

Mr Faulkner

WED

W65.

cc Martin

+  
Ope

DISTRIBUTION SELECTORS  
FILE COPY

PRIME MINISTER'S

PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL No. T61AA/83

SECRET

7184 - 1

ZZ BONN

GRS 335

SECRET

FM FCO 091252Z MAY 83

TO FLASH BONN

TELEGRAM NUMBER 248 OF 9 MAY

EUROPEAN COUNCIL, STUTTGART: BRITISH ELECTIONS

TELECON PRIVATE SECRETARY/EASTWOOD

1. DATE OF ELECTIONS WILL BE ANNOUNCED HERE AT 1430 LOCAL TIME. THE PRIME MINISTER WOULD LIKE THE FOLLOWING SECRET AND PERSONAL MESSAGE TO BE DELIVERED TO CHANCELLOR KOHL BEFORE THEN AND, FAILING THAT, AS SOON AS POSSIBLE THEREAFTER: BEGINS.

DEAR HERR CHANCELLOR

WE ARE ANNOUNCING TODAY THAT THERE WILL BE A GENERAL ELECTION IN THE UNITED KINGDOM ON 9 JUNE. " I WANTED TO BE IN TOUCH WITH YOU AT ONCE.

AFTER THE MOST CAREFUL THOUGH I HAVE DECIDED THAT IT WOULD NOT BE IN THE NATIONAL INTEREST TO DELAY AN ELECTION ANY LONGER. BUT THE DATE I HAVE HAD TO CHOOSE IS VERY CLOSE TO THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL IN STUTTGART ON 6/7 JUNE. WE SHALL BE TELLING THE PRESS IN ANSWER TO THE INEVITABLE QUESTIONS THAT THE UNITED KINGDOM WILL OF COURSE BE REPRESENTED AT STUTTGART BUT THAT DECISIONS ON OUR REPRESENTATION HAVE YET TO BE TAKEN.

I SHALL NEED A LITTLE TIME TO CONSIDER WHETHER IT WILL BE POSSIBLE FOR ME TO ATTEND THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL IN PERSON, IF ONLY FOR PART OF THE PROCEEDINGS. I VERY MUCH WANTED TO ATTEND TO HELP MAKE THIS COUNCIL, UNDER YOUR PRESIDENCY, AN OUTSTANDING SUCCESS (AND THIS CONSIDERATION HAS BEEN MUCH IN MY MIND IN THE DIFFICULT DECISION I HAD TO MAKE ABOUT THE TIMING OF THE ELECTION). ON THE OTHER HAND, I KNOW YOU WILL UNDERSTAND HOW DIFFICULT IT WOULD BE FOR ME TO BE AWAY FROM THE UNITED KINGDOM DURING THE CRUCIAL CLOSING DAYS OF OUR CAMPAIGN. I SHALL BE IN TOUCH WITH YOU AGAIN ABOUT THIS ISSUE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

1

SECRET

/OF COURSE,

SECRET

7184 - 1

OF COURSE, THE QUESTION OF OUR BUDGET PROBLEM NOW BECOMES ALL THE MORE CRITICAL AND URGENT. I VERY MUCH HOPE THAT WE CAN FIND A SOLUTION AT THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COUNCIL ON 24 MAY.

MEANWHILE, I AM MOST GRATEFUL TO YOU FOR ALL THE HELP YOU HAVE GIVEN TO THE UNITED KINGDOM AND TO ME PERSONALLY. THIS WILL BE OF CONTINUING IMPORTANCE TO ME IN THE DAYS AND WEEKS AHEAD.

WITH MY BEST WISHES, YOURS EVER, MARGARET THATCHER.  
ENDS.

PYM

NNNN

DISTRIBUTION

LIMITED

HEAD ECD (I)

HEAD/WED

HEAD/ECD (E)

HEAD/NEWS DEPT

PS

PS/MR HURD

PS/PUS

MR EVANS

MR

MR HANNAY

cc Election: Grand Election 1988

OUT TELEGRAM

cc 1/10/88

Classification and Caveats

Precedence Deskby

SECRET AND PERSONAL

FLASH

ZCZC 1 ZCZC  
 GRS 2 GRS  
 CLASS 3 SECRET AND PERSONAL  
 CAVEATS 4  
 DESKBY 5  
 FM FCO 6 FM FCO  
 PRE/ADD 7 TO FLASH BONN  
 TEL NO 8 TELEGRAM NO

A-J.C. 9/5  
k-a.

9 EUROPEAN COUNCIL, STUTTGART: BRITISH ELECTIONS  
10 TELECON PRIVATE SECRETARY/EASTWOOD

11 1. Date of elections will be announced here at 1430  
12 local time. The Prime Minister would like the following  
13 message to be delivered to Chancellor Kohl before then and,  
14 failing that, as soon as possible thereafter:  
15 Begins.

