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CABINET OFFICE

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B.07336

21 February 1986

Dear Charles

Northern Ireland

In line with your letter of yesterday to Jim Daniell in the Northern Ireland Office, I enclose a speaking note for the Prime Minister's use when she sees Mr Molyneaux and Dr Paisley on 25 February, together with two illustrative drafts for press statements on that meeting. One of these is designed for use if further talks are agreed; it shows the minimum which might bring the unionist leaders to agree to such further talks. The other would be for use if the talks broke down on 25 February. The three drafts are based on discussion with Sir Robert Armstrong and with officials from the Northern Ireland Office and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

2. I also enclose background notes by the Northern Ireland Office on the various possible types of devolution and on procedures for handling Northern Ireland business at Westminster. The Northern Ireland Office will provide separately a supplementary speaking note, including material for refuting allegations and complaints which the unionist leaders may be expected to raise and also points to reinforce various elements in the enclosed speaking note.

3. Point 12 in the enclosed speaking note includes the concession to the unionists of saying that, if the suggestions to be made in the meeting bore fruit, it would be necessary to consider how that affected the operation of the Anglo-Irish Agreement. This would be accurate in relation to talks about devolution. In relation to the other matters envisaged for discussion with the unionist leaders, it would not be provided for in the Agreement. If the Prime Minister decided to say it, we would have to expect the unionist leaders not only to publicise it but also to exaggerate and distort it. The same words are therefore reproduced in the draft press statement designed for use if further meetings with the unionist leaders are agreed.

C D Powell Esq
No 10
Downing Street



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4. I am sending copies of this letter to the Private Secretaries to the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland and the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, who will no doubt convey direct to you the views of their Secretaries of State; and to the Private Secretaries to the Lord President, the Home Secretary, the Chief Whip and Sir Robert Armstrong.

Yours ever

Christopher

C L G Mallaby

conqueror

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SPEAKING NOTE FOR THE PRIME MINISTER

A. Opening Remarks

1. Welcome. Important things to discuss. Keen to hear your suggestions. Know you'll listen to mine. Real dialogue. Let me explain my position.

2. Anglo-Irish Agreement exists. Two governments are committed to it. Endorsed at Westminster by massive majorities. At the same time, I recognise the fulip as significance of the Unionist vote in the by-elections. expressed by

3. Don't forget that Agreement reinforces status of Northern Ireland within the United Kingdom and right of majority to determine that status, as well as the sovereign responsibility of HMG in Northern Ireland. I should not have signed the Agreement on any other basis. I want Northern Ireland to remain part of the United Kingdom. and expect

4. Determined that Agreement shall bring benefits for everyone in Northern Ireland including unionists. Not doing badly so far. Arms finds in Sligo and Roscommon on 26 January were biggest ever on land in Ireland. We are working hard for more successes like that. Irish Republic [has signed] European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, something you have long wanted. I have pressed the

Taoiseach very hard to increase Garda Resources devoted to surveillance and intelligence.

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5. Government now working hard for moves by SDLP: support for RUC, clearer statements of readiness to talk without preconditions about devolution. / I made clear in House on 20 February the importance I attach to this. Seeing Hume on Thursday.

6. I respect and understand your wish to be consulted fully about the affairs of Northern Ireland, in parallel with what goes on in the Intergovernmental Conference. *Consultation* → I want to respond to that, by establishing arrangements for consultation - and they need not be confined to matters discussed in the Intergovernmental Conference. I suggest that there should be regular meetings between you and the Northern Ireland Secretary. They could take place at least as frequently as meetings of the Intergovernmental Conference. If you wish, they could cover security questions among others; the Northern Ireland Secretary is ready to arrange for the Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary to attend discussions with you about security matters. I should be glad to hear your views on this suggestion now or at another meeting between us.

B. Response to demands to scrap or suspend the Agreement

7. Two governments are committed to the Agreement. Both Houses of Parliament have overwhelmingly endorsed it. I could not abandon or suspend it even if I wanted to. That must be as clear to you as it is to me. As unionists you must accept the meaning of the union, and that includes accepting the will of the Sovereign Parliament of which you are both members.

