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YOUR TELNO 10: GENEVA ARMS TALKS: NAC BRIEFING, 3 FEBRUARY.

SUMMARY

1. THE THREE U.S. NEGOTIATORS OUTLINED THE DEVELOPMENTS AT GENEVA STEMMING FROM BUSINESS UNCOMPLETED IN ROUND THREE, THE SUMMIT AGREED STATEMENT, AND THE GORBACHEV PROPOSALS OF 15 JANUARY. NO CHANGE IN SOVIET POSITION ON SPACE AND DEFENCE, AND ON STRATEGIC SYSTEMS, BUT SOME NEW ELEMENTS ON INF. MANY LONG-STANDING PROBLEMS REMAIN: NO SUBSTANTIVE SOVIET RESPONSE TO THE U.S. ONE NOVEMBER PROPOSAL. ALTHOUGH ATMOSPHERE POST-SUMMIT AND POST-15 JANUARY PROPOSALS, IS QUOTE SOMEWHAT ENCOURAGING UNQUOTE, RUSSIANS WOULD CLEARLY NOT OFFER SUBSTANTIAL CONCESSIONS UNTIL QUOTE END GAME UNQUOTE. STRONG GERMAN CALL FOR SUBSTANTIVE ALLIANCE CONSULTATION ON GORBACHEV PROPOSALS, SUPPORTED, IN PARTICULAR, BY NETHERLANDS AND BELGIUM.

DETAIL

2. IN HIS OPENING OVERVIEW, KAMPELMAN OUTLINED SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY AT GENEVA SINCE THE NEGOTIATORS LAST BRIEFED THE COUNCIL: THE SOVIET 31 SEPTEMBER/1 OCTOBER PROPOSALS, THE U.S COUNTER PROPOSALS OF 1 NOVEMBER, THE SUMMIT JOINT AGREED STATEMENT, AND THE LATEST GORBACHEV PROPOSALS. THE U.S. HAD RETURNED TO GENEVA INTENT ON FULFILLING THE AGREEMENT IN THE REAGAN/GORBACHEV SUMMIT JOINT STATEMENT THAT PRIORITY BE GIVEN TO START AND INF, FOCUSING ON AREAS WHERE COMMON GROUND EXISTED: EG THE PRINCIPLE OF 50 PERCENT REDUCTIONS AND THE IDEA OF AN INTERIM INF AGREEMENT. ON 16 JANUARY, THE SOVIET SIDE HAD SET OUT THEIR LATEST PROPOSALS, BASED ENTIRELY ON GORBACHEV'S 15 JANUARY SPEECH. THESE HAD CONTAINED A FEW QUOTE POSSIBLY CONSTRUCTIVE UNQUOTE ELEMENTS, QUOTE NEUTRALISED UNQUOTE BY OTHER PROVISIONS AND PRECONDITIONS. THE SOVIET SIDE HAD ALSO SIGNALLED THEIR DESIRE TO CONCENTRATE ON PHASE 1 OF THE 15 JANUARY PROPOSALS.

3. WHILE THE PROPAGANDA ELEMENT SHOULD NOT BE UNDER-ESTIMATED, THE U.S. WOULD EXPLORE THE PROPOSALS SERIOUSLY. THEY WOULD ALSO CONTINUE TO PURSUE THEIR OWN 1 NOVEMBER PROPOSALS, TO WHICH THERE HAD BEEN LITTLE REAL RESPONSE. THEY WELCOMED THE SOVIET ACCEPTANCE OF THE GOAL OF A NUCLEAR FREE WORLD, BUT WOULD CONTINUE TO STRESS THE ROLE WHICH STRATEGIC DEFENCES, IF PROVEN EFFECTIVE, COULD PLAY IN ENHANCING STABILITY AND SECURITY IN THE MOVEMENT TOWARDS THIS GOAL.

