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PRIME MINISTER

US/SOVIET SUMMIT

I attach some points which you might make in speaking to President Reagan, assuming we can arrange a telephone call. If not, they could be embodied in a message.

fixed for 6.00pm

CDP

Charles Powell

13 October 1986

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POINTS TO MAKE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN

1. Congratulations on your bold and resolute performance throughout what must have been very demanding meetings with Gorbachev.
2. Impressed by the amount of progress you did make towards agreement on INF, START and in other areas. I know that George Shultz is giving a full account to NATO today. I look forward to hearing details.
3. I share your disappointment that it was not possible to reach agreed conclusions. But you did all you could. No doubt at all in my mind that the blame for the deadlock rests with the Soviet Union. By making everything depend upon your accepting their demands on SDI in full, they condemned the meeting to failure. I shall make clear to Gorbachev's emissary, whom I am seeing tomorrow, that this is my view.
4. How you present the outcome in your television address will be very important in handling this issue in Europe. It is clearly the Soviet aim to sow dissension in the Alliance. We must not let them succeed. But there is a risk that some of the weaker brethren will fall for the Soviet line that you were being unreasonable, and that only the SDI is blocking agreement.
5. I hope therefore you will be able to emphasise the following points:
 - (a) the fact that the Soviet Union wanted to make agreement on everything turn on acceptance of their terms on SDI; *They also do not mean*
 - (b) the extent to which this was a reversal of their earlier position that separate agreements would be possible, at least on INF;

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(c) the doubt which this all or nothing approach casts on their commitment to a successful outcome at Reykjavik;

(d) the reasonableness of the offer you made to extend the period of notice of withdrawal from the ABM Treaty to 10 years. This would give the Russians plenty of reassurance that there would be no sudden break-out to deployment of the SDI;

*from
6 mths*

(e) the blatant way in which the Soviet Union is trying to make propoganda out of this and divide the European allies from the US;

(f) your readiness to continue talking on all the issues which were raised at Reykjavik, all of which are important in their own right. If the Russians want to walk away from further discussions, they have no-one to blame but themselves.

6. The only point which has seriously worried me is your reference to eliminating all nuclear weapons within ten years. This of course would have very far-reaching implications for the Alliance's strategy based on nuclear deterrence, and would make my political position here very difficult. I hope that you will not stress this idea in your address on television — or at least not at a specific time-scale.

7. I think emphasis on these points rather than on the arguments for pursuing the SDI itself would help get your case across in Europe and hold the Alliance together.

8. I understand our people are discussing the possibility of my coming over to have a talk with you on the morning of 15 November. I hope we can go firm on this.

*perhaps
at Camp David*

DG2BKU