



United States Department of State

Washington, D. C. 20520

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JUL 13 1987

BRIEFING MEMORANDUM  
S/S

RELEASED IN FULL

TO: The Secretary

FROM: EUR - Rozanne L. Ridgway *RLR*

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Prime Minister Thatcher  
July 17 at 9:15 a.m.

I. ARMS CONTROL

- o The Prime Minister's major substantive interests during her visit will be the agenda for arms control negotiations and tactics for negotiating with the Soviets.
- o She will want to ensure that we adhere to the priorities agreed at Camp David and reaffirmed by the NAC in June.
- o She will also want to talk about handling Gorbachev and to ensure that a summit meeting in Washington includes human rights and regional issues as well as arms control.
- o At your meeting we believe she will focus on our most recent exchanges with the Soviets and our analysis of their apparent retreat from the forthcoming public positions they had taken on an INF agreement.
- o She will also be interested in our timetable for concluding an agreement and having it ratified in light of next year's election and the current Iran-Contra controversy with Congress.

II. DEALING WITH THE SOVIETS

- o Mrs. Thatcher will probably be most interested in talking with the President about her impressions of Gorbachev and her views on how best to deal with him.
- o She will still have very much in mind her triumphal march through the Soviet Union and the strong impact which it made on the Soviets as well as on her.
- o While recognizing Gorbachev's very different goals, she identifies with him as another reformer who is trying to bring change to a static society and economy.

REVIEW AUTHORITY: Robert Homme, Senior Reviewer

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DECL: OADR

1st # 88D140, Box # 5  
The Official visit of Prime Minister  
Thatcher July 17, 1987

SECRET

- 2 -

- o She believes that we all have an interest in working with Gorbachev to see that, consistent with our own interests, he and the more pragmatic people he has brought into the leadership are seen as successful in dealing with the West.

III. PERSIAN GULF

- o The British are themselves present in the Gulf and actively escorting ships; they have been publicly supportive of our actions there.
- o We coordinate extensively with the Royal Navy in the Gulf and are working on providing them more and better intelligence.
- o Mrs. Thatcher is concerned, however, about the possibility of a pre-emptive U.S. strike against Iran and the uncertain consequences of such a move.
- o She will be interested in hearing from the President and you about our plans for military action in the Gulf and our evaluation of Iranian and Iraqi reactions to Western military moves there.
- o On the Iran-Iraq war, the British have supported fully the drive for an UNSC cease-fire resolution and an arms control embargo against parties refusing to comply.
- o Mrs. Thatcher will be interested in our plans on the resolution and the results of General Walters' discussions with other members of the UNSC.
- o The Prime Minister suggested in a letter last week that we consider getting the Iraqis to cut back on their attacks on Iranian tankers which provoke in turn Iranian attacks on Kuwaiti and other shipping. We have in fact gone to the Iraqis to suggest a Gulf shipping cease-fire /moratorium after the UNSC resolution is passed.

IV. SYRIA

- o Despite some miscues in timing, we have coordinated reasonably well with the British on our recent initiative with Syria, and Mrs. Thatcher accepts our reopening of a high-level dialogue with Asad.
- o She will want to talk to you and the President about the sincerity and permanence of Asad's actions against Abu Nidal and other terrorists and about benchmarks for judging him.

SECRET

SECRET

- 3 -

- o Having led the charge in Europe for sanctions against Syria after the Hindawi trial, the British will not be anxious to reverse their own actions or to restore relations.
- o They will want us to continue to consult about our plans and to avoid dramatic initiatives immediately before or after the visit.

V. MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS

- o Mrs. Thatcher supports the initiative by Peres and King Hussein to convene a Middle East Peace Conference.
- o She saw Peres in London in June and promised him that she would talk up the idea of an international conference while in Washington.
- o She is scheduled to see King Hussein this week and will likely make a similar commitment.
- o She will be interested in our evaluation of the Soviets' interest in a conference and their willingness to play a constructive role with the PLO and the Syrians.

