

PRIME MINISTER

TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH CHANCELLOR KOHL

Judging from the enclosed message from Chancellor Kohl, received this afternoon, the subjects which he is likely to raise are:

(i) his imminent visit to Washington. You will wish to mention your own visit, which will be announced tomorrow. The main subjects for his visit are likely to be East/West relations, arms control and the US economy.

(ii) the recent France/German Summit. Copies of our reporting telegrams are enclosed.

(iii) WEU. We agree with him on the virtues of developing it provided that it is not divisive of the Alliance. This will require careful presentation to the Americans.

(iv) the Dooge Committee. You could welcome the emphasis of his message on the internal market. More generally you will want to urge him not to expect too much from this European Council. Discussions are still at an early stage. A cautionary word on European Union too.

(v) three points which you might mention to him are:

- the need to reach agreement at the European Council on the remaining issues of the enlargement negotiations;



- your hope that as a result, the Germans will agree to bring forward the date of introduction of new Own Resources; and
- the need for the UK and FRG to stand firm at the Council against exaggerated demands for funds for Integrated Mediterranean Programmes.

C.D.P.

P.S. Briefing subsequently received from FCO - very late - and attached.

27 November 1984



Prime Minister  
CDP



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

27 November 1984

President - Gorbachev  
USSR - arms talks  
Nuclear threshold - conversion  
Kohl

So. Remembrance

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- Anthony  
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Dear Charles,

Prime Minister's Telephone Conversation with Chancellor Kohl:  
28 November

Thank you for your letter of 20 November about Chancellor Kohl's plan to telephone the Prime Minister, probably on 28 November. The Embassy in Bonn report that Kohl is anxious for a good talk with the Prime Minister before he visits Washington on 30 November. (I enclose Sir Julian Bullard's telno 1125.) The themes of the Chancellor's discussions with President Reagan will be uppermost in his mind, and in particular the prospects for East/West relations, arms control and defence.

East/West Relations

Kohl's approach is not only to welcome the forthcoming Shultz/Gromyko meeting as evidence that dialogue is underway again, but also to claim some credit for it. The Germans regard East/West dialogue, particularly on arms control, as indispensable and to be pursued in good times and bad. Although Kohl has eschewed Schmidt's favourite role of mediator and public critic of the US, for domestic consumption he will want to portray his visit as evidence of personal achievement in East/West relations. His prestige at home is at a low ebb: he needs a foreign policy success.

The Prime Minister could say that we too welcome the Shultz/Gromyko meeting. But it will be important to remember that it will be concerned with the agenda and format of subsequent substantive negotiations. The problems of substance still remain. Expectations should not be allowed to rise too high too early. While progress is possible, it is unlikely to be rapid. The Prime Minister could add that the Russians have made a shrewd tactical concession by dropping their previous insistence that Cruise missiles and Pershing IIs should be withdrawn before discussion of INF or START could resume. We think it likely that at Geneva Gromyko could press Shultz for a 'reciprocal' concession on substance. The Russians no doubt hope that domestic and West European pressures will mount on the Americans to make unilateral concessions in order to move the actual negotiations. As ever, they will exploit every opportunity to wedge-drive and undermine Alliance unity. It will be important that our meetings with the Americans should not give them any such opportunities.

/Kohl





Kohl may refer to the postponement of Herr Genscher's visit to Poland (it would have been the first by a senior Western Foreign Minister since martial law). The Prime Minister could express our support for the German decision. It is right that the resumption of Ministerial contact should be on the West's terms. In the Ten and NATO we should continue to pursue opportunities to re-engage Western influence. The Prime Minister could say that we would support private German efforts to encourage a more forthcoming American approach to Poland. This is consistent with our policy of developing contacts with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe to recreate confidence and build the right political framework around the arms control process.

#### NATO Initiative on Conventional Defence

It seems that a communique may be issued after Kohl's visit. This may refer not only to prospects for East/West relations and arms control in broad terms, but also to work on an initiative to lay the ground work for a long-term programme to strengthen NATO's conventional defence. I enclose a self-contained background note agreed with the Ministry of Defence. The Prime Minister might say to Kohl that while the management of East/West relations and arms control will be central to NATO's security policy in 1985, experience over INF argues against making necessary conventional improvements conditional on developments in arms control. We hope any public reference to the NATO conventional defence initiative will be in general terms. It will be important to gain the support of other allies and not give the impression that the initiative has been pre-cooked by the Germans and the Americans. The Prime Minister could add that our own attitude will depend on precisely what is proposed, and ask Kohl if he has been in touch with other partners and Lord Carrington.