16 Dear Herr Chancellor

17 We are announcing today that there will be a General  
18 Election in the United Kingdom on 9 June. I wanted to be  
19 in touch with you at once.

20 After the most careful though I have decided that it  
21 would not be in the national interest to delay an Election  
22 any longer. But the date I have had to choose is very close  
23 to the European Council in Stuttgart on 6/7 June. We shall  
24 be telling the press in answer to the inevitable questions  
25 that the United Kingdom will of course be represented at

NNNN ends telegram		BLANK	Catchword Stuttgart
File number	Dept	Distribution	
Drafted by (Block capitals) BJP/AM		LIMITED Head ECD (I) PS PS/Mr Hurd PS/PUS Mr Evans Mr James Mr Hannay Head WED Head ECD(E) Head, News Dept	
Telephone number	Authorised for despatch 9/5		
Comcen reference	Time of despatch		

PS / No 10

OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

	Classification and Caveats	Page
	SECRET AND PERSONAL	2

<<<<  
1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28  
29  
30  
31  
32  
33  
34

<<<<  
Stuttgart but that decisions on our representation have yet to be taken.  
I shall need a little time to consider whether it will be possible for me to attend the European Council in person, if only for part of the proceedings. I very much wanted to attend to help make this Council, under your Presidency, an outstanding success (and this consideration has been much in my mind in the difficult decision I had to make about the timing of the Election). On the other hand, I know you will understand how difficult it would be for me to be away from the United Kingdom during the crucial closing days of our campaign. I shall be in touch with you again about this issue as soon as possible.  
Of course, the question of our budget problem now becomes all the more critical and urgent. I very much hope that we can find a solution at the Foreign Affairs Council on 24 May.  
Meanwhile, I am most grateful to you for all the help you have given to the United Kingdom and to me personally. This will be of continuing importance to me in the days and weeks ahead.  
With my best wishes, Yours ever, Margaret Thatcher.  
Ends.

PYM  
NNNN

NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword
--------------------	-------	-----------



*M. C. (No 10)*  
*Ad 9/5 We spoke*  
*h-a - [Signature] 3/5*

Stuttgart and the General Election

1. These notes are written on the assumption that the timing of Stuttgart (6-7 June) will not, and should not, influence the choice of the election date; but that, once the choice has been made, there are important issues relating to Stuttgart which need to be settled.

2. If the choice is October or later, then the implications for Stuttgart are reasonably clear. We continue to go all out for an interim settlement on 1983 refunds by, or at, Stuttgart; and the avoidance of any commitment there on new own resources. Failure at Stuttgart on the first objective need not be decisive. There are Foreign Affairs Councils in June and July which could provide the occasion for a settlement which would fulfil the March European Council timetable. There will be time after Stuttgart for Ministers to decide what action we should take if we do not obtain a satisfactory agreement by the Summer break.

3. If the choice is June, the chances of success for our present approach of trying to bounce through a satisfactory decision on 1983 refunds could be enhanced. The 'election factor' - bringing into play considerations of Alliance unity at a crucial time as well as continuing British membership of the Community - will be at its maximum. The avoidance of any damaging linkage between the long term and the interim will be easier; it will be clear to all that commitments on the long term cannot be sought on the eve of an election.

/4.

4. The Prime Minister's willingness to attend at least part of the Stuttgart meeting will be very important. It is difficult to see Chancellor Kohl exerting himself on our behalf, as we need him to do, in the Prime Minister's absence: he may even feel that his own plans for a major European success at Stuttgart are being undermined. It is equally difficult to see other Heads of Government swallowing the bitter pill of an interim resettlement which will give them pain if we are not represented at their level. The conclusions that will be (tendentiously) drawn in many European capitals, that we attach only secondary importance to Community issues, will be thoroughly unhelpful for the achievement of our EC objectives both at Stuttgart and thereafter.

5. Of course there can be no guarantee of success at Stuttgart. But the domestic handling of a setback there could be easier if the Prime Minister had attended the meeting than if she had not.

6. This suggests that if there is to be a June election:

- (i) the Prime Minister should go to Stuttgart for at least some of the time;
- (ii) she should tell Chancellor Kohl (either directly or through his office) of her intentions before - even if only just before - an announcement is made;
- (iii) she should emphasise to him the importance to the British Government of a satisfactory outcome on the budget, and ask for his help in achieving this and in explaining to the participants that she will not be able to attend the whole of the European Council; and
- (iv) it would probably also be wise to envisage messages to the other participants in the European Council.

DF