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MODUK FOR DNPS AND DACU

NUCLEAR AND SPACE TALKS: COUNCIL BRIEFING BY NITZE: 12 FEBRUARY

SUMMARY

1. NITZE SETS OUT U.S. APPRAISAL OF, AND PROSPECTIVE RESPONSE TO, GORBACHEV'S 14 JANUARY PROPOSALS IN FAMILIAR TERMS, AND ENVISAGES INVOLVEMENT OF OTHER NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES FOLLOWING INITIAL BILATERAL REDUCTIONS. SUPPORT FOR NEW INF COUNTER PROPOSAL FROM FRG, BUT MISGIVINGS ABOUT IMPLICATION OF QUOTE ZERO-ZERO IN EUROPE UNQUOTE FROM OTHER LRINF BASING NATIONS AND FRANCE. UK AND FRANCE MAKE STRONG STATEMENTS ON EXCLUSION OF THIRD COUNTRY FORCES.

DETAIL

2. NITZE (ACCOMPANIED BY LEHMAN, NSC) REPORTED ON THE U.S. APPRAISAL OF GORBACHEV'S 14 JANUARY PROPOSALS, AND ON THE U.S. IDEAS FOR THEIR RESPONSE, FOLLOWING CLOSELY THE SPEAKING NOTES USED IN LONDON.
3. THE MANNER OF ANNOUNCEMENT AND CONTENT OF THE PROPOSALS INDICATED THEY WERE PRIMARILY PROPAGANDA. THE FIRST STAGE WOULD ASSURE SOVIET MILITARY SUPERIORITY, WITH ITEMS OF MAJOR INTEREST TO THE WEST LEFT TO SUBSEQUENT STAGES, AND ESSENTIAL PRECONDITIONS FOR A NON-NUCLEAR WORLD UNCOVERED. THERE WAS POTENTIAL NEW GROUND ON INF BUT WITH UNACCEPTABLE PRECONDITIONS (NO TRANSFER, THIRD COUNTRY FREEZE, AND NO SS20 REDUCTIONS IN ASIA). THE POSITION ON START AND SPACE AND DEFENCE REMAINED UNCHANGED (AFTER SOME INITIAL POSSIBLY ENCOURAGING SIGNS ON SDII RESEARCH).
4. AFTER REVIEW THE PRESIDENT HAD MADE CERTAIN DECISIONS ABOUT REACTIONS BUT WANTED ALLIED ADVICE BEFORE TAKING FINAL DECISIONS. THE U.S. WERE PLEASED THAT THE SOVIET UNION NOW SHARED THE GOAL OF A NUCLEAR-FREE WORLD BUT WOULD CONCENTRATE INITIALLY ON BILATERAL REDUCTIONS ON THE BASIS OF 50 PERCENT AND A SEPARATE INF AGREEMENT. WHEN SUCH STEPS WERE COMPLETE AND FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS UNDERWAY QUOTE WE CAN ENVISION MULTILATERAL SUBSEQUENT STEPS WHICH COULD INVOLVE THE UK, FRANCE AND CHINA AND OTHERS SO THAT ALL CAN MOVE TO ZERO NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN A BALANCED AND STABLE MANNER UNQUOTE. (NITZE'S SPEAKING NOTE SAID QUOTE WHEN THE FORCES OF THE U.S. AND USSR HAVE BEEN REDUCED UNQUOTE, BUT IN THE COUNCIL HE ADDED QUOTE REDUCED BY 50 PERCENT UNQUOTE.)
5. HOWEVER, THE TOTAL ELIMINATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS WOULD REQUIRE THE CORRECTION OF CONVENTIONAL AND OTHER MILITARY IMBALANCES, FULL

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COMPLIANCE WITH AGREEMENTS, PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF REGIONAL CONFLICTS, AND COMMITMENT TO PEACEFUL COMPETITION. THE TOTAL ELIMINATION OF DEFENCES WOULD NOT BE A CONSEQUENCE.

