

Charles ~~on~~

I have shown this to
the gurus. We all think
it is excellent.

One point to which they
have drawn attention is
X on page 2. Robert Atson
says that the US Administration
has not accepted this.
But since it is our firm
view, there seems no
reason now to say so.

Len.



10 DOWNING STREET

Colin

Message to Gorbachev

The PTT took against

the draft & noted
"radical rewrite required".

I have not had a
chance today to find
out whether she has
problems of substance. I
have had a shot at
dictating a more
flowing version which I
enclose. Can you get

some-one to crawl under
it & let me have
it back by 4:30 or
so. I suggest one
person, not a
Committee!

C.D.D.

JD3AJ0

Thank you for your letter of 14 January explaining your latest arms control proposals. I have considered them with great care and discussed them with our closest allies.

Every sensible person would like to see a world in which armaments on the scale which both East and West at present maintain were no longer necessary. It is a perfectly respectable goal for which to work. But such a world will not be achieved without very considerable changes in the pattern of relations between States and the creation of a climate of confidence between East and West which sadly eludes us at present. Simply describing the goal of freeing the earth of nuclear weapons and setting down an arbitrary time-table for achieving it is not a practical approach. We need to tackle the causes of the insecurity which make nuclear weapons necessary. As I said to you when you visited the United Kingdom - a visit which we remember with pleasure - nuclear weapons at present make an essential contribution to preserving peace and stability. I am convinced that both East and West will continue to rely on them in their deterrent role for the foreseeable future.

To acknowledge that nuclear weapons will continue to be needed is no reason why they cannot be reduced. Such reductions must make both sides feel more, not less, secure. If that security is to be found at lower levels of armament,

then we need to focus on realistic arms control measures across the board which are both balanced and verifiable. It seems to me that a number of quite detailed proposals are on the table which now need to be the subject of thorough negotiation:

- On strategic weapons, both you and President Reagan agreed at your meeting in Geneva to work for 50% reductions. The United States tabled detailed proposals on 1 November for applying such reductions. I should like to see the Soviet Union respond constructively and in detail to these proposals at the expert, negotiating level.

- As regards space and strategic defence, the four points upon which I agreed with President Reagan at Camp David on 22 December 1984 seem to me to offer a good basis on which to proceed. Since research activities are not prohibited under the ABM Treaty and a ban on laboratory research could not in any case be verified, it is fruitless to make renunciation of research activities a pre-condition for reductions in strategic weapons. The way forward must surely lie through steps to strengthen the effectiveness of the ABM Treaty. I was surprised that your letter did not refer to this Treaty which is surely a fundamental achievement of arms control.

- As to INF, President Reagan's recent response to your proposals was discussed with us and has our full support. The conditions which you specify are, as they relate to British forces, unreasonable and unacceptable. The British deterrent force is a minimum one, and I spelled out in my letter of 7 November to you the only conditions on which we would be prepared to consider reductions in it.

But greater stability and security will not be achieved without parallel steps to correct the imbalance in conventional including chemical forces, and without widening the scope of East/West discussions to deal with regional, bilateral and human rights issues.

We need early progress in the MBFR talks in Vienna, in the negotiations on chemical weapons, and at the Stockholm Conference on Disarmament in Europe. In all these negotiations, adequate provisions for verification will be an essential part of any agreements. I was glad that your letter recognised the central importance of verification. And I hope that your reference to on-site inspection in connection with chemical weapons will be followed up with more detailed proposals. As you know, Britain holds the chairmanship of the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva in 1986. We shall do everything possible to encourage real progress towards an agreement to control chemical weapons. I have to say, however, that the recent Eastern response to the West's novel proposals at the MBFR talks in Vienna was disappointing. Verification also remains the key to progress towards a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing, and further work is required on this before resumption of the tripartite negotiations which you propose would be worth while.

These issues should all feature largely on the agenda for the visit which I hope Mr. Shevardnadze will soon pay us, and I look forward to discussing them with him - and in due course with you.

Mr. Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev

(1)



10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister

The FCO have had another go at a draft reply to Gorbachev. Its now getting urgent.

I find the draft rather stilted and convoluted, we have had a go at ironing out the worst obscurities. (Sorry about the mess).

Content with this?

or

Prefer a radical rewrite? (which I can attempt tomorrow).

Radical rewrite returned to C.D.P. 25/2

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

25 February 1986

Dear Charles,

Gorbachev Proposals on Arms Control

... In my letter of 24 January, I undertook to let you have a draft reply to Mr Gorbachev's letter of 15 January. I accordingly enclose a draft which the Foreign Secretary has approved.

The draft is designed to be in line with and supportive of the line which President Reagan will be taking (as set out in the message with your letter of 22 February). The tone is intended to be positive but firm; it takes up, if only briefly, the various points raised by Mr Gorbachev himself.

... We believe that it also covers very much the same ground as the French told us President Mitterrand would cover in his reply. I enclose the synopsis which was approved by the Elysee, although we have not seen the final text of the reply.