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a. discussions with the Government about the future of the Assembly, notably the question of new elections and getting the SDLP to participate in elections and in the Assembly itself. The Government would be glad to hear any suggestions you may have for improving and strengthening the work of the Assembly. We could discuss this informally in a series of meetings or establish a Working Party for the purpose ;

b. discussions between Ministers and you - perhaps in a special Working Party - on future handling of Northern Ireland business at Westminster.

D. Concluding points.

12. I have made a number of constructive suggestions. I have offered a method of thorough consultation with you about affairs in Northern Ireland including security matters. I have offered consultation, perhaps in a Working Party, about the future operation of the Assembly. I have offered consultation, perhaps in another Working Party, about the way Northern Ireland business is handled at Westminster. I have responded positively to a suggestion of yours, by agreeing to consider constructively the idea of a Round Table conference on devolution. The key difference between us is whether the Agreement should be suspended while all these ideas are followed up. You know and I know, and Parliament and the public know, that I cannot suspend the Agreement. What I can say is that, if after discussion with all concerned the ideas raised in our talk today bore fruit, we should need to consider what that meant for the work of the Intergovernmental Conference.

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8. But there is a way of reducing the scope of the operation of the Agreement. If there was an agreed scheme for devolution, devolved matters would no longer be discussed in the Intergovernmental Conference. Devolution is the constructive way forward; it would enable the people of Northern Ireland to resume responsibility for many of the affairs of the Province.
9. We are ready to consider any types of devolution that might command widespread acceptance in Northern Ireland. One obvious way forward is to construct a scheme within the 1982 Act. It would have to give a role to the minority but that need not mean a power-sharing executive. However we need not restrict ourselves to traditional devolution of both legislative and executive powers. We could look at the DUP's ideas for the devolution only of legislative powers. And at the UUP's ideas for executive or administrative devolution. And we could consider Sir Fred Catherwood's ideas for using weighted majorities to ensure minority interests were protected. Of course, any new system has to be acceptable to both sides of the community. But subject to that I am entirely flexible and open-minded.
- C. Response to a suggestion for a Round Table Conference on Devolution
10. Interesting. Willing to consider positively (but without preconditions about abandoning the Agreement). Talk to Hume on Thursday, later Kilfedder and then Cushnahan. Let us meet again after that, to discuss further. [SDLP would not consider devolution if the Agreement was frozen.]
11. Hope you will also consider positively some other ideas - not alternatives but additions -

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13. If this present meeting ends in break down, everyone will know that it was you who caused it, by insisting on the impossible, namely suspension of the Agreement. I am sure you don't want to go down the road of civil disobedience, with all the hardship and economic damage that it would cause for your own people. I am confident that you will uphold the union, in which everyone in this room passionately believes. Let us agree to reflect on each other's ideas and meet again soon - [say in a fortnight] - for another talk.

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Illustrative draft for a Public Statement if further talks
are agreed

The Prime Minister had a meeting today [lasting] with Mr Molyneaux of the Ulster Unionist Party and Dr Paisley of the Democratic Unionist Party.

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2. The Prime Minister, while reaffirming the Government's commitment to the implementation of the Anglo-Irish Agreement, made it clear that the Government would like to establish new arrangements for enabling unionists to make their views known to the Government on affairs in Northern Ireland. She said that she would welcome discussion with the unionist leaders of the form that such arrangements might take. The Prime Minister also offered consultations with the unionist leaders about the future of the Northern Ireland Assembly and about the arrangements for handling Northern Ireland business in Parliament at Westminster.

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3. The Prime Minister agreed to consider positively a suggestion by [Mr Molyneaux and Dr Paisley] that the Government should call a Round Table conference to discuss devolution in Northern Ireland. She said that the Government would be willing to consider any system of devolution that would command widespread acceptance in Northern Ireland.

