

ADVANCE COPIES

18

SECRET

US/SOVIET ARMS CONTROL TALKS

PS
PS/LADY YOUNG
PS/MR RENTON
PS/PUS
MR DEREK THOMAS
MR GOODALL
MR RATFORD
MR ~~DAUNT~~
MR DAVID THOMAS

MR POWELL, NO 10 DOWNING ST

MR D NICHOLLS, DUS(P)
B. NPS
DACU
CSI

MOD

HD/DEFENCE D
HD/ACDD
HD/SOVIET D

RESIDENT CLERK



15.1.85

SECRET

FM WASHINGTON

TO DESKBY 170830Z FCO

TELNO 1879

OF 162300Z JULY 86

INFO PRIORITY BONN, PARIS, UKDEL NATO, MOSCOW, MODUK

IMMEDIATE

MODUK FOR DACU

NY TELNO 1786: US RESPONSE TO SOVIET GENEVA ARMS CONTROL PROPOSALS

SUMMARY

1. PREPARATIONS FOR PRESIDENTIAL DECISIONS ON US RESPONSES TO SOVIET GENEVA ARMS CONTROL PROPOSALS HAVE BEEN ACCELERATED. PLANS FOR EARLY ALLIANCE CONSULTATION BEING DEVELOPED. THE PENTAGON AND STATE DEPARTMENT AT LOGGERHEADS ON MOST KEY ISSUES. IMPOSSIBLE TO PREDICT HOW THE PRESIDENT WILL DECIDE. YOUR VISIT VERY TIMELY. DETAIL

2. ALL THE INTER-AGENCY SENIOR ARMS CONTROL GROUP HAS THIS WEEK BEEN HOLDING AN ACCELERATED SERIES OF MEETINGS TO DISCUSS OPTIONS DEVELOPED BY THE VARIOUS AGENCIES FOR US RESPONSES TO THE SOVIET GENEVA PROPOSALS OF 29 MAY - 11 JUNE. AN NSPG MEETING AND OTHER RESTRICTED HIGH LEVEL MEETINGS WITH THE PRESIDENT ARE NOW LIKELY TO BE HELD THIS WEEK AND PROVISIONAL PRESIDENTIAL DECISIONS MAY BE MADE IN THE SAME TIMESCALE OR SHORTLY THEREAFTER. ALLIED CONSULTATION WOULD THEN FOLLOW IMMEDIATELY (SEE PARA 5 BELOW) THIS ACCELERATION OF THE PROCESS APPEARS TO BE THE RESULT OF WHITE HOUSE PRESSURE FOR EARLY PRESIDENTIAL DECISIONS SO THAT PROGRESS CAN BE MADE ON AGREEING DATES FOR THE NEXT SUMMIT. THE STATE DEPARTMENT HAVE ALSO BEEN ARGUING STRONGLY FOR A US RESPONSE TO THE RUSSIANS BEFORE THE END OF JULY.

3. OPTIONS WITHIN THE ADMINISTRATION HAVE BEEN DEVELOPED IN EXCEPTIONAL SECRECY AND THERE HAS BEEN A REMARKABLE ABSENCE OF LEAKS. BUT WE KNOW THAT THE FOLLOWING ISSUES ARE AMONG THOSE UNDER DISCUSSION (THE LIST IS NOT EXHAUSTIVE) :

(A) ON THE WEAPONS SIDE OF THE NEW SOVIET START PROPOSAL, ALL PARTS OF THE ADMINISTRATION APPEAR TO AGREE THAT 4,800 RYS ON SOVIET ICBMS (THE RESULT OF THE 60 PER CENT FORCE CONCENTRATION RULE

