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FM UKDEL NATO

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

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INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

INFO ROUTINE PARIS, BONN, ROME, MOSCOW, THE HAGUE, BRUSSELS, TOKYO

INFO SAVING PEKING, CANBERRA, UKDIS GENEVA

SCG QUINT MEETING, 12 FEBRUARY

SUMMARY

1. LACK OF FIRM CONSENSUS ON OUTLINE U.S. RESPONSE ON INF. OUTCOME SOMEWHAT CONFUSED ALTHOUGH UNDERLYING ASSUMPTION SEEMED TO BE THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN WILL DECIDE TO GO AHEAD. FRG UNCONDITIONALLY IN FAVOUR. DUTCH FIRMLY AGAINST. BRITISH MISGIVINGS ABOUT EUROPEAN ZERO-ZERO OPTION ECHOED BY OTHERS. BUT RECOGNITION THAT ALLIANCE MUST NOT RISK SEEMING TO BACK TRACK ON ITS ORIGINAL ZERO-ZERO PROPOSAL. AGREEMENT THAT U.S. RESPONSE SHOULD STRESS GLOBAL NATURE OF PROPOSAL, EVEN IF SOME SS20S PERMITTED IN ASIA IN FIRST STEP. JAPANESE REPORTEDLY UNHAPPY ON ASIAN ASPECT. POSSIBLE NEED FOR STUDY OF MILITARY IMPLICATIONS OF NEW ALLIANCE APPROACH.
2. NITZE AND ROWNY TO REPORT TO REAGAN PRIOR TO FINAL DECISION. U.S CONSCIOUS OF NEED FOR EARLY RESPONSE TO GORBACHEV. ROUND 4 AT GENEVA ENDS 4 MARCH.

DETAIL

3. HOLMES (SCG CHAIRMAN) SAID THAT THE SCG WAS PART OF THE WIDER CONSULTATION PROCESS ON THE RESPONSE TO THE GORBACHEV PROPOSALS OF 14 JANUARY. DISCUSSION THEN FOCUSED ON THE INF ISSUES TOUCHED ON AT THE NAC BRIEFING BY NITZE EARLIER TODAY (MY TELNO 47).
4. WHILST NOT RULING IT OUT (THE BACKGROUND BEING THE DEFINITIVE VIEWS IN YOUR MESSAGE TO SHULTZ - YOUR TELNO 247 TO WASHINGTON), DAUNT EXPLAINED BRITISH MISGIVINGS ABOUT A ZERO-ZERO SOLUTION APPLIED ONLY TO EUROPE. THIS ARGUABLY RISKED UNDERMINING THE RATIONALE OF THE 1979 DUAL TRACK DECISION, ESPECIALLY AS REGARDS COUPLING AND THE SPECTRUM OF DETERRENCE. THE ZERO-ZERO PROPOSAL HAD ORIGINALLY BEEN ADOPTED IN THE CONFIDENT EXPECTATION THAT THE RUSSIANS WOULD NOT TAKE IT UP. IF THERE WAS NOW AN INCREASED POSSIBILITY OF SOVIET ACCEPTANCE WE SHOULD BE CERTAIN THAT OUR SECURITY INTERESTS WERE ADEQUATELY MET. THE UK WAS NOT ENTIRELY CONFIDENT ON THIS POINT. THERE COULD BE AN ADDITIONAL POLITICAL PROBLEM IN CONTINUING DEPLOYMENT OF GLCM WHILST ACTIVELY PUSHING FOR EARLY AGREEMENT ON ZERO-ZERO IN EUROPE.
5. DAUNT CAUTIONED ABOUT THE TERMINOLOGY APPLIED TO ANY NEW PROPOSAL. IT WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE TO CLAIM THAT A WHOLE CATEGORY OF SOVIET WEAPONS WAS BEING ELIMINATED IF SOME SS20 DEPLOYMENTS IN ASIA REMAINED, EVEN IF THE ULTIMATE GOAL WAS THEIR COMPLETE REMOVAL. HE NOTED THAT UNDER THE ZERO-ZERO PROPOSAL NATO WOULD NO LONGER BE ABLE TO TARGET SOVIET TERRITORY FROM WESTERN EUROPE. THERE WOULD NEED TO BE CAREFUL EXAMINATION OF THE IMPLICATIONS FOR NATO SHORTER RANGE

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INF.

INF (SRINF). THE POSITION OF THE FRG WOULD BE PARTICULARLY SENSITIVE IF IT WERE ONCE AGAIN THE ONLY EUROPEAN ALLY WITH DEPLOYED NATO MISSILES (PERSHING 1).