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INF NEGOTIATIONS

4. REPORTING ON DISCUSSIONS IN THE INF GROUP, GLITMAN SAID THAT THE LATEST GORBACHEV PROPOSALS HAD INTRODUCED NEW ELEMENTS INTO THE NEGOTIATIONS. THE U.S. SIDE WERE EXPLORING THE DEGREE TO WHICH THESE MIGHT LEAD TO A BROADENING AND DEEPENING OF THE AREAS OF CONVERGENCE PREVIOUSLY IDENTIFIED. THE SOVIET SIDE HAD HOWEVER PROVIDED LITTLE DETAIL BEYOND THAT ALREADY MADE PUBLIC. THE U.S. HAD RESTATED THEIR 1 NOVEMBER PROPOSALS, AND HAD DEVOTED A PLENARY SESSION TO THE ISSUE OF GEOGRAPHIC LIMITATIONS.

5. THE U.S. SIDE HAD ALSO SOUGHT CLARIFICATION AND AMPLIFICATION OF THE LATEST SOVIET PROPOSAL, WITH THE RUSSIANS RESPONDING THAT THE FIRST STAGE OF THEIR PROPOSAL - THE ELIMINATION OF LRINF MISSILES IN EUROPE - SHOULD BE THE FOCUS OF CURRENT BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS.

6. ON LINKAGE, THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE 3 SOVIET PROPOSAL STAGES AND THE ACTUAL SEQUENCE OF EVENTS REMAINED VAGUE. THERE HAD BEEN SOME BROAD INDICATION OF FLEXIBILITY, BUT NO PRECISION ON WHERE THIS MIGHT APPLY. OBUKOV HAD NOT, HOWEVER, TRIED TO ESTABLISH A FIRM LINK BETWEEN THE LATEST SOVIET INF PROPOSAL AND THE RESOLUTION OF SPACE DEFENCE OR STRATEGIC ISSUES. NOR HAD HE CONTESTED U.S. STATEMENTS THAT THERE WAS CONVERGENCE ON THE ISSUE OF A SEPARATE INF AGREEMENT, WHILE NOT DIRECTLY CONFIRMING THAT THIS WAS SO. OTHER MEMBERS OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION HAD MADE CONFLICTING AND CONTRADICTIONARY STATEMENTS ON THIS ISSUE. THE SOVIET POSITION THUS REMAINED AMBIGUOUS. ANY FIRM LINKAGE WOULD OF COURSE CONTRIBUTE A MAJOR WITHDRAWAL FROM GORBACHEV'S PARIS OFFER OF A SEPARATE INF AGREEMENT.

7. THE SOVIET SIDE HAD CONTINUED TO PORTRAY UK AND FRENCH SYSTEMS AS A MAJOR OBSTACLE TO AN AGREEMENT. THIS WAS HOWEVER, THE FIRST SOVIET PROPOSAL WHICH HAD NOT INCLUDED A DEMAND FOR A SOVIET RIGHT TO RETAIN RESIDUAL SS-20 MISSILES IN EUROPE AS COMPENSATION FOR THIRD COUNTRY FORCES. THE SOVIET SIDE HAD ALSO INDICATED INFORMALLY THAT UNILATERAL STATEMENTS BY BRITAIN AND FRANCE WOULD BE AN ACCEPTABLE METHOD OF EXPRESSING THEIR COMMITMENT NOT TO BUILD UP THEIR FORCES. HOWEVER, MOVEMENT BY THIRD PARTIES REMAINED A PRECONDITION TO THE CONCLUSION OF A BILATERAL UNITED STATES/SOVIET AGREEMENT.

(IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE MEETING, GLITMAN CONFIRMED PRIVATELY TO DAUNT THAT THE SOVIET SIDE HAD SUGGESTED A BILATERAL APPROACH BY THE U.S. AND SOVIET UNION TO THE GOVERNMENTS OF BRITAIN AND FRANCE ON THIS ISSUE). THE U.S. HAD MADE CLEAR THAT IT COULD MAKE NO COMMITMENT FOR ANY OTHER NUCLEAR POWERS NOR NEGOTIATE ON THEIR BEHALF. THE SOVIET PRECONDITION THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO TRANSFER OF STRATEGIC AND MEDIUM RANGE MISSILES WOULD OBVIOUSLY SERIOUSLY AFFECT U.S. CO-OPERATION WITH THEIR ALLIES.

