

56.25



United States Department of State

Washington, D. C. 20520

RELEASED IN FULL

SECRETBRIEFING MEMORANDUM
S/S

NOV 13 1986

TO: The Secretary

FROM: EUR - Charles H. Thomas, Acting

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with UK Prime Minister Thatcher
November 14 at 5:30 p.m.

- o Objectives: To review the agenda for the President's meeting with Mrs. Thatcher at Camp David, to ask if she has in mind adopting any agreed points on arms control negotiations, to discuss any issues which Mrs. Thatcher wishes to raise with you but not with the President, and to assess the likely outcome of the meeting with the President.

I. NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL/EAST-WEST RELATIONS

- o At the top of Mrs. Thatcher's agenda are her concerns that U.S. proposals on arms reductions have diverged from UK positions and that they undercut her politically. She is seeking reassurance that we are taking these concerns into consideration in order to bring UK and U.S. positions on security issues closer together again.
- o Mrs. Thatcher has indicated in private and in public (most recently in a speech in London on November 11) that she has serious reservations about attempting to eliminate either nuclear weapons or all offensive ballistic missiles in a set time frame.
- o These expressions of her strongly held views point up the challenge which we will face in reconciling the President's proposals with the Prime Minister's positions and her political and financial commitment to Trident and to a nuclear deterrent.
- o We have been told that Mrs. Thatcher also intends to raise during her visit a British intelligence report on the Soviet assessment of the Reykjavik summit. The report indicates that the Soviets expected the summit to fail and planned a follow-up public relations campaign aimed at exploiting the Alliance disunity which would result.
- o The Prime Minister will also bring with her Gorbachev's latest views which she received in a letter delivered to her by the Soviet Ambassador on November 13.

REVIEW AUTHORITY: Robert Homme, Senior Reviewer

lot # 89D488, Box # 3
56.25 visit of PM
Thatcher 86

SECRET

- 2 -

- o The public treatment of outcome of the Camp David meeting will be of great importance to us both. Some care and attention will be necessary to coordinate our presentations after the meeting to avoid a concentration in the press on differences. A copy of draft joint contingency press guidance is attached at Tab 4.
- o Points to Make
 - Your meeting with the President will be very important to our mutual understanding of where we and the Alliance are and where we should be going in our negotiations with the Soviet Union on arms control.
 - I understand you wish to spend most of the time at Camp David concentrating on this area.
 - He is well briefed on your concerns and looks forward to a lively exchange with you.
 - I have read reports of your November 11 London speech in which you quoted Winston Churchill's warning that the U.S. should not let go of atomic weapons until it had other means of assuring peace.
 - The second part of Sir Winston's admonition--other means of assuring peace--will, I think, be a useful springboard for your discussion with the President since this is at the heart of his proposals.
 - We understand your concerns and want to assure you that there are no differences on our objectives of peace and stability.
 - We have not let go of the concept of deterrence, and nuclear weapons obviously will have a role to play for years to come even as we achieve the reductions being negotiated at Geneva.
 - The aim of the President's proposals is to increase stability and security by eliminating the weapons which might threaten a first strike while maintaining nuclear deterrence through survivable retaliatory forces.
 - As we move on reducing offensive ballistic missiles, we will insist that multilateral efforts to curb Soviet conventional and chemical superiority complement work on nuclear reductions.

SECRET

SECRET

- 3 -

- We recognize that reports of what happened at Reykjavik have prompted attacks in the UK on Trident. Nothing in our negotiations with the Soviets has changed our full support of the UK deterrent.
- We are ourselves spending a great deal on new ballistic missile systems including Trident, Midgetman and mobile basing of MX. We strongly support your commitment to UK Tridents and want to cooperate in sustaining public support for the modernization program.
- Following the Camp David meeting it will be important for both of us to convey to the public our fundamental agreement on objectives and strategy for dealing with security issues.
- We do not have in mind a joint statement but we would be interested now or at Camp David in any themes which you have in mind that we should both stress in our meetings with the press.
- If you do have something in mind along these lines, some preparations before the meetings at Camp David would be useful.

II. CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL

- o Mrs. Thatcher may raise the question of the possibility of a compromise between the US and France on a framework for future conventional arms control in Europe.
- o Alliance agreement on procedural issues--forum and method of instructing delegations--is desirable before the December NATO Ministerials; the Alliance could then turn to substantive proposals for both CSBMs and reductions.
- o Working from the FRG/France document passed to us in Vienna, we aim to preserve the essence of the US position: an alliance-to-alliance format with no role for the NNA; NATO control over Western negotiating positions.
- o Points to Make
 - Should resolve differences over forum and method of instructing negotiators in future conventional arms control talks as soon as possible, but our vital security interests demand that the Alliance get it right.
 - Must have an alliance-to-alliance format--both for the mandate for the talks and actual negotiations--with no role for the NNA, and NATO control over the negotiating positions of the Western negotiators.

