

US/SOVIET ARMS CONTROL TALKS**ADVANCE COPY**

PS  
 PS/LADY YOUNG  
 PS/MR RENTON  
 PS/PUS  
 MR DEREK THOMAS  
 MR GOODALL  
 MR RATFORD  
 MR ~~W~~ DAUNT  
 MR DAVID THOMAS

MR POWELL, NO 10 DOWNING ST

MR D NICHOLLS, DUS(P) }  
 B. NPS( ) } MOD  
 DACU }  
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HD/DEFENCE D  
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RESIDENT CLERK

GRS 1000

UNCLASSIFIED  
 FM WASHINGTON  
 TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
 TELNO 1632  
 OF 192230Z JUNE 86  
 INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK, MOSCOW  
 INFO PRIORITY UKDEL, NATO, BONN, PARIS  
 INFO ROUTINE UDMIS GENEVA, UKMIS VIENNA, UKDEL STOCKHOLM  
 INFO ROUTINE MODUK

MODUK FOR DACU

PRESIDENT REAGAN'S GLASSBORO SPEECH : EAST/WEST AND ARMS  
 CONTROL

1. FOLLOWING IS THE SUBSTANTIVE PASSAGE IN THE PRESIDENT'S  
 SPEECH ON 19 JUNE AT GLASSBORO, NEW JERSEY:-

QUOTE. WHAT THEN ARE WE TO MAKE OF THE SOVIET UNION? MY OWN  
 VIEWS UPON THE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME ARE WELL-KNOWN, AND I AM  
 CONVINCED THAT WE MUST CONTINUE TO SPEAK OUT FOR FREEDOM, AGAIN  
 AND AGAIN MAKING THE CRUCIAL MORAL DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN DEMOCRACY  
 AND TOTALITARIANISM. SO, TOO, I AM CONVINCED THAT WE MUST TAKE  
 SERIOUSLY THE SOVIET HISTORY OF EXPANSIONISM AND PROVIDE AN  
 EFFECTIVE COUNTER.

AT THE SAME TIME, WE MUST REMAIN REALISTIC ABOUT AND  
 COMMITTED TO ARMS CONTROL. IT IS INDEED FITTING TO PAY PARTICULAR  
 ATTENTION TO ARMS NEGOTIATIONS IN THESE DAYS, FOR IF THE SOVIET  
 UNION PROVES WILLING, THIS CAN REPRESENT A MOMENT OF OPPORTUNITY  
 IN RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR NATIONS.

WHEN I MET MR GORBACHEV LAST NOVEMBER IN GENEVA, HE AND I  
 AGREED TO INTENSIFY OUR EFFORT TO REDUCE STRATEGIC ARMS. WE  
 AGREED ON THE NEXT STEPS - NEGOTIATING A 50 PERCENT REDUCTION  
 IN STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES, AND AN INTERIM AGREEMENT TO COVER  
 INTERMEDIATE-RANGE MISSILES. AND WE BOTH SPOKE OF THE ULTIMATE  
 GOAL OF ELIMINATING ALL NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

BY NOVEMBER 1ST, WE HAD PRESENTED NEW STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION  
 PROPOSALS DESIGNED TO BRIDGE THE GAP BETWEEN EARLIER SOVIET AND  
 AMERICAN PROPOSALS. OUR PROPOSAL WOULD HAVE ACHIEVED A 50 PERCENT  
 REDUCTION IN STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES IN A MANNER BOTH EQUITABLE

AMERICAN PROPOSALS. OUR PROPOSAL WOULD HAVE ACHIEVED A 50 PERCENT REDUCTION IN STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES IN A MANNER BOTH EQUITABLE AND RESPONSIBLE. THEN, IN MID-FEBRUARY WE PROPOSED A DETAILED PHASED APPROACH FOR ELIMINATING AN ENTIRE CLASS OF WEAPONS - THE SO-CALLED LONGER-RANGE INTERMEDIATE RANGE WEAPONS, OR INF'S - BY 1990. AND WE REPEATED OUR OFFER OF AN OPEN LABORATORIES EXCHANGE OF VISITS TO FACILITIES PERFORMING STRATEGIC DEFENCE RESEARCH. UNTIL RECENTLY, THE SOVIET RESPONSE HAS BEEN DISAPPOINTING IN A NUMBER OF WAYS.