If Kohl wishes to discuss the initiative the Prime Minister might agree that we need to show the Americans that practical steps are being taken to meet weaknesses in conventional defence highlighted in the Nunn Amendment, notably on aircraft shelters and war stocks. Both the UK and Germany are putting increased emphasis on war stocks and Germany has agreed to an increase in NATO's infrastructure budget. The Prime Minister could add, more generally, that we see advantage in the initiative as evidence that the allies are grappling with longer-term problems. This should help to keep congressional pressures at bay, contribute to the maintenance of public support for defence and help ensure effective management of available resources. But it is important that the exercise should not give rise to unrealistic expectations, especially about the prospects for additional resources. The Prime Minister might say to Kohl that we think it important that the exercise should not be seen as endorsing the (mistaken) view that conventional defence is in a state of parlous weakness.

/The European





The European Community

If discussion turns to the Community the Prime Minister might draw on the points in the Foreign Secretary's separate minute to her of today's date on European Union. The Prime Minister might say that she looks forward to working closely with Kohl at the European Council in Dublin.

UN Law of the Sea Convention

?? The German Cabinet decided on 27 November that the FRG will not sign the Convention, but will not veto signature by the Community. We are told that Kohl is unlikely to raise this question. If however he does, the Prime Minister could tell Kohl that the Cabinet will consider the position on 29 November, and that we shall let the Germans know of our decision before any public announcement.

Yours ever,

Colin Budd

(C R Budd)  
Private Secretary

Discussion with  
C.R.S.C. / Secretary  
Shunday night

→ I shall save interest  
Serelle arrangement  
as regards  
date of resp.  
among new  
members of  
Commission.





## PROPOSED NATO INITIATIVE ON CONVENTIONAL DEFENCE

1. The Americans raised informally with us in September the question of launching an initiative in the Alliance to 'lay the groundwork for a long term programme to strengthen NATO's conventional defence'. They had in mind a long term study directed by the Secretary General on the basis of a mandate from Ministers: and saw this as complementing short term measures to fill deficiencies (notably in warstocks and aircraft shelters) identified by Senator Nunn in the summer. The UK and FRG have been playing a major role here by devoting additional resources to warstocks and (in the case of the Germans) agreeing to an increase in funding for NATO's common infrastructure programme to levels favoured by other Allies (including the UK).
  
2. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and the Defence Secretary took the view that we had an interest in responding positively to the idea of a longer term study, both in order to help manage the pressures the European members of the Alliance could expect to come under from the US, and also in the light of our own strong interest in encouraging the better use of NATO's collective defence resources. But at the same time, they recognised that the American suggestion contained serious risks. It would be necessary to minimise the danger of any initiative being seen (mistakenly) as an endorsement of the view that conventional defence was in a state of parlous weakness, or as confirmation that non nuclear defence was possible. It would be essential to ensure that no exaggerated expectations were aroused and, in particular to steer the Americans clear of misleading assumptions that additional resources would be available for defence. As you know, we will not be meeting the current NATO target of 3% real increase in defence expenditure after 1985/86. On this basis, they agreed that officials should explore the idea further with the Americans and Germans. In order to avoid a 'made in USA' label, the Americans had already indicated that they would like to see the initiative launched by the Germans in the Alliance. For his part, Lord Carrington had made it clear that he would only accept responsibility for managing it, if it enjoyed the support of major allies.
  
3. Our contacts with the Americans and Germans revealed considerable confusion not least within their own administrations. This was not wholly cleared up by contacts between the Americans and Germans earlier this month. The latter were unwilling to take the lead in proposing a study, which they saw as creating expectations of greater expenditure by them on conventional defence. They told our Embassy in Bonn that they had proposed instead to subsume improvements in conventional defence in a report to be prepared by a Study Group under Lord Carrington's chairmanship on:

(a)/





- (a) how the allies could activate East/West dialogue;
- (b) how to achieve progress in arms control;
- (c) how better to implement NATO strategy.

