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FM BRASILIA 3:2120Z APRIL 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 064 OF 3 APRIL

REPEATED TO PRIORITY NEW YORK, WASHINGTON

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FALKLANDS

(6) OUR TELNO 062

1. THE BRAZILIAN FOREIGN MINISTER'S STATEMENT IS SURPRISINGLY PUSILLANIMOUS. IT CAN BE CHARITABLY EXPLAINED BY THE BRAZILIAN GOVERNMENT'S OVERRIDING PREOCCUPATION WITH MENDING THEIR FENCES WITH ARGENTINA, WHOSE FRIENDSHIP IS OF CAPITAL IMPORTANCE IN THE CONTEXT OF BRAZIL'S PRIME AIM OF FORMENTING LATIN AMERICAN GOOD NEIGHBOURLINESS.
2. PRESIDENT FIGUEIREDO HAS A PERSONAL BIAS IN FAVOUR OF ARGENTINA, STEMMING FROM HIS YOUTHFUL YEARS SPENT IN BUENOS AIRES. GUERREIRO HIMSELF BY TEMPERAMENT ALWAYS FOLLOWS A NONCOMMITTAL LINE WHERE POSSIBLE, EVEN IN CIRCUMSTANCES (E.G. THE ASSASSINATION OF SADAT) WHICH CRY OUT FOR CONDEMNATION.
3. BRAZILIAN PUBLIC OPINION, HOWEVER, AS REFLECTED IN THE PRESS COMMENT SUMMARISED IN MY TUR, REGARDS THE ARGENTINES WITH SUSPICION AND DISDAIN. BRAZILIANS PARTICULARLY DISLIKE THE GALTIERI REGIME, WHICH THEY REGARD AS UNPOPULAR, OPPRESSIVE AND INCOMPETENT. EVEN THE BRAZILIAN ARMED FORCES, WHILE ACCEPTING THE STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF A GOOD OPERATIONAL RELATIONSHIP WITH THEIR ARGENTINE OPPOSITE NUMBERS, DISAPPROVE STRONGLY OF THE ARGENTINES' EMOTIONALISM AND OF THEIR PROPENSITY TO HISTRIONIC AND VAINGLORIOUS ATTITUDES.
4. BRAZIL'S ACCEPTANCE OF THE ARGENTINE REQUEST TO PROTECT THEIR INTERESTS VIS A VIS THE UK IS A BLOW. IT MEANS THAT THE NATURAL CAUTION OF THE BRAZILIAN GOVERNMENT WILL BE REINFORCED BY STRONG JURIDICAL ARGUMENTS. AS A RESULT, ANY ROLE THEY PLAY IN OUR DISPUTE IS LIKELY TO BE AN EMASCULATED ONE. MOREOVER, IF WE PROCEED WITH OUT MILITARY CONTINGENCY PLANS, AND ASSUMING THAT THESE INVOLVE THE USE OF FORCE, WE MUST EXPECT THE BRAZILIANS TO ABANDON THEIR PIOUS EVEN-HANDEDNESS AND JOIN WITH OTHER LATIN AMERICAN STATES IN CONDEMNING US IN INTERNATIONAL FORA.
5. THAT SAID, WE HERE WILL LOSE NO OPPORTUNITY OF PUTTING THE UK VIEW TO THE BRAZILIAN AUTHORITIES AT ALL LEVELS. I HAVE ASKED TO SEE THE FOREIGN MINISTER AT HIS EARLIEST CONVENIENCE (HE RETURNED FROM TOKYO VIA NEW YORK TODAY): HE WILL ALREADY HAVE SEEN YOUR PERSONAL MESSAGE CONTAINED IN TELNO 174 TO BANGKOK. I HOPE ALSO TO SEE OTHER MINISTERS WHO MAY HAVE A MORE INDEPENDENT VIEW. MY ATTACHES WILL BE IN TOUCH WITH THEIR RESPECTIVE SERVICES FOR THE SAME PURPOSES.

HARDING

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GRS 180
 UNCLASSIFIED
 FM BRASILIA 2:2245Z APRIL 82
 TO IMMEDIATE FCO
 TELEGRAM NUMBER 062 OF 2 APRIL
 REPEATED TO IMMEDIATE NEW YORK , WASHINGTON

FALKLAND ISLANDS

1. FOLLOWING IS A STATEMENT BY FOREIGN MINISTER GUERREIRO IN NEW YORK ON 2 APRIL.
2. WHEN GREAT BRITAIN OCCUPIED THE ISLANDS ARGENTINA PROTESTED IN 1833 OUR MINISTER IN LONDON WAS INSTRUCTED TO SUPPORT THE ARGENTINE PROTEST. ARGENTINA NEVER ACCEPTED THE BRITISH PRESENCE IN THE ISLANDS. FOR ARGENTINA IT WAS ALWAYS MERELY A DE FACTO OCCUPATION. BRAZIL ALWAYS SUPPORTED THE ARGENTINE CAUSE. BRAZIL ALSO ALWAYS SAID THAT IT HOPED THAT THE PARTIES MIGHT RESOLVE THE PROBLEM BY PEACEFUL MEANS. NOW THAT ARGENTINA HAS CARRIED OUT A DIRECT ACTION TO OCCUPY THE TERRITORY, THE ONLY THING WE CAN DO IS HOPE THAT RELATIONS BETWEEN TWO FRIENDLY NATIONS DO NOT DETERIORATE FURTHER.

HARDING

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