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 HD/PLANNING STAFF  
 HD/ECD(E)  
 PS (6)  
 PS/MR HURD  
 PS/MR RIFKIND  
 PS/PUS  
 MR EVANS  
 MR THOMAS  
 RESIDENT CLERK

MR GOODALL CABINET OFFICE

IMMEDIATE

N° 10 DS (2)

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CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 130800Z

FM WASHINGTON 130150Z

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELNO 3681 OF 12 NOVEMBER 1982,

INFO IMMEDIATE BTDO NEW YORK (FOR PS/SOST), PRIORITY PARIS, BONN,  
 ROME, MOSCOW, COPENHAGEN, UKDEL NATO, UKDEL OECD, UKREP BRUSSELS,  
 AND ROUTINE TOKYO, OTTAWA, BRUSSELS, THE HAGUE,  
 INFO SAVING ATHENS, DUBLIN, LUXEMBOURG.

MY TWO IPT'S (NOT TO ALL): EAST/WEST ECONOMIC RELATIONS (PIPELINE):  
 MEETING OF THE FOUR.

1. AFTER TODAY'S MEETING WITH THE AMERICANS REPORTED IN MY TELEGRAM  
 UNDER REFERENCE, THE FOUR MET AGAIN AT THE DANISH EMBASSY TO DISCUSS  
 THE SITUATION WE HAD NOW REACHED.

THERE WERE AGAIN THREE POINTS TO BE COVERED.

- (I) PUBLIC HANDLING.
- (II) THE INTERPRETIVE SIDE LETTER.
- (III) EXTRA-TERRITORIALITY.

2. ON THE FIRST POINT, THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR, ON INSTRUCTIONS, PUT  
 FORWARD TWO NEW ARGUMENTS AGAINST PUBLICATION OF THE SUMMARY OF  
 CONCLUSIONS. FIRST, IF THE DOCUMENT WAS OFFICIALLY PUBLISHED THERE  
 WOULD BE A RISK THAT IT WOULD PROVOKE CONTRADICTIONARY COMMENTARIES  
 IN THE PRESS OR WORSE FROM OFFICIAL SPOKESMEN. THIS COULD  
 EASILY DEVELOP INTO EXCHANGES OF CONTRARY INTERPRETATIONS AS WE HAD  
 SEEN AFTER VERSAILLES. THIS COULD DAMAGE FROM THE START THE WHOLE  
 PROCESS WE WERE TRYING TO ESTABLISH. SECONDLY, THE PROBLEMS OF THE  
 GREEKS AND THE IRISH COULD MORE EASILY BE HANDLED IF THE DOCUMENT

PROCESS WE WERE TRYING TO ESTABLISH. SECONDLY, THE PROBLEMS OF THE GREEKS AND THE IRISH COULD MORE EASILY BE HANDLED IF THE DOCUMENT WERE NOT PUBLISHED.

3. IN THE DISCUSSION THAT FOLLOWED, A NUMBER OF COUNTER-ARGUMENTS WERE PUT FORWARD BY THE GERMANS AND OURSELVES:-

(I) THE DOCUMENT WAS BOUND TO LEAK, PROBABLY SOONER THAN LATER. THE RISK OF COUNTER-COMMENTARIES WAS THEREFORE PRESENT WHETHER THE DOCUMENT WAS PUBLISHED OFFICIALLY OR NOT. WHAT WAS NEEDED IN EITHER CASE WAS A SELF-RESTRAINING ORDINANCE.

(II) IF WE TRIED TO KEEP THE DOCUMENT SECRET, IT WOULD BE REGARDED AS MORE RATHER THAN LESS SIGNIFICANT (''A NEW SECRET STRATEGY'') BETTER MAKE IT PUBLIC AT THE BEGINNING SO THAT IT COULD BE SEEN FOR WHAT IT WAS. IN ANY CASE, IT WOULD BE DRAGGED OUT OF US AFTER A FEW WEEKS, PARTICULARLY IF IT LEAKED IN BITS, WHICH COULD DISTORT THE WHOLE PICTURE IN WAYS THAT COULD BE DAMAGING TO US.

(III) IF IT WAS OFFICIALLY PUBLISHED, THERE WOULD BE LESS PRESSURE FOR COMMENT THAN IN THE CASE OF INDIVIDUAL NATIONAL STATEMENTS.