6. THE U.S. WOULD PROPOSE NO NEW INITIATIVE ON START OR SPACE AND DEFENCE. THEY WERE CONSIDERING A NEW INF PROPOSAL INVOLVING NO U.S. OR SOVIET LRINF WEST OF NOVOSIBIRSK, INITIAL REDUCTION OF SS20S IN ASIA BY 50 PERCENT (NITZE REMARKED THAT THIS FIGURE MAY NEED TO BE ALTERED AS A RESULT OF ROWNY'S VISIT TO TOKYO, WHERE, HE TOLD THE COUNCIL AT THE SUBSEQUENT PRIVATE LUNCH, THE JAPANESE HAD REACTED VERY ADVERSELY), A GLOBAL WARHEAD CEILING AND AN EQUAL SRINF CEILING AT CURRENT LEVELS, OR A FREEZE AT 1 JAN 82 (THE DATE IN THE U.S. DRAFT TREATY) LEVELS.

7. ON OTHER ISSUES THE U.S. WOULD KEEP TESTING SEPARATE FROM THE BILATERAL GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS. TESTING WOULD BE REQUIRED SO LONG AS THERE WAS NUCLEAR DETERRENCE. THE U.S. WOULD PURSUE PROGRESS IN MBFR, CDE AND CW NEGOTIATIONS IN CD. THEY WOULD ALSO SEEK TO STRENGTHEN THE NPT REGIME AND MEASURES TO CURB CW PROLIFERATION.

8. RESPONDING FIRST, HANSEN (FRG) POINTED TO THE DANGERS OF SOVIET WEDGE-DRIVING AND THE NEED TO DEVELOP AN ALLIED RESPONSE ACCEPTABLE TO ALL. THE AIM SHOULD BE TO CREATE A STATE OF LASTING SECURITY: THE ELIMINATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS WOULD DECREASE STABILITY WITHOUT CORRESPONDING MEASURES IN NON-NUCLEAR AREAS. THE SOVIET SIDE'S INTENTIONS SHOULD BE TESTED IN CURRENT NEGOTIATIONS. IN PARTICULAR A SEPARATE INF AGREEMENT WAS AN URGENT OBJECTIVE. THE FRG SUPPORTED THE MODIFIED US ZERO-ZERO PROPOSAL AS A STEP TOWARDS COMPLETE ELIMINATION OF LRINF.

9. BERG (NORWAY) SAID THAT HIS GOVERNMENT WELCOMED NITZE'S IDEAS ON INF AND AGREED THAT A NEW INITIATIVE IN START WAS LESS URGENT. IT WAS IMPERATIVE TO REJECT SOVIET PRECONDITIONS ON THIRD COUNTRY FORCES AND INF. HOWEVER HE SYMPATHISED WITH THE VIEW THAT IT WAS DIFFICULT TO COMMIT ONESELF TO SIGNIFICANT REDUCTIONS IN STRATEGIC FORCES WITHOUT SOME IDEA OF FUTURE DEFENCES.

10. HE EMPHASISED THAT LINKAGE OF CURRENT BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS TO THIRD COUNTRY FORCES WAS NOT ACCEPTABLE AND REMINDED THE COUNCIL OF OUR PRECONDITIONS FOR RECONSIDERING OUR POSITION. SUCH LINKAGE EXISTED IN ALL FORMS OF THE CURRENT SOVIET INF POSITION. IN THE CONTEXT OF NITZE'S REMARKS ABOUT SUBSEQUENT INVOLVEMENT OF OTHER NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES, HE STRESSED THAT WE WERE NOT PREPARED TO GO BEYOND YOUR 1983 UNGA STATEMENT, NOR TO GIVE FIGURES FOR THE LEVEL OF REDUCTION WHICH MIGHT CAUSE US TO RECONSIDER. WE WERE GLAD TO NOTE NITZE'S STRESS ON THE NEED FOR A BALANCE OF CONVENTIONAL AND CHEMICAL FORCES AS IMPORTANT FACTORS FOR SECURITY IN EUROPE. WE ALSO WELCOMED THE U.S. INTENT TO RESPOND POSITIVELY AND TEST THE EXTENT OF GENUINE SUBSTANCE IN THE SOVIET PROPOSALS. CLEARLY IT MADE SENSE TO CONCENTRATE ON THE FIRST STAGE WITHOUT LINKAGE TO SUBSEQUENT STEPS.

