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REYKJAVIK MEETING: PRESIDENT REAGAN'S TELEVISION ADDRESS
SUMMARY

1. PRESIDENT REAGAN GAVE A FAIRLY UP-BEAT ACCOUNT OF THE MEETING, STRESSING THAT PROGRESS HAD BEEN MADE, BUT ADAMANT THAT HE WAS NOT PREPARED TO GIVE UP SDI.

DETAIL

2. PRESIDENT REAGAN GAVE A 20 MINUTE ADDRESS TO THE NATION ON THE EVENING OF 13 OCTOBER. HE BEGAN BY SUMMARISING WHAT HAD OCCURRED: 'WE PROPOSED THE MOST SWEEPING AND GENEROUS ARMS CONTROL PROPOSAL IN HISTORY. WE OFFERED THE COMPLETE ELIMINATION OF ALL BALLISTIC MISSILES, SOVIET AND AMERICAN, FROM THE FACE OF THE EARTH BY 1996. WHILE WE PARTED COMPANY WITH THIS AMERICAN OFFER STILL ON THE TABLE, WE'RE CLOSER THAN EVER BEFORE TO AGREEMENTS THAT COULD LEAD TO A SAFER WORLD WITHOUT NUCLEAR WEAPONS.'

ARMS CONTROL

3. IN A SHORT HISTORICAL SECTION, THE PRESIDENT OUTLINED THE PURPOSE OF THE ABM TREATY, AND POINTED TO SOVIET VIOLATIONS: 'FOR SOME YEARS NOW, WE'VE BEEN AWARE THAT THE SOVIETS MAY BE DEVELOPING A NATIONWIDE DEFENSE. THEY HAVE INSTALLED A LARGE MODERN RADAR AT KRASNOYARSK, WHICH WE BELIEVE IS A CRITICAL PART OF A RADAR SYSTEM DESIGNED TO PROVIDE RADAR GUIDANCE FOR ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILES PROTECTING THE ENTIRE NATION. NOW THIS IS A VIOLATION OF THE ABM TREATY.' THE POLICY OF MUTUAL ASSURED DESTRUCTION WAS UNCIVILISED. HE HAD THEREFORE ASKED US SCIENTISTS TO STUDY WHETHER THERE WAS A PRACTICAL WAY TO DESTROY NUCLEAR MISSILES AFTER THEIR LAUNCH BUT BEFORE THEY COULD REACH THEIR TARGETS. 'OUR SCIENTISTS ARE CONVINCED IT IS PRACTICAL AND THAT SEVERAL YEARS DOWN THE ROAD WE CAN HAVE SUCH A SYSTEM READY TO DEPLOY ... SDI IS A NON-NUCLEAR DEFENCE.'

4. THE PRESIDENT THEN SUMMARISED THE DISCUSSIONS IN REYKJAVIK. THE TWO SIDES SEEMED TO BE IN AGREEMENT ON DRASTIC REDUCTIONS IN INF MISSILES IN EUROPE AND ASIA, AND SEEMED WILLING TO FIND A WAY TO REDUCE, EVEN TO ZERO, STRATEGIC BALLISTIC MISSILES. ON SDI 'I OFFERED A PROPOSAL THAT WE CONTINUE OUR PRESENT RESEARCH AND, IF AND

/WHEN

WHEN WE REACHED THE STAGE OF TESTING, WE WOULD SIGN NOW A TREATY THAT WOULD PERMIT SOVIET OBSERVATION OF SUCH TESTS: AND, IF THE PROGRAM WAS PRACTICAL, WE WOULD BOTH ELIMINATE OUR OFFENSIVE MISSILES: AND THEN WE WOULD SHARE THE BENEFITS OF ADVANCED DEFENSES. I EXPLAINED THAT, EVEN THOUGH WE WOULD HAVE DONE AWAY WITH OUR OFFENSIVE BALLISTIC MISSILES, HAVING THE DEFENSE WOULD PROTECT AGAINST CHEATING OR THE POSSIBILITY OF A MADMAN SOMETIME DECIDING TO CREATE NUCLEAR MISSILES."

5. THE REPORT BY THE TWO TEAMS FOLLOWING OVERNIGHT DISCUSSIONS IN THE WORKING GROUP HAD BEEN MOST PROMISING: "THE SOVIETS HAD ASKED FOR A TEN YEAR DELAY IN THE DEPLOYMENT OF SDI PROGRAMMES. WE PROPOSED A TEN YEAR PERIOD IN WHICH WE BEGAN WITH THE REDUCTION OF ALL STRATEGIC NUCLEAR ARMS: BOMBERS, AIR-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES, INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILES, SUBMARINE-LAUNCHED BALLISTIC MISSILES, AND THE WEAPONS THEY CARRY. THEY WOULD BE REDUCED 50 PERCENT IN THE FIRST FIVE YEARS. DURING THE NEXT FIVE YEARS WE WOULD CONTINUE BY ELIMINATING ALL REMAINING OFFENSIVE BALLISTIC MISSILES OF ALL RANGES. AND DURING THAT TIME, WE WOULD PROCEED WITH RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND TESTING OF SDI, ALL DONE IN CONFORMITY WITH ABM PROVISIONS. AT THE TEN YEAR POINT, WITH ALL BALLISTIC MISSILES ELIMINATED, WE COULD PROCEED TO DEPLOY ADVANCED DEFENSES, AT THE SAME TIME PERMITTING THE SOVIETS TO DO LIKEWISE. AND HERE THE DEBATE BEGAN. THE GENERAL SECRETARY WANTED WORDING THAT IN EFFECT WOULD HAVE KEPT US FROM DEVELOPING THE SDI FOR THE ENTIRE TEN YEARS. IN EFFECT, HE WAS KILLING SDI. AND UNLESS I AGREED, ALL THAT WORK TOWARD ELIMINATING NUCLEAR WEAPONS WOULD GO DOWN THE DRAIN, CANCELLED. I TOLD HIM THAT I HAD PLEDGED TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE NOT TO TRADE AWAY SDI."

