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
BY CAS NARA, DATE 8/29/02

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Alexander M. Haig, Jr. 

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Prime Minister  
Spadolini of Italy, June 7, 1982

I. SETTING

Although you will have been with Spadolini in Versailles and on the flight to Rome, this meeting is necessary for bilateral relations. Spadolini should still be head of government, even if in caretaker status. Political tensions particularly between Christian Democrats and Socialists may be rather high at the time of your visit. Socialist leader Craxi wants the Prime Ministry and may be willing to risk early parliamentary elections to try and get it. The new Christian Democratic leaders are concerned that the Socialist Party will grow at their expense. They may be more forthcoming toward the opposition Communists in order to gain leverage with the Socialists. Christian Democrat and Socialist views on foreign policy issues may differ markedly, but both support close and strong ties with the U.S. Bilateral relations are excellent.

II. ISSUES

1. Arms Control Negotiations

Your Eureka College speech set the stage for negotiations. Italy's participation in the NATO decision to deploy intermediate nuclear forces as necessary helps provide western credibility. The Italian Communist Party will lead massive anti-nuclear demonstrations just prior to your arrival in Rome. However, that should not affect Italian government resolve.

o WE NEED MEANINGFUL STRATEGIC ARMS CONTROL. OUR PLAN AIMS TO REDUCE THE RISK OF WAR BY MAKING A MAJOR EFFORT TO ENHANCE STABILITY OF THE STRATEGIC BALANCE.

o WE WILL FOCUS ON A REDUCTION OF BALLISTIC MISSILE WEAPONS AND WARHEADS AND ON LESSENING THEIR DESTRUCTIVE POTENTIAL.

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FOUGHT FOR THEM. THOSE WHO DO NOT SHARE THESE VALUES WILL SEEK TO UNDERMINE THEM.

o ITALY'S INCREASING INFLUENCE ON THE INTERNATIONAL SCENE WILL BE HELPED BY PREDICTABILITY AND POLITICAL STABILITY.

## 2. Terrorism in Italy

Terrorism has plagued Italy for some years, but the government campaign to eradicate it has achieved significant success. The rescue of General Dozier illustrated improved Italian police capability. Italy's terrorists have sporadically sought international links to secure arms and other support. President Pertini personally believes that the Soviet Union or its surrogates have used the terrorists to foster destabilization, and he publicly alludes to that. Political parties from Communists to the Right condemn the terrorists.

o WE ADMIRE THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT'S SUCCESS IN SECURING THE SAFE RELEASE OF GENERAL DOZIER.

o WE ARE PLEASED THAT OUR TWO COUNTRIES ARE WORKING SO CLOSELY WITH REGARD TO ANTI-TERRORISM PROGRAMS AND POLICIES.

o WE ARE CONCERNED ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF FOREIGN SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM IN ITALY. WE WELCOME ANY INFORMATION THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT MAY DEVELOP AND WILL BE PLEASED TO PROVIDE INFORMATION WE OBTAIN.

## 3. Central America

President Pertini has often been critical of U.S. policy on Central America. He did not raise the issue during his March State Visit to Washington and seemed genuinely impressed by the voter turnout as well as fairness of the Salvadoran elections. Pertini abhors the human rights violations in El Salvador and is skeptical about its new government. In Rome he may not defer this question to the government but feel free to express his personal views.

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○ WE CONTINUE TO BE DEEPLY DISTURBED OVER CUBAN AND NICARAGUAN SUPPORT FOR GUERRILLAS IN CENTRAL AMERICA.

○ STEPS CONTINUE TOWARD DEMOCRACY AND PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS IN EL SALVADOR.

○ WE HOPE EUROPEANS WILL SUPPORT DEMOCRATIC PROCESS AND NOT LEND ENCOURAGEMENT TO GUERRILLAS WHO SEEK CHANGE BY FORCE OF ARMS.

○ WE CONTINUE TO PUSH FOR AGRARIAN REFORMS AND FURTHER HUMAN RIGHTS PROGRESS.

○ WE WELCOME ITALY'S INTERESTS IN CARIBBEAN BASIN INITIATIVES. ITALY'S ASSISTANCE WILL HELP ELIMINATE CONDITIONS THAT BREED REVOLUTION.

○ WE SHOULD EXPLORE HOW LEFT CAN JOIN DEMOCRATIC PROCESS. THERE CAN BE NO POWER SHARING OUTSIDE OF THAT.

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TALKS WITH SPADOLINI/PERTINI

- ITALY'S NATO ROLE. APPRECIATE ITALY'S CONSTRUCTIVE LEADERSHIP ROLE IN ALLIANCE (CRUISE MISSILES, MFO, AFGHANISTAN, POLAND)
- + CONSULTATIONS. WE SUPPORT EFFORTS BY FOREIGN MINISTERS COLOMBO AND GENSCHER TO IMPROVE ALLIANCE CONSULTATIONS
- NATO SUMMIT. SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME ESSENTIAL; PARTICULARLY NEED ITALIAN SUPPORT ON CREDIT RESTRICTIONS ISSUE

TALKS WITH SPADOLINI/PERTINI

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- ARMS CONTROL. STRONG ALLIED SUPPORT FOR US START/INF INITIATIVES ESSENTIAL TO COUNTER SOVIET PROPAGANDA MOVES
- + LIBYA. WE REMAIN CONCERNED BY QADHAFI'S IRRESPONSIBLE ACTIVITY; HOPE YOU WILL NOT RECEIVE HIM IN ROME AND STOP ARMS COOPERATION WITH LIBYA
- TERRORISM. ADMIRE ITALY'S FORCEFUL ANTI-TERRORISM EFFORT (DOZIER CASE); WILL CONTINUE FULL COOPERATION AGAINST THIS SCOURGE