SECRET

SECRET

- 4 -

- Looking for ways to build consensus on essential Alliance security requirements among all Allies.
- Recent German/French paper and earlier British ideas may lay groundwork but will need fine tuning.
- As we lay these issues to rest, we need to turn promptly to the substance of proposals to increase stability at lower levels of forces.
- In the meantime, we must adhere to our December 5 MBFR position; MBFR forum and our current position serves our purposes until something better is created to take its place.

III. TERRORISM

- o The U.S. announcement on further measures against Syria is now expected at 10 a.m. on November 14.
- o Points to Make
 - We have been delighted with your firm response to Syria following the Hindawi trial and the leadership you have provided to Europe in confronting this case of state-sponsored terrorism.
 - You have provided a strong lead which we have been happy to follow.
 - Our own measures go a bit further than those adopted by the Community. Over time, assuming that the Syrians do not disassociate themselves from terrorism, we would like to see further action by Europeans in three areas: restrictions on Syrian Arab Airlines, restrictions on Syrian diplomatic missions, and a gradual winding down of bilateral commercial relations with Syria.
 - Sir Geoffrey and I have talked and written to each other frequently on coordination, and Ambassador Bremer has also had useful discussions in London and in other European capitals.
 - We will need to ensure that despite controversies and differences which inevitably arise, neither we nor the public lose sight of the real problem and the need for firm action.

SECRET

SECRET

- 5 -

IV. SOUTHERN AFRICA

o Points to Make

- Is this the time to let the dust settle, or is there something concrete we can accomplish in the region? We are not optimistic in near-term, but my meetings with Front Line States, Colin Eglin, and Boesak and our contacts with black internal opposition indicate that the contending parties want us to remain engaged.
- Need also to improve our political position and fend off pressure for new sanctions. Our Africa experts had good meeting on this last month and we look forward to the next session.
- On Mozambique, we hope that Chissano will be able to stay with Machel's turn Westward and will support Mozambican efforts in that direction. Your assessment?
- It appears that Zambia and Zimbabwe now will delay new sanctions against SAG, at least until after Security Council debate on new sanctions. Will they use Western vetoes as a way of backing away from new sanctions of their own?

V. ARGENTINA/FALKLANDS

- o The Argentina/Falklands issue has not been on the agenda for this visit. Given the public attention and the problems which have followed the UK's declaration that it would enforce a fishing zone around the Falklands, it may come up.
- o We do not recommend that you initiate a discussion with Mrs. Thatcher, but, given your personal involvement, you should be prepared to respond if she raises it.
- o We and the British will need to come to a better understanding on how we take care of our broader long-term interests in Argentina and this hemisphere.
- o Points to Make
 - The President and I have both been personally involved in the last two weeks in soothing and quieting the Argentines following your declaration of a fishing conservation zone around the Falklands.
 - The mood at the OAS meeting in Guatemala, where I was on Monday and Tuesday this week, was quite anti-British, as you can imagine.

SECRET

- 6 -

- Our interests in Argentina of nurturing democracy and preventing Soviet penetration require development of a security relationship with the Alfonsin government.
- We have honored your concerns about deliveries of military equipment to Argentina and will continue to consult about our plans.
- We will wish, however, to return to the question of military aircraft for Argentina after present the excitement has passed and when the issue is less sensitive in the UK.

SETTING

Our assessment of Mrs. Thatcher's position and our overall view of the objectives of the visit were set out in your memorandum for the President (Tab 1). Your meeting with Mrs. Thatcher will be the first on her schedule. She will see Secretary Weinberger after you and have breakfast with the Vice President before flying to Camp David. The schedule of the visit is attached at Tab 2. Biographic reports on the British participants are attached at Tab 3, including one on Mrs. Thatcher which does not reflect the recent polls showing the Conservatives ahead of Labor for the first time in over a year. A more detailed set of talking points on arms control and our proposals at Reykjavik provided by the NSC is attached at Tab 5.

PARTICIPANTSU.S.

The Secretary
 Assistant Secretary Ridgway
 Ford Cooper, EUR/NE Director
 (notetaker)

UK

The Prime Minister
 Ambassador Acland
 Private Secretary Powell

Attachments

- Tab 1 - Scope paper and talking points
- Tab 2 - Schedule
- Tab 3 - Biographic reports
- Tab 4 - Contingency joint press guidance
- Tab 5 - Supplementary talking points

Drafted: EUR/NE: RDJohnson
 Cleared: EUR: MJWilkinson
 EUR/RPM: Gward
 ACDA: Lfisher
 AF: CFreeman
 ARA/SC: DHarrington

EUR/NE: FCooper
 PM/TMP: JWalker
 S/CT: AAdams
 NEA/ARN: AGLaspie
 EUR/NE: JCWhitlock

SECRET