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FM BRASILIA 12:1900Z APRIL 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO DESKBY 122100Z APRIL 82

AND TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK

TELEGRAM NO 094 OF 12 APRIL

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MY TELS NOS 087 AND 088: FALKLANDS: PRESIDENT FIGUEIREDO'S MESSAGE

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1. THE CONTRAST IN THE LANGUAGE USED BY PRESIDENT FIGUEIREDO IN HIS MESSAGES TO THE PRIME MINISTER AND TO PRESIDENT GALTIERI UNDERLINES FOR THE FIRST TIME IN PUBLIC THE BRAZILIAN GOVERNMENT'S PREDISPOSITION TO LEAN TOWARDS ARGENTINA IN THE FALKLANDS DISPUTE.

2. I ANALYSE THE REASONS FOR THIS BIAS AS FOLLOWS:

(A) BRAZIL AND ARGENTINA ARE CONDEMNED BY GEOGRAPHY TO BE CLOSE NEIGHBOURS AND WILL HAVE TO CONTINUE TO LIVE TOGETHER LONG AFTER THE PRESENT CRISIS IS PAST. ARGENTINA HAS GIVEN BRAZIL A GREAT DEAL OF TROUBLE FROM TIME TO TIME; AND BRAZIL HAS INVESTED A LOT OF DIPLOMATIC AND OTHER EFFORT IN PUTTING RELATIONS WITH ARGENTINA ON A SOUND FOOTING.

(B) ECONOMIC RELATIONS BETWEEN BRAZIL AND ARGENTINA ARE MORE SUBSTANTIAL, AND ARE LIKELY TO CONTINUE TO REMAIN SO, THAN THOSE BETWEEN BRAZIL AND BRITAIN.

(C) PRESIDENT FIGUEIREDO'S PERSONAL FRIENDSHIP WITH GENERAL GALTIERI AND HIS FONDLY-REMEMBERED EXPERIENCE OF HIS YOUTH IN BUENOS AIRES COLOURS HIS VIEW OF THE QUESTION.

(D) THE BRAZILIANS FEAR THAT, IF GALTIERI FALLS, CHAOS MAY ENSUE IN ARGENTINA. THAT COULD UNDERMINE THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC STABILITY OF THE WHOLE SOUTH AMERICAN SUB-CONTINENT.

(E) THEY ALSO FEAR THAT, IF ARGENTINA FEELS HERSELF DESERTED BY MOST OF HER TRADITIONAL FRIENDS AND IS OFFERED PRACTICAL HELP BY THE SOVIET UNION, THIS COULD LEAD TO A RECIPROCAL OFFER OF ARGENTINE FACILITIES TO THE RUSSIANS, WITH CONSEQUENT PREJUDICE TO BRAZIL'S OWN STRATEGIC INTERESTS. (THE INCIDENT OF THE CUBAN AIRLINER FORCED TO LAND AT BRASILIA EN ROUTE FOR ARGENTINA, REPORTED IN MY TELNO 089 WILL HAVE REINFORCED THESE FEARS).

(F) THE BRAZILIAN GOVERNMENT REPEATEDLY ASSERT THAT THEY AND THEIR PREDECESSORS HAVE NEVER WAVERED IN THEIR SUPPORT OF ARGENTINA'S CLAIM TO THE FALKLANDS SINCE THE BRITISH TAKEOVER BY FORCE IN 1833. MOREOVER, WHATEVER THEIR PRIVATE RESERVATIONS ABOUT THE IDIOTCY OF THE ARGENTINES' RECKLESS AGGRESSION AGAINST THE FALKLANDS, BRAZILIAN MINISTERS ARE UNLIKELY TO VIEW WITH EQUANIMITY THE PRESENCE OF A LARGE BRITISH FLEET IN SOUTH ATLANTIC WATERS CLOSE TO THE MAINLAND.

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/ 3. THERE ARE,

3. THERE ARE, NEVERTHELESS, CONSIDERATIONS WHICH PULL THE BRAZILIANS IN A CONTRARY DIRECTION:

(A) THEY WOULD NOT LIKE TO SEE ARGENTINA EMERGE FROM THE PRESENT DISPUTE WITH A CLEAR VICTORY. THEY SEE IN GALTIERI A CLASSIC ARGENTINE CAUDILLO WHO MIGHT HAVE AMBITIONS TO BECOME A LATTER-DAY PERON. THEY WOULD REGARD THE ADVENT OF AN OUTRIGHT FASCIST REGIME IN ARGENTINA WITH ALAR.

(B) THEY ARE GREATLY IMPRESSED BY THE RESOLUTE MANIFESTATIONS OF SOLIDARITY WITH US ON THE PART OF OUR EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND COMMONWEALTH PARTNERS. THEY HAVE ALSO TAKEN NOTE OF OTHER EXPRESSIONS OF SUPPORT FOR US.