8. THE LATEST SOVIET PROPOSAL HAD NOT INCLUDED ANY FIRST-STAGE REDUCTIONS IN SS-20S IN THE ASIAN REGION. BUT THE SOVIET SIDE HAD SAID INFORMALLY THAT THEIR EARLIER OFFER OF AN ASIAN FREEZE REMAINED VALID IN THE CONTEXT OF THE FIRST STAGE, AND THAT THEIR PREVIOUS PROPOSAL REGARDING SS-20S WEST OF 80 DEGS EAST LONGITUDE REMAINED VALID. FINALLY, THE SOVIET PROPOSAL ENVISAGED NO RESTRICTION ON SHORTER RANGE INF SYSTEMS IN THE FIRST STAGE.

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9. GLITMAN CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT THE RUSSIANS, IN ATTEMPTING TO PORTRAY BRITAIN AND FRANCE AS STANDING IN THE WAY OF AN AGREEMENT, WERE CLEARLY TRYING TO DIVIDE ALLY FROM ALLY AND UNDERCUT PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR EUROPEAN NATIONAL DETERRENT FORCES. THE ALLIANCE SHOULD REMAIN FIRM IN ITS RESISTANCE TO SUCH SOVIET EFFORTS. SHOULD THE SOVIET UNION PERCEIVE ANY WEAKENING OF ALLIANCE RESOLVE, THE U.S. ABILITY TO NEGOTIATE AN ACCEPTABLE INF AGREEMENT, WITHOUT COMPENSATION, WOULD BE UNDERMINED.

SPACE AND DEFENSIVE SYSTEMS

10. KAMPELMAN BRIEFLY REHEARSED EVENTS IN THE DEFENCE AND SPACE TALKS DURING ROUND 3. THE U.S. HAD COMMENTED AT LENGTH ON THE SOVIET UNION'S OWN SDI-RELATED RESEARCH PROGRAMME, AND THEIR CONCERN THAT THE SOVIET MILITARY APPEARED TO REGARD STRATEGIC DEFENCES ONLY AS AN ADJUNCT TO AN OFFENSIVE MILITARY STRATEGY. THE U.S. HAD DESCRIBED THEIR OPEN LABORATORIES INITIATIVE AS A STEP WHICH COULD HELP BUILD CONFERENCE RELATING TO THE DIRECTION AND CHARACTER OF EACH SIDE'S STRATEGIC DEFENCE PROGRAMME. THE SOVIET SIDE HAD REPLIED THAT SINCE THE USSR WAS NOT ENGAGED IN RESEARCH OR DEVELOPMENT OF QUOTE SPACE STRIKE ARMS UNQUOTE, THEIR PROPOSAL WAS NOT APPLICABLE TO SOVIET PROGRAMMES (WITH THE EXCEPTION OF ASATS.): AND THEY HAD, DURING THE THIRD ROUND, INTRODUCED A PROPOSAL FOR A COMPREHENSIVE BAN ON QUOTE SPECIALISED UNQUOTE ANTI-SATELLITE WEAPONS AS AN QUOTE INITIAL FIRST STEP UNQUOTE TOWARDS A BAN ON QUOTE SPACE STRIKE ARMS UNQUOTE. THE U.S. SIDE HAD IN TURN POINTED OUT THAT THEY SOUGHT THE STRICTEST POSSIBLE ASAT LIMITS WHICH WERE VERIFIABLE AND IN THEIR NATIONAL INTEREST. THEY HAD REPEATED THAT A COMPREHENSIVE BAN WAS UNVERIFIABLE: THE SOVIET UNION ITSELF - IN THE 1978-79 TALKS - HAD RECOGNISED THAT SUCH LIMITS WERE NOT FEASIBLE.

