



10 DOWNING STREET

CSP

Robert Calshaw rang re
tonight's talks with Nitze.
He stressed there was no need
for an immediate read-out of
the talks for their meeting
tomorrow. — something by
lunchtime would suffice. He
also suggested you might
consider whether a reply to
Reagan on Arms Control
is necessary.

C:G
22/7.

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

22 July 1986

EDP 23/7

Dear Charles,

Arms Control: Discussion with Ambassador Paul Nitze,
22 July

As requested in your letter of 21 July which transmitted the text of President Reagan's latest message to the Prime Minister on US-Soviet arms control negotiations, I now enclose a brief for the Prime Minister's use when she sees Mr Nitze later today at Ambassador Price's Residence.

The brief, which has been agreed with MOD officials, consists of a number of Points to Make, and additional Background. In the time available, the Prime Minister may not be able, or may not wish to make all these points. Mr Renton is to have a subsequent meeting with Mr Nitze at 0900 hours tomorrow morning at the US Embassy; and he will be able both to re-emphasise the points already made by the Prime Minister and to pick up any which she did not wish to make herself. For that purpose, it would be most helpful if you could give us an account of the Prime Minister's discussion with Mr Nitze as early as possible on the morning of 23 July.

However, we very much hope the Prime Minister will be able to register firmly the points in paragraphs 3-7 of the Speaking Note, and especially those in paragraphs 3-4.

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In addition, we see much advantage in the Prime Minister sending a personal message to President Reagan on your own channels after Mr Renton's discussion but before the US deadline for comments; this we understand to be close-of-business on Wednesday 23 July. If you agree, I will arrange for an appropriate draft to be submitted by tomorrow afternoon.

The fact that Mr Nitze is visiting London (and Bonn, Paris and Rome) for consultations on the President's response to Gorbachev is already public knowledge. The US Administration are confirming in response to questions that Mr Nitze (and General Rowny) are visiting Allied capitals for this purpose. However, they intend not to be drawn on the substance of the consultations, and have expressed the hope that we will do the same. In answer to questions, we therefore suggest that you should take the following line;

Ambassador Paul Nitze, Special Adviser to the President of the United States on arms control matters, held a discussion with the Prime Minister on the evening of 22 July; he [will also be seeing/has also seen] Mr Tim Renton, Minister of State at the FCO. The purpose of Mr Nitze's visit was to continue the very close and welcome consultations we have had with the US Administration on aspects of arms control, including the US response to the latest proposals at Geneva by the Soviet Union. These consultations are confidential and it would not be appropriate to reveal further details. However the Government continues to offer its support to the approach taken by the US at Geneva, and to hope that as a result of further US-Soviet contacts a summit will be held later this year which will produce concrete results in arms control.

I am sending copies of this letter to John Howe (MOD) and Michael Stark (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever,

Colin Budd

(C R Budd)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
No 10 Downing St



MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR PAUL NITZE, 22/23 JULY:

POINTS TO MAKE

1. Welcome prospect of early US response, good to regain initiative. Keen interest in further details of US current thinking [to be provided to Mr Renton]. Believe Russians (Shevardnadze visit) may now be ready to negotiate seriously. Have pressed them on need for Summit, and on their compliance record.
2. Recognise package outlined in President's letter as serious attempt to move negotiations forward. Many aspects welcome to HMG - see paragraph 8 below. But one point of serious concern, and some reservations.
3. Severe difficulty with commitment to Gorbachev that "other nuclear powers" to participate in further negotiations for reductions, once 50 per cent cuts and progress on INF achieved. Not consistent with long-established UK position. We have two conditions for reviewing a possible UK contribution to nuclear arms control: deep cuts in superpower arsenals and no significant increase in Soviet defensive capabilities. Have been over this ground before, but must emphasise that unable to support present formula in President's letter. Not prepared to make any commitment now about future involvement in advance of US/Soviet agreement/implementation of reductions. Important that



the Soviet Union should not sense any divergence of view between the UK and the US on this point.

4. Hope to be able to give unqualified and warmest support for new US proposals. But if present formula retained, and HMG questioned publicly (or privately by Russians or others), would have to confirm that our position remains unchanged and both our conditions in force. Therefore strongly urge deletion of reference to "other nuclear powers participating".

5. Also reservations about space/defence element of US package. Recognise this may not be last word, and disagreements in Washington about extent of possible flexibility relevant to SDI. But doubt whether present formula sufficient to convince Russians to negotiate offensive cuts. Their linkage apparently requires, even for one-third reductions, some clarification of ABM Treaty ambiguities. As mentioned in own message to
B President of 11 February, still believe that some sort of agreement on clarification will be necessary to impel Russians to agreement.

6. Concerned at formula used for extension for at least five years of ABM Treaty - confinement "to a programme of research, development and associated testing, which is permitted by the ABM Treaty". Does this imply US moving towards "broader" interpretation of Treaty limits and



away from present commitment to conduct research within "restrictive" interpretation? Emphasise continued UK wish to see latter maintained.