4. It was agreed that the Prime Minister and the unionist leaders would reflect on the various suggestions that had been made and would meet again shortly. It was understood that, if after discussion with all concerned the ideas raised in our talk today bore fruit, we should need

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to consider what that meant for the work of the Intergovernmental Conference.

5. The Prime Minister will be discussing the various ideas in forthcoming meetings with Mr Hume of the Social Democratic and Labour Party, Mr Kilfedder of the Ulster Popular Unionist Party and Mr Cushnahan of the Alliance Party.

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Illustrative draft for a Public Statement if the talks
break down

The Prime Minister had a meeting today [lasting....] with Mr Molyneaux of the Ulster Unionist Party and Dr Paisley of the Democratic Unionist Party.

2. The Prime Minister reaffirmed the Government's commitment to the successful implementation of the Anglo-Irish Agreement, in line with the clearly expressed will of Parliament and in the interests of all the people of Northern Ireland. The Prime Minister reminded the unionist leaders that the Agreement reinforced the status of Northern Ireland within the United Kingdom and involved no derogation from United Kingdom sovereignty. She deprecated all public misrepresentations of the Agreement, including suggestions that it provided for some kind of joint authority with the Irish Republic.

3. The Prime Minister made it clear that the Government would like to establish arrangements for enabling unionists to make their views known to the Government on affairs in Northern Ireland. She said that she would welcome discussion with the unionist leaders of the form that such arrangements might take. She also offered the unionist leaders consultations on the future of the Northern Ireland Assembly and on the procedures for the handling of Northern Ireland business in Parliament at Westminster.

4. The Prime Minister agreed to consider positively a suggestion by [Mr Molyneaux and Dr Paisley] that the Government should call a Round Table conference to discuss devolution in Northern Ireland. She said that the Government would be willing to consider any system of devolution that would command widespread acceptance in Northern Ireland.

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5. The unionist leaders were unwilling to hold further discussions of the various suggestions made in the meeting on any basis except suspension by the Government of the Anglo-Irish Agreement. They declined the Prime Minister's proposal that she and they should meet again shortly to continue discussion of the suggestions made by both sides.

6. At the end of the meeting, the Prime Minister made clear her strong view that the unionists should accept the will of Parliament and said that she was willing on that basis to resume discussions at any time.

D

C O N F I D E N T I A L

EXAMPLES OF DEVOLVED GOVERNMENT

1. In constructing models of devolved government a number of variables is involved:

- i. should legislative and executive powers be devolved;
- ii. what range of powers should be devolved (ie British-style local government powers - housing, education, personal social services, etc; "transferred" matters - the foregoing together with finance, health, environment, commerce, agriculture, etc; "reserved" matters - principally law and order);
- iii. how should powers be exercised procedurally - through a conventional Cabinet or Executive, through some less formal co-ordinating group, or through committees;
- iv. what arrangements for involving minority representatives in decision-making are to be made, given that widespread acceptance throughout the community is essential (see Article 4(b) of Agreement and Section 1 of the Northern Ireland Act 1982).

2. The variables, and some illustrative models, were set out in a White Paper copy published in 1979 before the inter-party Conference chaired by Sir Humphrey Atkins and attended by the DUP, SDLP and Alliance.

3. In discussion with the Unionists the following models might be mentioned as worthy of consideration:

- i. Full legislative and executive devolution
As existed under Stormont and briefly in 1974.
Official party policy of both DUP and UUP. Key factors: powers to be devolved ("transferred"

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matters first with possibility of "reserved" matters later, as in 1974?); minority involvement (1974 "power-sharing" gave minority seats in the Executive but Unionists now set against that. Alternatives: committee structure rather than Cabinet, or weighted majority voting, which was suggested by Sir Fred Catherwood - and attracted Unionist parties - last autumn).

ii. "Partial" devolution

Provided for by Northern Ireland Act 1982.

Legislative and executive powers devolved in respect of all Northern Ireland Departments except Department of Finance and Personnel.