11. IN BOTH THE THIRD AND FOURTH ROUNDS THE SOVIET SIDE HAD CONTINUED TO HINT AT THE POSSIBILITY OF PARTIAL STEPS TOWARDS A COMPLETE BAN ON QUOTE SPACE STRIKE ARMS UNQUOTE, INCLUDING LIMITS ON ASAT, AND THE PROHIBITION OF SPACE BASED WEAPONS. HOWEVER, THEY HAD MADE CLEAR THAT A TOTAL BAN ON QUOTE SPACE STRIKE ARMS UNQUOTE REMAINED A PRECONDITION FOR OFFENSIVE REDUCTIONS.

12. KAMPELMAN WENT ON TO SAY THAT GORBACHEV'S 15 JANUARY STATEMENT HAD NOT ALTERED THE SOVIET POSITION ON DEFENCE AND SPACE ISSUES: THE RUSSIANS HAD MADE IT CLEAR AT GENEVA THAT THIS WAS SO, WHILE NOT EXPLICITLY MENTIONING THEIR PROPOSAL BAN ON SDI RESEARCH, AND THE WORDS QUOTE INCLUDING SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH UNQUOTE HAD REAPPEARED IN SOVIET PLENARY STATEMENTS. ONE PURPOSE OF GORBACHEV'S TIMETABLE FOR THE ELIMINATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS WAS EVIDENTLY TO UNDERCUT THE RATIONALE FOR THE SDI.

13. THE U.S. SIDE HAD REPLIED THAT THE DRASTIC REDUCTION, OR EVEN ELIMINATION, OF OFFENSIVE WEAPONS WOULD NOT JUSTIFY THE CONCLUSION THAT NO DEFENCES WERE REQUIRED. DEFENCES COULD PLAY AN IMPORTANT ROLE AS LONG AS SOME OFFENSIVE FORCES CONTINUE TO EXIST. THIS WOULD BE THE CASE WELL PAST THE FIRST STAGE OF THE GORBACHEV PLAN. EVEN IF NUCLEAR FORCES WERE AT VERY LOW LEVELS OR ELIMINATED, IMPROVED DEFENCES WOULD UNDERWRITE THE SECURITY OF BOTH SIDES, PROVIDING INSURANCE AGAINST NON-COMPLIANCE, COVERT PRODUCTION OR RETENTION (INCLUDING THAT BY THIRD COUNTRIES) AND BACKING UP A NECESSARILY IMPERFECT VERIFICATION REGIME.

14. THE SOVIET SIDE HAD ALSO PLACED GREATER EMPHASIS AT GENEVA ON THEIR CHARGE THAT SDI WAS INTENDED AS A COVER FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF OFFENSIVE SYSTEMS. THE U.S. SIDE HAD RESPONDED BY STRESSING THE IMPORTANCE OF OPEN LABORATORIES IN ESTABLISHING CONFIDENCE THAT THIS WAS NOT THE CASE. THE SOVIET SIDE HAD, HOWEVER, INTERPRETED THIS PROPOSAL AS A MEASURE INTENDED TO VERIFY A BAN ON QUOTE SPACE STRIKE ARMS UNQUOTE, A VERSION WHICH THE AMERICANS HAD REBUTTED.

STRATEGIC FORCES

15. TOWER CONFIRMED THAT THE LATEST SOVIET PROPOSAL HAD INDICATED NO SHIFT IN THE SOVIET PRE-SUMMIT POSITION ON START. THERE HAD BEEN NO POSITIVE SOVIET REACTION TO THE U.S. 1 NOVEMBER PROPOSALS. THE MAJOR IMPEDIMENTS TO AGREEMENT IN THE STRATEGIC FIELD THEREFORE REMAINED: THE COMPOSITION OF THE FORCES TO BE INCLUDED WITHIN AN AGREEMENT, THE STRUCTURE OF REDUCTIONS WITHIN THE AGREEMENT, AND THE ASSOCIATED SOVIET PRECONDITION THAT QUOTE SPACE STRIKE ARMS UNQUOTE BE BANNED.