11. HOWEVER WE HAD ALWAYS SEEN SOME DANGER IN A ZERO-ZERO OUTCOME FOR INF ON A GLOBAL BASIS. THIS WAS REINFORCED WHEN ZERO-ZERO APPLIED ONLY TO EUROPE EVEN WITH REDUCTIONS IN ASIA AND GLOBAL CEILINGS. WE UNDERSTOOD WHY THE U.S. WERE PUTTING FORWARD THEIR REVISED PROPOSALS BUT WOULD HAVE PREFERRED THE 1 NOVEMBER INTERIM

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OUTCOME, WHICH WOULD HAVE BEEN CONSISTENT WITH THE RATIONALE OF NATO'S DUAL TRACK DECISION. IT WAS IMPORTANT TO BEAR THAT POINT IN MIND IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. FINALLY, ON A MORE GENERAL NOTE, WE HOPED THAT THE U.S. WOULD CONTINUE TO OBSERVE THE SALT I AND II LIMITS.

12. CURIEN (FRANCE) DWELT AT SOME LENGTH ON THE NEW INF PROPOSAL. THERE WERE RISKS BOTH IN SECURITY AND POLITICAL TERMS. IN SECURITY TERMS HE QUESTIONED WHETHER ZERO-ZERO WOULD LEAD TO A GENUINE BALANCE; EVEN WITHOUT SS20'S THE SOVIET UNION HAD AMPLE MEANS OF HOLDING WESTERN EUROPE AT RISK. PREVIOUS INEQUALITIES WOULD REMAIN. THE CONVENTIONAL AND CHEMICAL IMBALANCES WOULD ALSO PERSIST. POLITICALLY SOVIET INSISTENCE ON LINKAGE WITH THIRD COUNTRY FORCES PROVIDED THEM WITH TACTICAL AND PRESENTATIONAL ADVANTAGES. IF THE WEST CONCEDED THAT, SOVIET POLICY WOULD BEGIN A PROCESS OF DENUCLEARISATION AND QUOTE VASSALISATION UNQUOTE OF EUROPE. IF INF NEGOTIATIONS FAILED, THE RUSSIANS COULD PIN THE BLAME ON THE BRITISH AND FRENCH IN AN ATTEMPT TO DRIVE WEDGES. THE WEST SHOULD STAND FIRM, INCLUDING ON THE ISSUE OF THIRD COUNTRY FORCES. FRENCH CONDITIONS FOR A CHANGE IN THEIR POSITION WERE ALSO WELL KNOWN.

13. DE HOOP SCHEFFER (NETHERLANDS) WHILE COMMENDING A POSITIVE AND CONSTRUCTIVE RESPONSE ALSO EXPRESSED A PREFERENCE FOR THE INTERIM INF SOLUTION PUT FORWARD A PREFERENCE FOR THE INTERIM INF SOLUTION PUT FORWARD ON 1 NOVEMBER. HE ALSO HOPED THAT THE U.S. WOULD REPEAT ITS PREPAREDNESS TO ABIDE BY SALT INTERIM RESTRAINTS. CASSIERS (BELGIUM) ALSO REFERRED TO MISGIVINGS ABOUT THE ZERO-ZERO OUTCOME AS DID FULCI (ITALY). HOWEVER ALL WHO SPOKE ON THIS ISSUE RECOGNISED THE POLITICAL IMPOSSIBILITY OF THE ALLIANCE CHANGING ITS BASIC GOAL FOR INF.

14. NITZE SAID THAT HE EXPECTED THE PRESIDENT'S RESPONSE TO BE FINALISED AFTER HIS ROWNY'S RETURN TO WASHINGTON. THE FULL TEXT WOULD REMAIN CONFIDENTIAL BUT HE UNDERTOOK TO TRY AND ENSURE THAT THE MAIN ELEMENTS WERE MADE KNOWN TO THE ALLIES IN ADVANCE OF THEIR BECOMING PUBLIC IN THE U.S. THE VIEWS EXPRESSED ON THE POSSIBLE NEW INF PROPOSAL WOULD BE FOLLOWED UP IN MORE DETAIL IN THE SUBSEQUENT SCG MEETING.

15. FULL TEXT OF NITZE'S OPENING STATEMENT FOLLOWS BY BAG.

GRAHAM

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FCO PASS SAVING PEKING, CANBERRA

REPEATED AS REQUESTED

US/SOVIET ARMS CONTROL TALKS

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SOVIET D

NEWS D

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