Key factors: Secretary of State would retain finance responsibilities - and hold the ring in all resource allocation discussions; a conventional Cabinet could therefore be avoided; would Unionists therefore accept minority representatives as heads of Department since there would be no "power-sharing in Cabinet"? .

iii. Legislative-only devolution

Favoured by DUP in the past. The Assembly would pass legislation on "transferred" matters, but all executive responsibilities would remain with central Government. Key factors: problem of central Government being obliged to administer laws passed by subordinate body; difficulties of financial discipline; splitting of NI Departments between local (legislative) and central (executive) arms; makes no easier the issue of how to involve the minority.

iv. Executive devolution

Long advocated by UUP integrationists. All legislative powers would remain with Westminster

C O N F I D E N T I A L

(with the implication that primary legislation for Northern Ireland would be by UK-wide Bill rather than Orders in Council), but executive responsibilities devolved to local control. Variousy described as executive devolution, administrative devolution, Regional Council (s), upper tier of local government. Key factors: range of powers to be devolved (only British local government functions or all the executive responsibilities of the NI Departments?); a single province-wide elected body or several local bodies; clear integrationist shift since it would be difficult to make special legislative provision for Northern Ireland; splitting of NI Departments between local (executive) and central (legislative) arms; nationalist/Irish hostility to integrationist shift; makes no easier the issue of how to involve the minority.

4. The importance of the institutional and procedural arrangements is as a means of facilitating agreement on minority involvement. HMG has never had a "preferred scheme": the best scheme has always been the one that presents fewest problems to both sides in terms of acceptability. The fundamental issue is therefore not one of devising constitutional structures; it is one of finding the political will in Northern Ireland to reach agreement on minority involvement. The appropriate structures can then follow.
5. The Government working paper of November 1979 is attached as background (Prime Minister's copy only).

E

C O N F I D E N T I A L

POSSIBLE CHANGES IN PARLIAMENTARY PROCEDURES AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS

(1) Legislation for Northern Ireland by Bill

During direct rule primary legislation for Northern Ireland on "transferred" and "reserved" matters (which were the responsibility of the NI Parliament) takes the form of Orders in Council under the Northern Ireland Act 1974. This preserves the separate corpus of NI law and saves Westminster much complicated work. If legislation for Northern Ireland were to be by Bill, over 60 years of NI legislation would have to be harmonised with GB law, or else long and complex NI adaptation provisions would have to be included in every Bill. The timing and contents of UK-wide Bills would be determined by GB considerations, and it would be difficult to take account of any special needs of Northern Ireland. Legislation by Bill is a key demand of UUP integrationists since it would be a big step towards applying a common policy in GB and Northern Ireland.

(2) A Northern Ireland Select Committee

A departmental Committee was not set up for Northern Ireland in 1979 for three reasons:

- (a) if the Committee were to include a significant number of NI Members and still have a Government majority it would have to be extremely large (the normal maximum is 15);
- (b) powers to call for persons and papers could cause severe difficulties if, as was likely, it wished to investigate delicate security and political matters; and
- (c) by strengthening procedures at Westminster, it might suggest a lack of commitment to devolution.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

These reasons still carry weight. But Ministers have always recognised that if there were strong Parliamentary pressure for such a Committee it would be difficult to resist.

(3) Transform the Northern Ireland Committee into a Grand Committee

This Standing Committee allows MPs to consider "any matter relating exclusively" to Northern Ireland which may be referred to it. It may only debate and report that the matter has been considered. Matters are referred to the Committee by the Government at the request of Members. The Committee comprises 17 NI Members, plus not more than 25 Members nominated by the Committee of Selection.

The NI Committee could be changed to resemble the Scottish Grand Committee, which in addition to considering specifically Scottish matters, considers uncontroversial Scotland Bills in principle and Estimates. It would only report that it had considered an issue and would not be permitted to make recommendations. But the different legislative procedures for Northern Ireland could present problems (there are virtually no uncontroversial Bills extending only to Northern Ireland), as could the fact that the Committee would be dominated by Unionist members.