DISCUSSION

16. A FEW NEW POINTS EMERGED DURING THE ENSUING DISCUSSION. ON INF, GLITMAN CONFIRMED THAT BOTH SOVIET OPTIONS REMAINED ON THE TABLE, ALTHOUGH OBUKOV HAD MADE CLEAR THE SOVIET PREFERENCE FOR THE LATEST QUOTE ZERO-ZERO IN EUROPE UNQUOTE PROPOSAL. THE QUESTION OF INF LINKAGE TO SDI AND OTHER ELEMENTS OF THE GORBACHEV PLAN REMAINED VAGUE, BUT THERE WAS NOT SIGN OF ANY WEAKENING ON THE ISSUES OF NO-INCREASE IN THIRD COUNTRY FORCES, AND NO TRANSFER OF U.S. MISSILES. GLITMAN AGREED THAT THE RUSSIANS WERE QUOTE AMBIGUOUS UNQUOTE IN DEMANDING NUMERICAL COMPENSATION IN ONE OFFER, AND DROPPING THE DEMAND IN ANOTHER, BUT COULD NOT PREDICT HOW LONG THEY MIGHT PERSIST IN THIS CONTRADICTION. HE CONFIRMED THAT CHINA HAD NOW EMERGED IN GENEVA AS ANOTHER POTENTIAL NEGOTIATING PARTNER IN STAGES 2 AND 3 OF THE GORBACHEV PLAN. IN THIS CONTEXT, THE U.S. SIDE HAD SPENT TIME ATTACKING THE SOVIET CONTENTION THAT THEIR ASIAN SS-20 SYSTEMS WERE REQUIRED TO COUNTER U.S. SYSTEMS IN THE FAR EAST. HE BELIEVED HE HAD ACHIEVED SOME SUCCESS.

17. SENATOR TOWER SAID THERE HAD BEEN SOME DISCUSSION OF SLCMS: THE U.S. HAD TRIED TO COUNTER THE SOVIET CONTENTION THAT THEY HAD NO MEDIUM RANGE SYSTEMS CAPABLE OF REACHING THE UNITED STATES. BUT THE SOVIET SIDE STILL CONTINUED TO INSIST ON AN UNACCEPTABLE RANGE LIMITATION FOR SLCMS. ON SPACE AND DEFENSIVE SYSTEMS, KAMPELMAN OFFERED THE JUDGEMENT THAT THE FUNDAMENTAL SOVIET DISTINCTION APPEARED TO BE BETWEEN QUOTE PURPOSEFUL AND NONPURPOSEFUL UNQUOTE RESEARCH. THE RUSSIANS APPEARED TO BE TRYING TO INTERPRET THE ABM TREATY TO IMPLY THAT RESEARCH INTO AN ACTIVITY WHICH, IF SUCCESSFUL, COULD LEAD TO ACTIVITY IN VIOLATION OF THE TREATY, WOULD OF ITSELF BE A VIOLATION. SINCE THE SDI'S PURPOSE WAS CLEAR IT MUST THEREFORE BE BANNED.

18. CURIEN (FRANCE) REITERATED THE BY-NOW FAMILIAR NEGATIVE FRENCH ASSESSMENT OF THE 15 JANUARY PROPOSALS. SOVIET BASIC POSTURES HAD NOT CHANGED: THEIR INF PROPOSAL WOULD QUOTE ATROPHY UNQUOTE THIRD COUNTRY FORCES, ALTHOUGH SOME NEW ELEMENTS, SUCH AS A TEST BAN, AND THE PROHIBITION OF WEAPONS BASED ON NEW PHYSICAL PRINCIPLES, HAD INDEED BEEN INTRODUCED, THE PROPOSALS WERE CAREFULLY DESIGNED TO PRESERVE SOVIET SUPERIORITY AT EACH STAGE OF THE PLAN. FRANCE'S POSITION REMAINED UNCHANGED. 4