SOVIET ICBMS (THE RESULT OF THE 60 PER CENT FORCE CONCENTRATION RULE APPLIED TO THE PROPOSED OVERALL WEAPONS LIMIT OF 8,000) IS TOO MANY SINCE IT WOULD LEAVE THE SOVIET ICBM FORCE VIRTUALLY UNTOUCHED. THE OVERALL LIMIT OF 8,000 IS ALSO REGARDED BY MANY AS TOO HIGH. THERE THEREFORE SEEMS TO BE INTER-AGENCY CONSENSUS THAT THE US RESPONSE SHOULD MAKE A RENEWED BID FOR A 50 PER CENT CUT IN STRATEGIC WARHEAD TOTALS OR, AT THE LEAST, INSIST ON A FORCE CONCENTRATION RULE WHICH WOULD HAVE THE EFFECT OF LIMITING WARHEADS ON THE SOVIET ICBM FORCE TO ABOUT 3,600 (THE OCTOBER SOVIET PROPOSAL). THE STATE DEPARTMENT FAVOUR TELLING THE RUSSIANS IN ADDITION THAT THE 8,000 WEAPONS 30 PER CENT CUT PROPOSAL COULD BE CONSIDERED AS A FALL BACK OPTION BUT OSD AND ACDA ARE ARGUING THAT THE RESPONSE SHOULD CONTAIN NO HINT THAT THE US IS READY TO CONTEMPLATE ANYTHING LESS THAN THE 50 PER CENT CUTS FORESHADOWED IN THE GENEVA SUMMIT COMMUNIQUE. THERE APPEARS TO BE VERY LITTLE DEBATE ABOUT WHETHER BOMBS AND SRAMS SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN THE WEAPONS TOTALS; ALL AGENCIES SEEM TO AGREE THAT THEY SHOULD NOT, (B) LAUNCHERS. A US CONCESSION INVOLVING AGREEMENT TO THE AGGREGATION OF SNDVS HAS BEEN CONSIDERED AND HAS SOME SUPPORTERS IN ACDA AND THE STATE DEPARTMENT;

(C) SLCS. THE GENERAL VIEW APPEARS TO BE THAT THE US RESPONSE SHOULD SAY THAT SLCS SHOULD BE HANDLED SEPARATELY FROM THE MAIN REDUCTIONS AGREEMENT BECAUSE OF THE UNVERIFIABILITY OF ANY CONSTRAINTS ON THESE SYSTEMS. WHETHER ANY AGENCY HAS INDICATED ANY WILLINGNESS ACTUALLY TO ENVISAGE SUCH CONSTRAINTS IS UNCLEAR AND IT SEEMS MOST LIKELY THAT THE US RESPONSE WILL AT THIS STAGE SIMPLY ARGUE FOR THE CONTINUED EXCLUSION OF SLCS FROM THE SCOPE OF THE AGREEMENT.

4. ON THE DEFENCE/SPACE SIDE, THE MAIN ARGUMENT IS OF COURSE ABOUT WHETHER THE US SHOULD OFFER ANY CONCESSIONS AT ALL OR ACCEPT ANY LINKAGE WITH START. OSD ARE ARGUING THAT SUCH LINKAGE SHOULD BE REJECTED, AS SHOULD THE SOVIET PROPOSALS FOR EXTENDING AND STRENGTHENING THE ABM TREATY, ON THE GROUNDS THAT ANY AND ALL CONSTRAINTS ON THE SDI WILL PLACE THE WHOLE PROGRAMME AT RISK AND ARE THEREFORE UNACCEPTABLE. THE US WOULD IN THIS CASE RESPOND ONLY TO THE SOVIET START PROPOSALS. ACDA'S POSITION IS UNCLEAR; ALTHOUGH ADELMAN MAY FAVOUR THE OSD VIEW IT IS CLEAR THAT SOME OF HIS OFFICIALS DO NOT. THE STATE DEPARTMENT ARE ARGUING THAT IT WILL BE IMPOSSIBLE TO OBTAIN SIGNIFICANT OFFENSIVE REDUCTIONS (WHETHER OF 50 PER CENT OR 30 PER CENT) WITHOUT OFFERING SOME CONSTRAINTS ON THE SDI. AS FAR AS WE HAVE BEEN ABLE TO DISCOVER, THERE IS NO LOBBY WITHIN THE STATE DEPARTMENT FOR PICKING UP THE SOVIET PROPOSAL TO NEGOTIATE NEW DEFINITIONS OF ABM TREATY RELATED TERMS OR FOR TAKING ANY ACTION WHICH COULD RESULT IN THE ADMINISTRATION UNDERTAKING A LEGAL OBLIGATION TO ABIDE BY THE RESTRICTIVE INTERPRETATION OF THE TREATY (AS OPPOSED TO CHOOSING TO DO SO VOLUNTARILY AS A MATTER OF POLICY - THE PRESENT SITUATION). BUT THE STATE DEPARTMENT ARE ARGUING THAT THE ADMINISTRATION SHOULD PICK UP THE SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR EXTENDING THE ABM TREATY (VARIOUS PROCEDURAL WAYS FOR DOING THIS ARE BEING CONSIDERED) THOUGH FOR A PERIOD LESS THAN THE 15 - 20 YEARS PROPOSED BY THE RUSSIANS. THE STATE DEPARTMENT'S THINKING IS THAT THIS PERIOD OF COMMITMENT TO THE ABM TREATY SHOULD COINCIDE WITH THE PERIOD OVER WHICH OFFENSIVE REDUCTIONS WOULD BE MADE UNDER ANY START AGREEMENT. IT MIGHT THEREFORE BE IN THE RANGE 5 - 8 YEARS.

