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TELNO 1211

OF 151600Z OCTOBER 86

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MY TELNO 1209 : REYKJAVIK MEETING

1. IN THE ACCOUNT WHICH MY US COLLEAGUE (PLEASE PROTECT) GAVE ME (AND MY FRG AND FRENCH COLLEAGUES) ON 15 OCTOBER OF THE REYKJAVIK DISCUSSIONS, THE FOLLOWING POINTS EMERGED WHICH MAY NOT HAVE BEEN COVERED IN BRIEFINGS ELSEWHERE:

(I) INF.

GORBACHEV HAD ARGUED STRONGLY AGAINST THE US PREFERENCE FOR A GLOBAL ZERO-OPTION RATHER THAN A EUROPEAN ZERO ONLY: HE INSISTED ON A SOVIET QUOTA IN ASIA. REAGAN OPPOSED THIS, OFFERING AS AN ALTERNATIVE EQUAL GLOBAL LIMITS AT A LEVEL HIGHER THAN 100 WARHEADS PER SIDE. AN ELEMENT IN THE FINAL COMPROMISE (ZERO IN EUROPE, 100 IN SOVIET ASIA AND THE CONTINENTAL US RESPECTIVELY) WAS THAT THE SOVIET ASIAN QUOTA WOULD NOT BE DEPLOYED IN THE SOVIET FAR EAST BUT IN THE (APPROX) NOVOSIBIRSK LONGITUDE. IT WAS UNCLEAR WHETHER THE US QUOTA COULD OR COULD NOT BE DEPLOYED IN ALASKA.

(II) SRNF.

THE SOVIET SIDE EVENTUALLY, AFTER LONG ARGUMENT, ACCEPTED THE US PROPOSAL FOR A FREEZE ON EXISTING SRNF COMBINED WITH THE US RIGHT TO BUILD UP TO SOVIET SRNF LEVELS IF TALKS ON THE ISSUE DID NOT ACHIEVE A REDUCTION.

(III) VERIFICATION.

ALTHOUGH BOTH SIDES - PARTICULARLY GORBACHEV - SPOKE IN RINGING TERMS OF THE NEED FOR AGREEMENTS WHICH WERE UNCONTESTABLY VERIFIABLE, THERE WAS NO DISCUSSION OF DETAIL, EG ON HOW THE DESTRUCTION RATHER THAN CONCEALMENT OF WITHDRAWN SS20S WOULD BE VERIFIED.

(IV) SDI.

REAGAN HAD MADE IT CLEAR TO GORBACHEV THAT IF, OVER THE 10 YEAR PERIOD, STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS WERE ELIMINATED, AN SDI FOR

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THE SUCCEEDING PERIOD WOULD BE VERY DIFFERENT FROM THAT NOW ENVISAGED: IT WOULD SIMPLY BE AN INSURANCE POLICY AGAINST THE ACQUISITION OF MISSILES BY A MAVERICK THIRD COUNTRY, GORBACHEV HAD BEEN UNIMPRESSED. AGAINST REAGAN'S OFFER OF A 10-YEAR COMMITMENT NOT TO WITHDRAW FROM THE ABMT WHILE MAINTAINING THE "RESTRICTIVE" INTERPRETATION OF IT, GORBACHEV HAD STUCK OUT FOR A SUBSTANTIVE AMENDMENT OF THE TREATY.

V) CTB.

GORBACHEV HAD SAID THAT ALTHOUGH HE DID NOT AGREE WITH THE US POSITION ON CTB, - I.E. THAT FOR SO LONG AS THERE WERE NUCLEAR WEAPONS, TESTING WOULD BE NEEDED - HE NEVERTHELESS SAW THE LOGIC OF IT. HE ARGUED THAT ANY NECESSARY TESTING COULD BE CONDUCTED IN LABORATORIES, BY COMPUTERS ETC. REAGAN HAD OFFERED A DEAL WHEREBY THE US WOULD AGREE IN PRINCIPLE TO RATIFY THE TTB AND PNE TREATIES, SUBJECT TO A SUCCESSFUL NEGOTIATION ON VERIFICATION MEASURES: AND A SUBSEQUENT LIMITATION ON THE NUMBER OF TESTS CONDUCTED ANNUALLY, LINKED TO THE PROGRESSIVE REDUCTION IN STRATEGIC INVENTORIES, AND/OR A FURTHER REDUCTION IN TEST THRESHOLDS. THE EXCHANGE ENDED INCONCLUSIVELY.

VI) HUMAN RIGHTS.

TO THE SURPRISE OF THE US TEAM, THE RUSSIAN (SHISHLIN) TASKED WITH DRAFTING A COMMUNIQUE (WHICH NEVER EMERGED) AGREED TO INCLUDE IN THE DRAFT A REFERENCE TO SOVIET AGREEMENT TO REGULAR DISCUSSIONS OF HUMANITARIAN "AND HUMAN RIGHTS" MATTERS.

CARTLEDGE

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