



ArB 000/3.	
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18 JUN 1982	
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INDEX	PA
	Stamp: 7 June 1982

BRITISH EMBASSY  
BRASILIA

Sir Antony Acland KCVO CMG  
Permanent Under-Secretary of State  
Foreign & Commonwealth Office

What about this?  
My feeling is - now  
quite yet. We can't  
see our own way clearly  
enough.

*Pos*  
Dear Anthony,

## FALKLANDS: AFTERMATH

1. By the time you receive this letter you will have seen my telegrams nos 254 and 255 putting forward some suggestions about Brazil's role in the aftermath of the present conflict with Argentina, in the hope that they might be of some use in briefing the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for their discussions with President Reagan and Mr Haig. I am sorry that I did not get them off earlier, largely owing to our preoccupation here with the highly unsatisfactory matter of the Vulcan bomber diverted to Rio de Janeiro.
2. Though I have no wish to try to get in on an act which is at present occupying much greater talents than mine, I should like to register my keen personal interest in seeing a satisfactory and lasting solution to the Falklands problem. As you know, I was involved in it in 1966/7, as Assistant Head of the then America Department, when Carlos Ortiz de Rosas was Minister/Counsellor at the Argentine Embassy. I became re-involved in September 1979 when I took over from George Hall as Assistant Under-Secretary of State for the Americas, and again found myself dealing with Ortiz de Rosas, this time as Ambassador. I also had several meetings with the Argentine Air Force team who were then in charge of the Foreign Ministry. I got deeply - perhaps too deeply - involved in Nicholas Ridley's ill-fated drive to negotiate with the Argentines a lease-back solution, which finally came unstuck in the Islands themselves. On my arrival here in March of last year my first thought was to get in touch with Oscar Camillion, the then Argentine Ambassador who subsequently became President Viola's Foreign Minister and is now, I hear, in danger of being imprisoned for his free-thinking views. When his successor, Hugo Caminos, arrived, he and I made early contact and hit it off together very well until the present crisis exploded. Since the break in relations, we have naturally steered well clear of each other; but I am confident that, if need be, we could get a constructive working relationship going again in short order.
3. For obvious reasons, the dialogue which Robin Fearn and I were able to keep up from time to time until this crisis hit us has now fallen by the wayside. In consequence, I have very little idea of thinking in the Office about the Falklands

/problem



problem and the aftermath of the present military phase, apart from what I glean from Ministerial statements and guidance telegrams. I suggested to Robin in the early days of April that it might be useful if I could return to London for a few days' consultation in order to get myself fully seized of the view from London. I was worried then that, as the crisis matured, the Brazilians would get more and more anxious and might modify their then non-committal posture. My fears do not seem to have been entirely unjustified, though I should say that the Brazilians have kept cooler heads than most of the other Latin Americans, with some honourable exceptions. I quite understood then that it was thought better that I should stay at my post; and obviously it has been impossible to leave it in recent weeks. But I suggest that the time may soon come when it would be no bad thing if I were given an opportunity of briefing myself in London and receiving fresh oral instructions, more particularly if the ideas in my telegram no 255 find favour. I have already cancelled the arrangements I had provisionally made, with your predecessor's agreement, to proceed on mid-tour leave on 18 June. I imagine that all those concerned at home are similarly having to abandon their summer holiday plans. But you may wish to consider either summoning me for consultations at a suitable moment when the dust has settled in the Falklands themselves or giving me permission to return home on abbreviated mid-tour leave, to which I would tack on an intensive week or so of briefing in Whitehall.

4. If you could find time to let me have an indication of your views by telegram, I would be most grateful.

*Yours ever,*

*Bill*

G W Harding

R + G. L. Mr Chase  
22/6 EJA/6

14/6/4

76

PS/PUS

PS/Mr Onslow

Minister

We may need to re-assess  
the high of developments  
within the last 24 hours.  
Should like to discuss  
with Mr. Ure, please.

Mr Ure  
You discussed this  
with Mr Onslow.

