

*7/11/83*

PRIME MINISTER

THE WEST MIDLANDS

1. Herewith Patrick Jenkin's Minute to you dated 9th March, and Peter Walker's Minute dated 15th March.
2. I have asked Cecil Parkinson to follow up the point which Peter makes in the second paragraph of his Minute.
3. As you know, Patrick has recently appointed John Butcher as Minister with special responsibility for the West Midlands.
4. Do you agree that we should now have a meeting at which the following would be present:-

Patrick Jenkin  
Peter Walker  
Geoffrey Howe  
Cecil Parkinson  
John Butcher

25.3.83

IAN GOW



25th March 1983

Peter Walker

I am enclosing a copy of Patrick Jenkin's Minute to the Prime Minister dated 9th March, together with a copy of Peter Walker's Minute dated 15th March.

May I leave it to you, please, to follow up the point which Peter makes in the second paragraph of his Minute?

IAN GOW

The Rt Hon Cecil Parkinson MP





From the Minister

MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE, FISHERIES AND FOOD  
WHITEHALL PLACE, LONDON S.W.1

*15 March 1983*

PRIME MINISTER

I have seen Patrick Jenkin's minute to you of 9 March on the West Midlands. When you have a moment I would like to come and discuss with you the manner in which I now believe we should present the whole case of the West Midlands. Certainly some substantial initiatives need to be taken over the next few months so as to start to remedy the present atmosphere, and I believe this has got to be organised almost on a constituency by constituency basis.

When we last met you suggested a briefing in campaign methods for our members from marginal seats. I would naturally be delighted to do this whenever you wish the arrangements to be made.

*PLD*

PETER WALKER

*(dictated by the  
Minister and  
signed in his absence)*





CONFIDENTIAL

 cc/jr  
 (2)  
 Prime Minister

To note.

MUS a/3

PRIME MINISTER

THE WEST MIDLANDS

I know that you are as concerned as I am at the serious industrial and economic decline in the West Midlands. Under the current criteria for Assisted Area status, most of the region would now qualify; indeed, Telford where the January unemployment rate was 20.6% would qualify as a Special Development Area. In his minute of 24 February, however, the Chancellor of the Exchequer sent you the first thoughts of MISC 14 on the review of regional economic policy and explained that it would not be consistent with the Government's regional policy to increase the coverage of the assisted areas so substantially at this moment. At the meeting of MISC 14, I indicated that I had one or two initiatives open to me under national schemes for industrial support and that I was putting together a modest package aimed at increasing substantially the take-up of the schemes by West Midlands Industry.

2 The CBI in the West Midlands region has been very statesman-like in handling the issue of Assisted Area status and with the blessing of the CBI nationally has been working on a proposal to set up a regional co-ordinating body to promote (but not to finance) industrial and commercial developments in the region of a self-help basis. I think this is an encouraging development and I have asked my officials to give them such advice and help





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as they can in getting the support of the Chambers of Commerce and all the local authorities in the region; however, the CBI have probably under-estimated the difficulty of getting all the local authorities to pull together given the extent to which they are increasingly doing their own thing in promoting job creation and seeking to attract new investment. If an association is established to carry out an effective role in the promotion of the region overseas, in a co-ordinated way incremental to the promotional effort which is undertaken on behalf of the UK as a whole, I would be prepared to provide some modest grant in aid, on a matching basis, of the kind now provided to associations in the Assisted Area regions. This possibility may be helpful in getting the various representative bodies to work together, and strong participation by industry would be a valuable plus factor.

3 The CBI and Chambers of Commerce are both anxious to collaborate with my Department in promoting our national schemes of assistance within the region. The schemes **I** have at my disposal include in particular a range of advisory services, the Department's technology awareness programmes and a variety of schemes providing grants for innovation. Hitherto, no special effort has been made to market these schemes in the West Midlands and it is a fact that the take-up by firms in the region does not in my view adequately reflect the extent to which they could help industry to grapple with the effects of the recession. In my view, a special effort is necessary and to achieve this, I am





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setting up, at the Department's West Midlands Regional Office, a "team for innovation". I am recruiting an industrial adviser who will head up the team. The team's main objective will be to promote the adoption of new technology and the growth of new industries by increased take-up of the help available under the Department's schemes.