The draft intentionally deals at greater length than Mr Gorbachev's letter with the non-nuclear arms control negotiations, with verification as a linking theme. The slightly longer section on MBRR is intended to convey the message that the latest Eastern proposals do not match up to Mr Gorbachev's fine words.

The Foreign Secretary recommends that the message should be sent at once but, if it was for any reason delayed, you should know that Sir Bryan Cartledge is hoping to see the Soviet Foreign Minister within a day or so of the Party Congress finishing on 6 March, about the latter's visit to the UK, and could hand over the message.

I am copying this letter to Richard Mottram in the MOD and Michael Stark in the Cabinet Office.

Yours ever,

Lev Appleyard
(L V Appleyard)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

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DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despach/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:

Reference

Prime Minister

P02 AAG.
~~SECRET~~

DEPARTMENT:

TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO:

Your Reference

- Top Secret
- Secret
- Confidential
- Restricted
- Unclassified

Mr Gorbachev

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

SUBJECT:

.....In Confidence

CAVEAT.....

Thank you for your letter of ¹⁴17 January explaining your latest arms control proposals. I have considered them with great care.

We in Britain and our allies have been committed since the 1950s to general and complete disarmament as the ultimate objective in arms control. We share this goal with you. But ^{we need no focus on} the immediate emphasis must be on the steps which can realistically be taken now. ^{And the} The question of reducing the level of nuclear weapons must be approached in terms of current realities. Nuclear weapons will not be disinvented and, as I told you when you visited London, ^{to visit high} in present circumstances they form ^{an} an important element in ^{maintaining} maintaining peace and stability. I would expect them to be ^{retained} retained in their deterrent role for the foreseeable future.

if progress is to be made

Enclosures—flag(s).....

But that is no reason why they cannot be reduced, while strengthening stability through balanced and verifiable arms control measures. The immediate priority, in

accordance with the Joint Statement which you and President Reagan made at Geneva, ^{are} ~~is~~ to agree 50% reductions in the two sides' strategic weapons, appropriately applied, and an INF agreement. The US proposals tabled on 1 November offer the best prospect of progress in the category of strategic systems and I urge the Soviet Union to respond ^{constructively} ~~positively~~ and in detail.

As regards the negotiations on

~~In the space and defence group at Geneva~~ the four Points which I agreed with President Reagan on 22 December 1984 ^{offer} remain, in my view, ^{a good} ~~the~~ basis on which ~~the~~ two sides might ^{be} ~~best~~ proceed. Since research activities are not prohibited under the ABM Treaty, and a ban on laboratory research could not in any case be verified, it would be wrong to make giving up research activities a ^{in strategic weapons} pre-condition for agreement on nuclear reductions. ~~The~~ ^{I hope} ~~Soviet Union should now take up the US proposal for a substantive dialogue on the future relationship between offensive and defensive forces,~~ ^{and at the same time} ~~You do not refer in your letter to the ABM Treaty, a fundamental achievement of arms control. I believe that the Parties should seek ways to strengthen its effectiveness of the ABM Treaty~~

Your proposals on intermediate range nuclear forces touch directly on our security and that of our Allies.

~~Agreement is urgent but~~ the conditions you specify, as these relate to British nuclear forces, are unreasonable and are not acceptable. The British deterrent force is a minimum one; ^{shall} we will review how best to contribute to arms control only on the conditions which I set out in my

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letter of 7 November. [The first priority remains substantial reductions in American and Soviet nuclear arsenals, and I note that you are continuing your own modernisation programmes, including the deployment of a new Soviet ICBM since the Geneva talks began.]

The proposals which President Reagan has made for INF in response to yours have ^{our} full British support. The way forward is through reductions in ^{these} nuclear forces in Europe within a framework of global limits, leading on to a zero outcome.

Whilst reducing nuclear weapons, we also need to strengthen stability by correcting the imbalance in conventional forces. Your proposals are less specific on that score. Our security requires that the threat from nuclear, chemical and conventional forces ^{should} all be tackled.

Your letter referred to verification in non-nuclear arms control. I fully agree on the importance of compliance with arms control agreements and adequate provisions for verifying their implementation. In particular, I hope that ^{your} the reference to on-site inspection in connection with chemical weapons will be followed up by more detailed ideas from the Soviet delegation to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. You have my assurance that, under British chairmanship at the Conference in 1986, we ^{shall} will do everything possible to ensure real progress towards an agreement covering this

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Omit:
[Already
said]

whole category of weapons. ~~The verification issues are crucial.~~

The recent Western proposals at the Vienna MBFR talks included major concessions intended to break the logjam. Here too, adequate verification is the key. I was particularly disappointed, in the light of your general assurances over verification, that our important concession on data was not matched ~~in the Eastern~~ response on 20 February. I trust ~~it~~ was not ~~the~~ final word.