(4) More 'Opposition Days'

At present the Unionist parties have only a half 'Opposition Day' annually. Further time could not be taken from the other Opposition Parties without their agreement, and would almost certainly have to come from Government time. An amendment to Standing Orders would be required.

file . SLHF



cc PC

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

30 October 1985

Dear Jim,

NORTHERN IRELAND: CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER BY
THE RT. HON. JAMES MOLYNEAUX M.P. AND
THE REVEREND IAN PAISLEY M.P.

The Prime Minister saw Mr Molyneaux and Dr Paisley for nearly an hour this morning. The Secretary of State for Northern Ireland was also present. Both visitors seemed to me intent on displaying restraint and moderation in their remarks, in contrast to their subsequent press conference. The enclosed note which they left with the Prime Minister at the end of the meeting - Fair Play for Northern Ireland - purports to set out the points they made. In practice the tone of the meeting was much less sharp.

Mr Molyneaux opened by saying that in his judgment there had been a significant change since their last meeting with the Prime Minister in the background against which the Government's negotiations with the Republic were being conducted. It was now clear that the prospect of improved security cooperation was a chimera. The Irish side, whatever their intentions, would not be able to deliver on any commitments they made. This had been borne out not only by Sir John Hermon's comments but by remarks by the Irish Ambassador in London to the effect that the Garda and Irish Army were unable even to cooperate among themselves. Dr Paisley added that if the Republic were a civilised government, it would offer such improved cooperation without seeking any quid pro quo. They should not ask a price for doing the decent thing. The Northern Ireland Secretary said that violence in the North was on a plateau, indeed rising slightly. The only way to make a dent in it was through improved cooperation across the border. Such cooperation existed at present but could be improved.

Mr Molyneaux continued that neither his party nor Dr Paisley's wanted to see the United Kingdom and the

Handwritten scribble or signature at the bottom right corner.

Republic at loggerheads. Indeed they wanted closer and normal relations, so that the Irish Government would not haul the United Kingdom off to the European Court or lead the pack against us as over the Falklands. But they did not see any need to make special arrangements, within this broader move towards better relations, for six counties of the United Kingdom. Dr Paisley elaborated on this. The idea of a role for the Republic in the affairs of Northern Ireland was totally repugnant to the majority in the North. If there was to be an agreement with the Republic, people in the North should at least be consulted about it, whether by election or referendum. Northern Ireland had a special form of government and wished to preserve it. The Prime Minister said that she did not yet know whether an agreement would be reached with the Republic. If it was, it would not alter the fact that decisions about Northern Ireland would continue to be made by the United Kingdom alone (and decisions in the South by the Republic). The Assembly would of course remain, and could become the focus for devolved local government if arrangements which commanded widespread acceptance could be devised. Dr Paisley said that there was no reason to introduce the Republic into Northern Ireland's government, particularly when it had designs on the territory of Northern Ireland. So far as the Assembly was concerned, proposals would shortly be reaching the Government. The Prime Minister said that she did not see progress towards devolved local government as an alternative to agreement with the Republic but as complementary to it.

Mr Molyneaux said that people in the North were particularly worried about reports of a consultative role for the Republic. This would not be consistent with the guarantees given in the Northern Ireland Constitution Act 1973. Moreover, if whatever arrangement might be reached with the Republic had the status of an international agreement, there was always the risk that the Republic would claim that it had not been fully consulted about a particular decision of the Northern Ireland Secretary, or that its views had not been adequately taken into account. He recalled Appendix 6 to the Joint Declaration of 1969 (copy enclosed) under which the United Kingdom Government affirmed that responsibility for affairs in Northern Ireland was entirely a matter of domestic jurisdiction. He thought this might strengthen the Government's hand in negotiations with the Republic. The Prime Minister repeated that no agreement would affect HMG's responsibility for decisions in the North. But she would look closely again at the draft texts being discussed with the Republic to make sure that nothing would be conceded which conflicted with the Government's statutory obligations.

