

4 NOV 1985

FILING INSTRUCTIONS

FILE No. ....

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PM THE WHITE HOUSE

TO CABINET OFFICE

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SECRET VIA CABINET OFFICE CHANNELS WHO1275

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO SIR ROBERT ARMSTRONG

ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

~~c- Mr Mallaby.~~

NOVEMBER 4, 1985

DEAR SIR ROBERT:

ALTHOUGH YOUR MESSAGE CONCERNING YOUR VISIT WITH SEAN DONLON NEXT WEEK REACHED ME IN HELSINKI, I HAVE ASKED MY SECRETARY IN WASHINGTON TO ARRANGE IT AND SHALL BE BACK IN TOUCH TO SET A TIME AND PLACE. I SHALL LOOK FORWARD TO SEEING BOTH OF YOU AND TO HEARING OF THE STATUS OF YOUR TALKS.

SEPARATELY I WAS EXTREMELY HEARTENED, AS I AM SURE THE PRESIDENT WAS, TO RECEIVE THE PRIME MINISTERS MESSAGE OF SUPPORT CONCERNING THE PRESIDENTS RECENT DECISIONS ON THE GENEVA TALKS. (GOD SAVE MARGARET THATCHER). I MUST SAY, HOWEVER, THAT I AM CONSCIOUS THAT WE OWED YOU MORE THAN WE HAVE GIVEN IN THE WAY OF EXPLANATION OF THE THINKING THAT WENT INTO THE POSITION WE HAVE TAKEN. AT THE OUTSET WE WANTED TO TAKE FROM THE SEPTEMBER PROPOSAL THOSE ELEMENTS THAT SEEMED TO OFFER REASONABLE LEVELS OF WARHEADS AND DELIVERY VEHICLES AS MEASURED BY PROPER UNITS OF ACCOUNT (OBVIOUSLY EXCLUDING FORWARD BASED SYSTEMS). THIS MOTIVATED US TO APPLY THE 50 PERCENT FORMULA TO BALLISTIC MISSILE WARHEADS AND DVS AT BOTH THE STRATEGIC AND INF LEVELS. IN ADDITION WE SINCERELY WANT TO ENGAGE THE RUSSIANS ON THE ISSUE OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE FORCES--NOT THAT WE WILL EVER CONVINCE THEM BUT WE MAY WELL BE ABLE TO DIMINISH THE CREDIBILITY WITH OUR PUBLICS OF THEIR SCARE TACTICS.

BUT ONCE WE HAD DONE THE SUMS ON OFFENSIVE SYSTEMS, WE REALIZED THAT WE HAD PRODUCED AN ESSENTIALLY +BOTTOM LINE+ POSITION THAT LEFT VERY LITTLE THAT WE COULD AFFORD TO GIVE AWAY. CONSEQUENTLY WE THOUGHT SOME MORE AND CAME UP WITH SOME ADDITIONAL ELEMENTS, ONE OR TWO OF WHICH MAY HAVE APPEARED SOMEWHAT CURIOUS TO YOU AND THE PM. FOR EXAMPLE, WE HAVE CALLED FOR A BAN ON ALL MOBILE SYSTEMS. THIS WOULD APPEAR IN CONTRADICTION TO OUR HISTORIC REFERENCE TO MOBILITY (AND ASSOCIATED SURVIVABILITY) AS STABILIZING. IN FACT WE HAVE NOT CHANGED OUR MINDS AT LEAST WITH REGARD TO THE ESSENTIALLY STABILIZING EFFECT OF SINGLE

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WARHEAD MOBILES (ALTHOUGH THE SOVIET COMPLIANCE RECORD OVER THE PAST DECADE HAS GIVEN US SERIOUS DOUBTS AS TO HOW MUCH CONFIDENCE WE CAN HAVE THAT THEY WILL NOT CLANDESTINELY ADD MULTIPLE WARHEADS TO THE SS-25.) BUT IT SEEMED TO US THAT IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO ASK FOR A TOTAL BAN ON MOBILES SO THAT WE COULD MAKE THE FULL ARGUMENT OF OUR CONCERNS REGARDING BOTH OUR LACK OF CONFIDENCE IN VERIFYING THE NUMBER AND LOCATION OF THE MISSILES AND OUR CONCERNS OVER THE WARHEAD LOADING. AT THE END OF THE DAY WE CAN PROBABLY LIVE WITH SINGLE WARHEAD MOBILES BUT IT SEEMED SENSIBLE TO GO IN WITH SOME NEGOTIATING ROOM. SIMILARLY WE ARE ASKING FOR A 50 PERCENT CUT IN THROW WEIGHT= A BAN ON UPGRADES TO THE SS-13 AND A BAN ON SOVIET GLCMs. CLEARLY WE WOULD LIKE TO GET ALL THESE THINGS BUT WOULD ALSO FIND AN AGREEMENT WITHOUT THEM ACCEPTABLE. IN SHORT WE BUILT IN SOME NEGOTIATING LEVERAGE. THIS IS NOT, OF COURSE, SOMETHING WE CAN AFFORD TO PASS AROUND TO THE ALLIES IN NORMAL DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS (AND NO SUCH MESSAGE WILL BE GIVEN TO FCO OR YOUR MCD) BUT I DIDNT WANT YOU TO GAIN THE IMPRESSION THAT WE WERE ADOPTING MAXIMALIST POSITIONS THAT MIGHT GRATUITOUSLY LEAD TO AN IMPASSE.

WE WILL BE IN MOSCOW THROUGH TUESDAY AND PERHAPS BEYOND, DEPENDING UPON HOW READY THE RUSSIANS ARE TO SET PRECISE GOALS FOR THE OUTCOME IN GENEVA. I WILL STAY IN TOUCH AND REPORT AS MATTERS PROGRESS.

ONCE MORE, PLEASE CONVEY TO THE PRIME MINISTER OUR DEEP GRATITUDE FOR HER SOLID EXPRESSION OF SUPPORT.

WARM REGARDS,

FUD

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