VI. SOUTHERN AFRICA

- o The next showdown for the British on South African sanctions will take place at the Commonwealth meeting in Vancouver in September.
- o The British intend to lie low on the issue as much as possible, sticking to their opposition to sanctions and their belief that Western action now will not be effective.
- o While not supporting a declaration on South Africa now, they have indicated that they will not oppose our proceeding on our own.
- o Mrs. Thatcher has taken a personal interest in Mozambique, where she sees Chissano as an effective and congenial leader, and in Zimbabwe, to which she has offered to sell fighter aircraft.
- o Her public endorsement of support for Mozambique and Chissano during her visit here may be helpful to us.
- o In return she will be interested in clearer signals from Washington in support of working with Mozambique and agreement on the idea of economic support for the Frontline States.

SECRET

SECRETVII. FALKLANDS/ARGENTINA

- o We do not believe Mrs. Thatcher intends to raise this issue during her visit, and we would prefer to defer a substantive discussion with the British until later when our own plans are better developed.
- o It could arise, however, given the recent Argentine proposal on the fisheries issue which we passed to the British and the press play on the U.S. mediation role.

VIII. INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ISSUES

- o The major international economic issues were covered in detail in Venice.
- o During her meetings in Washington she will undoubtedly talk about the need to combat protectionism, opening Japanese markets, and the U.S. budget deficit.
- o The UK deserves praise as a leader in the successful fight in the EC to shelve the fats and oils tax.
- o Mrs. Thatcher may raise the almost-completed US-UK agreement on conditions for the export of supercomputers to the UK. Secretary Weinberger's objections are being reviewed by the NSC.

IX. JAMAICA

- o Mrs. Thatcher will visit Jamaica for one day after leaving Washington.
- o Prime Minister Seaga, who faces an uphill re-election campaign next year against Michael Manley, hopes that some of the Thatcher magic will rub off on him.
- o Years of austerity budgets and an IMF-dictated cap of 10% on wage increases have cost Seaga politically, and the economy is only slowly beginning to turn around.

X. SETTING

Mrs. Thatcher is scheduled to begin the day with live interviews with all of the morning talk shows. She will then have breakfast with the Vice President. After her meeting with you she will see Secretary Weinberger, have the meeting and lunch at the White House, receive Secretary Baker and Alan Greenspan at the residence, meet the Senate leadership at the Capitol, and tape a "Face the Nation" interview.

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SECRET

- 5 -

XI. PARTICIPANTS

U.S.

UK

The Secretary  
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Assistant Secretary Ridgway  
EUR/NE Director Cooper  
(notetaker)

Prime Minister Thatcher  
Ambassador Acland  
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SECRETI. ARMS CONTROL

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- Soviets are playing "hard to get" right now; not even willing to set a date for a Washington foreign ministers' meeting. Thus much too soon to talk about a summit.
  - The Soviet Ambassador just returned from Moscow but when we met last Friday he had nothing at all to offer.
  - The Camp David priorities on arms control which NATO endorsed in June govern our approach.
  - Key issues remain in reaching an INF agreement:
    - o Soviets still have not responded to our June 16 proposal for global elimination of U.S./Soviet SRINF, tabled after extensive allied consultation.
    - o They continue to insist on including U.S. warheads for FRG Pershings. We have made clear negotiations are bilateral--we have always refused to negotiate on forces of other countries, will not allow Soviets to interfere with programs of cooperation.
    - o Soviets also recalcitrant on verification--they have not provided necessary details. We emphasize how zero LRINF would simplify verification, but no serious response.
  - (if raised) We must continue to work together to ensure your sovereignty is protected in the INF verification processes.
  - We intend to be patient, confident that they will again bargain seriously.
  - Know Germans are worried about agreements which would not cover short-range systems which chiefly threaten the two Germanys; the FRG wants us to keep negotiating, even after INF zero outcome, to reduce systems with ranges below 500 km.
  - NATO's 1983 Montebello decision to reduce our own nuclear forces in Europe was based on the assumption that there would be no negotiations on short-range forces (SNF).
  - This is a complex issue; vital that we preserve our flexible response capability for nuclear deterrence. Glad NATO is doing comprehensive evaluation of the whole issue rather than rushing into negotiations.

