
## SECRET

SECRET FM WASHINGTON TO IMMEDIATE FCO **TELNO 383** OF 142359Z FEBRUARY 86 HNFO PRIORITY MODUK, PARIS, BONN, UKDEL NATO



MODUK (FOR DACU). MY TELNO 270: ARMS CONTROL: US RESPONSE TO GORBACHEV'S 15 JANUARY PROPOSALS SUMMARY

- 1. SOME RETHINKING OF THE PROPOSED US RESPONSE ON MAF IN THE LIGHT OF ALLHED AND JAPANESE VIEWS. RESPONSE UNLIKELY TO HISSUE FOR ANOTHER WEEK.
- MINTER-AGENCY DEBATE ALSO REOPENED ON THE DANGERS OF QUOTE A NUCLEAR FREE WORLD UNQUOTE AS A POLICY AIM. BUT DOUBTS ABOUT WHETHER THE PRESIDENT WILL BACK OFF. DETAIL
- 3. CONTACTS IN STATE AND OSD HAVE GIVEN US (ON A STRICTLY PERSONAL BASHS: PLEASE PROTECT) AN ACCOUNT OF HINTER-AGENCY DISCUSSIONS FOLLOWING NITZE'S CONSULTATIONS IN EUROPE AND ROWNY'S IN ASHA. IT IS CLEAR THAT THE DEGREE OF CONCERN, WHICH BOTH HAVE REPORTED, ABOUT THE PROPOSED US PROPOSAL ON HAF HAS LED TO A PAUSE FOR REFLECTION. WHITE HOUSE AND STATE ARE STILL KEEN THAT THE PRESIDENT SHOULD REPLY TO GORBACHEV BEFORE THE SOVIET PARTY CONGRESS OPENS ON 26 FEBRUARY. BUT HT LOOKS AS HE A REPLY MUCH BEFORE THEN WILL NOT NOW BE FEASIBLE. POINDEXTER HAS GONE TO CALHFORNIA TO BRIEF THE PRESIDENT ON THE NITZE/ROWNY FINDINGS: A SAC(G) MEETING TO LOOK AT REVISED INF OPTIONS IS LIKELY TO TAKE PLACE ON 18 OR 19 FEBRUARY SEMI-COLON AND A SUBSEQUENT NSC DISCUSSION IS ALSO LIKELY (POSSIBLY ON 21 FEBRUARY) TO DISPLAY THE OPTIONS TO THE PRESIDENT. FINAL DRAFTING OF THE RESPONSE WILL AWAIT HIS REACTIONS (? OVER THE WEEKEND OF 22/23 FEBRUARY).
- 4. THE PRINCIPAL REASON FOR THE PAUSE FOR REFLECTION IS FOREIGN REACTIONS TO THE PLANNED INF PROPOSAL. ROWNY, WHO HAD THE TASK OF PERSUADING THE JAPANESE THAT A 50 PER CENT RED-UCTION IN ASIAN SS20S, AND A (FOLLOWING WORD IN SQUARE BRACKETS) QUASI-COMMITMENT TO THEIR SUBSEQUENT ELIMINATION, WOULD SUFFICE, APPARENTLY RECEIVED AN EARFULL FROM NAKASONE. NITZE HAS CLEARLY GIVEN A FULL ACCOUNT OF UK/FRENCH/ DUTCH CONCERNS ABOUT THE ELIMINATION OF US LRINF IN EUROPE. BOTH IN STATE AND IN OSD IT IS THOUGHT UNLIKELY THAT THE ORIGINAL PROPOSAL WILL GO ANY FURTHER IN ITS PRESENT FORM: SHULTZ, WHO PREVIOUSLY ADVOCATED IT, IS NOW EXPECTED TO RETREAT, GIVEN THE STRENGTH OF ALLIED AND JAPANESE OBJECTIONS. 5. AMONG THE NEW OPTIONS WHICH MAY BE PUT TO THE SAC(G) ARE

SECRET THE FOLLOWING FOUR:

- (A) A REPACKAGING OF THE ORIGINAL PROPOSAL AS A GLOBAL ZERO/
  ZERO SOLUTION, BUT WITH DIFFERENTIAL EUROPEAN/ASIAN
  SS2D REDUCTION SCHEDULES. THE 50 PER CENT FIGURE FOR INITIAL
  REDUCTIONS IN ASIAN SS2OS WOULD DISAPPEAR: INSTEAD,
  AGREED REDUCTION SCHEDULES WOULD INVOLVE FASTER
  REDUCTIONS TO ZERO IN EUROPE THAN IN ASIA.
  - (B) A FRONT-END-LOADED VERSION OF THE ORIGINAL PROPOSAL, WHEREBY THE STAGE 1 REDUCTION IN ASIAN SS20S WOULD BE 75 OR 80 PER CENT, NOT 50 PER CENT.
- (C) A QUITE DIFFERENT PROPOSAL WHICH WOULD DROP THE EUROPEAN/
  ASIAN SUB-CEILINGS, AND SIMPLY CALL FOR REDUCTIONS OF 80 PER
  CENT (OR PERHAPS 75 PER CENT) IN SSEED, ESTABLISHING
  A MUTUAL GLOBAL CEILING AT THE RESIDUAL NUMBER. UNDER THIS
  VARIANT BOTH STDES WOULD BE FREE TO DEPLOY WITHOUT
  GEOGRAPHICAL LIMITATION UP TO THE AGREED CEILING.
- (D) EQUAL GLOBAL CEILINGS (PERHAPS AT 20 PER CENT OF CURRENTLY DEPLOYED SS20S) WITH THREE GEOGRAPHICAL SUB-CEILINGS.


