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ARGENTINA: ECONOMIC SANCTIONS

Summary Record of discussion among Political Directors of the Ten, Brussels, 14 June 1982

1. Bullard (UK): Britain hoped soon to complete repossession of the islands. We should then be ready to cease all hostilities. How could we ensure that Argentina did likewise? Our main card was the military one: if Argentina continued to fight, we could do the same, not confining ourselves to the defence of the islands. We should also have the Argentine prisoners of war. But sanctions must also be a card of value. How best to play it?
2. Andreani (France): The task for Britain was to turn her military victory into a political victory. As President Mitterrand had indicated, repossession of the islands would create a new situation. At that point Britain should announce willingness to negotiate as envisaged in UNSCR 502. "It is not that we are looking for a way of ending sanctions, or that we regret imposing them: but we are fearful of a situation of 'no peace, no war' involving the whole of Europe on one side and the whole of Latin America on the other".
3. Pfeffer (FRG): Once the objective of UNSCR 502 (Argentine withdrawal) had been achieved by British arms, pressure to lift sanctions would be very strong.
4. Bottai (Italy): Total political solidarity with Britain, despite inability to continue sanctions after the first month. Recovery of the islands would open a new phase. Italy would then envisage opening of negotiations between Britain and Argentina, no doubt with certain conditions. No 'blank cheque' for Britain.
5. Jakobovits-Szeged (Netherlands): There must be negotiations, and Britain should beware of making it impossible for Argentina to negotiate ~~and~~ by insisting on total victory.
6. Dyvig (Denmark): There must be negotiations, and "don't make them impossible by winning the war". If, after repossession, Argentina was ready to negotiate and Britain was not, it would be very difficult to maintain sanctions.
7. Cahen (Belgium): Sanctions could perhaps end on the day when negotiations began.
8. Katapodis (Greece) confined himself to asking whether the British question was not premature. Bloes (Luxembourg), Corcoran (Ireland) and Jenkins (Commission) did not speak.
9. Bullard asked partners to understand the strength of feeling in Britain. Any ten men in the street would say that Argentina had forfeited any say in the future of the islands; Britain had

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not lost over 200 lives and several fine ships in order to resume the talks where they left off in February; it could be years before the islanders would be willing to speak to an Argentine. The most we might contemplate would be a pause for reflection and reconstruction during which no doors would be closed.

10. After further discussion on unchanged lines, Cahen (Presidency) summed up: all would reflect on the matter, and Ministers would reply to Mr Pym's message in writing and/or orally when they next met.

dh.

15 June 1982

J L Bullard

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