Dr Paisley said that people in the North were being unsettled by statements about the negotiations being made by

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politicians in the South. He and Mr Molyneux did not want a confrontation with the Government. There were signs at long last of an economic dawn in the North and they wanted to build upon it. But the secrecy of the current negotiations inevitably aroused fears. It also reduced his credibility and that of Mr Molyneux when John Hume was kept fully briefed by the Republic while they were told nothing. The Prime Minister said that she had hoped her remarks at her press conference following the Chequers Summit had provided all the reassurance which people in the North required. She stood by everything she had said then, and it was on this basis that discussions with the Republic were proceeding. The Northern Ireland Secretary acknowledged the difficulty for the Unionist leaders: but there had to be strict confidentiality about negotiations between sovereign governments. All the Government could do was repeat the pledges and the assurances which they had given. An agreement with the Republic would not be a slippery slope. Dr Paisley said that the Prime Minister's statements gave hope and comfort to people in the North. But if something were to happen which looked like a sell-out, the Government would find itself dealing not any longer with him and with Mr Molyneux but with men of violence. The Prime Minister recalled that she had pledged a full debate in Parliament. Dr Paisley said that he was not aiming for anarchy or stirring people up, provided that Unionists were satisfied with the outcome.

Mr Molyneux said that both he and Dr Paisley accepted the assurances given by the Prime Minister. The problem hinged on the legal consequences of giving the Republic a consultative role. He was glad that the Prime Minister had given an undertaking to look closely at this. A consultative mechanism affecting the North alone would set Northern Ireland apart from the normal processes of consultation between sovereign governments. The Prime Minister repeated that she would look at the wording of the draft agreement closely. The Northern Ireland Secretary added that regular consultation with the Republic might help clear up the misunderstandings, often based on misinformation, which bedevilled relations with the Republic. The greater part of the work of any consultative mechanism would be in dealing with this sort of problem. If the Government were able to reach an agreement with the Republic which recognised that the border could not be changed without the consent of the majority, there could be real benefits for the North. One had to ask whether it was better to accept paralysis or seek a way through. Dr Paisley commented that the way through lay in an internal settlement in Northern Ireland. The Northern Ireland Secretary said that the Government hoped that an agreement with the Republic would encourage, not obstruct, progress towards devolution.


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The Prime Minister asked why the Sinn Fein vote in the North was increasing. Mr Molyneux said that people had the impression that the SDLP was in a rut and a spent force. The Government should urge them to concentrate on delivering the goods to their electors rather than on a high-wire act with the Dublin Government. Dr Paisley added that the SDLP could not be given a veto over devolution. And in his view the Government should look again at banning Sinn Fein.

Mr Molyneux concluded that he and Dr Paisley and their supporters did not object to the Government discussing matters of common concern with the Republic. But they should try to avoid provision for structured consultations about Northern Ireland. That was where the problem would lie. Dr Paisley handed over a note of what he and Mr Molyneux had been seeking to convey.

I enclose a transcript of the Northern Ireland Secretary's remarks to the press after the meeting.

I am copying this letter and enclosures to Len Appleyard (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and Michael Stark (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely,


CHARLES POWELL

J A Daniell, Esq.,
Northern Ireland Office

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*for the attention
of Jim Molyneux.*

Appendix 6: Joint Declaration of August 1969

(1) The United Kingdom Government re-affirm that nothing which has happened in recent weeks in Northern Ireland derogates from the clear pledges made by successive United Kingdom Governments that Northern Ireland should not cease to be a part of the United Kingdom without the consent of the people of Northern Ireland or from the provision in Section 1 of the Ireland Act 1949 that in no event will Northern Ireland or any part thereof cease to be part of the United Kingdom without the consent of the Parliament of Northern Ireland. The Border is not an issue.

(2) The United Kingdom Government again affirm that responsibility for affairs in Northern Ireland is entirely a matter of domestic jurisdiction. The United Kingdom Government will take full responsibility for asserting this principle in all international relationships.

