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FM BRASILIA 062300Z APRIL 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 077 OF 6 APRIL

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, NEW YORK, BONN, PARIS, UKDEL NATO

MY TELNO 072: FALKLANDS

1. THE FOREIGN MINISTER SUMMONED ME THIS AFTERNOON TO HAND TO ME A FIRST PERSON NOTE (TRANSLATION IN MIFT) WHICH CONSTITUTES A PUBLIC APPEAL BY THE BRAZILIAN GOVERNMENT TO BOTH PARTIES TO SEEK A PEACEFUL SOLUTION TO THE PRESENT DISPUTE. A NOTE IN SIMILAR TERMS IS BEING DELIVERED TO THE ARGENTINE AMBASSADOR AND BOTH WILL BE GIVEN TO THE PRESS LATER TODAY.

2. GUERREIRO THEN SAID THAT HE HAD HEARD THAT INFORMAL CONTACTS HAD BEEN MADE IN NEW YORK BETWEEN THE ARGENTINE FOREIGN MINISTER, SIR A PARSONS AND - ON THE TELEPHONE - THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL IN ROME. IF THE TWO PARTIES BOTH THOUGHT THAT BRAZIL COULD PROVIDE USEFUL GOOD OFFICES FOR A SIMILAR PURPOSE, THE BRAZILIAN GOVERNMENT WOULD BE VERY READY TO OFFER THE NECESSARY FACILITIES. I ASKED WHETHER THIS SHOULD BE CONSTRUED AS AN OFFER OF MEDIATION. AFTER HEDGING A BIT, HE SAID THAT STRICTLY SPEAKING IT WAS NOT SUCH AN OFFER AND HE WAS AWARE THAT OTHER CHANNELS, SUCH AS NEW YORK, WERE AVAILABLE TO BOTH PARTIES. I SAID THAT, IN THE VIEW OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT, THE QUESTION OF MEDIATION DID NOT ARISE. OUR PRIME OBJECTIVE AT PRESENT WAS TO MOBILISE PRESSURE ON THE ARG ARGENTINES TO COMPLY IN FULL WITH THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL'S RESOLUTION. IF THE QUESTION OF MEDIATION WERE TO ARISE IN THE FUTURE, WE WOULD NOT EXPECT BRAZIL TO OFFER HERSELF, IN VIEW OF HER SUPPORT FOR THE ARGENTINE CLAIM TO SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE FALKLANDS AND OF HER UNDERTAKING TO PROTECT ARGENTINE INTERESTS IN BRITAIN. GUERREIRO AGREED. HE REPEATED THAT BRAZIL WOULD OFFER HER GOOD OFFICES ONLY IF THEY WERE ACCEPTABLE TO BOTH PARTIES.

3. I THEN SAID THAT, WHILE BRAZIL'S EFFORTS TO FIND A WAY OUT OF THE PCESENT CRISIS WOULD BE APPRECIATED IN LONDON, I WAS NOT AT ALL SURE THAT THE TERMS OF THE NOTE WOULD BE UNDERSTOOD. IT WAS ONE THING FOR BRAZIL T O SUPPORT THE ARGENTINE CASE FOR SOVERIEGNTY, AS SHE HAD DONESINCE 1833:

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BUT IT WAS QUITE ANOTHER TO REFRAIN FROM CONDEMNING ARGENTINA'S RECOURSE TO VIOLENCE TO ASSERT HER CLAIM. GUERREIRO WAS RELUCTANT TO COMMENT ON THIS POINT, EVEN WHEN I PRESSED HIM ON IT. I WENT ON TO SAY THAT IT WAS ALL VERY WELL FOR BRAZIL TO BE CAREFUL NOT TO ANNOY THE ARGENTINES, BUT HER FAILURE TO CONDEMN SUCH AN ACT OF AGGRESSION AS THE ARGENTINES HAD COMMITTED IN FORCEFULLY OCCUPYING THE FALKLANDS WOULD BE TAKEN IN LONDON AS EVIDENCE THAT BRAZIL WAS LEANING TOWARDS ARGENTINA. GUERREIRO REPLIED THAT BRAZIL'S CAPACITY TO INFLUENCE ARGENTINA WAS STRICTLY LIMITED, GIVEN ARGENTINA'S STRONG EMOTIONS. BUT BRAZIL'S APPEAL TO CHILE AND ARGENTINA TO EXERCISE RESTRAINT, ADMITTEDLY IN VERY DIFFERENT CIRCUMSTANCES, WHEN THE BEAGLE CHANNEL DISPUTE THREATENED TO BLOW UP IN DECEMBER 1978, HAD BORNE FRUIT. HE HOPED THAT THE PRESENT APPEAL TO BOTH SIDES WOULD BE LISTENED TO IN ARGENTINA.

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