While agreeing that these 3 elements could be covered in a communique issued at the end of Chancellor Kohl's visit to Washington, the Americans reacted negatively to the idea of including the East/West dialogue in arms control as substantive components in any NATO study programme. We agree with them on this. There is not the same case for new special machinery in the Alliance on arms control and East/West relations. Moreover, experience with the twin track decision on INF argues strongly against making necessary conventional improvements conditional on developments in arms control. In any case, expanding the scope of the study would divert attention from the primary purpose of the exercise, to give a higher profile to NATO's best endeavours on longer term conventional improvements so that congressionnal pressures can be contained and a damaging inter-alliance row avoided.



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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1125 OF 27 NOVEMBER

INFO ROUTINE UKDEL NATO WASHINGTON

TELEPHONE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE FEDERAL CHANCELLOR AND THE  
PRIME MINISTER 28 NOVEMBER

1. THE GERMAN PRESS, OBVIOUSLY REFLECTING OFFICIAL BRIEFING, HAS SAID THAT THE CHANCELLOR WILL TALK AT LENGTH BY TELEPHONE WITH THE PRIME MINISTER AS PART OF THE PREPARATION FOR HIS VISIT TO WASHINGTON ON 30 NOVEMBER.

2. TELTSCHIK, THE CHANCELLOR'S DIPLOMATIC ADVISER, TOLD MINISTER TODAY THAT HE EXPECTED THE CHANCELLOR, IN THE TELEPHONE CONVERSATION ON 28 NOV, TO CONCENTRATE ON MATTERS CONCERNING HIS WASHINGTON TRIP. KOHL MIGHT JUST POSSIBLY TOUCH ALSO ON THE PREPARATIONS FOR THE DUBLIN COUNCIL OR THE ALLOCATION OF PORTFOLIOS IN THE COMMISSION. KOHL WAS UNLIKELY TO MENTION LAW OF THE SEA, ON WHICH THE GERMAN CABINET TOOK ITS DECISION THIS MORNING (MY TEL NO. 1123).

3. TELTSCHIK SAID THAT THE CHANCELLOR HAD THREE MAIN THEMES FOR HIS WASHINGTON VISIT:-

(A) EAST/WEST RELATIONS: TO FIND OUT EXACTLY WHAT HAD PASSED IN HIGH LEVEL CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN THE RUSSIANS AND THE AMERICANS AND TO HEAR ABOUT US INTENTIONS.



(B) ARMS CONTROL: TO ASK THE AMERICANS WHICH FIELDS WERE THEIR TOP PRIORITIES FOR RESUMED NEGOTIATIONS AND WHAT POSITIONS THEY WERE PREPARING.

(C) NATO: TO URGE THE IMPORTANCE OF CONSULTATION AMONG THE ALLIES (WITHOUT MAKING ANY SPECIFIC SUGGESTIONS) AND TO ARGUE THAT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL BE GIVEN THE TASKS OF 'HARMONISING' THE VARIOUS EFFORTS (ROGERS PLAN, AIR/LAND BATTLE ETC) TO INCREASE CONVENTIONAL CAPABILITY.

4. ASKED WHAT KIND OF COMMUNIQUE WOULD RESULT FROM KOHL'S WASHINGTON VISIT, TELTSCHIK SAID THAT NEGOTIATIONS ON A TEXT WERE STILL IN TRAIN AND IT WAS NOT YET CERTAIN THAT THERE WOULD BE A COMMUNIQUE. IF THERE WAS, IT WOULD ENUNCIATE PRINCIPLES - SUCH AS THE IMPORTANCE OF CONSULTATION IN NATO OR THE NEED TO STRENGTHEN CONVENTIONAL CAPABILITY - AND WOULD NOT (NOT) MAKE SUGGESTIONS ABOUT HOW THESE SHOULD BE DEALT WITH IN THE ALLIANCE. TELTSCHIK AGREED THAT THIS WAS A MATTER FOR ALL THE ALLIES, NOT JUST TWO OF THEM.

BULLARD

NNN



27 NOV 1994

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PRIME MINISTER

cc: Mrs. Ryder

CHANCELLOR KOHL

BF  
Chancellor Kohl wants to talk to you on the telephone on Wednesday next week. The precise reason is not yet clear, but he too will be going to Washington and may want to exchange views on some issues related to that. We shall fix an exact time next week.

CDP

mt

20 November 1984



File

OTG

20 November 1984

AF |  
Chancellor Kohl's Office have been in touch to say that the Chancellor wants to telephone the Prime Minister, probably on 28 November, before he goes to Washington. It would be helpful if the Embassy could discover discreetly from the Federal Chancellery what particular subject the Chancellor proposes to raise.

Charles Powell

Colin Budd, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.