6. ON THE THIRD COUNTRY ISSUE, DAUNT REPEATED THE FIRM LINE TAKEN IN THE COUNCIL.

7. IN SUPPORTING THE PROPOSED U.S. RESPONSE, FRG (RUTH) SAID THAT NONE OF THE ALLIES HAD BEEN UNAWARE OF THE RISKS ATTACHED TO THE 1979 DECISION. THEY HAD CONSCIOUSLY ACCEPTED THE ZERO-ZERO PROPOSAL IN 1982 AS A POLITICAL AND MILITARY DECISION. GLCM/P11 DEPLOYMENTS IN 1983 HAD BEEN NEEDED TO SHOW THAT NATO COULD ACT IN THE FACE OF A SPECIFIC SOVIET THREAT. IF THAT THREAT WAS REMOVED THEN NATO SHOULD RESPOND AND PROVE THAT IT WAS NOT QUOTE MISSILE CRAZY UNQUOTE. IN THE MEANTIME DEPLOYMENTS HAD TO CONTINUE.

8. THE GERMANS BELIEVED THE U.S. RESPONSE SHOULD COUNTER THE NEGATIVE ASPECTS OF THE SOVIET PROPOSALS. NATO SHOULD AVOID THE TERM QUOTE ZERO-ZERO IN EUROPE UNQUOTE BUT STRESS THAT THE APPROACH WAS A GLOBAL ONE. UK/FRENCH SYSTEMS WERE STRATEGIC AND HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH LRINF. NATO SHOULD THINK THROUGH THE MILITARY IMPLICATIONS AND REQUIREMENTS, ESPECIALLY FOR SRINF, QUOTE AT SOME STAGE UNQUOTE. SRINF CONSTRAINTS WOULD BE ESSENTIAL AS PART OF AN INF AGREEMENT. VERIFICATION WOULD ALSO BE IMPORTANT. ONCE THE U.S. RESPONSE HAD BEEN DECIDED THE ALLIANCE SHOULD GIVE IT UNANIMOUS BACKING EVEN IF THERE WERE SOME RESERVATIONS.

9. MAKING IT CLEAR THAT DUTCH POLICY HAD BEEN DECIDED AT CABINET LEVEL, THE NETHERLANDS SAID THAT ALTHOUGH THE ULTIMATE OBJECTIVE OF ZERO-ZERO REMAINED THE ALLIANCE SHOULD MOVE STEP BY STEP, CONCENTRATING ON AN INTERIM AGREEMENT ON THE LINES OF THE U.S.

1 NOVEMBER 1985 PROPOSAL. THIS WOULD HAVE THE ADVANTAGE OF REFLECTING THE CURRENT LEVEL OF NATO DEPLOYMENTS. A ZERO-ZERO OUTCOME IN EUROPE RISKED SERIOUS DAMAGE TO THE ALLIANCE. ON UK/FRENCH FORCES, THERE HAD BEEN ONLY AN APPARENT SOVIET CONCESSION BUT IT WAS NOW POSSIBLE THAT THE RUSSIANS MIGHT BE PERSUADED TO LEAVE THE ISSUE OF THIRD COUNTRY SYSTEMS UNTIL A SUBSEQUENT STAGE.

10. ITALY (DANOVI) SAID THE ALLIANCE FACED A CLEAR CHOICE ON THE RESPONSE TO GORBACHEV: TO STICK TO THE ORIGINAL GLOBAL ZERO-ZERO PROPOSAL WOULD BE UNCONSTRUCTIVE. IF IT WANTED TO PICK UP THE POSITIVE ELEMENTS IN THE SOVIET APPROACH IN A CONSTRUCTIVE MANNER, THEN THE DRAFT U.S. RESPONSE WAS THE BEST APPROACH. BUT IT WAS IMPORTANT TO RECOGNISE THAT THE SOVIET OBJECTIVE WAS A LOWER LEVEL OF WEAPONS THAT ENSURED NOT ONLY ITS SECURITY BUT ALSO SOVIET SUPERIORITY IN EVERY CATEGORY, INCLUDING SRINF AND BATTLEFIELD SYSTEMS. THE UK/FRENCH FORCES WOULD REMAIN A KEY ELEMENT IN THE SOVIET POSITION. IT WAS THEREFORE LIKELY THAT THE RUSSIANS WOULD THEMSELVES SPARE THE ALLIANCE FROM EMBARRASSMENT BY FAILING TO TAKE UP THE ZERO-ZERO OFFER IN EUROPE. NATO WOULD THEN BE ABLE TO REVERT NATURALLY TO ITS INTERIM PROPOSAL WITHOUT ITS CREDIBILITY BEING CALLED INTO QUESTION. AS FAR AS ASIAN SS20S WERE CONCERNED, THE RUSSIANS WOULD PROBABLY INSIST ON RETAINING SOME TO COUNTER THE CHINESE THREAT, ALTHOUGH WITHOUT MAKING THIS EXPLICIT.