BUT, IN RECENT WEEKS, THERE HAVE BEEN FRESH DEVELOPMENTS. THE SOVIETS HAVE MADE SUGGESTIONS ON A RANGE OF ISSUES, FROM NUCLEAR POWER PLANT SAFETY TO CONVENTIONAL FORCE REDUCTIONS IN EUROPE. PERHAPS MOST IMPORTANTLY, THE SOVIET NEGOTIATORS AT GENEVA HAVE PLACED ON THE TABLE NEW PROPOSALS TO REDUCE NUCLEAR WEAPONS. WE CANNOT ACCEPT THESE PARTICULAR PROPOSALS WITHOUT CHANGE, BUT IT APPEARS THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE BEGUN TO MAKE A SERIOUS EFFORT.

IF BOTH SIDES GENUINELY WANT PROGRESS, THEN THIS COULD REPRESENT A TURNING POINT IN THE EFFORT TO MAKE OURS A SAFER AND MORE PEACEFUL WORLD. WE BELIEVE THAT POSSIBLY AN ATMOSPHERE DOES INDEED EXIST THAT WILL ALLOW FOR SERIOUS DISCUSSION.

I HAVE INDICATED TO GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV MY WILLINGNESS FOR OUR REPRESENTATIVES TO MEET TO PREPARE FOR THE NEXT SUMMIT. THE LOCATION IS UNIMPORTANT. WHAT MATTERS IS THAT SUCH A MEETING TAKE PLACE IN MUTUAL EARNESTNESS SO THAT WE CAN MAKE PROGRESS AT THE NEXT SUMMIT.

CERTAINLY, MR GORBACHEV KNOWS THE DEPTH OF MY COMMITMENT TO PEACE. INDEED, WHEN WE WENT TO GENEVA MY ADVISORS TOLD ME THAT IF WE COULD ACHIEVE NOTHING BUT AN AGREEMENT TO MEET AGAIN - IF WE COULD DO NO MORE THAN THAT - THEN ALL OUR WORK WOULD HAVE BEEN WORTHWHILE.

ON THE FIRST DAY OF MEETINGS, MR GORBACHEV AND I TOOK A LITTLE WALK TOGETHER. HE HAPPENED TO MENTION THAT THERE WAS A GREAT DEAL IN THE SOVIET UNION HE WANTED ME TO SEE. I ANSWERED THAT I WISHED HE COULD VISIT THE UNITED STATES. NEXT THING YOU KNEW, WE HAD AGREED TO MEET HERE IN 1986 AND IN THE SOVIET UNION IN 1987. NOW, THAT WASN'T SO HARD, WAS IT?

IN THIS ESSAY ON PEACE, THEN, WE CAN ASSERT THAT THE TIME HAS COME TO MOVE FORWARD. LET US LEAVE BEHIND EFFORTS TO SEEK ONLY LIMITS TO THE INCREASE OF NUCLEAR ARMS AND SEEK INSTEAD ACTUAL ARMS REDUCTIONS - THE DEEP AND VERIFIABLE REDUCTIONS THAT MR GORBACHEV AND I HAVE AGREED TO NEGOTIATE. THE GOAL HERE IS NOT COMPLICATED. I AM SUGGESTING THAT WE AGREE NOT ON HOW MANY NEW, BIGGER, AND MORE ACCURATE MISSILES CAN BE BUILT, BUT ON HOW TO REDUCE AND ULTIMATELY ELIMINATE ALL NUCLEAR MISSILES.

LET US LEAVE BEHIND, TOO, THE DEFENCE POLICY OF MUTUAL ASSURED DESTRUCTION - OR MAD, AS IT'S CALLED - AND SEEK TO PUT IN ITS PLACE A DEFENCE THAT TRULY DEFENDS. EVEN NOW WE ARE PERFORMING RESEARCH AS PART OF OUR STRATEGIC DEFENCE INITIATIVE THAT MIGHT ONE DAY ENABLE US TO PUT IN SPACE A SHIELD THAT MISSILES COULD NOT PENETRATE - A SHIELD THAT COULD PROTECT US FROM NUCLEAR MISSILES JUST AS A ROOF PROTECTS A FAMILY FROM RAIN.

AND LET US LEAVE BEHIND SUSPICION BETWEEN OUR PEOPLES AND REPLACE IT WITH UNDERSTANDING. UNQUOTE.

2. FULL TEXT FOLLOWS BY BAG. FOR COMMENT SEE M I F T.

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