


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TELNO 238
OF 251530Z OCTOBER 85.



MY CALL ON JANOS KADAR.

1. I HAD THREE QUARTERS OF AN HOUR WITH KADAR THIS MORNING AT MY REQUEST. HE RAMBLED A GREAT DEAL AND SMOKED AT THE RATE OF SIX CIGARETTES AN HOUR. BUT HE SEEMED FIT FOR HIS AGE AND WAS VERY MUCH IN COMMAND. I DO NOT THINK THAT YOU OR THE PRIME MINISTER WILL DETECT ANY SIGNIFICANT CHANGE SINCE LAST SEEING HIM.
2. KADAR MADE MUCH OF THE FACT THAT IT WAS VERY EXCEPTIONAL FOR HIM TO RECEIVE AN AMBASSADOR. HE THEN EMBARKED ON A MONOLOGUE. HE SAID THAT HE WAS LOOKING FORWARD TO THE VISIT AND WOULD UNDERTAKE EVERYTHING WE HAD PROPOSED, INCLUDING THE VISIT TO EDINBURGH. BUT HE MADE IT CLEAR THAT HE THOUGHT THIS WOULD BE HARD WORK FOR A MAN OF HIS AGE.
3. RECALLING THAT I HAD BEEN HERE IN THE FIFTIES KADAR SAID THAT I WOULD KNOW THAT HUNGARIAN POLICY WAS ENTIRELY CONSISTENT. TRYING TO RUN ENTERPRISES PRODITABLY DID NOT MAKE THEM CAPITALISTS. THEY HAD THEIR PROBLEMS, MOST PARTICULARLY IN THE ECONOMIC FIELD. BUT THEY WOULD NOT DEPART FROM THEIR CONSISTENT COURSE, WHICH I TAKE TO MEAN BOTH COMMUNISM AND REFORM.
4. IN SEPTEMBER GORBACHEV HAD ASKED ABOUT HIS HEALTH. HE HAD TOLD HIM THAT HE FELT AS WELL AS COULD BE EXPECTED AT HIS AGE. BUT GORBACHEV SHOULD NOT WORRY. POLICY IN HUNGARY WAS NOT MADE BY ONE MAN, OR TWENTY, OR EVEN 200.
5. I SAID THAT I KNEW THE PRIME MINISTER WAS LOOKING FORWARD TO HIS VISIT TOO. IT STRUCK ME AS HELPFUL THAT IT WAS TAKING PLACE SHORTLY AFTER THE NEW YORK AND SOFIA MEETINGS AND BEFORE GENEVA. KADAR DID NOT RISE ON WHAT HAD HAPPENED IN SOFIA. BUT HE SAID THAT HE VERY MUCH HOPED FOR THE BEGINNINGS OF PROGRESS AT GENEVA. PEOPLE TOLD HIM THAT REAGAN WANTED PEACE. HE FELT THAT HIS ACTIONS BELIED IT. I SAID THAT WE WERE CONVINCED THAT REAGAN WANTED PEACE AND BELIEVED THAT US POLICY AS IT UNFOLDED WOULD PROVE IT. I HOPED WE COULD PERSUADE HIM OF THIS WHILE HE WAS IN LONDON.

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16.

6. KADAR AGREED THAT HIS VISIT CAME AT A GOOD TIME. SO HAD THE PRIME MINISTER'S IN 1984 TO BUDAPEST. THERE HAD BEEN THOSE, INSIDE HUNGARY AND OUTSIDE, WHO HAD HAD THEIR DOUBTS ABOUT HER VISIT, POINTING TO THE CONCENTRATION OF VISITS BY WESTERN LEADERS (THE PRIME MINISTER, CRAXI AND KOGL) WHO WERE ABOUT TO RECEIVE CRUISE MISSILES. THE POLITICAL CLIMATE AT THE END OF 1983 HAD BEEN VERY COLD. BUT HE WAS A SIMPLE MAN. HE HAD REALISED THAT WE WOULD ALL HAVE TO GO ON LIVING TOGETHER IN EUROPE IN 1984. HE HAD DECIDED THAT THE VISITS SHOULD GO AHEAD. AND THEY HAD PLAYED A USEFUL PART IN THE SEARCH FOR PEACE. I MAY BE WRONG BUT IT CROSSED MY MIND THAT THIS WAS AN ALLUSIVE REFERENCE TO DOUBTS ABOUT HIS OWN VISIT TO LONDON (BUDAPEST TELEGRAM NO 209) PRESUMABLY PUT AT REST WHEN HE SAW GORBACHEV IN SEPTEMBER.

7. KADAR WENT ON TO REFER TO HIS RESPECT FOR THE PRIME MINISTER. HE WAS GLAD THAT SHE HAD ENJOYED HER VISIT TO HUNGARY. HE FELT THAT HIS TALK WITH HER HAD MADE A SERIOUS AND RESPONSIBLE CONTRIBUTION. HE ADDED THAT COLLEAGUES HAD RIBBED HIM, SAYING THAT HER PROGRAMME HERE HAD SHOWN THAT SHE WAS NOT THE NEGATIVE IRON LADY WHICH THE HUNGARIAN MEDIA HAD SUGGESTED.

8. THE WHOLE CONVERSATION WAS VERY INSUBSTANTIAL. BUT I THINK KADAR'S AIM IN HAVING ME IN WAS TO SHOW HIS COMMITMENT TO THE VISIT AND THE WARMTH OF HIS FEELINGS TOWARDS THE PRIME MINISTER. THE CALL WAS INTERESTING^{ER} LESS FOR WHAT WAS SAID THAN BECAUSE IT TOOK PLACE AT ALL.

9. SEE MIFT FOR SCENE-SETTER.

UNWIN

LIMITED.

EED.

SOV D

DEF D

RES D

PLANNING STAFF

NAID

WE'D

ACDD

CRD

FED

NE'D

POSD.

PS

PS/LADY YOUNG

PS/MR RIFKIND

PS/MR BENTON

PS/POS.

MR DEREK THOMAS

SIE WARDING,

MR FERCUSSON.

MR GODDALL

MR SAMUEL

MR DABUT

MR DAVID THOMAS.

MR LONG.

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