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Prime Minister
CDP
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Mr Powell

Soviet Union: Nuclear Testing

It appears from United States satellite photography that the Soviet Union is about to resume nuclear testing.

The timing of the forthcoming test is almost certainly political rather than military.

2. A Soviet test would bring to an end the self-imposed moratorium declared by Gorbachev on 29 July 1985 and originally scheduled to last from 6 August 1985 to 1 January 1986. This moratorium has been extended twice: in January, when an extension to the end of March was announced, and then in mid-March, when Gorbachev said that the moratorium would continue until such time as the United States conducted a test. Throughout the moratorium period preparations for a resumption of testing continued at all the Soviet test sites.

3. The United States conducted its first nuclear test of the year on 22 March. In response the Soviet Union did not immediately conduct a test of its own (which it was in any case not ready to do, as about three more weeks were needed to complete preparations), but it announced that the moratorium would continue until the United States tested again. This move was clearly designed publicly to lay the blame for the intended resumption of Soviet testing squarely on the United States.

PERCY CRADOCK

24 April 1986

SOVIET COMPLIANCE WITH ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS

<u>Treaty/Issue</u>	<u>US view</u>	<u>UK view</u>
<u>ABM Treaty</u>		
a. Krasnoyarsk radar	Violation of provision on siting, orientation of BMEWS radars.	Primary function probably BMEWS. But not proven violation.
b. Mobility of new ABM Systems	Potential violation of provision on testing of mobile land-based ABM systems or components.	Not convinced.
c. Concurrent testing of ABM and SAM components	Probable violation on testing SAM components in ABM mode.	Possible technical violation but recent agreed US/USSR understanding on this in SCC.
d. ABM capability of modern SAM systems	Activities could contribute to ABM territorial defence.	Tests have taken place against tactical ballistic missiles (not prevented by the Treaty). A major upgrade would be necessary for ABM capability.
<u>SALT II (unratified)</u>		
a. Deployment of SS-X-25 ICBM	(1) Violation of no second new type provision (2) Violation of restriction on RV: throw-weight ratio.	Not proven that SB-X-25 not permitted modernisation of SS-13. Possible violation of minor military significance.
b. Encryption of telemetry	Violation of prohibition on use of to impede verification.	Not proven that verification impeded.
c. SS-16 deployment	Probable violation - equipment has now been removed.	Do not believe SS-16 is operationally deployed.

<u>Treaty/Issue</u>	<u>US view</u>	<u>UK view</u>
d. Strategic Nuclear Delivery Vehicles (SNDVs)	Has deployed SNDVs in violation of agreed limit.	Possible that limited has been marginally exceeded on occasions.
e. Backfire bomber	(1) Possible marginal violation of production rate limitation. (2) Possible violation of agreement not to give strategic capability.	Agree Do not believe it has this role.
f. Concealment of missile/launcher association	Concealment measures during SS25 testing violated SALT provision.	Probably environmental covering which has led to US confusion.
<u>Others</u>		
a. Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention	Violation of prohibition on maintaining BW capability and using myotoxins (Laos, Cambodia, Afghanistan).	Insufficient evidence to prove.
b. Underground Nuclear Test Venting	Violation of prohibition of explosions causing debris outside USSR (Limited Test Ban Treaty)	Probable inadvertent technical breaches.
c. 150Kt nuclear test limitation.	Violation of limitation on yields.	Insufficient evidence to prove.
d. Use of dismantled ICBM sites	Violation of prohibition on use of "remaining facilities" at abandoned ICBM sites.	Agree (but no clear definitions of "remaining facilities").
e. Notification of military exercises.	Did not notify ZAPAD 81 exercise (Helsinki Final Act).	Not necessarily required.

