You were kind enough to say that you would be seeking my views on your forthcoming meeting with Mr. Gorbachev in Reykjavik. Since I shall be away from London this week attending our annual party conference, I thought that I would let you have my thoughts straightaway.

I am sure you were right to take up Gorbachev's proposal for a meeting. He clearly feels the need to form a first-hand personal assessment of what might be achieved at a Summit. Only you can give him that. And having handled him so skilfully in Geneva, you have established a very strong position for dealing with him in future.

Although we must not look at relations with the Soviet Union just in terms of arms control, it seems inevitable that the issues of arms reductions and nuclear tests will take up a great deal of the time at your meeting. I am puzzled why Gorbachev is pressing so hard for a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty when he must know that he is not going to achieve it, given your position. But he will want to register at least some progress in the area of nuclear testing if he is not to lose face. I hope therefore that you will follow up what you said in your speech to the United Nations a fortnight ago: that is, press for ratification of the Threshold Test Ban and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions treaties, while being prepared to look at further limits on testing in parallel with cuts in offensive forces.

SECRET

INF seems to offer the best prospect for agreement on arms reductions. Soviet willingness to eliminate all reference to British and French forces is a great step forward and, of course, a condition for our endorsing any agreement. When it comes to the ceiling for US and Soviet LRINF in Europe, I want you to know that we would accept an agreement based on any equal ceiling in Europe, always provided that the difference between this and the Asian ceiling is not excessive, and that other Alliance conditions, including the important proviso on SRINF, are met.

My views on the handling of the ABM Treaty, and the link with the SDI, remain as in my message of last February. The key is to provide the Russians with reassurance that there will be no sudden break-out from the research stage, while preserving your right to conduct research within

the ABM Treaty. The proposals which you put to Gorbachev in your message of last July were helpful in this respect. In this next phase, I expect you should be able to narrow the gap on the length of the period of notice for withdrawal from the Treaty. I would suggest you concentrate on trying to refine your respective understandings on what the ABM Treaty does and does not allow in the way of research.

On START, I could support an interim agreement on the lines proposed by your negotiators in Geneva last month. But I hope the objective of even greater reductions in strategic forces will not be lost.

I know that you never let any meeting with Soviet leaders pass without reference to human rights. You have been very successful in securing the release of Sharansky and Orlov. But I do hope you will bring home to Gorbachev that releasing a few individuals is not nearly enough.

I understand that you propose to raise some regional issues. The mujahedin in Afghanistan are coming under increasing pressure, and I am increasingly concerned about

their ability to hold out. I hope that you will again bring strong pressure on Gorbachev for early Soviet withdrawal.

In the Middle East, we need a fresh effort to make progress on the Arab/Israel dispute once your congressional elections are out of the way. It seems to me increasingly likely that there will have to be an international conference with Soviet participation (but no Soviet veto over negotiations at it). The moderate Arab governments seem set on this. You will want to urge on Gorbachev the need for the Soviet Union to play a constructive role and to repair its relations with Israel. You might also raise with him the need to stem the flow of arms to Iran.

Thank you for your staunch support in opposing punitive sanctions against South Africa. I was dismayed by the Senate vote, but you did everything you could to make reason prevail.

I send you my very best wishes for this meeting. You have our absolute confidence and trust.

With warm regards,

Margaret

SECRET



Handwritten initials and number: "jk", "e pg", and "21".

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

6 October 1986

MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN

I enclose the Prime Minister's message to President Reagan, in the form which the Prime Minister has approved it. I have despatched it on the direct link to the White House but the Prime Minister agrees that you may, in this case, send a copy to the Embassy in Washington.

(CHARLES POWELL)

C.R. Budd, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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Via WHITEHOUSE

EDP
6/11

~~Following~~ FOR JOHN POINDEXTER FROM CHARLES POWELL

Following is text of a personal message from the Prime Minister to President Reagan about the forthcoming meeting in Reykjavik.

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SECRET

INF seems to offer the best prospect for agreement on arms reductions. Soviet willingness to eliminate all reference to British and French forces is a great step forward and, of course, a condition for our endorsing any agreement. When it comes to the ceiling for US and Soviet LRINF in Europe, I want you to know that we would accept an agreement based on any equal ceiling in Europe, always provided that the difference between this and the Asian ceiling is not excessive, and that other Alliance conditions, including the important proviso on SRINF, are met.

My views on the handling of the ABM Treaty, and the link with the SDI, remain as in my message of last February. The key is to provide the Russians with reassurance that there will be no sudden break-out from the research stage, while preserving your right to conduct research within

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their ability to hold out. I hope that you will again bring strong pressure on Gorbachev for early Soviet withdrawal.

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Thank you for your staunch support in opposing punitive sanctions against South Africa. I was dismayed by the Senate vote, but you did everything you could to make reason prevail.

I send you my very best wishes for this meeting. You have our absolute confidence and trust.

With warm regards,

Margaret

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PRIME MINISTER

US/SOVIET MEETING IN REYKJAVIK: MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN

I have recast the message on the lines you suggested and shortened it.

Content for it to issue?

C.D.P

(C. D. POWELL)

4 October 1986

SECRET

TEXT OF A MESSAGE TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Following in text of a personal message from the Minister to President Reagan about the following meeting in Reykjavik

Following for John Poindexter from Charles Powell

Dear Ron

It should be grateful if you would pass the following message in Reykjavik

You were kind enough to say that you would be seeking my views on your forthcoming meeting with Mr. Gorbachev in Reykjavik. Since I shall be away from London ^{it is} next week attending our annual party conference, I thought that I would let you have my thoughts straightaway.

I am sure you were right to take up Gorbachev's proposal for a meeting. He clearly feels the need to form a first-hand personal assessment of what might be achieved at a Summit. Only you can give him that. And having handled him so skilfully in Geneva, you have established a very strong position for dealing with him in future.

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INF seems to offer the best prospect for agreement on arms reductions. Soviet willingness to eliminate all reference to British and French forces is a great step forward and, of course, a condition for our ^{endorsing} accepting any agreement. When it comes to the ceiling for US and Soviet LRINF in Europe, I want you to know that we would accept an agreement based on any ~~equal~~ ceiling in Europe, always provided that the difference between this and the Asian ceiling is not excessive, and that other Alliance conditions, ^{including the important proviso} above all on SRINF, are met.

SECRET

My views on the handling of the ABM Treaty, and the link with the SDI, remain as in my message of last February. The key is to provide the Russians with reassurance that there will be no sudden break-out from ^{the} research ^{stage} to deployment, while preserving your right to conduct research within the ~~hitherto~~ ^{restrictive} ~~accepted~~ interpretation of the ABM Treaty. The proposals which you put to Gorbachev in your message of last July were very helpful in this respect. In this next phase, I would suggest you concentrate on trying to ^{refine your respective understandings} reach agreement on what the ABM Treaty does and does not allow in the way of research, ^{I expect you should be able to narrow the gap} and on the length of the period of notice for withdrawal from the Treaty.

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With warm regards,

Margaret

SL2AJP

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