  NEITHER THE US NOR THE SOVIET UNION WOULD BE PERMITTED

  ""EUROPEAN OR ASIAN" DEPLOYMENTS: SS20 DEPLOYMENTS

  WOULD BE CONFINED TO A ZONE BETWEEN THE URALS AND

  NOVOSIBIRSK (WHICH WOULD PRESUMABLY BE REGARDED AS NEITHER IN EUROPE NOR IN ASIA) AND THE US WOULD RETAIN THE RIGHT

  TO HAVE AVAILABLE IN THE US A MATCHING NUMBER OF SYSTEMS.
- 6. OPTIONS (A), (B) AND (D) COULD BE PRESENTED AS (PARTIALLY)
  MEETING THE JAPANESE POINT. THEY MAY ALSO HAVE WHITE HOUSE APPEAL,
  IN THAT THE PRESIDENT WOULD NOT APPEAR INSISTENT ON EUROPEAN
  DEPLOYMENT OF US INF. BUT OPTION (C) IS THE ONLY ONE THAT WOULD
  ALLOW PERSHING 2 AND GLCM DEPLOYMENTS IN EUROPE AND HENCE THE ONLY
  ONE THAT TAKES MUCH ACCOUNT OF EUROPEAN OBJECTIONS TO THE ORIGINAL
  PLAN. (IT MIGHT OF COURSE SEEM LESS GOOD TO THE JAPANESE THAN E.G.
  (D).)
- 7. THE SAC(G) WILL ALSO LOOK AGAIN AT EARLIER OPTIONS
  HANCLUDING OSD'S PREFERENCE, HE. STACKING TO THE ANF ELEMENT ON
  THE 1 NOVEMBER US PROPOSAL.
- B. A SECOND, AND LESS WELL-FOCUSED, DEBATE IS NOW PROCEEDING
  ON THE STRENGTH OF NITZE'S REPORTS OF ALLIED CONCERN, PARTICULARLY
  IN LONDON, ABOUT THE ESPOUSAL OF THE AIM OF A QUOTE NUCLEAR FREE
  WORLD UNQUOTE. UK VIEWS ARE STRONGLY SUPPORTED BY OSD, AND BY
  MOST OF THE EXPERTS IN STATE, TO WHOM THEY CAME OF COURSE AS NO
  SURPRISE: IT WAS HOWEVER CLEAR, WHEN THE PUS SAW HIM ON
  12 FEBRUARY, THAT WHITEHEAD HAD BEEN SURPRISED AT NITZE'S REPORT
  OF THE STRENGTH WITH WHICH THESE VIEWS ARE HELD. IT IS SAID THAT
  SHULTZ TOO WAS STRUCK BY THIS. AMONG OFFICIALS IN BOTH OSD AND
  STATE THERE IS SOME PESSIMISM AS TO WHETHER CHANGES IN WHITE
  HOUSE RHETORIC CAN BE ENGINEERED. EVEN IN DOD THERE IS NO HOPE
  THAT THE JANUARY 1985 SHULTZ/GROMYKO REFERENCE, SUBSEQUENTLY
  RATHFIED AT THE SUMMIT, TO THE EVENTUAL COMPLETE ABOLITION
  OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAN BE CLAWED BACK. BUT AT LEAST THE ARGUMENTS
  FOR NOT NOW GOING FURTHER DOWN THAT ROAD ARE BACK ON THE TABLE.



## SECRET

COMMENT

FOR ONCE, THE NITZE/ROWNY EXERCISE AND THE SCG AND NAC DISCUSSIONS HAVE BEEN A GENUINE CONSULTATION EXERCISE. THE CURRENT RETHINKING PROVES THE POINT. ALTHOUGH NO-ONE FEELS LIKE PREDICTING WITH CONFIDENCE WHERE THE PRESIDENT WILL FINALLY COME OUT, SOME MODINFICATION OF THE SINF PROPOSAL SEEMS VIRTUALLY CERTAMN. BUT UNLESS THE HIDEA OF A REPLY BEFORE THE SOVIET PARTY CONGRESS HIS DROPPED, HIT SEEMS UNLAKELY THAT THERE WILL BE A FURTHER FORMAL CONSULTATION WHITH ALLHES.

WRIGHT

US/SOVIET ARMS CONTROL TALKS

LIMITED PB/LADY YOUNG

ACDD

DEFENCE D

BOVIET D

NEWS D NAD

EED

WED PLANNING STAFF

RES D INFO D

PUBD

NED

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