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TO IMMEDIATE FCO
AND IMMEDIATE MODUK
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TELEGRAM NUMBER 067 OF 5 APRIL

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 DESK OFFICE
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YOUR TELNOS 62 AND 63: FALKLANDS

1. I CALLED ON THE FOREIGN MINISTER THIS MORNING AND SPOKE AS INSTRUCTED IN YOUR TURS.
2. IN ANSWER TO MY REQUEST FOR BRAZILIAN SUPPORT IN BRINGING PRESSURE TO BEAR ON ARGENTINA, GUERREIRO SAID THAT BRAZIL WOULD NOT MAKE ANY PUBLIC STATEMENT ON THE DISPUTE. IN THE PRESENT SITUATION IT COULD ONLY BE IRRELEVANT AND UNHELPFUL. IN PRIVATE, HOWEVER, THE BRAZILIANS WOULD TRY TO GET ACROSS TO THE ARGENTINES THE NEED FOR RESTRAINT. THEY WOULD ALSO, IN REPRESENTING ARGENTINE INTERESTS IN LONDON, ACT STRICTLY ACCORDING TO ESTABLISHED INTERNATIONAL PRACTICE. HE IMPLIED THAT THEY WOULD NOT SHOW BIAS TOWARDS ARGENTINA, ANY MORE THAN THE SWISS WOULD SHOW BIAS TOWARDS THE UK (IN FACT MY SWISS COLLEAGUE IS UNABASHED IN SHOWING A MOST AGREEABLE BIAS IN OUR DIRECTION).
3. GUERREIRO WENT ON TO SAY THAT BRAZIL'S ONLY STRONG POINT LAY IN HER ABILITY TO SPEAK TO BOTH SIDES WITHOUT INHIBITION. IF ANY IDEA FOR A SOLUTION, HOWEVER CRACKPOT OR ILL-INFORMED, OCCURRED TO HIM OR HIS COLLEAGUES, HE WOULD NOT HESITATE TO COMMUNICATE IT TO US AND TO THE ARGENTINES.
4. GUERREIRO MADE NO COMMENT ON MY EXPLANATION OF HM GOVERNMENT'S ACTION IN FREEZING ARGENTINE ASSETS. HIS REMARKS ABOUT THE REFUELLING OF BRITISH SHIPS ARE REPORTED IN MY IFT.

COMMENT

5. GUERREIRO RECEIVED ME WITH HIS CUSTOMARY LOW-KEY CORDIALITY AND GOOD HUMOUR - AS NO DOUBT HE WILL MY ARGENTINE COLLEAGUE. HE APPEARED STILL WEARY AFTER HIS ARDUOUS TRAVELS IN CHINA AND JAPAN. HIS REPLIES TO MY QUESTIONS (DETAILED RECORD BY BAG) WERE, AS USUAL, EXCESSIVELY PRUDENT AND SOMETIMES INTENTIONALLY AMBIGUOUS. BUT HE DID NOT, AS I FEARED HE MIGHT, UTTER ANY CAUTIONARY WORDS ABOUT OUR OWN PREPARATIONS FOR THE USE OF FORCE. I THINK HE IS GENUINELY ANXIOUS TO DO NOTHING TO SPOIL BRAZIL'S GOOD RELATIONS WITH ARGENTINA AND, PERHAPS SLIGHTLY LESS SO, WITH BRITAIN. WITHIN THAT OVERRIDING PREOCCUPATION, I JUDGE THAT HE WOULD LIKE TO HELP BOTH SIDES IF HE COULD.

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6. ONE MUST CONCLUDE THAT WE HAVE LITTLE LEVERAGE OVER BRAZIL AND EVEN LESS PROSPECT OF GETTING THEM TO LEAN TO OUR SIDE IN OUR CONFLICT WITH ARGENTINA. BUT I STILL THINK THAT TAKING THE BRAZILIANS INTO OUR CONFIDENCE AS FAR AS WE PRUDENTLY CAN WILL PAY OFF IN THE END.

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