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FM BONN 191815Z NOV 84

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1099 OF 19 NOVEMBER

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, PARIS, MOSCOW, UKDEL NATO, DUBLIN,

UKDEL VIENNA

INFO SAVING WARSAW

PUS'S TALKS WITH STATE SECRETARY MEYER-LANDRUT: 19 NOVEMBER

SUMMARY

1. THE PUS HAD A VERY USEFUL DAY OF TALKS WITH MEYER-LANDRUT COVERING A WIDE RANGE OF SUBJECTS. BRITISH AND GERMAN VIEWS ON THE PRESENT JUNCTURE IN EAST/WEST RELATIONS VERY SIMILAR. PUS ALSO CALLED ON MINISTER OF STATE MOELLEMANN AND STATE SECRETARY RUHFUS (MY TELNOS 1096 AND 1097). THIS TELEGRAM AND MIFT COVER EAST/WEST RELATIONS. TWO FURTHER IFTS COVER (A) POLAND AND (B) MIDDLE EAST.

DETAIL

2. I WAS STRUCK BY THE SIMILARITY OF THE VIEWS EXPRESSED BY THE TWO SIDES ON EAST/WEST RELATIONS, A SUBJECT ON WHICH MEYER-LANDRUT IS A NOTABLE EXPERT. I THEREFORE SUGGESTED THAT THE MAIN POINTS WHERE AGREEMENT HAD BEEN EXPRESSED SHOULD BE NOTED IN A JOINTLY PRODUCED LIST, WHICH COULD BE USEFUL IN FURTHER DISCUSSION IN POCO AND POSSIBLY AS A BASIS FOR WIDER EUROPEAN AGREEMENT. MIFT CONTAINS OUR DRAFT OF SUCH A LIST, WHICH WE ARE CONVEYING TO THE AUSWAERTIGES AMT. GRATEFUL FOR COMMENTS ON 20 OR 21 NOVEMBER.

3. OTHER EAST/WEST POINTS MADE BY THE GERMANS ARE NOTED BELOW.

4. REAGAN'S SDI INITIATIVE MUST HAVE BROUGHT HOME TO THE SOVIET UNION THAT THE AMERICANS MIGHT MAKE MAJOR LEAP FORWARD IN DEFENCE TECHNOLOGY. THIS WOULD INCREASE MOSCOW'S INTEREST IN ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS.

5. UNDER THE SOVIET SYSTEM THE IMPULSE NEEDED FOR SUCCESS IN ARMS CONTROL MUST COME FROM THE TOP. HENCE THE IMPORTANCE OF AN EARLY US/SOVIET SUMMIT. SUCH A SUMMIT MIGHT AROUSE LESS PUBLIC EXPECTATION IF IT WERE HELD DURING A MULTILATERAL CSCE ANNIVERSARY SUMMIT. (THE PUS REMINDED MEYER-LANDRUT OF THE WORDING OF THE TEN'S STATEMENT ON THIS).

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6. IF US/SOVIET ARMS NEGOTIATIONS RESUMED, THE EUROPEANS WOULD NEED TO TAKE CARE THAT DECISIONS WERE NOT TAKEN OVER THEIR HEADS.

7. THERE WAS NO INDICATION THAT THE RUSSIANS WERE INTERESTED IN A MERGER BETWEEN START AND INF. HARTMANN, UNDER SECRETARY COVERING ARMS CONTROL, REPEATED THE GERMAN IDEA OF A NEGOTIATING ROOF UNDER WHICH SEPARATE INF AND START TALKS COULD BE HELD. THIS BORE SOME SIMILARITY TO THE US IDEA OF AN ARMS CONTROL UMBRELLA, AT WHICH CHERNENKO HAD SEEMED TO BE HINTING APPROVINGLY IN HIS LATEST INTERVIEW.

8. THE EXPIRY IN DECEMBER 1985 OF THE US AND SOVIET UNDERTAKINGS TO OBSERVE SALT 2 WAS ONE FACTOR WHICH MIGHT INFLUENCE THE RUSSIANS TO RESUME STRATEGIC ARMS NEGOTIATIONS NEXT YEAR.

9. ARMS CONTROL IN THE CONVENTIONAL FIELD MUST NOT BE NEGLECTED. WE SHOULD PERSIST IN OUR EFFORTS FOR PROGRESS IN MBFR. BUT A FRESH LOOK AT MBFR WAS NEEDED BEFORE THE CSCE REVIEW CONFERENCE IN VIENNA IN 1986. TWO FINDINGS OF SUCH A STUDY MIGHT BE THAT

- (A) SOME CONCLUSION MUST BE DRAWN FROM THE FAILURE OF 11 YEARS OF DATA DISCUSSION TO PRODUCE RESULTS: AND
- (B) A POLITICAL IMPULSE WOULD HAVE TO BE INJECTED IF PROGRESS WAS TO BE ACHIEVED IN MBFR.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING TO WARSAW

REPEATED AS REQUESTED

BULLARD

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EAST WEST & US/SOVIET RELATIONS

LIMITED	PS
SOVIET D	PS/LADY YOUNG
DEFENCE D	PS/MR RIFKIND
RESEARCH D	PS/MR LUCE
PLANNING STAFF	PS/PUS
EED	MR DEREK THOMAS
NAD	SIR W HARDING
WED	MR GOODALL
ACDD	MR JENKINS
	MR WESTON
	MR DAVID THOMAS

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