4 I have also asked English Industrial Estates to investigate the industrial and commercial property market in the West Midlands and report to me if they identify any needs for the economic development of the region, especially in relation to high technology industry and small businesses which private sector developers are unwilling or unable to undertake. If necessary I will ask them to undertake development in the region even though it is not an Assisted Area.

5 I hope that the campaign can be fully underway by May and I propose to announce it just after Budget day. At the same time, it is important that we do not seek to claim too much for these proposals. Their merit is that they fit in well with the needs of the region and with the commitment of both the CBI and the Chambers of Commerce to the principle of self-help.

6 I am copying this minute to the Chancellor, the Secretaries of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Education and





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Science, Northern Ireland, Scotland, Wales, Employment and Environment, the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, the Chief Secretary, Sir Robert Armstrong and Mr Sparrow.

P J

9 March 1983

Department of Industry  
Ashdown House  
123 Victoria Street  
London  
SW1E 6RB





MR GOW

We will let you have a draft reply  
as soon as possible

WR  
11/3

HOUSE OF COMMONS  
LONDON SW1A 0AA

hsk

FROM: H. D. MILLER, M.P.

9th March, 1983.

The Rt. Hon. Mrs. Margaret Thatcher, M.P.

(F)

Dear Prime Minister

West Midland Situation  
Spanish Tariffs.

On Wednesday, 15th December, 1982, you were kind enough to receive a number of us who told you of our concern about the decline in morale and support in the West Midlands, a region where 11 marginal seats won in the last election account for more than half your Government's present majority. We thought this decline followed a worsening of the economic prospects in the area and put forward a number of measures aimed at restoring confidence and support for the Party.

Included among these measures was the need to resolve the tariff discrepancies in our trade with Spain, particularly as affecting cars and components, which the Secretary of State for Industry had publicly described the previous October as grotesque, the position as untenable and the subject as very much in the action file.

You disclosed to us that you had already personally warned the EEC Commissioner responsible that the high Spanish tariffs against British goods could not remain in force until Spain became a full member of the EEC and you left us in no doubt that, if action was not taken swiftly, Britain would act unilaterally. We understood that the period envisaged for effective EEC action was by the end of February. At the end of our meeting we decided that we should only discuss Spanish tariffs with the Press and Hal Miller was authorised to brief them on the welcome assurance you had given us, which he gave to the Birmingham Post and Evening Mail. Later on Monday, 7th February, some of us put the assurance on record in the House. The Minister did not confirm it in his reply to the debate but the commitment was checked the next day through Tristan Garel-Jones the Trade Whip, who confirmed it two days later.

From the tenor of Ministerial replies to Trade Questions on Monday, 21st February, also following the Statement on the EEC Trade Council on Wednesday, 23rd February and as a result of lobby conversations with the two Ministers of State in question from the Trade Department and the Foreign Office, we became concerned that the timetable was slipping and the commitment might no longer be secure. Accordingly, on Thursday, 3rd March, Hal Miller accompanied by Ian Gow saw Lord Cockfield and Peter Rees, QC. From this meeting Hal Miller came away with the clear impression that the issue of tariffs on cars and components had become enmeshed with other items such as tobacco and whisky, that the timetable was more protracted than we had been led to suppose and that the tariff reductions envisaged were likely to be considerably less than necessary to achieve reciprocity.



Because we valued your assurance so greatly and thought that action in defence of our national and regional interest in the matter of the Spanish tariffs on cars and components would demonstrate Government's understanding of and concern for the situation in the West Midlands and would help greatly to restore morale and support for the Party, we feel we must report to you our fears about the lack of tangible progress and ask for your personal intervention once more in the matter.

Yours sincerely  
Hal Miller

~~Quinn~~

Bill Knight

Eric Lockman

Laird Miller

Percy Greene

Colin Shephard

J. J. [unclear]

John Brackman  
John Stokes

Walter Budgett

Don [unclear]

Woma Hawley

Peter [unclear]

Ray [unclear]



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CONFIDENTIAL



*7/ae*

10 DOWNING STREET

11th March 1983

United Kingdom - Spain - Cars - Meeting with  
Hal Miller on 3rd March 1983

Many thanks for your letter of 7th March  
together with its most helpful enclosure.

I agree, entirely, that the Note which you  
enclosed should remain confidential.