(IV) THE TONE OF THE DOCUMENT WAS LOW-KEY. THE US DRAFT FOR A US PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT WAS, ON THE CONTRARY, COUCHED IN MORE AGGRESSIVE TERMS. THE AMERICANS WOULD CERTAINLY WANT TO KEEP SOMETHING OF THAT FLAVOUR. THIS WOULD RISK PRODUCING EVEN STRONGER COUNTER-COMMENTARIES THAN THE DOCUMENT.

(V) THE TIMING POINT WAS ALSO RELEVANT. IF PRESIDENT REAGAN MADE A BRIEF REFERENCE IN HIS BROADCAST TOMORROW ON THE LINES WALLIS HAD SUGGESTED (PARA OF MY FIRST IPT) THIS WOULD BE LIKELY TO ATTRACT MINIMUM ATTENTION AND COMMENT, GIVEN ALL THE OTHER THINGS THAT WOULD BE HAPPENING (BREZHNEV'S FUNERAL, ANDROPOV'S APPOINTMENT, WALESIA'S RELEASE ETC).

(VI) THE FRENCH HAD REFERRED TO THE DANGER OF REPEATING WHAT HAD HAPPENED AFTER VERSAILLES. BUT THERE WAS LESS RISK THIS TIME. THE DOCUMENT HAD BEEN CAREFULLY NEGOTIATED. IF INDIVIDUAL AMERICAN SPOKESMAN CLAIMED MORE FOR IT THAN WE THOUGHT JUSTIFIED, WE COULD SIMPLY REFER TO THE TEXT OF THE DOCUMENT, ASSUMING IT HAD BEEN PUBLISHED. IF IT HAD NOT BEEN PUBLISHED, WE WOULD BE MUCH MORE LIKELY TO HAVE TO CONTRADICT THE COMMENT.

4. THE CONSENSUS AT THE END OF THIS DISCUSSION WAS ONCE AGAIN IN FAVOUR OF PUBLICATION. BUT THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR COULD NOT AGREE ON THE BASIS OF HIS PRESENT INSTRUCTIONS. HE ARGUED THAT THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF THE FOUR HAD AGREED AT HESSELET THAT THE DOCUMENT SHOULD NOT BE PUBLISHED. ONLY THEY COULD REVERSE THAT AGREEMENT. THE PRESIDENCY SUGGESTED THAT THE FOREIGN MINISTERS CONCERNED SHOULD CONTACT ONE ANOTHER BY TELEPHONE TOMORROW TO TRY TO REACH AGREEMENT ON THIS IN TIME TO MEET THE AMERICAN DEADLINE (1330Z). THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR SAID THAT CHEYSSON WAS IN KUWAIT BUT COULD

AGREEMENT ON THIS IN TIME TO MEET THE AMERICAN DEADLINE (1330Z). THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR SAID THAT CHEYSSON WAS IN KUWAIT BUT COULD PROBABLY BE CONTACTED. HE SUGGESTED THAT IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO AGREE BOTH ON WHETHER TO CONSENT TO PUBLICATION AND ON THE NEED FOR ALL THE PARTICIPANTS TO EXERCISE MAXIMUM RESTRAINT IN SUBSEQUENT COMMENT.

5. DISCUSSION OF THE NEED FOR AN INTERPRETATIVE SIDE LETTER (PARA 3 OF MY FIRST IPT) WAS BRIEF AND CONSTRUCTIVE. WE ALL AGREED, INCLUDING THE FRENCH, THAT THE TERMS OF SHULTZ'S MESSAGE TODAY TO THE FOUR EUROPEAN FOREIGN MINISTERS (MY SECOND IPT) FULLY MET THE TWO POINTS ON WHICH THE FRENCH HAD EXPRESSED RESERVATIONS. THERE WAS THEREFORE NO NEED TO INSIST ON A SIDE LETTER.

6. DISCUSSION OF THE PROBLEM OF EXTRA-TERRITORIALITY (PARA 4 OF MY FIRST IPT) WAS SIMILARLY BRIEF. WE AGREED THAT WALLIS'S RESPONSE TO THE DANISH AMBASSADOR'S REMARKS TODAY WAS ADEQUATE. THE DANISH AMBASSADOR WILL RECORD THIS EXCHANGE AND SEND IT TO THE STATE DEPARTMENT AS OUR UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT WAS SAID. THE IMPORTANCE WE ATTACH TO THIS QUESTION AND OUR INTENTION OF PURSUING IT AS A MATTER OF URGENCY THEN BE CLEARLY ON RECORD.

7. PLEASE SEE MIFT.

FCO PASS SAVING ATHENS DUBLIN LUXEMBOURG.

WRIGHT

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