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TO IMMEDIATE THE HAGUE
TELNO 223
OF 081720Z JUNE 86
INFO IMMEDIATE UKDEL NATO, WASHINGTON

MY CALL ON LUBBERS AND VAN DEN BROEK: 6 JUNE
ARMS CONTROL
SUMMARY

1. AGREEMENT ON THE NEED FOR A STRONG EUROPEAN LINE IN DISCUSSION WITH THE US. LUBBERS SERIOUSLY WORRIED ABOUT DIFFICULTY OF DEFENDING CURRENT US POLICY TO NETHERLANDS PARLIAMENT.

DETAIL

2. VAN DEN BROEK SAID THAT HE WAS WONDERING WHETHER IT WOULD STILL BE WORTH WRITING TO SHULTZ TO TRY TO REINFORCE HIS POSITION IN DISCUSSION WITH THE WHITE HOUSE AND THE PENTAGON. THE DUTCH FELT SURE THAT WHAT SHULTZ HAD SAID AT HALIFAX HAD BEEN AGAINST HIS OWN PERSONAL INCLINATIONS. THERE MIGHT STILL BE VALUE IN ARGUING STRONGLY IN FAVOUR OF RESPECT FOR SALT II.

3. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THIS RAISED THE CENTRAL AND EXTREMELY IMPORTANT QUESTION ABOUT THE MAINTENANCE OF GOOD RELATIONS BETWEEN EUROPE AND THE US. IF WE WANTED TO RE-ESTABLISH THE COHERENCE OF THE ALLIANCE, IN A FASHION THAT WOULD ENABLE US TO PRESENT THE ALLIANCE WELL TO OUR VOTERS,

THEN WAS IT A GOOD OR A BAD THING IF THE EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS WERE TO BE SEEN TO BE PUTTING PRESSURE ON THE US TO CHANGE ITS MIND, IF IT TURNED OUT THAT CHANGE WAS NOT GOING TO BE FORTHCOMING? HIS OWN CONCLUSION WAS THAT SOME RISKS HAD TO BE TAKEN, AND THAT IT WAS RIGHT TO ADVOCATE CERTAIN POLICIES TO THE US GOVERNMENT IN AN ATTEMPT TO GET THEM TO CHANGE THEIR MIND. THE HISTORY OF THE TWISTS AND TURNS IN THE US ATTITUDE TO SALT OVER THE PAST 18 MONTHS, AND THE WAY IN WHICH THE INFORMATION ABOUT THE DEVELOPMENTS IN GENEVA PASSED ON IN STRICT CONFIDENCE BY SHULTZ IN HALIFAX HAD BEEN LEAKED SHORTLY THEREAFTER BY WEINBERGER, SHOWED ALL TOO CLEARLY THAT THERE WERE MAJOR DISAGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE STATE DEPARTMENT AND THE PENTAGON. IT WAS NOT TO BE EXCLUDED THAT REAGAN MIGHT AT THE END OF THE DAY SUPPORT SHULTZ IN RELATION TO THE NEW SOVIET SDI/ABM PROPOSALS. IF HE DID, THEN IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO BRING HIM BACK UP THE HILL ON SALT. SHOULD WE NOT WORK FOR THAT? VAN DEN BROEK SAID HE THOUGHT IT UNLIKELY THAT CONCRETE RESULTS WOULD BE FORTHCOMING FROM THE NEW SOVIET PROPOSALS IN TIME FOR THEM TO HAVE ANY EFFECT BEFORE THE SALT DEADLINE WHICH REAGAN HAD NOW IMPOSED ON HIMSELF.

4. THE REAL QUESTION, HE WENT ON, WAS WHETHER THE COHESION OF THE ALLIANCE WOULD NOT BE BETTER SERVED BY A VIGOROUS, COHERENT AND OPEN DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE EUROPEANS AND THE UNITED STATES THAN BY EUROPEAN SUBSERVIENCE. THE SECRETARY OF STATE POINTED TO THE CLEAR POSITION ON SALT TAKEN BY THE PRIME MINISTER IN THE HOUSE EARLIER IN THE WEEK.