6. A WAY FORWARD COULD STILL BE FOUND: "THE DOOR IS OPEN, AND THE OPPORTUNITY TO BEGIN ELIMINATING THE NUCLEAR THREAT IS WITHIN REACH. WE MADE PROGRESS IN ICELAND." SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS WERE NOW MOVING IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION: NOT JUST TOWARDS ARMS CONTROL, BUT TOWARDS ARMS REDUCTION.

HUMAN RIGHTS

7. ANOTHER OF THE FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES DISCUSSED WAS THE VIOLATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS BY THE SOVIET UNION, INCLUDING BREACHES OF THE HELSINKI AGREEMENTS. ORLOV HAD BEEN IMPRISONED FOR POINTING OUT SUCH VIOLATIONS. "I MADE IT PLAIN THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD NOT SEEK TO EXPLOIT IMPROVEMENT IN THESE MATTERS FOR PURPOSES OF PROPAGANDA. BUT I ALSO MADE IT PLAIN ONCE AGAIN THAT AN IMPROVEMENT OF THE HUMAN CONDITION WITHIN THE SOVIET UNION IS INDISPENSABLE FOR AN IMPROVEMENT IN BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES: FOR A GOVERNMENT THAT WILL BREAK FAITH WITH ITS OWN PEOPLE CANNOT BE TRUSTED TO KEEP FAITH WITH FOREIGN POWERS."

REGIONAL ISSUES

8. A PRINCIPAL OBJECTIVE OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY WAS THE EXTENSION OF FREEDOM. THE US WAS COMMITTED TO THE GROWTH OF DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT: THAT IS WHY THEY SUPPORTED FREEDOM FIGHTERS. THIS SUBJECT LAY AT THE HEART OF THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION AND THE US. SUMMIT MEETINGS COULD NOT MAKE THE AMERICAN PEOPLE FORGET WHAT SOVIET ACTIONS HAD MEANT FOR

THE PEOPLES OF AFGHANISTAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, AFRICA AND SOUTHEAST ASIA. UNTIL SOVIET POLICIES CHANGED, "WE WILL MAKE SURE THAT OUR FRIENDS IN THESE AREAS HAVE THE SUPPORT THEY NEED."

BILATERAL ISSUES

9. THERE HAD BEEN INDICATIONS OF FURTHER MOVEMENT ON CULTURAL EXCHANGES. THE US REMAINED COMMITTED TO PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE PROGRAMMES THAT WOULD INVOLVE THOUSANDS OF ORDINARY CITIZENS FROM BOTH COUNTRIES.

SUMMIT PROSPECTS

10. SOME MIGHT BE ASKING: WHY NOT GIVE UP SDI FOR THE AGREEMENTS ON OFFER AT REYKJAVIK? THE ANSWER WAS SIMPLE. "SDI IS AMERICA'S INSURANCE POLICY THAT THE SOVIET UNION WOULD KEEP THE COMMITMENTS MADE AT REYKJAVIK." THE RUSSIANS UNDERSTOOD THIS: THEY HAD LONG BEEN DEVELOPING THEIR OWN SDI." WHAT MR GORBACHEV WAS DEMANDING AT REYKJAVIK WAS THAT THE US AGREE TO A NEW VERSION OF THE ABM TREATY THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAS ALREADY VIOLATED. I TOLD HIM WE DON'T MAKE THOSE KINDS OF DEALS IN THE US."

11. THE US PREFERRED NO AGREEMENT TO A BAD AGREEMENT.

GORBACHEV HAD GIVEN NO INDICATION OF WHEN OR WHETHER HE PLANNED TO COME TO THE US AS AGREED AT GENEVA. BUT THE INVITATION STOOD. THE US CONTINUED TO BELIEVE THAT ADDITIONAL MEETINGS WOULD BE USEFUL. BUT THAT WAS A DECISION FOR THE RUSSIANS TO MAKE. WHATEVER THE IMMEDIATE PROSPECTS, "I AM ULTIMATELY HOPEFUL ABOUT THE PROSPECTS FOR PROGRESS AT THE SUMMIT." THE CURRENT SUMMIT PROCESS WAS DIFFERENT FROM THOSE OF PREVIOUS DECADES, BECAUSE THE US WAS NOW DEALING FROM A POSITION OF STRENGTH. "WE NOW HAVE IT WITHIN OUR GRASP TO MOVE SPEEDILY WITH THE SOVIETS TOWARD EVEN MORE BREAKTHROUGHS." US IDEAS REMAINED ON THE TABLE, AND THEIR NEGOTIATORS WERE HEADING BACK TO GENEVA. SO THERE WAS GOOD REASON FOR HOPE.

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