TALKS WITH SPADOLINI/PERTINI

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- FALKLANDS. APPRECIATE SENSITIVITIES BUT HOPE ITALY CAN FIND MEANS TO SUPPORT ITS ALLY, UK, AT THIS GRAVE MOMENT
- + CENTRAL AMERICA. HOPE EUROPEANS WILL SUPPORT DEMOCRATIC PROCESS, NOT ENCOURAGE GUERRILLAS WHO SEEK CHANGE BY VIOLENCE



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YOUR MEETING WITH PRESIDENT PERTINI OF ITALY  
June 7, 1982

I. SETTING

President Pertini was deeply impressed by his U.S. visit in March. He recalls it with fondness and refers to his new friendship with you. Pertini is very pleased to have the opportunity to be your host for lunch in Rome. He will want to discuss Italian affairs but will no doubt vividly recount his travel to San Francisco and the California wine country following his March visit in Washington.

When you arrive in Rome the Spadolini government may be near collapse. President Pertini will work to keep the coalition partners together in the interest of stability. He will resist the dissolution of parliament and early elections which are unlikely to change the need for a political alliance between Christian Democrats and Socialists. The alternative is a government with explicit or implicit Communist participation.

II. ISSUES

1. Italy's Internal Politics

In view of the government's uncertain status, Pertini will be one of the key players in the political game. He may discuss the political scene and his role as a stabilizing factor, which tends to reinforce the current Italian coalition and relegate the Communists to the opposition. Although we need not discuss the merits of the different governing arrangements for which the parties and not Pertini are responsible, we can applaud his contribution to institutional stability.

o WE MUST WORK TOGETHER TO PROTECT THE VALUES OF FREEDOM AND DEMOCRACY WHICH WE SHARE. YOU HAVE ALWAYS

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o ITALY'S DECISION TO ACCEPT CRUISE MISSILES HELPS MAINTAIN STRENGTH AND CREDIBILITY, A NECESSARY PRECONDITION FOR MEANINGFUL ARMS CONTROL TALKS.

o WE VALUE ITALY'S VITAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE ALLIANCE AND WILL CONTINUE TO CONSULT CLOSELY WITH YOU. WE NEED TO MAINTAIN THE DIALOGUE ON DEFENSE AND ARMS CONTROL ISSUES, WHICH ARE SO CRITICAL FOR US ALL.

o ITALY'S CONTRIBUTION TO PEACEKEEPING EXTENDS TO THE SINAI, WHERE WE ARE WORKING TOGETHER IN THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE TO MAINTAIN PEACE. WE APPRECIATE THAT.

2. East-West Economic Issues

The Italians have been among the most cooperative of our allies on East-West issues. They have maintained a long "pause for reflection" on the Soviet pipeline. They are prepared to go as far as the European consensus on curtailment of credit to the USSR. They insist, however, on equal burden sharing and are wary of their European partners.

o WE APPRECIATE ITALIAN COOPERATION ON CREDITS.

o IN VIEW OF WORSENING SOVIET ECONOMIC OUTLOOK, FINANCIAL PRUDENCE REQUIRES RESTRAINT. WE ARE NOT SEEKING TO REDUCE TRADE OR ENGAGE IN "ECONOMIC WARFARE".

o WE SEEK CREDIT RESTRAINT EQUITABLE FOR ALL.

3. Italy-Libya Relations

There are about 20,000 Italians in Libya and Italy firmly believes in the importance of maintaining strong commercial relations. Italy hopes that its approach will help to moderate Qadhafi. Although arms sales to Libya continue the Italians might reduce them. Qadhafi seeks an invitation to Rome but the Italians have resisted.

o WE HOPE ITALY WILL STOP ARMS COOPERATION WITH LIBYA. THEY CONTRIBUTE TO HIS CAPABILITY FOR MILITARY INTERVENTION ELSEWHERE IN AFRICA.

o ITALY SHOULD NOT RECEIVE QADHAFI.

4. U.S.-European Consultations

In a speech at Georgetown in February Foreign Minister Colombo presented a plan on U.S.-European consultations.

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His German counterpart later presented a proposal for more frequent meetings of foreign ministers. We have supported this initiative.

o WE SUPPORT THE COLOMBO AND GENSCHER PROPOSALS FOR INFORMAL MEETINGS OF NATO FOREIGN MINISTERS.

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BACKGROUND PAPER: ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS

I. ESSENTIAL FACTORS

o Italy has been our strongest supporter of INF modernization and generally supports our positions on all arms control issues.

o Urging close U.S. consultation with Allies on START similar to INF.

II. U.S. AND HOST COUNTRY POSITIONS

o Compatible on principles and approach for dealing with START, INF, MBFR, CSCE/CDE, SSOD.

o Differ on START consultations: We intend to consult closely, but not in INF-style Special Consultative Group Italy at one time proposed.

III. DISCUSSION

The GOI deserves a pat on the back for its staunch support for our positions, particularly in the INF and START negotiations. Faced with domestic pressure from anti-nuclear critics, the Italians are now, like other Europeans, very anxious for START talks to get under way. They view progress on START also as easing negative reaction to site preparations now underway for cruise missile bases in Italy.

Italy has pressed for close Alliance consultations on START. We are prepared to go somewhat beyond briefings in the North Atlantic Council, which were used during the SALT talks, but do not plan to imitate the INF precedent of intensive consultations within an SCG, which was intended for the unique circumstances of those negotiations.

May 12, 1982

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