(C) THEY SEEM TO HAVE TAKEN ON BOARD MR HAIG'S MESSAGE THAT THE BRITISH CABINET MEANS BUSINESS AND WILL NOT BE DETERRED FROM ITS MAIN OBJECTIVE.

(D) THEY ARE NEEDED BY REPEATED EDITORIALS IN THE JORNAL DO BRASIL AND FORTHRIGHT ARTICLES IN OTHER NEWSPAPERS CASTIGATING THE ARGENTINES AND DEFENDING THE BRITISH CASE. THEY MUST ALSO BE PEEVED BY THE JOINT DECLARATIONS PUT OUT BY THE MAIN OPPOSITION PARTIES (PMDB AND PT) CONDEMNING THE ARGENTINE AGGRESSION AND SUPPORTING SELF-DETERMINATION FOR THE ISLANDERS - MORE ESPECIALLY AS THE FOREIGN POLICY PURVEYED BY THE ITAMARATY HAS HITHERTO BEEN SINGLED OUT FOR PRAISE BY THE OPPOSITION PARTIES.

(E) ALTHOUGH DR GUERREIRO DISMISSED THE NOTION WHEN I PUT IT TO HIM, THEY MUST BE SERIOUSLY WORRIED BY THE PROSPECT OF ARGENTINE SOVEREIGNTY BEING RECOGNISED OVER THE SOUTH GEORGIA AND SOUTH SANDWICH ISLANDS SINCE THEY MIGHT EXPECT THE ARGENTINES TO BE MORE TROUBLESOME THAN US IN FRUSTRATING THEIR PLANS TO PROJECT THEIR OWN INFLUENCE INTO THE ANTARCTIC AREA, OF WHICH WE HAVE AMPLE RECENT EVIDENCE.

4. WHILE I SEE NO CHANCE OF PERSUADING THE BRAZILIAN GOVERNMENT TO MODIFY THEIR PRESENT STANCE, FOR THE REASONS SPELLED OUT IN PARAGRAPH 2 ABOVE, THE CONTRARY ARGUMENTS IN PARAGRAPH 3 GIVE US A CERTAIN LEVERAGE.

5. I FEAR, HOWEVER, THAT THE BRAZILIANS MAY ALREADY BE PREPARING TO SIDE WITH ARGENTINA IN ANY OAS DEBATE ON THE APPLICATION OF THE RIO TREATY TO THE PRESENT DISPUTE. THE ITAMARATY HAVE ALREADY TOLD MY FRENCH COLLEAGUE THAT, IN THEIR VIEW, THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION NO 502 WILL NOT BE VIEWED BY THE OAS AS CONSTRAINING THEIR FREEDOM OF ACTION, SINCE THE FIRST OPERATIVE PHRASE OF THE RESOLUTION SPECIFICALLY CALLS FOR THE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES; AND BRITAIN IS NOW SEEN TO BE IGNORING, OR THREATENING TO IGNORE, THAT CALL. GUERREIRO HAS TOLD MY AMERICAN COLLEAGUE TODAY THAT THE BRAZILIAN DELEGATION ARE TRYING TO DELAY THE

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CONVENING OF AN OAS MEETING SINCE THEY FEAR A CONFLICT BETWEEN THE LATIN AND CARIBBEAN MEMBERS AND CONSEQUENT DAMAGE TO THE ORGANISATION ITSELF. HE SAID HE HAD TOLD THE ARGENTINES THAT THE TIMING OF SUCH A MEETING WAS NOT YET RIPE: BUT I AM NOT SURE THAT WE SHOULD BELIEVE THIS STATEMENT.

6. FOR THE MOMENT, THE BRAZILIANS ARE PINNING MUCH FAITH ON MR HAIG'S MISSION. IF IT FAILS, THEY MAY VERY RELUCTANTLY CONCLUDE THAT THEY MUST NERVE THEMSELVES TO PLAY A ROLE. BUT I HAVE LEFT THEM IN NO DOUBT WHATEVER THAT MEDIATION BY BRAZIL COULD NOT BE ENDORSED BY THE BRITISH SIDE. I HOPE I AM RIGHT IN THIS.

7. AS NO SUBSTANTIVE REPLY HAS SO FAR BEEN SENT TO GUERREIRO'S PUBLISHED NOTE TO ME (MY TELS NOS 077 AND 078), I SUGGEST THAT A REPLY FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT FIGUEIREDO, PREFERABLY IN TERMS SUITABLE FOR PUBLICATION, SHOULD BE SENT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. AS I HAVE HAD NO FORMAL COMMUNICATION TO MAKE TO THE BRAZILIAN GOVERNMENT SINCE YOU TOOK OFFICE AS SECRETARY OF STATE, IT WOULD HELP MY OWN POSITION IF THE REPLY COULD BE SENT THROUGH ME.

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