*by a similarly constructive
(that this) your*

At the Stockholm Conference on Disarmament in Europe, we have consistently pressed for confidence and security building measures designed to minimise any risk of misunderstanding about the true purpose of military activity, and to avoid unnecessary heightening of tension. [It is essential for the building of confidence that the countries involved should all be able to establish directly what the pattern of military activity is.]

[I don't understand this]

As part of this ^{process} it is essential that we should be able to establish directly the pattern of activity of such other forces.

Turning to the question of a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing, you will be aware of the British Government's view that verification remains a major outstanding problem. Further work on this aspect will be necessary before the resumption of tripartite negotiations which you propose would be possible.

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I am moreover anxious that arms control, vital as it is, should not come to be seen as the sole issue for discussion between East and West. I hope we shall also be able to achieve a closer meeting of minds on regional and CSCE issues, and the development of our bilateral relations including trade.

I value our exchanges on these matters which affect so directly the security interests of both the UK and Soviet Union. I naturally welcome the indication in your letter of the Soviet Union's determination to make progress across the board in arms control. I now hope that this resolve will be reflected in early and substantial proposals at the various negotiations, most importantly at Geneva. Such resolve will be fully matched on our side. These are issues which, as I suggested in my last letter, should figure as major agenda items when Mr Shevardnadze visits the United Kingdom. I look forward to meeting him *and discussing them with him.*

CONFIDENTIAL

Confidentiel

Hambourg et un/Fraich officier (M. L. M.)

7 feb.

PROJET DE REPONSE AU MESSAGE DE M. GORBACHEV

cc ACDD
Srv O.
M. Jaminé.
G. J. J.

2. M. Anton
M. Thomas a. i.

- ces propositions justifient une analyse approfondie de leur contenu. J'y fais actuellement procéder.
- le processus de désarmement doit, bien évidemment, contribuer à accroître la sécurité et non à la réduire.
- l'objectif auquel on doit inlassablement s'efforcer est d'obtenir par la négociation d'accords concrets et vérifiables l'équilibre des forces au niveau le plus bas.
- La sécurité de nos pays repose depuis l'avènement de l'ère nucléaire sur l'équilibre et l'interaction de toutes les catégories de forces militaires. Si la réduction des forces nucléaires, en particulier celles qui sont les plus importantes, est un élément primordial d'un tel processus de désarmement, ses implications ne peuvent considérées isolément.
- En Europe où le déséquilibre au niveau des forces conventionnelles et des capacités d'utilisation de l'arme chimique s'est accru l'arme nucléaire a permis d'assurer une dissuasion globale.
- Pour la France l'objectif de l'élimination de l'arme nucléaire est peu réaliste en dehors du rétablissement des équilibres conventionnels et de l'élimination de la menace chimique.
- Nous souhaitons que les négociations bilatérales de Genève sur les armes nucléaires et spatiales des Etats-Unis et de l'URSS puissent progresser .
- La contribution d'un tel accord à la prévention d'une nouvelle course aux armements y compris dans l'espace serait naturellement très importante.
- La France n'étant pas partie à cette négociation il ne lui appartient pas d'en fixer les étapes et les modalités.
- S'agissant des forces nucléaires françaises, qui constituent un ensemble dissuasif indivisible et qui ne peuvent être comparées à une partie seulement des forces nucléaires susceptibles d'atteindre le territoire français, leur indépendance interdit qu'elles puissent être prises en compte par d'autres.
- Le moment venu, et les conditions que j'ai indiquées, dès 1983, étant alors réunies, la France ne se déroberait pas vis-à-vis de ses responsabilités.

.../...

- Il faut d'abord que les réductions des arsenaux nucléaires soviétiques et américains en soient arrivées au point où la disparité qui existe entre ces derniers et ceux des autres puissances nucléaires ait changé de nature;

- il est nécessaire ensuite que les systèmes défensifs ne soient pas renforcés. C'est dans cet esprit que nous avons fait des propositions sur l'espace à la conférence sur le désarmement de Genève ;

- enfin, il faudrait que le déséquilibre des forces classiques ait disparu et que l'élimination de la menace chimique soit devenue réalité.

- Nous différons toutefois sur l'étape à laquelle l'arrêt des essais pourrait intervenir.

- Pour nous celui-ci devrait être la conséquence d'une réduction des arsenaux nucléaires si profonde que le rôle même de l'arme nucléaire dans l'équation de sécurité globale s'en trouverait modifiée, alors que pour l'URSS il pourrait s'agir d'un préalable pour atteindre cet objectif.

- les négociations multilatérales en vue de l'interdiction vérifiée de la production d'armes chimiques :

La France y attache beaucoup d'importance.

- La France porte un grand intérêt au rendez-vous des 35 pays signataires de l'Acte Final à Vienne.

- l'importance que revêtent, dans le cadre de chacune de ces négociations, les problèmes de vérification.

Des solutions adéquates, dégagées par la négociation constituent une condition de la confiance que peuvent avoir nos Etats dans le respect des accords de désarmement./.

- Désarmement / développement

Army Control : DEFENCE Pt 7.