



Copy to Mr Powell M10

CONFIDENTIAL

Discussed with
Mr. Heselgrave.

EDP
2/7.

GRS 400

CONFIDENTIAL

FM BONN 051010Z JUL 85

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 689 OF 5 JULY

INFO PRIORITY PARIS, ROME, MADRID, MODUK (FOR AS/CDEC, PS/S OF S AND PS/MR BUTLER)

YOUR TELNO 354: EUROPEAN FIGHTER AIRCRAFT (EFA)

1. DURING MR ADAM BUTLER'S VISIT HERE THIS WEEK THERE WAS PLENTY OF EVIDENCE THAT THERE IS INDEED A DANGER OF THE WEIGHT OF THE PROFESSIONAL ADVICE BEING OVERRIDDEN BY CHANCELLOR KOHL FOR POLITICAL REASONS. IT WAS PUT TO MR BUTLER BY STATE SECRETARY TIMMERMANN THAT IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE, ESPECIALLY FOLLOWING MILAN, FOR KOHL TO TAKE WHAT WOULD LOOK LIKE AN ANTI-FRENCH DECISION ON EFA WITHOUT SOME 'COMPENSATION' TO FRANCE, AND WE WERE INVITED TO SUGGEST WHAT FORM THIS MIGHT TAKE. THE TROUBLE IS THAT THE ONLY OTHER DEFENCE PROJECT WHICH IS (A) OF IMPORTANCE TO FRANCE AND (B) OF COMPARABLE SIGNIFICANCE TO EFA IS THE IDEA OF A EUROPEAN RECONNAISSANCE SATELLITE, WHICH THE GERMAN DEFENCE MINISTRY ARE EXTREMELY COOL ABOUT AND DO NOT THINK THEY WOULD GET THE MONEY TO PAY FOR.

2. I THINK IT ESSENTIAL IN THE NEXT FORTNIGHT THAT OUR CASE SHOULD BE REPEATED TO THE GERMANS AT THE POLITICAL LEVEL, KOHL ESPECIALLY. IF CIRCUMSTANCES ARE NOT THOUGHT PROPITIOUS FOR A PERSONAL MESSAGE OR TELEPHONE CALL FROM THE PRIME MINISTER, I BELIEVE IT WOULD BE VALUABLE IF I COULD RECEIVE INSTRUCTIONS TO SPEAK ON THE PRIME MINISTER'S AUTHORITY. AS REPORTED TO RENWICK, I HAVE ALREADY ASKED FOR A CALL ON THE CHANCELLOR ON COMMUNITY BUSINESS. IF I COULD RECEIVE A PACKET OF INSTRUCTIONS COVERING BOTH COMMUNITY AND EFA (THE CONNECTION BEING OBVIOUS) I COULD TRY TO SEE KOHL EITHER BEFORE OR MORE LIKELY AFTER HIS VISIT TO TURKEY (9-12 JULY).

3. THERE IS ALSO GENSCHER, WHOSE INFLUENCE, IF HE HAS ANY IN THIS MATTER, WILL BE EXERTED IN A PRO-FRENCH DIRECTION. I RECOMMEND THAT I TELL THE MFA THAT, ALTHOUGH YOU DO NOT WISH THE POINT TO BE PUT ON THE FORMAL AGENDA, YOU WOULD LIKE TO TAKE THE OPPORTUNITY OF YOUR MEETING WITH GENSCHER ON 21 JULY TO TALK TO HIM VERY SERIOUSLY ABOUT THE POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF EFA.

CONFIDENTIAL

14. BOMH

CONFIDENTIAL

4. BOTH WITH KOHL AND WITH GENSCHER OUR MAIN MESSAGE COULD BE THAT THE PROFESSIONAL ADVICE IS IRREFUTABLE, AND THAT IT WOULD BE THE HEIGHT OF IRRESPONSIBILITY AT GIGANTIC COST TO EQUIP FIVE NATO AIR FORCES WITH AN AIRCRAFT IN WHICH NEITHER GERMAN INDUSTRY NOR THE GERMAN DEFENCE MINISTRY HAVE ANY CONFIDENCE. THE TECHNICAL ARGUMENTS IN PARIS TELNO 563 WOULD NEED TO BE ADDRESSED AT LEAST AS DEFENSIVE POINTS. ON THE POLITICAL SIDE, THE ARGUMENT IN MY TELNO 657 IS ALL THE MORE VALID SINCE MILAN.

BULLARD

LIMITED
DEFENCE D
WED
PS
PS/PWS
MR DEREK THOMAS
MR DAUNT
MR JENKINS

Charles - we must discuss. We can't have our pilot program independent aircraft on the German front - or anywhere else.

not