IAN GOW

The Rt Hon The Lord Cockfield





*From the Secretary of State*

COVERING CONFIDENTIAL

Ian Gow Esq MP  
10 Downing Street  
London, SW1

7 March 1983

*Dear Ian,*

UNITED KINGDOM-SPAIN CARS: MEETING WITH HAL MILLER MP

.... I am enclosing, for your information, a note of the meeting which we had last Thursday with Hal Miller.

You will have seen the Friday 4 March Press coverage of the issue, and will also be aware that the Prime Minister held a meeting on Friday to discuss the position. Given the present sensitivity of the negotiations, the note has not been circulated outside the Department. I do not propose sending a copy to either Mr Miller or to the Whips Office.

Finally, may I thank you for setting up the meeting. I think it was most helpful.

*Yours,*  
*Arthur*

LORD COCKFIELD

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SECRETARY OF STATE FOR TRADE OFFICE MINUTE NUMBER: 399/83

MEETING BETWEEN THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND MINISTER FOR TRADE  
AND MR HAL MILLER MP: THURSDAY 3 MARCH 1983

Those present:-

Secretary of State for Trade  
Minister for Trade  
Mr Michael Neubert MP  
  
Mr Ian Gow MP  
Mr Hal Miller MP

The purpose of the meeting was to discuss with Mr Miller United Kingdom-Spain trade relations, particularly in respect of cars and car components. The meeting, as Mr Gow explained in his introduction, followed one between the Prime Minister and a number of Conservative MPs from the West Midlands shortly before Christmas. It was stressed by both sides that the meeting was a private one: Mr Miller had not informed his West Midlands colleagues of it. Discussion concentrated on HMG's attitude to the problem, and the particular concerns of the West Midlands.

HMG VIEW

Mr Gow began by recalling the Prime Minister's meeting. The Prime Minister had made clear that the Government shared the concern about the imbalance in trade terms between the United Kingdom and Spain. We were seeking to redress this through EC action: if this were not successful the Government would need to consider other steps.

The Secretary of State emphasised that the issue had been a great concern to him throughout his term of office, and he had made this clear in public statements. The problem was serious, and the trade terms unfair. The root problem, the terms of the 1970 EC-Spain Agreement, had been inherited by the United Kingdom on accession. For some time it had been hoped that the issue would be resolved by Spanish accession, but the date of accession was slipping back. Recognising this, the Government had increasingly made it clear that the problem must be on its way to solution ahead of Spanish accession being completed. There had been intensive discussions in Brussels by both the Minister for Trade and Mr Gray (Deputy Secretary/Department of Trade), and the Secretary of State had himself spoken to Commissioner Natali before the February FAC stressing the need for progress. It was made clear to the Commission that the portfolio could not be closed, however difficult. These discussions had, however, been kept at a relatively low profile. Otherwise other Member States would confuse the issue with their own demands and concerns. Spain would naturally wish to seek concessions in the agricultural sector for any in the industrial: on this the EC would not readily unite.

The Secretary of State fully recognised the seriousness of the problem. But it was important to remember the facts. These were that actual imports of Spanish cars into the United Kingdom had fallen from some 70,000 in 1980 to 50,000 in 1982. Over the same

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period our admittedly very small exports had risen sharply in percentage terms: from some 400 to 1,500. Component exports had also increased in money terms. Overall, there was a general balance on visible trade, and the substantial invisible imbalance was largely attributable to tourism. The latter could not easily be remedied.

The Secretary of State again emphasised that he recognised that United Kingdom-Spanish car trade was a high profile issue, on which something had to be done. The Government was not relaxing its efforts. Negotiations did, however, have to be pursued with some stealth and confidentiality. He felt that the Spanish government would undoubtedly offer something. The question was whether it would be adequate, particularly since any settlement would necessarily have to apply to all EC Member States. But some solution was needed to dispose of the "grit" in the accession discussions.

Mr Miller asked whether the negotiations with Spain were limited to cars. The Secretary of State and the Minister for Trade said that other issues were involved: for example, blonde tobacco and whisky exports to Spain.

WEST MIDLANDS POSITION

The Secretary of State asked whether the West Midlands' real interest was in the import of Spanish cars, or the export of United Kingdom ones.

Mr Miller said that there were two interest groups. The component manufacturers might have enjoyed an increase, but it was only a small one. Furthermore, there were indications that Ford might, because of the delay in accession, be looking to source more components (from small castings to gear components) domestically in Spain. In addition, it was a particular source of complaint that the GM Nova incorporated only £74 worth of United Kingdom components per car.