SECRET

SECRETII. DOING BUSINESS WITH GORBACHEV

- Gorbachev seeks to modernize and rationalize the Soviet system to provide for Soviet power in the next century.
- Ultimately, Soviet foreign policy has to be the decisive gauge for Western interaction with the USSR.
- The Soviets have shown no signs of withdrawal from their global commitments. Their aid to Nicaragua and Angola is at record levels; while taking steps to intensify negotiations on Afghanistan, they have escalated the military situation in and around Afghanistan.
- Gorbachev has made some welcome steps on human rights, but there must be sustained progress based on Helsinki agreement.
- Nothing has changed the Soviet military threat to the West.

III. PERSIAN GULF

- We appreciate UK efforts to enhance security of shipping in the Persian Gulf, including increased Royal Navy presence in the Gulf and your willingness to publicize this presence.
- We believe that concerted UNSC action provides the most promising avenue for ending the Iran-Iraq war.
- We have gone to the Iraqis to urge strongly that they announce and observe a unilateral cease-fire/moratorium on shipping after the UNSC resolution is passed.
- We believe the Saudis are ready to weigh in similarly and we would welcome your doing so as well. You might also urge King Hussein to support the effort.
- With UNSC passage of a cease-fire/withdrawal resolution, we will need to be prepared to follow-up with binding enforcement measures against either party refusing to comply with the resolution.
- Our experts must continue to work together in New York and key capitals to develop these measures to bring an end to the war.

SECRET

SECRETIV. SYRIA

- We appreciate the useful and forceful role which the UK has played in bringing Asad around; we are encouraged by Asad's recent actions and the results of the Walters mission.
- We will be looking at useful next steps in light of the Walters visit and expulsion of the Abu Nidal organization from Syria.
- We will need to continue to work and consult closely together.

V. MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS

- Divided Israeli government makes it difficult to move forward in peace process, but we must not abandon effort.
- You have already had a positive impact on developments in this area in recent months.
- We are still willing to explore an international conference, but only if it leads immediately to and does not interfere with direct negotiations.
- Soviets clearly want into the process, but we are still looking for signs that they intend to play a constructive role, especially with the PLO and Syria.

VI. SOUTHERN AFRICA

- On Mozambique, you have played a leading and effective role in encouraging Chissano to continue his movement away from the Soviets. Your stance has helped us to explain our own support for Mozambique to those here who question it.
- How can we be helpful to you on Mozambique?
- On Zimbabwe, we are pleased that your relations with the GOZ are good and support your efforts to deter the Zimbabweans from a closer military relationship with the USSR. Our Africa experts should stay in close touch on this.
- There are differences on the utility of a Western statement in favor of democracy and constitutional government in South Africa. We think making such a declaration at the right time will improve the prospect for quiet diplomacy later in the year, in cooperation with you.
- South Africa will obviously be a major item at the Commonwealth meeting in Vancouver in September and we will look to play a constructive and supportive role in our contacts with other participants.

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SECRETVII. ARGENTINA/FALKLANDS

- We believe that democracy can be sustained in Argentina and will be the best insurance against a return to dominance by the military and the consequent threat to Western interests in the region.
- It also provides best guarantee of security for Falklands.
- We believe that a carefully developed U.S. security relationship with Argentina, which has been requested by President Alfonsin, will buttress democracy by strengthening civilian control and promoting military professionalism.
- We will honor our commitment to consult with you about major arms sales or transfers that could threaten the Falklands.

VIII. INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ISSUES

- We greatly appreciated your help on the EC fats and oils tax.
- The Administration is committed to fight protectionist measures in the Congress.
- (if raised) Aware of importance of US-UK agreement on supercomputers. Looking at it closely.

IX. JAMAICA

- Your visit to Jamaica will certainly be a plus for Seaga who is in trouble politically for his tough but effective economic program.
- Hope your visit and the recent example of your party's success with the voters will spur Seaga to get moving on the practical political problems of getting re-elected.

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