11. BELGIUM WARNED AGAINST REOPENING THE 1979 DEBATE. A NUMBER OF ALLIES HAD HAD, AND STILL HAD, MISGIVINGS ABOUT THE ZERO OPTION. IT HAD ALWAYS BEEN SEEN AS A THEORETICAL POSSIBILITY. IT PROBABLY STILL WAS GIVEN THE CONDITIONS NATO ATTACHED. BUT IT WAS OUT OF THE

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Question

QUESTION TO DROP THE PROPOSAL. WE SHOULD THEREFORE CONCENTRATE ON A TRUE ZERO SOLUTION, IE ON A GLOBAL BASIS. HE AGREED THAT THE RUSSIANS WERE UNLIKELY TO AGREE BECAUSE OF THEIR INSISTENCE ON INCLUDING UK/FRENCH FORCES.

12. HOLMES REPORTED THAT THE JAPANESE HAD EXPRESSED STRONG CONCERN TO ROWNY, WHO HAD BEEN CONSULTING WITH U.S. ALLIES IN THE FAR EAST, ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF A RESIDUAL SS20 FORCE IN ASIA IN THE EVENT OF THEIR COMPLETE REMOVAL IN EUROPE. ON COUPLING, HE SAID THAT EVEN WITHOUT LRINF, BATTLEFIELD SYSTEMS AND POSEIDON SLBMS ASSIGNED TO SACEUR WOULD PROVIDE A CONTINUING GUARANTEE. BUT HE RECOGNISED THAT THEY WOULD NOT FILL THE SPECTRUM OF DETERRENCE IN THE SAME WAY. GLITMAN (US INF NEGOTIATOR) ADDED THAT GLCM/PII HAD BEEN DEPLOYED TO FILL A GAP. THERE WAS A TRADE-OFF BETWEEN MAINTAINING NATO LRINF AND CLOSING THE GAP, OR GETTING RID OF AN ENTIRE CATEGORY OF SOVIET WEAPONS IN EUROPE AND THUS REDUCING THE THREAT.

13. GLITMAN SAID THAT NATO HAD SUCCESSFULLY PERSUADED PUBLIC OPINION THAT THE ONLY WAY TO ACHIEVE AN ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENT WAS BY PROVING THAT IT WAS ABLE TO DEPLOY. THERE SHOULD BE NO ADDITIONAL DIFFICULTY NOW. IT WAS ALSO CLEAR THAT IF NATO BACKED DOWN ON ITS EARLIER ZERO-ZERO PROPOSAL THE RUSSIANS WOULD WIN EASY PUBLICITY POINTS. THE CHOICE FACING THE ALLIANCE WAS NO LRINF IN EUROPE AND, AS A FIRST STEP, 50 PERCENT REDUCTIONS IN ASIA, OR SOME LRINF DEPLOYMENTS, EG 140 LAUNCHERS AS IN THE 1 NOVEMBER PROPOSALS, AND PROPORTIONATE REDUCTIONS IN ASIA WHICH WOULD RESULT IN ALMOST THE SAME SS20 TOTAL. HE STRONGLY PREFERRED THE FORMER OPTION BUT ON THE BASIS THAT THIS CONSTITUTED A GLOBAL, NOT A EUROPEAN, SETTLEMENT.

14. HOLMES SAID THE U.S. LINE ON UK/FRENCH FORCES WOULD CONTINUE TO BE AS OBDUKATE AND UNEQUIVOCAL AS BEFORE.

15. HOLMES DID NOT ATTEMPT TO REACH AN AGREED CONCLUSION. NITZE AND ROWNY WOULD REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT WHEN THE VIEWS EXPRESSED AT THE SCG WOULD ALSO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT. HE AGREED THAT IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF ALLIES WERE GIVEN ADVANCE NOTIFICATION OF THE TERMS OF THE REPLY TO GORBACHEV. (THE NSC REPRESENTATIVE MADE NO COMMENT). HE AND GLITMAN NOTED THAT THE GORBACHEV PROPOSALS HAD ALREADY GONE UNANSWERED FOR 4 WEEKS AND THAT ROUND 4 AT GENEVA ENDED ON 4 MARCH. THE NEXT ROUND, THE LAST BEFORE THE SUMMIT, MIGHT NOT BEGIN UNTIL MID-MAY. THE CLEAR IMPLICATION WAS THAT THE REPLY WOULD BE SENT SOON.

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16. CONTRARY TO NORMAL PRACTICE, HOLMES DID NOT GIVE A PRESS CONFERENCE AFTER THE MEETING ON THE GROUNDS THAT MITZE HAD ASKED FOR CONFIDENTIALITY AT THE NAC, AND THE SCG HAD COVERED THE SAME GROUND. BUT HE ISSUED A SHORT STATEMENT (COPY BY BAG). IF ASKED, THE U.S. WOULD CONFIRM THAT THE SS20 FORCE WAS UNCHANGED AT 441 LAUNCHERS.

GRAHAM

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FCO PASS SAVING PEKING, CANBERRA, UKDIS GENEVA
UBLNAN 0117

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