5. LUBBERS ARGUED THAT THE PRIMARY NEED FOR THE EUROPEANS WAS TO PROMOTE A MECHANISM WHICH WOULD SEEK TO GIVE CENTRAL PRIORITY TO THE EXAMINATION OF VIOLATIONS OF SALT I. AT PRESENT WE RAN THE RISK THAT THE US WOULD SET OFF ON A QUITE DIFFERENT PATH FROM THAT FAVOURED BY THE EUROPEANS. THAT WOULD BE VERY UNWISE. COULD WE NOT ORGANISE SOME MECHANISM WHICH WOULD BE AN EFFECTIVE CHECK ON SOVIET COMPLIANCE AND HELP PULL THE US BACK FROM THE PATH IT HAD TAKEN? THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID HE THOUGHT THAT THAT ANALYSIS, THOUGH LOGICALLY CORRECT, WAS NOT LIKELY TO LEAD TO A WAY THROUGH. EXPERIENCE SUGGESTED

THAT IT WOULD BE NEXT TO IMPOSSIBLE TO DESIGN ANY SUCH MECHANISM. VAN DEN BROEK EXPLAINED TO LUBBERS THAT THE MAIN DIFFICULTY WITH SALT CONCERNED DISAGREEMENTS OVER INTERPRETATION OF THE TREATY RATHER THAN ABOUT FACTS.

6. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THERE MIGHT BE A DIFFERENT WAY ROUND THE PROBLEM. THE KEY DIFFERENCE WAS REALLY BETWEEN AVOIDANCE AND EVASION. REAGAN HAD SAID THAT IF THE RUSSIANS RETURNED TO A STATE OF GRACE ON COMPLIANCE THEN HE WOULD TAKE THAT INTO ACCOUNT, BUT NEITHER CONCEPT HAD BEEN DEFINED WITH PRECISION. THIS MIGHT OFFER SOME ROOM FOR MANOEUVRE. THERE MIGHT THEREFORE BE HOPE IN ONE OTHER IDEA: IF THE RUSSIANS MADE A MOVE ON SDI/ABM THAT CONVINCED THE PRESIDENT THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT TO KEEP THE PROCESS AS A WHOLE GOING, THEN IT MIGHT BE THAT SOME KIND OF MODEST SOVIET MOVE ON COMPLIANCE WOULD SATISFY HIS REQUIREMENTS.

7. LUBBERS STRESSED HEAVILY THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE NETHERLANDS GOVERNMENT WAS NOW VULNERABLE ON THIS ISSUE IN PARLIAMENTARY TERMS. THE POSITION WAS REALLY INDEFENSIBLE, GIVEN THE WAY IN WHICH THE US ATTITUDE HAD CHANGED, AND GIVEN TOO THE COINCIDENCE WITH THE US WALK-OUT FROM THE CSCE BERNE MEETING. HE FOUND THE PICTURE BLEAKER THAN EVER BEFORE, AND ESPECIALLY BLEAK BECAUSE THE PRESIDENT SIMPLY DID NOT REALISE THE SIGNIFICANCE OF WHAT HE HAD DONE. THE EFFECT OF THE US ACTION HAD BEEN TO CAUSE AN EXPLOSION IN WEST/WEST RELATIONS. BIG RISKS WERE BEING TAKEN. EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS NOW FACED A MUCH MORE DIFFICULT TASK THAN THEY HAD DONE OVER INF DEPLOYMENT.

8. VAN DEN BROEK SAID HE FELT PARTICULARLY FRUSTRATED BY THE FAILURE OF THE WEU TO DISCUSS ISSUES OF REAL SUBSTANCE OF THIS KIND. HE THOUGHT SERIOUS CONSIDERATION SHOULD BE GIVEN TO THEIR BEING TAKEN UP IN THAT FORUM.

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