Secondly, there was the concern of the assembly manufacturers - essentially BL. Their main concern was the potential level of Nova exports. There were some signs that United Kingdom sourcing of Fiestas was being switched to Germany and, indeed, the United Kingdom. But the prospect of the Nova on top of Fiesta supplies, leading to Spanish exports of some 75-100,000 per annum, was manifestly unfair. The Spanish motor industry was now larger than the United Kingdom's, but gross disparities of trade opportunity between the two countries remained. It was this point which backbench MPs had concentrated on. If there were not signs of real progress towards redressing the problems of access to the Spanish market, there would be very considerable pressures for import restraint measures. He, personally, would not welcome this - but he had to recognise the realities of the situation.

The Secretary of State again emphasised that he recognised that there needed to be clear signs of progress. He could assure Mr Miller that the government was pursuing the problem vigorously. It had been raised with the Commission very shortly after the

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Prime Minister's meeting, and the pressure was being maintained: Commissioner Natali was under instructions to report further to the March FAC.

In the longer term, the introduction of VAT by the Spanish government would also help. This was due to take place in the course of 1984, and would help remove the distortion of present non-tariff taxes.

Mr Miller said that he understood that the effect of a reduction of the tariff to 20% would, because of taxes, reduce the retail price of United Kingdom car exports by only 8%. Politically, VAT alterations in 1984 was a long time off. Indeed, assuming a VAT level of 22% his calculations showed that there would remain a 30% difference in the sale price of Spanish and United Kingdom cars. He offered to send copies of the calculations to the Department. The Minister for Trade emphasised that it was a very complex calculation, but a important element was the terms of valuation for imports.

POSITION OF UNITED KINGDOM CAR MANUFACTURERS

The Secretary of State said that he had had discussions with both Ford (United Kingdom) and GM (United Kingdom). Ford had stressed the extent to which they were net exporters from the United Kingdom: Mr Miller suggested that this might not, in fact, be the case. The Secretary of State recognised that this was certainly not the case for GM, and that he would seek to clarify Ford's position.

The Minister for Trade probed BL's ability to take advantage of improved access to the Spanish market. Mr Miller was under no illusions. At present, BL had only 27 dealers in Spain, and was selling some 2,000 units per annum. But there was potential. BL had its own importing agency, and in the right trading environment could expect to increase its market in some 18 months.

CONCLUSION

Mr Miller stressed that his concern was that the present position was perceived in the West Midlands to be intolerable: statements by Mr Jenkin as well as the Secretary of State echoed this. The issue had become a "totem pole". There was a limit to how long he, and his colleagues, could claim that the matter was being dealt with urgently, if there were no tangible results. As a result of the Prime Minister's meeting some form of deadline was thought to have been set for the end of March - if not earlier. He recognised that negotiations inevitably had to be conducted in some secrecy, but time was running out. Results had to be apparent within the next few weeks.

The Secretary of State agreed with Mr Gow that it would be wrong to suggest, at this stage, that matters would be resolved by a specified date. But clearly the matter was urgent. He recognised that there were problems for component suppliers as well as car

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manufacturing. He also agreed that further consideration should be given to the sourcing activities of Ford and GM.

Finally, Mr Miller agreed with the Minister for Trade that it would be valuable if they could further discuss the handling of any Parliamentary business which touched on the issue, particularly Parliamentary Questions.

*John Rhodes*  
JOHN RHODES  
PS/SoS(Trade)  
Rocm 807 VS  
Extn 5422

4 March 1983

cc PS/Ministers  
PPSs  
PS/Secretary  
Mr Beckett, Sols  
Mr Gray  
Mr Roberts  
Miss Lackey, WEG  
Mr Burbridge, OT 3  
Mr Williams, ITP  
Mr Meadway, ITP  
Mr Wells, WEG  
Mr Garrod, Inf  
Mrs Drage, WEG  
Mr Bowder, V (Industry)

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Jiles

7th March 1983

I am writing to thank you and Peter Rees very much for having given up your time to see Hal Miller and me on Thursday afternoon.

We are both most grateful.