(3) The United Kingdom Government have ultimate responsibility for the protection of those who live in Northern Ireland when, as in the past week, a breakdown of law and order has occurred. In this spirit, the United Kingdom Government responded to the requests of the Northern Ireland Government for military assistance in Londonderry and Belfast in order to restore law and order. They emphasise again that troops will be withdrawn when law and order has been restored.

(4) The Northern Ireland Government have been informed that troops have been provided on a temporary basis in accordance with the United Kingdom's ultimate responsibility. In the context of the commitment of these troops, the Northern Ireland Government have re-affirmed their

intention to take into the fullest account at all times the views of Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, especially in relation to matters affecting the status of citizens of that part of the United Kingdom and their equal rights and protection under the law.

(5) The United Kingdom Government have welcomed the decisions of the Northern Ireland Government in relation to Local Government franchise, the revision of Local Government areas, the allocation of houses, the creation of a Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration in Northern Ireland and machinery to consider citizens' grievances against other public authorities which the Prime Minister reported to the House of Commons at Westminster following his meeting with Northern Ireland Ministers on May 21 as demonstrating the determination of the Northern Ireland Government that there shall be full equality of treatment for all citizens. Both Governments have agreed that it is vital that the momentum of internal reform should be maintained.

(6) The two Governments at their meeting at 10 Downing Street today have re-affirmed that in all legislation and executive decisions of Government every citizen of Northern Ireland is entitled to the same equality of treatment and freedom from discrimination as obtains in the rest of the United Kingdom irrespective of political views or religion. In their further meetings the two Governments will be guided by these mutually accepted principles.

(7) Finally, both Governments are determined to take all possible steps to restore normality to the Northern Ireland community so that economic development can proceed at the faster rate which is vital for social stability.

Appendix 7: Joint Communique of 29 August 1969

(1) During his visit to Belfast, the Home Secretary, Mr James Callaghan, was invited to attend two meetings with the Northern Ireland Cabinet, on 27th and 29th August: at the second meeting the Home Secretary was accompanied by the Minister of State, Home Office, Lord Stonham.

(2) Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom

reaffirmed the pledges previously given that Northern Ireland would remain a part of the United Kingdom and that the Government would continue to support the principle of self-determination for the people of Northern Ireland. The Home Secretary explained the points made by the Minister of State in the course of his visit to Belfast. He explained that the points scheme for the allocation of local authority houses was now in operation in all local authority areas pending consideration by the Minister of Development of the comments of particular authorities on the application of such schemes in their areas. Thereafter the Minister would approve permanent

The Home Secretary informed that the United Kingdom Government will make a grant of £250,000 to assist the Government of Northern Ireland in the following ways: (a) to relieve the immediate distress in Northern Ireland by providing clothing, food, medicine and other necessities; (b) to spread the money to meet the most urgent needs; and (c) to provide a small cash grant to meet the most urgent needs. The grant is not appropriate.

The grant will take the form of a grant to the Northern Ireland Government for the Ulster Innocent Victims Fund.

(7) In their discussions the two Governments reaffirmed the affirmation in paragraph 6 of the Joint Declaration of every citizen of Northern Ireland of equality of treatment and freedom of political views or religion as obtains in the rest of the United Kingdom.

(8) It has been agreed that the following principles of political views or religion in working fields is fundamental:

- (i) Equality of opportunity without regard to religion or political views or religion.
- (ii) Protection against discrimination against any citizen on the grounds of religion or political views or religion.
- (iii) Guaranteed fairness in housing, with no special preference, as the only remedy for housing shortages.
- (iv) Effective means not only for the redress of grievances against public authorities but also for the redress of grievances against private individuals if the redress is otherwise ineffective.
- (v) Proper representation of the elected levels of government and of minorities or appointed representatives of minorities have a right to be represented.

(9) The Government of Northern Ireland has sought the co-operation of the Joint Working Parties to examine the extent to which the Government of Northern Ireland's proposals adequately ensure