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FM UKDEL NATO

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 76

OF 051513Z MARCH 86

AND TO IMMEDIATE MODUK

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, BONN, PARIS, MOSCOW

INFO ROUTINE ANKARA, ATHENS, BRUSSELS, COPENHAGEN, LISBON

INFO ROUTINE LUXEMBOURG, MADRID, OSLO, OTTAWA, REYKJAVIK

INFO ROUTINE ROME, UKDEL STOCKHOLM, THE HAGUE, UKDEL VIENNA

MODUK (FOR DACU AND DNPS)

YOUR TELNO 30: NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL: US CONSULTATION WITH NAC

SUMMARY

1. US NEGOTIATORS REPORT LESS ACHIEVED THAN HOPED. NO SUBSTANTIVE SOVIET MOVEMENT FROM PRE SUMMIT POSITIONS ON SPACE AND DEFENCE OR STRATEGIC WEAPONS, AND NO READINESS TO EXPLORE AREAS OF CONVERGENCE. ALLIANCE CONSULTATION ON NEW US INF PROPOSALS A QUOTE MODEL UNQUOTE: SOVIET REACTION STOPPED JUST SHORT OF OUTRIGHT REJECTION. CONCERN EXPRESSED BY COUNCIL ABOUT WIDENING GAP BETWEEN PUBLIC EXPECTATIONS AND REAL PROGRESS AT GENEVA. US TEAM KEEN TO PLAY DOWN SPECULATION ABOUT LINKAGE BETWEEN NEXT SUMMIT AND AGREEMENT ON INF. ROUND 5 BEGINS 8 MAY.

DETAIL.

2. KAMPELMAN SAID THAT THE US HAD APPROACHED ROUND 4 KEEN TO FOLLOW UP THE MANDATE IN THE 21 NOVEMBER SUMMIT STATEMENT. THE US HAD REITERATED THE ULTIMATE GOAL OF THE ELIMINATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS WHEN POSSIBLE AND CONSISTENT WITH OVERALL SECURITY REQUIREMENTS. IN PURSUIT OF THIS, CERTAIN CONDITIONS MUST BE MET, INCLUDING CORRECTION OF CONVENTIONAL AND OTHER FORCE IMBALANCES, EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION AND FULL COMPLIANCE WITH AGREEMENTS. THE US HAD STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF PROMPT ACCOMPLISHMENT OF THE FIRST STEPS INCLUDING 50 PER CENT REDUCTION APPROPRIATELY APPLIED TO STRATEGIC SYSTEMS AND A SEPARATE INF AGREEMENT, CONCLUDED ON A BILATERAL BASIS. ONLY ON COMPLETION OF THESE COULD MULTILATERAL STEPS BE ENVISAGED. THEY HAD EXPRESSED DISAPPOINTMENT THAT THE SOVIET 15 JANUARY PROPOSALS FAILED TO RECOGNISE INEQUITIES IN PREVIOUS SOVIET POSITIONS AND CALLED ON THE SOVIETS TO CORRECT NON-COMPLIANCE WITH CURRENT AGREEMENTS.

3. THE SOVIET SIDE HAD SHOWN NO MATCHING KEENNESS TO FOLLOW UP THE SUMMIT MANDATE. THEY HAD MADE NO DETAILED RESPONSE TO THE US 1 NOVEMBER PROPOSALS AND HAD REBUFFED US ATTEMPTS TO EXPLORE COMMON GROUND, WHILE IMPUGNING US MOTIVES. THE SOVIET SIDE HAD ATTEMPTED TO SHIFT THE FOCUS TO THE LONG TERM ELEMENT OF THEIR POSITION.

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4. IN GENERAL LESS HAD BEEN ACCOMPLISHED THAN HOPED. ALLIANCE CONSULTATION ON THE NEW INF PROPOSALS HAD BEEN A MODEL, AND A CLEAR MESSAGE THAT EFFORTS TO DIVIDE THE ALLIANCE WERE FRUITLESS. ROUND 5 WOULD BEGIN 8 MAY, THE US WOULD PREPARE ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT THE SOVIET UNION WAS READY TO JOIN IN A FULLY CONSTRUCTIVE EFFORT AT NEGOTIATION.