5. ON TIMING, THE NSC'S NEW TIMETABLE ENVISAGES PROVISIONAL PRESIDENTIAL DECISIONS AS EARLY AS 10 JULY. THESE COULD BE CONVEYED

5. ON TIMING, THE NSC'S NEW TIMETABLE ENVISAGES PROVISIONAL PRESIDENTIAL DECISIONS AS EARLY AS 18 JULY. THESE COULD BE CONVEYED TO THE ALLIES BY PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE. PRESENT PLANS FOR CONSULTATION ARE THAT ANY INF ELEMENT IN THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSED RESPONSE WOULD BE DISCUSSED WITH ALL THE ALLIES AT NEXT WEEK'S SCG MEETING (ANY SUCH ELEMENT IS UNLIKELY TO INVOLVE ANY SIGNIFICANT DEPARTURE FROM THE US FEBRUARY POSITION) : HOLMES WOULD VISIT THE HAGUE AND BRUSSELS TO DISCUSS THE START AND DEFENCE/SPACE ELEMENTS OF THE RESPONSE : NITZE WOULD VISIT LONDON, PARIS, BONN AND ROME FOR THE SAME PURPOSE : AND ROWNY TOKYO AND SEOUL. ALL THIS COULD START HAPPENING AS EARLY AS THE BEGINNING OF NEXT WEEK.

6. OVERALL, IT IS CLEAR THAT THE PENTAGON AND THE STATE DEPARTMENT ARE PREDICTABLY AT LOGGERHEADS ON ALL KEY ISSUES AND, IN PARTICULAR, ON WHETHER THE US SHOULD NOW SHOW SOME GIVE IN THEIR SDI POSITION IN GENEVA. YOUR MEETINGS WITH SHULTZ AND (WE HOPE) THE VICE-PRESIDENT ON 17-18 JULY THEREFORE LOOK AS IF THEY WILL BE PARTICULARLY TIMELY. AS SEEN FROM HERE, IT WOULD BE VERY HELPFUL IF YOU WERE ABLE TO REGISTER WITH SHULTZ, AS EARLY IN THE PROGRAMME AS POSSIBLE, THE FOLLOWING MAIN POINTS :

(A) WE CONTINUE TO SUPPORT THE TARGET OF 50 PER CENT "DEEP" CUTS. THE RUSSIANS SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO DEVALUE THE CURRENCY OF SUBSTANTIVE ARMS CONTROL:

(B) WE WELCOME THE IDEA OF AN EXTENSION OF THE ABM TREATY WITHDRAWAL PERIOD, AS THE PRIME MINISTER AND YOU CONFIRMED IN FEBRUARY:

(C) BUT, IN ADDITION, WE SEE REAL VALUE IN THE STRENGTHENING OF THE TREATY BY AGREEMENTS WHICH CLARIFY THE CURRENT AMBIGUITIES. THAT DOES NOT MEAN WE SUPPORT CURRENT SOVIET PROPOSALS (ON WHOSE DETAILS WE REMAIN UNCLEAR). BUT SOME EFFORT IN THAT DIRECTION SEEMS TO US THE MINIMUM NECESSARY, FOR THE REASONS IN YOUR 13 FEBRUARY MESSAGE TO SHULTZ, IF A SUBSTANTIVE DEAL ON THE MAIN ISSUES IS TO BE CUT.

WRIGHT

YYYY

ORWBAN 4959

NNNN

TO BE AREA FILIFE
THE NSC'S NEW TIMETABLE ENVISAGES PROVISIONAL PRESIDENTIAL DECISIONS AS EARLY AS 18 JULY. THESE COULD BE CONVEYED TO THE ALLIES BY PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE. PRESENT PLANS FOR CONSULTATION ARE THAT ANY INF ELEMENT IN THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSED RESPONSE WOULD BE DISCUSSED WITH ALL THE ALLIES AT NEXT WEEK'S SCG MEETING (ANY SUCH ELEMENT IS UNLIKELY TO INVOLVE ANY SIGNIFICANT DEPARTURE FROM THE US FEBRUARY POSITION) : HOLMES WOULD VISIT THE HAGUE AND BRUSSELS TO DISCUSS THE START AND DEFENCE/SPACE ELEMENTS OF THE RESPONSE : NITZE WOULD VISIT LONDON, PARIS, BONN AND ROME FOR THE SAME PURPOSE : AND ROWNY TOKYO AND SEOUL. ALL THIS COULD START HAPPENING AS EARLY AS THE BEGINNING OF NEXT WEEK.