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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

2 September 1985

CALL ON GORBACHEV BY SIR BRYAN CARTLEDGE

This is to confirm that the Prime Minister agreed the draft telegram attached to your letter of 30 August. She did, however, suggest that the point in paragraph 4 of the telegram, about Mr. Gorbachev's message to the Prime Minister, should be mentioned to allies only if they reveal that they have received similar communications and if the point were raised. I discussed this with your Resident Clerk, and agreed an appropriate amendment. We also agreed that paragraph 5 of the draft called for a minor amendment to make clear that the confirmation in question had been obtained from No. 10.

Mark Addison

Colin Budd, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

30 August 1985

Agreed with Prime Minister. ①

Agree to draft telegram with instructions and after for Sir Bryan Cartledge when he sees Mr. Gorbachev? The important point is whether the Ambassador should reveal to allies the message you received from Mr. G. MEA 20/8.

Dear Mark,

Call on Gorbachev by Sir Bryan Cartledge

No time has yet been fixed for this call but it will probably take place in the very near future, quite possibly over the weekend. Very soon thereafter, as Sir Bryan points out in his telno 1116 (attached), we will come under pressure to brief close partners. I enclose a draft reply to Sir Bryan's telegram, which we should like to despatch as soon as possible, preferably before the weekend, and would be grateful for any comments you may have.

Yours Sincerely,
Colin Budd

(C R Budd)
Private Secretary

Mark Addison Esq
10 Downing Street

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 FM MOSCOW
 TO IMMEDIATE 291200Z F C O
 TELNO 1116
 OF 29 AUGUST 85

YOUR TELNOS 834, 835 AND 837 : CALL ON GORBACHEV

1. I AM GRATEFUL FOR THESE SWIFT INSTRUCTIONS. I HAVE NOT YET BEEN TOLD WHEN THE CALL WILL BE.

2. I SHALL CLEAR A PRESS LINE WITH THE RUSSIANS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, WHICH MAY NOT BE UNTIL THE TIME OF THE CALL ITSELF. I SEE NO DIFFICULTY WITH THE LINE YOU PROPOSE EXCEPT THAT THE RUSSIANS MAY PREFER US TO AVOID WORDING WHICH IMPLIES THAT OTHER RECENTLY ARRIVED AMBASSADORS CAN EXPECT SIMILAR CALLS IN FUTURE.

3. DEPENDING ON THE SUBJECTS COVERED DURING THE CALL YOU WILL WISH TO CONSIDER BRIEFING CLOSE ALLIES. ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT THE CALL COVERS BILATERAL RELATIONS IN GENERAL, FUTURE HIGH LEVEL VISITS, AND ARMS CONTROL, I SHOULD WELCOME AUTHORITY IN PRINCIPLE TO BRIEF AT LEAST THE U S, FRENCH AND GERMAN AMBASSADORS, AND IN OUTLINE ALSO REMAINING E.C. COLLEAGUES. IF, AS I EXPECT GORBACHEV TAKES UP THE THEME OF HIS MESSAGE TO THE PRIME MINISTER (YOUR TELNO 841) GRATEFUL FOR INSTRUCTIONS ON WHETHER I MAY TELL COLLEAGUES OF THE EXISTENCE OF THE MESSAGE AND ITS GENERAL THRUST.

I ASSUME, HOWEVER, THAT YOU WOULD NOT (NOT) WISH ME TO MENTION ANY INVITATION GORBACHEV MAY EXTEND TO MRS THATCHER NOR THE INVITATION WE INTEND TO ISSUE TO ALIEV TO VISIT THE UK.

4. FINAL CLEARANCE WILL HAVE TO DEPEND ON WHAT EMERGES DURING THE CALL. BUT IF THE FACT OF IT IS PUBLICISED I WILL COME UNDER VERY EARLY PRESSURE TO BRIEF COLLEAGUES AND SHOULD WELCOME YOUR PRELIMINARY THINKING ON HOW MUCH TO SAY.

CARTLEDGE

LIMITED
 SOVIET D
 NEWS D
 PLANNING STAFF
 PS
 PS/MR RIFKIND
 MR JENKINS

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OUT TELEGRAM

	Classification CONFIDENTIAL	Caveat	Precedence IMMEDIATE
ZCZC TC CAVEAT FM TO TELNO OF AND TO	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29	ZCZC CONFIDENTIAL FM FCO TO IMMEDIATE MOSCOW TELNO OF 301410 AUGUST 85 FROM LLEWELLYN SMITH YOUR TELNO 1116: CALL ON GORBACHEV 1. The nature and extent of briefing of allies/partners will depend closely on the content of the call. We have not therefore put the hypothetical questions in your tur to No.10 at this stage. 2. On your paragraph 2, rather than attempt to agree with the Russians a common form of words to describe the call, it would give us greater flexibility if you would ask them how <u>they intend to publicise it and in what terms</u> , and tell them that we will obviously reflect this in any announcement we might make to the Press on our side. 3. On the assumption that your conversation with Gorbachev does cover the points you suggest in your para 3, our recommendation will be for a fairly <u>full briefing</u> for the four, and a watered down version for the Ten/Twelve (it would be useful if you would include a recommendation to this effect in your telegram reporting the call). 4. <u>On the message (our tel 841) there are indications that other allies may have received similar communications at this level. If others reveal that this is the case, if asked, you</u>	
YYY MAIN ADDITIONAL NNNN	Catchword: may		
	File number	Dept Soviet	Drafted by (Block capitals) J M MACGREGOR
	Authorised for Initials Date/time despatch by:		Telephone no 233 6081
	For COD use only	Comcen reference	Telegram number Processed by

OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

	Classification CONFIDENTIAL	Caveat	Precedence IMMEDIATE
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
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1	<<<<
2	may mention the message to the Prime Minister and its subject
3	but should say that we have not made its receipt public nor
4	yet decided whether any reply might be sent.
5	5. Subject to confirmation with No.10 we concur with your
6	assumption that mention should not be made at this stage of any
7	invitations in either direction.
8	
9	RIFKIND
10	
11	YYYY
12	SOVIET
13	PS
14	PS/MR RIFKIND
15	MR JENKINS
16	ACDD
17	DEF DEPT
18	NEWS DEPT
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