5. REPORTING ON THE INF GROUP, GLITMAN SAID THAT THE US HAD PRESSED THE SOVIET SIDE FOR FURTHER DETAILS OF THEIR 15 JANUARY PROPOSALS. THIS HAD YIELDED LITTLE EXCEPT CLARIFICATION OF THE SOVIET POSITION ON GEOGRAPHY (IE THE DIVIDING LINE AT 80 DEGREES EAST LONGITUDE) AND ON THE NEED TO NEGOTIATE ABOUT LAND-BASED MISSILES ONLY. US INSISTENCE ON THE NEED FOR PROPORTIONATE REDUCTIONS IN ASIA AND APPROPRIATE SRINF CONSTRAINTS HAD BEEN CHARACTERISED AS QUOTE CONTRIVED OBSTACLES UNQUOTE. THE SOVIET SIDE HAD CONTINUED TO STRESS THEIR PRECONDITIONS CONCERNING THIRD COUNTRY FORCES AND HAD SUGGESTED A JOINT APPROACH TO THE UK AND FRANCE. THE US HAD CONTINUED TO REJECT ANY SUCH CONDITION. THE SOVIET SIDE HAD FORMALLY STATED THAT AN INF AGREEMENT WOULD NOT BE CONTINGENT ON THE BANNING OF THE SDI.

6. THE US TEAM HAD SET OUT THEIR NEW INF PROPOSAL ON 24 AND 27 FEBRUARY. THE POSSIBILITY OF SS20S REMAINING IN THE QUOTE SWING ZONE UNQUOTE HAD BEEN PUT FIRMLY IN THE CONTEXT OF TOTAL ELIMINATION BY 1989 AND AS SOMETHING THE US MIGHT BE PREPARED TO CONSIDER IF THE SOVIET SIDE WISHED TO PURSUE IT. THE US HAD CONFIRMED THAT THE ORIGINAL ZERO-ZERO PROPOSAL REMAINED ON THE TABLE, AS DID THE NOVEMBER 1985 INTERIM OFFER. ON 27 FEBRUARY THE US HAD SET OUT DETAILS OF A POSSIBLE INF VERIFICATION REGIME, INCLUDING NON-INTERFERENCE WITH NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS, NO ENCRYPTION OF ENGINEERING DATA DURING FLIGHT, COOPERATIVE MEASURES TO VERIFY DISMANTLING AND ON-SITE INSPECTION.

7. THE SOVIET PLEBNARY REACTION HAD STOPPED JUST SHORT OF OUTRIGHT REJECTION, BEING DESCRIBED AS A QUOTE FIRST ANALYSIS UNQUOTE. THEY HAD CHARACTERISED THE US PROPOSAL AS A REPEAT OF THE OLD ZERO OPTION DIMINISHING SOVIET SECURITY IN ASIA AND EUROPE. OBUKHOV HAD MADE CLEAR THAT PROGRESS WAS ONLY POSSIBLE ON THE BASIS OF THE SOVIET PROPOSAL. THERE WOULD BE NO EXTENSION OF ROUND 4 FOR THE INF GROUP.

8. IN THE SPACE AND DEFENCE GROUP THE US HAD GIVEN HIGH PRIORITY TO ELABORATING THEIR OPEN LABORATORY INITIATIVE PROPOSING RECIPROCAL VISITS BY US AND SOVIET SCIENTISTS TO THE HIGH ENERGY LASER FACILITIES AT WHITE SANDS AND SARY SHAGAN. THERE HAD BEEN NO OFFICIAL SOVIET RESPONSE BUT THEY HAD CONTINUED TO CHARACTERISE OPEN LABORATORIES AS A MEANS OF VERIFYING A BAN ON SDI.

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9. THE SOVIET PROPOSALS OF 15 JANUARY ON SPACE AND DEFENCE REFLECTED NO CHANGE FROM PREVIOUS POSITIONS ALTHOUGH TWO ELEMENTS APPEARED TO BE NEW. IN STAGE 2 OF THE GORBACHEV PLAN THE BAN ON SPACE STRIKE ARMS WOULD BECOME MULTILATERAL, WITH PARTICIPATION BY ALL LEADING INDUSTRIAL POWERS. THERE WOULD ALSO BE A BAN ON THE CREATION OF NON-NUCLEAR WEAPONS BASED ON NEW PHYSICAL PRINCIPLES, WHICH POSSESSED DESTRUCTIVE POWER APPROACHING THAT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THIS APPEARED TO BE AN ATTEMPT TO FOCUS ON KEY SDI TECHNOLOGIES.