IAN GOW

The Rt Hon The Lord Cockfield



MAJ TON  
 Subject copy filed in  
 Spain March 1980  
 UK relations



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 be S-127  
 JV  
 B1  
 Hui yue

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

4 March 1983

Dear John,

SPANISH CARS

The Prime Minister held a meeting today to discuss the minutes of 1 March from the Secretary of State for Trade and 3 March from the Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, about Anglo-Spanish trade in cars. The Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, the Secretary of State for Trade, the Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Minister of State, Department of Industry and Mr. R.W. Gray (Department of Trade) were present.

The Prime Minister said it was agreed that the United Kingdom should accept the best terms for improved access for United Kingdom car exports to Spain which could be negotiated. The alternative options for putting pressure on the Spaniards by blocking the accession negotiations or unilaterally restricting Spanish imports should not be pursued. The Prime Minister said that important considerations in this decision were British Leyland's inability to export up to the enlarged quota they were seeking, the fact that other trade with Spain had shown some improvement and was currently roughly in balance, and the risk of adverse repercussions on other matters if the United Kingdom sought to put undue pressure on the Spaniards.

In discussion of the ways in which the current Spanish offer could be improved, it was noted that Spain were aware that the United Kingdom found their present proposals inadequate and would be seeking improvements. It was suggested that, while Spain had designed their proposals to favour British Leyland as against French and German manufacturers, it would be helpful if a duty quota on small cars could be obtained in order to facilitate exports of the British Leyland Metro car. It was pointed out, however, that in the previous negotiations Spain had been adamant that they were not prepared to offer anything below the mid-range cars, and that in 1982 British Leyland had sold 750 Metros in Spain in spite of the tariff, in addition to 1,000 light commercial vehicles; the company also assembled Landrovers in Spain and Portugal. The Secretary of State for Trade said that there were four possible improvements which might be negotiable:

/(a)



- (a) an increase in the quota for mid range cars from 4,000 to 5,000;
- (b) a further reduction in the tariff on these cars to 18 per cent. This would be particularly important since it would enable us to claim that we had succeeded in reducing the tariff by half;
- (c) a further reduction, though probably of only a few percentage points, in the duty on upper range cars;
- (d) a formula which would preserve the United Kingdom's right to seek further improvements.

It would be important that concessions obtained from Spain should last for at least three years in order to justify the establishment of dealer networks in Spain by United Kingdom exporters. It was agreed that an unqualified assurance to this effect could not be expected, and that while the United Kingdom should seek to obtain improvements along the lines the Secretary of State for Trade had indicated, our negotiators could not be tied down.

In discussion of the way in which such an improved deal could be sold to domestic opinion, it was recognised that it was unlikely to be welcomed by the car industry in the West Midlands and that it was therefore important that it should be presented in a single package together with the announcement of other improvements in our trade relations with Spain. The Secretary of State for Trade said that there were a number of measures of this kind which could be incorporated in such a package, including the introduction of VAT in Spain in the course of 1984, the re-sourcing of the Fiesta, and the dramatic increase in this country's exports to Spain of components. It was noted that the presentation of the package would be considerably improved if the support of the component manufacturers could be obtained. It would also be helpful if the United Kingdom could be seen to be seeking to improve the terms of our trade with Spain in such other sectors as machine tools. Action could also be taken with the automobile manufacturers themselves, both to impress on the major American multi-nationals how reasonable Britain's attitude had been, and to encourage United Kingdom manufacturers to improve their exports, particularly of the larger goods vehicles for which there were big market opportunities.

I am sending copies of this letter to the Private Secretaries to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, the Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Minister of State, Department of Industry, and Sir Robert Armstrong.

*Yours sincerely,*

*Michael Scholm*

John Rhodes, Esq.,  
Department of Trade.





HOUSE OF COMMONS  
LONDON SW1A 0AA

FROM H. D. MILLER, M.P.  
8th March, 1983.

West Midlands Members.

Dear Colleague,

Situation in the West Midlands  
Spanish Tariffs.

*Kamp*  
You will recall that a number of us went to see the Prime Minister on the evening of Wednesday, 15th December, 1982, to report on the decline in morale and support in the region and to suggest a number of measures aimed to restore confidence and support for the Party. Included among these measures was the need to resolve the discrepancies in our trade with Spain, particularly as affecting cars and components, which the Secretary of State for Industry had publicly described as grotesque the previous October and the position as untenable.