MOVEMENTS OF HM AMBASSADOR, BRASILIA

- A 1. Mr Harding has written to the PUS suggesting that we should consider calling him back for consultations shortly and reminding us that he was due for mid-tour leave in a week's time. processed 15/6
- B 2. Mr Onslow has at the same time suggested that it might be useful to call Mr Harding back to London shortly to consider Brazil's role in re-establishing our relations with Latin America.
- C 3. You have invited my comments on a proposed reply. This reflects my own views. I think it would be immensely useful to discuss this whole question with Mr Harding soon, but I too think that it would be better for him to stay at his post for a week or two more while we have the risk of further incidents such as the Vulcan and until we know the general background against which we are having to reconstruct our Latin American policies (ie will Argentina be trying to continue the war from the mainland after the fall of Port Stanley, etc).
- 4. I therefore recommend that the draft should issue.
- 5. I have had much in mind the need to keep not only Mr Harding but our other Ambassadors in the area in touch with future thinking. As you know we are only now in a position to put forward (as I have done today) papers for OD(SA) about the considerations for reconstructing our relations with South America. While we are precluded from sending OD(SA) papers to posts, I intend - when writing to Mr Harding - to enclose a draft of some of the work which has been done on this subject in the last few days so that he has an idea of the way our minds are working. Again, the value of such forward projections will be very much greater when we know the background against which we are having to try to put them into operation, and it should not be long before we do know this.

J B Ure

J B Ure

10 June 1982

cc:

Mr Giffard  
Mr Brighty, POD

S.A.M.D.

Bull 22 June

ARB 00293	
18 JUN 1982	
DESK OF [unclear] [unclear]	
INDEX	PA
Teleprint sent	

Miss Stearns  
to. Friday 25/6.

Teleprint sent

R.A. [unclear]  
11/vi

Ron 17/6.

75

AUG 20/3		
RECEIVED & REGISTERED NO.		
18 JUN 1982		
INDEXED	FILED	INITIALS
		W/S

Mr Ure

cc: Mr Brighty, POD

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1. I attach a self-explanatory draft reply to a letter to the PUS from Mr Harding in Brasilia. I should be grateful for any comments.

*R.A. Burns*

9 June 1982

R A Burns  
PS/PUS

(Revised)

DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despach/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM: ANTONY ACLAND

Reference

DEPARTMENT:

TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO: G W Harding Esq CMG CVO  
BRASILIA

Your Reference

- Top Secret
- Secret
- Confidential
- Restricted
- Unclassified

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

SUBJECT: FALKLANDS: AFTERMATH

.....In Confidence

1. Thank you for your letter of 7 June in which you raised the possibility of your coming back for

consultations/abbreviated mid-tour leave. *I am glad that it was good to hear from you. We have admired enormously*

the way you have been handling the Brazilians during the present crisis. *I am sorry that you had the Vulcan*

*landed on you in this way but it is good to know that we like you,* you are trying to think, as I am, about how we pick

up the pieces after we repossess the Islands.

2. I fear *however* that you are right in saying that at this testing time it would really not be *reasonable* right for you to

come back on your mid-tour leave next week as you had originally planned. It is impossible to say when the

present phase of the crisis will be over but things always seem to take rather longer than one hopes and

I would be surprised if the pressure eased up much before the end of the month or the middle of July.

In such circumstances, I am sure it is right for you to stay at your post, *although I much dislike the thought of people having to alter or disrupt their plans.*

3. *Nonetheless,* I agree with you that it would make sense to get you back for a short period of

CAVEAT.....

Enclosures—flag(s).....

*and it would be useful to have a talk at the right moment.*

*a bit of*

We will let you know when the

consultations. ~~Thereafter we will keep the possibility~~  
~~timing looks right. It is rather difficult to judge at~~  
~~in mind and let you know as soon as we think we can.~~  
~~the moment, so much depends on the circumstances~~  
~~manage something.~~ ↑ Meanwhile, I am asking John Ure to

consider whether there is anything more in writing here  
that we can let you have as an indication of our future  
thinking.

of our  
repossession  
of Port Stanley  
and on  
what happens  
immediately  
thereafter.

ACB 02013		74
REC. NO. OF MESSAGE NO.		
1 11 1982		
INDEX	FILE	SEARCHED
	P	WS

Mr Ure

FALKLANDS: BRAZIL'S ROLE AFTER HOSTILITIES

1. Mr Onslow has seen Brasilia telno 255 suggesting that Brazil has a role to play and that tactics could be concerted during President Reagan's visit to London. He has also seen a copy of your submission covering a draft reply.
2. Mr Onslow finds Mr Harding's line of argument convincing and thinks that we should consider asking Mr Harding to come back to London for consultations fairly soon.

*J M Cresswell*

9 June 1982

J M Cresswell  
PS/MR ONSLOW

cc

PS  
PS/PUS  
Mr Wright  
Mr Giffard  
Emergency Unit  
SAmD