10. THE SOVIET SIDE HAD ELABORATED THE DEFINITION OR PROHIBITED ACTIVITY UNDER THEIR PROPOSED BAN. THIS WOULD INCLUDE OUT OF LABORATORY TESTING AND THE CREATION IN LABORATORIES OF MODELS, MOCK-UPS, AND COMPONENTS OF SPACE-STRIKE ARMS. HOWEVER THEY HAD BEEN EVASIVE ABOUT THE PRECISE MEANING OF THESE TERMS, WHICH APPEARED TO BE INTENDED TO IMPOSE A MORE RESTRICTIVE REGIME THAN THAT CONTAINED IN THE ABM TREATY. THIS MIGHT IMPLY SOME IMPLICIT RECOGNITION THAT THE ABM TREATY PERMITTED SDI RESEARCH.

11. THE SOVIET SIDE HAD ALSO OUTLINED SOME QUOTE PARTIAL UNQUOTE MEASURES DESIGNED TO BAN SPACE STRIKE ARMS INCLUDING PREVENTION OF THE DEPLOYMENT OF OFFENSIVE SPACE ARMS (IE ALL SPACE BASED SYSTEMS EXCEPT GROUND BASED ASATS), A WORKING GROUP ON GROUND-BASED ASATS AND A COMPREHENSIVE BAN ON SUCH WEAPONS. THE US SIDE WOULD LOOK AT THESE IDEAS IN THE LIGHT OF THEIR EXISTING CRITERIA CONCERNING VERIFIABLE ASAT LIMITS WHICH WOULD BE IN THE NATIONAL INTEREST, BUT HAD REMINDED THE RUSSIANS OF THEIR EARLIER AGREEMENT THAT A COMPREHENSIVE ASAT BAN WAS IMPRACTICABLE.

12. TOWER REPORTED THAT THE TONE IN THE STRATEGIC GROUP HAD BEEN CORDIAL BUT ANY PROGRESS REMAINED HOSTAGE TO SOVIET PRECONDITIONS AND TO THEIR UNACCEPTABLE DEFINITION OF US STRATEGIC WEAPONS. HIS SUSPICION THAT THE SOVIET JANUARY PROPOSALS DID NOT CHANGE THEIR 30 SEPTEMBER POSITION HAD BEEN CONFIRMED. THE SOVIET SIDE HAD ATTEMPTED TO SHIFT THE FOCUS OF DISCUSSION FROM THE NEAR TERM TO THE LONGER TERM ASPECTS OF THE GORBACHEV PROGRAMME. THEY CLAIMED THAT THIS RENDERED QUOTE MOOT UNQUOTE US CONCERN ABOUT THE INEQUITY OF SOVIET DEFINITIONS. THE US HAD INSISTED THAT THE 50 PER CENT REDUCTION MUST STAND ON ITS OWN MERIT. SERIOUS NEGOTIATION WOULD BE REQUIRED IN THE STRATEGIC FIELD AND THE US WERE COMMITTED TO THIS APPROACH. BUT PROGRESS TOWARDS CONSTRUCTIVE SOLUTIONS WOULD NOT BE MADE UNTIL THERE WAS EVIDENCE OF SOVIET SERIOUSNESS.

13. FEW NEW DETAILS EMERGED FROM THE DISCUSSION WHICH FOLLOWED. BERG (NORWAY) EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT THE GAP BETWEEN PUBLIC OPTIMISM CONCERNING THE GENEVE PROCESS AND THE LACK OF REAL EVIDENCE OF TANGIBLE PROGRESS. BORCH (DENMARK) ASKED ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF AN INF AGREEMENT BEFORE THE NEXT SUMMIT, AND WHETHER GORBACHEV MIGHT HAVE COME UNDER PRESSURE FROM KREMLIN HAWKS FOR GIVING AWAY TOO MUCH AT HIS MEETING WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN. CURIENS (FRANCE) STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE CONDITIONS ATTACHED TO THE GENERAL IDEA OF