The Prime Minister disclosed that she had already personally warned the EEC Commissioner responsible that the high Spanish tariffs against British goods could not remain in force until Spain became a full member of the EEC and that she had left the Commissioner in no doubt that if action was not taken swiftly, Britain would act unilaterally. At the conclusion of the meeting I was authorised to tell the Press of the commitment, which I passed to the Birmingham Post and Evening Mail lobby correspondents. A number of us put it on the record in the House in the West Midlands debate on 7th February. Following the reply to that debate of John Selwyn Gummer, M.P. I checked the commitment with the Trade Whip and received confirmation that it stood.

After Trade Questions on Monday 21st February and the statement on the EEC Trade Council the following Wednesday, I became concerned about progress in dealing with the matter. On Thursday, 3rd March, I saw Lord Cockfield with Ian Gow, M.P., to discuss progress. It appeared to me that the issue of tariffs on cars and components had become enmeshed with other items such as tobacco and whiskey, that the timetable was considerably more protracted than we had been led to suppose and the tariff reductions were likely to be considerably less than necessary to achieve reciprocity.

I therefore think we should now write to the Prime Minister to seek her assistance in securing an earlier and fuller resolution of the matter and should be grateful to learn whether you would be willing to join me in signing a letter on the lines of the enclosed draft.

Yours ever,

*Hal*

Hal Miller.





DRAFT LETTER TO P.M.

HOUSE OF COMMONS  
LONDON SW1A 0AA

FROM: H. D. MILLER, M.P.

The Rt. Hon. Mrs. Margaret Thatcher, M.P.

Dear Prime Minister,

West Midland Situation  
Spanish Tariffs.

On Wednesday, 15th December, 1982, you were kind enough to receive a number of us who told you of our concern about the decline in morale and support in the West Midlands, a region where 11 marginal seats won in the last election account for more than half your Government's present majority. We thought this decline followed a worsening of the economic prospects in the area and put forward a number of measures aimed at restoring confidence and support for the Party.

Included among these measures was the need to resolve the tariff discrepancies in our trade with Spain, particularly as affecting cars and components, which the Secretary of State for Industry had publicly described the previous October as grotesque, the position as untenable and the subject as very much in the action file.

You disclosed to us that you had already personally warned the EEC Commissioner responsible that the high Spanish tariffs against British goods could not remain in force until Spain became a full member of the EEC and that you had left the EEC Commissioner in no doubt that, if action was not taken swiftly, Britain would act unilaterally. We understood that the period envisaged for effective EEC action was by the end of February. At the end of our meeting we decided that we should only discuss Spanish tariffs with the Press and Hal Miller was authorised to brief them on the welcome assurance you had given us, which he gave to the Birmingham Post and Evening Mail, later on Monday, 7th February, some of us put the assurance on record in the House. The Minister did not confirm it in his reply to the debate but the commitment was checked the next day through the Trade Whip who confirmed it two days later.

From the tenor of Ministerial replies to Trade Questions on Monday, 21st February, also following the Statement on the EEC Trade Council on Wednesday, 23rd February and as a result of lobby conversations with the two Ministers of State in question from the Trade Department and the Foreign Office we became concerned that the timetable was slipping and the commitment might no longer be secure. Accordingly, on Thursday, 3rd March, Hal Miller accompanied by Ian Gow, saw Lord Cockfield and Peter Rees, QC. From this meeting Hal Miller came away with the clear impression that the issue of tariffs on cars and components had become enmeshed with other items such as tobacco and whisky, that the timetable was considerably more protracted than we had been led to suppose and that the tariff reductions envisaged were likely to be considerably less than necessary to achieve reciprocity.

Because we valued your assurance so greatly and thought that action in defence of our national and regional interest in the matter of the Spanish tariffs on cars and components would demonstrate Government's understanding of and concern/



concern for the situation in the West Midlands and would help greatly to restore morale and support for the Party, ~~we~~ we feel we must report to you our fears about the lack of tangible progress and ask for your personal intervention once more in the matter.

Yours  
Sincerely



Cockfield  
(Times)

2nd March 1983

Spain

I am so sorry that I had to cancel our 5.00 p.m. meeting today.

This is just to confirm that Hal Millar and I will now come to see you in your room at the House of Lords at 4.30 p.m. tomorrow, Thursday 3rd March.

IAN GOW

The Rt Hon The Lord Cockfield