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FM THE HAGUE 261310Z JUNE 85

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 220 OF 26 JUNE

PRIORITY INFO EC POSTS, LISBON, MADRID, UKREP BRUSSELS

MILAN EUROPEAN COUNCIL MEETING : DUTCH BILATERAL DIPLOMACY

SUMMARY

1. LUBBERS AND VAN DEN BROEK VISITED PARIS LAST WEEK AND POSTHUMUS MEYJES WENT TO BONN TO DISCUSS THE MILAN MEETING. MITTERRAND DID NOT DISCLOSE HIS HAND. RUHFUS PLEASSED THE DUTCH BY TALKING OF TREATY AMENDMENTS. LUBBERS WILL GO TO MILAN PROBABLY STILL AIMING MUCH HIGHER THAN US IN TERMS OF EUROPEAN IDEALISM, BUT PREPARED TO SETTLE FOR LESS AND EVEN TO ARGUE IN FAVOUR OF OUR OWN PROPOSALS, WHICH HE PROBABLY REALISES STAND A GREATER CHANCE OF SUCCESS.

DETAIL

2. OVER THE LAST WEEK THE DUTCH HAVE BEEN ACTIVE IN THE RUN UP TO MILAN. ON 19 JUNE MR LUBBERS AND MR VAN DEN BROEK WENT TO PARIS AND THIS WAS FOLLOWED BY A VISIT TO BONN BY POSTHUMUS-MEYJES. AS VICE PRESIDENT BUSH, THE CZECH FOREIGN MINISTER AND LORD CARRINGTON ARE ALL IN THE HAGUE ON OFFICIAL VISITS, IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO SEE VAN DEN BROEK. I HAVE HOWEVER TALKED TO POSTHUMUS-MEYJES.

3. LUBBERS AND VAN DEN BROEK SAW PRESIDENT MITTERRAND VERY PRIVATELY

NO DUTCH OFFICIAL WENT TO PARIS AND THE DUTCH AMBASSADOR WAS EXCLUDED FROM THE TALKS. POSTHUMUS-MEYJES SAID THAT MITTERRAND CONTINUED TO KEEP HIS CARDS CLOSE TO HIS CHEST. NEVERTHELESS LUBBERS AND VAN DEN BROEK GOT THE IMPRESSION THAT, IF HE SAW THE CHANCE AT MILAN, MITTERRAND WOULD CARRY FORWARD THE WORK OF THE DOOG COMMITTEE. MITTERRAND SEEMED IN SYMPATHY WITH THE DUTCH DRAFT MANDATE FOR AN INTERGOVERNMENTAL CONFERENCE. HE SAID NOTHING TO DISCOURAGE THAT DUTCH APPROACH, BUT DID NOT INDICATE THE EXTENT TO WHICH HE WOULD SUPPORT IT.

4. THE TALKS ALSO COVERED EUREKA. MITTERRAND DID NOT CLARIFY THIS MUCH : HE APPEARED TO HAVE MOVED AWAY FROM A COMMUNITY APPROACH AND VIEWED IT PRIMARILY IN TERMS OF PROJECTS (AS IN DUMAS' LETTER OF 24 JUNE). IT WAS NOT CLEAR TO THE DUTCH HOW ALL THAT RELATED TO THE COMMISSION'S PROPOSALS IN THAT FIELD. POSTHUMUS-MEYJES CONCLUDED THAT IT WAS APPARENT THAT MITTERRAND DID NOT WISH TO INDICATE HIS MILAN POSITIONS UNTIL THE LAST MOMENT.

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5. ON HIS BONN VISIT, POSTHUMUS-MEYJES COMMENTED THAT THE GERMANS WERE STILL NOT SPEAKING WITH ONE VOICE. HE HAD ONLY SEEN RUHFUS WHO HAD UNDERLINED THAT THEY STOOD SQUARELY BEHIND THE DOOGE REPORT (INCLUDING THE THREE GERMAN RESERVATIONS IN THE REPORT) AND THE RECOMMENDATIONS FOR AN INTER GOVERNMENTAL CONFERENCE AND MORE MAJORITY VOTING. THEY WANTED TREATY AMENDMENTS, ON WHICH SUBJECT RUHFUS WAS MORE PRECISE THAN THE DUTCH IN SINGLING OUT ARTICLES 57, 99, 100 AND 235. RUHFUS ADDED THAT THEY ALSO WANTED TREATY AMENDMENTS ON THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT (ARTICLES 236-238). ON THESE THEY THOUGHT THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT SHOULD BE REQUIRED TO APPROVE THE AMENDMENTS BEFORE THEY WENT TO NATIONAL PARLIAMENTS FOR RATIFICATION.

COMMENT

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6. IT SEEMS THAT THE DUTCH, HAVING RECEIVED A FULL ACCOUNT OF THE BRITISH POSITION DURING YOUR RECENT VISIT, HAVE THOUGHT IT WORTH-WHILE TO CHECK ON HOW FAR THEIR OWN MORE IDEALISTIC PROPOSALS MIGHT RECEIVE SUPPORT IN MILAN FROM THE OTHER HEAVYWEIGHTS. THEY MUST BE DISAPPOINTED AT THE FRENCH RESPONSE, ALTHOUGH I SUSPECT THEY MAY BE TEMPTED TO INTERPRET MITTERRAND'S DELPHIC UTTERANCES IN AS FAVOURABLE A LIGHT AS POSSIBLE. THE GERMAN EMPHASIS ON TREATY AMENDMENT HAS CERTAINLY PLEASSED THEM, ALTHOUGH THEY WELL UNDERSTAND THAT RUHFUS MAY NOT BE REFLECTING THE PRECISE LINE WHICH THE CHANCELLOR MAY ACTUALLY TAKE AT MILAN. ON THE BASIS OF THIS I BELIEVE THAT LUBBERS WILL PROBABLY APPROACH MILAN STILL AIMING MUCH HIGHER THAN THE BRITISH IN TERMS OF EUROPEAN IDEALISM AND WILL WISH TO ARGUE ALONG THE LINES OF THE DUTCH DRAFT MANDATE FOR AN INTERGOVERNMENTAL CONFERENCE TO AMEND THE TREATY. DEPENDING VERY MUCH ON HOW MUCH SUPPORT MITTERRAND AND KOHL LEND TO SUCH IDEAS, THEY WILL BE PREPARED TO SETTLE FOR MUCH LESS AND EVEN TO ARGUE IN FAVOUR OF OUR OWN PROPOSALS WHICH THEY PROBABLY REALISE STAND A GREATER CHANCE OF SUCCESS.

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