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ELIMINATING NUCLEAR WEAPONS. IT WAS ALSO IMPORTANT NOT ONLY THAT THE INF GROUP SHOULD BE SEEN AS A BILATERAL NEGOTIATION BUT ALSO THE SPACE GROUP, WHERE FRANCE'S POSITION MIGHT NOT CONVERGE WITH THAT OF THE U.S. DE HOOP SCHEEFER (NETHERLANDS) WONDERED WHETHER THE RUSSIANS MIGHT SHOW MORE FLEXIBILITY AFTER THE 27TH CONGRESS. CASSIERS (BELGIUM) CHARACTERISED THE REPORT AS A BIG STEP BACKWARDS BUT THIS MIGHT ONLY BE TEMPORARY. HANSEN (FRG) REPEATED HIS COUNTRY'S SUPPORT FOR THE NEW US INF PROPOSAL AND EXPRESSED DISAPPOINTMENT AT WHAT HE HAD HEARD OF THE SOVIET RESPONSE. I EXPRESSED OUR THANKS FOR THE ROBUST US POSITION ON THIRD COUNTRY FORCES AND ALSO STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE QUALIFICATIONS SET OUT BY KAMPELMAN TO THE GOAL OF ELIMINATING NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THERE WAS CLEARLY A NEED FOR PATIENCE AND TO ENSURE THAT PUBLIC EXPECTATIONS DID NOT OUTFRUM THE REALITY OF THE NEGOTIATIONS.

14. IN RESPONSE TO THESE AND OTHER POINTS, KAMPELMAN SAID THAT WE SHOULD ESCHEW BOTH OPTIMISM AND PESSIMISM. WE HAD KNOWN AT THE OUTSET OF NEGOTIATIONS THAT IT WAS DIFFICULT TO DEAL WITH THE RUSSIANS AND SHOULD NOT BE SURPRISED IF THIS PROVED TO BE THE CASE. FOR THE NEXT SUMMIT NO DATE HAD BEEN SET; THE SOVIET SIDE HAD NOT ACCEPTED THE US SUGGESTION OF JUNE AND IT WAS NOW TOO LATE FOR THIS. BUT THE RUSSIANS HAD AGREED THAT THERE WOULD BE A SUMMIT IN 1987: IF THEY WITHDREW FROM THAT, RESPONSIBILITY SHOULD BE PLACED ON THEM. THE SOVIET SIDE WERE CLEARLY NOT YET READY TO MAKE PROGRESS IN THE SPIRIT OF THE FIRST SUMMIT AGREEMENT. TOWER HAD QUESTIONED KARPOV ON THE APPARENT LINKAGE IN GORBACHEV'S SPEECH TO THE PARTY CONGRESS BETWEEN THE SUMMIT AND AGREEMENTS ON A CTB AND ON INF. MAKING CLEAR THAT IT WAS NOT FOR HIM TO INTERPRET THE GENERAL SECRETARY'S COMMENTS, KARPOV HAD SAID THAT THE SECOND SUMMIT COULD NOT BE A REPETITION OF THE FIRST. IT HAD ALSO BEEN CLEAR FROM COMMENTS BY KARPOV THAT THE SOVIET SIDE DID NOT LIKE THE REFERENCE IN THE 21 NOVEMBER SUMMIT STATEMENT TO AREAS OF POSSIBLE CONVERGENCE. THIS MIGHT SUGGEST THAT THERE WAS INDEED A BODY OF OPINION WHICH THOUGHT GORBACHEV HAD GIVEN TOO MUCH AWAY. GLITMAN STRESSED THAT IT WOULD BE A GREAT MISTAKE TO DRAW AN EQUATION BETWEEN THE NEXT SUMMIT AND AN INF AGREEMENT. WHAT WAS REQUIRED WAS A GOOD AGREEMENT AT WHATEVER STAGE THIS BECAME POSSIBLE.

15. FULL TEXT OF OPENING STATEMENTS FOLLOWS BY BAG.

GRAHAM

US/SOVIET ARMS CONTROL TALKS

LIMITED

ACDD

DEFENCE D

SOVIET D

NEWS D

HAD

EED

WED

PLANNING STAFF

REB D

INFO D

PUSD

NED

PS

PS/LADY YOUNG

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