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19. I SUMMARISED OUR VIEWS ALONG THE LINES OF PARAGRAPH 2 OF TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE, ADDING THE POINT THAT THE SOVIET 15 JANUARY DEMANDS FOR NO-INCREASE AND NO-TRANSFER, WHICH WOULD PREVENT THE UK STRATEGIC MODERNISATION PROGRAMME FROM GOING AHEAD, WOULD BE UNACCEPTABLE, WE WERE STILL CONSIDERING OUR RESPONSE TO GORBACHEV'S MESSAGE, RYZHOV HAVING INDICATED IN LONDON A PREFERENCE FOR A SUBSTANTIAL RATHER THAN RAPID REPLY. MEANWHILE, THE 15 JANUARY PROPOSALS GAVE AN OPENING ON THE ISSUE OF THIRD FORCE COMPENSATION WHICH THE ALLIANCE SHOULD FOLLOW UP VIGOROUSLY.
FUTURE CONSULTATION

20. ZU RANTZAU (FRG) RAISED THE QUESTION OF ALLIANCE CONSULTATION IN THE WAKE OF THE GORBACHEV PROPOSALS. NATO MUST PRESERVE A UNITED FRONT AGAINST SOVIET ATTEMPTS TO WEDGE DRIVE. NATIONAL ASSESSMENT OF THE PROPOSALS HAD PROBABLY REACHED THE POINT WHERE SUBSTANTIVE ALLIANCE CONSULTATION ON THE GORBACHEV PROPOSALS COULD, AND SHOULD, BEGIN WITHIN A COUNCIL CONTEXT. ZU RANTZAU WAS SUPPORTED BY THE NETHERLANDS AND BELGIAN PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES. I MADE THE POINT THAT THE ALLIANCE ALREADY HAD A MECHANISM, IN THE SPECIAL CONSULTATIVE GROUP, FOR CO-ORDINATING POLICY IN THIS FIELD, AND IT WAS PERHAPS HERE THAT OUR EFFORTS SHOULD INITIALLY BE CONCENTRATED. THE BELGIAN COUNTERED WITH THE VIEW THAT THE GORBACHEV PROPOSAL EXTENDED WELL BEYOND THE LIMITED MANDATE OF THE SCG.
CONCLUSION

21. SUMMING UP, KAMPELMAN SAID THAT IT WAS NATURAL TO QUESTION THE GOOD FAITH BEHIND PROPOSALS - GORBACHEV'S 15 JANUARY STATEMENT - THE MAIN PURPOSE OF WHICH APPEARED TO BE PROPAGANDA. THE U.S. TEAM IN GENEVA WAS STILL NOT GETTING CLEAR REPLIES TO ITS FOLLOW-UP QUESTIONS ON THE PROPOSALS' SIGNIFICANCE (THERE WERE INDICATIONS THAT THE SOVIET SIDE HAD NOT BEEN FULLY BRIEFED ON THEIR CONTENT IN ADVANCE OF THEIR PUBLICATION.) THE AMERICAN FIRST PRIORITY REMAINED TO GET NEGOTIATIONS ON SIGNIFICANT REDUCTIONS UNDERWAY WHILE STRESSING THAT THERE WAS A ROLE FOR STRATEGIC DEFENCES IN THIS PROCESS. THE U.S. WAS PROPOSING JOINT CONSIDERATION OF HOW A CO-OPERATIVE TRANSITION TO GREATER RELIANCE ON DEFENCES COULD BE ACHIEVED; AND MAKING THE POINT THAT IT HAD AN EQUAL INTEREST WITH THE SOVIET UNION IN ENSURING THAT EFFECTIVE DEFENCES DID NOT BECOME AN ADJUNCT TO AN OFFENSIVE AND, IN PARTICULAR, A FIRST-STRIKE, CAPABILITY. KAMPELMAN REMARKED FINALLY THAT THE ATMOSPHERE CREATED BY THE SUMMIT, AND THE NEW SOVIET PROPOSALS, WAS QUOTE SOMEWHAT ENCOURAGING UNQUOTE. BUT THE SOVIET SIDE WOULD CLEARLY WAIT FOR THE QUOTE END GAME UNQUOTE BEFORE OFFERING SUBSTANTIAL CONCESSIONS, IF ANY.
GRAHAM

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