7. Some regret that US sees necessary to reduce objective in START from 50 per cent to 30 per cent cuts. May reduce not only military effect but also political impact. Soviet backing off earlier Summit commitment no reason for US to follow suit. Important in any case to constrain Soviet ICBM warhead totals. Welcome further details on SLCM approach, mobile ICBMs, and aggregation of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles/warheads and other nuclear weapons.

8. Nevertheless, many elements in package welcome to us. Particularly glad to see:

- (a) proposed extension to no less than seven years of current ABM Treaty limits (as suggested in my 11 February message), and negotiations as agreed in Second Point of Camp David. Understand US legal view that deployments without Soviet agreement would require abrogation of Treaty. Also interested in further details of additional assurances to Russians on space weapons;
- (b) proposed INF approach. Presume interim approach would be based on current US November 1985 proposals, or first stage only of February



proposals [140 launchers each in Europe/proportionate Soviet reductions in Asia]. Note some UK concern if global solution dropped and zero outcome applied to Europe only. Global criterion essential whether zero or interim agreement;

- (c) prospective steps on nuclear testing, consistent with UK views advanced to US since February 1985. Will wish to keep in close touch, given own crucial interests, and to ensure that no unacceptable constraints on UK testing programme;

- (d) continued interest in progress on conventional and chemical arms control. Hope in both fields Allies can maintain upper hand, and that UK initiative in CW will prove useful. Assume that reference to "existing fora" on conventional arms control does not preclude possibility of new fora if current NATO Task Force Study so recommends.



BACKGROUND FOR CALLS BY AMBASSADOR NITZE, 22/23 JULY

C 1. The President's letter contains his prospective
D response to Mr Gorbachev on the Soviet proposals at
Geneva made between May and June and summarised in the
attached tables (prepared for the Shevardnadze visit).
Washington telno 1879 reports the inter-agency struggle
over the response, prior to the President's decision on
18 July. Against that background, the current proposals
seem to reflect something of a success for the State
Department over the Pentagon. However, the suggestion of
a US readiness to accept less than 50% cuts in offensive
forces indicates that Mr Shultz, who has consistently
supported this goal, has not won all the tricks. The
lack of substance and specific proposals, particularly in
the START area, and the apparent US reluctance to make
any further concessions on the space/defence (SDI) side
do not increase the chances of a positive Soviet
response. The draft response also appears to imply that
the US would apply the "broader" interpretation of the
ABM Treaty to the SDI programme in particular as regards
the permissible limits to testing and development.

B 2. In her 11 February message to the President (page 4)
the Prime Minister proposed an extension of the ABM
Treaty withdrawal period, and an agreed commitment not to
enter particular phases of defence programmes before
certain specified dates. The President has picked up
these ideas in his latest draft; and he has implicitly



accepted the existence of a linkage - in the reverse direction - between offensive cuts and constraints on BMD development. But, presumably for the reasons described in Washington TUR para 4, he does not propose to respond to the Soviet requirement (which the Prime Minister also suggested to him and has publicly supported) for refining the Treaty, and clarifying ambiguities. As a result, the initial view of UK officials is that the US package will be insufficiently potent, particularly in the absence of such clarification, to shift the Russians from their present position. A further US move could of course be held in reserve for the end-game at a summit. Arguably we should not press now for a commitment to clarification. But once we drop this element from the UK game-plan, it will be correspondingly harder to have it re-inserted later. Some reference to it therefore seems desirable.

3. Other Points to Make are self-explanatory. Special note should be taken of the President's suggestion that other nuclear powers should participate in subsequent negotiations for reductions. In her 11 February message (page 5) the Prime Minister registered firmly to the President her opposition to such a proposal. Nonetheless, the idea (espoused particularly by Mr Nitze) that we - and presumably the French - could become committed to involvement in subsequent negotiations, without our own conditions being met, has now been formally revived.





4. Some in Washington indeed see in UK and French forces a real obstacle to reaching agreement with the Russians, an assessment which we do not share. Others see some later UK/French contribution to nuclear arms control as inevitable in practice, and want to cash that negotiating chip now. But a commitment on our part to accept our involvement under the lesser conditions spelled out in the President's letter would constrain the long-term future of our own deterrent; and would run counter to British policy of the past 20 years and HMG's position as elaborated firmly since 1983. The French can be expected to oppose the idea vigorously.

5. The President's conditions omit the point of greatest importance to us: that there should be no significant increase in Soviet defences. It is these, rather than the level of Soviet offensive forces, that by and large dictate the size of the UK deterrent. As the Foreign Secretary noted in paragraphs 7 to 9 of his minute to the Prime Minister of 28 April, we face a fundamental dilemma in squaring our own security interests with the contradictory US desire to raise the level of Soviet defences as part of the transition towards an SDI-dominated strategic balance.

6. In his latest letter the President has repeated his interest in securing Soviet agreement to share the results of BMD research, a point on which the Prime Minister commented in her 11 February message (page 3).

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Whether or not the Russians take this offer seriously (which continues to seem unlikely), it points up the fundamental conflict in approach between the way the President wishes to achieve his goal and the way in which we aim to preserve a credible independent deterrent.

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10 DOWNING STREET

23 July 1986

From the Private Secretary

Dear Robert,

**ARMS CONTROL: PRIME MINISTER'S DISCUSSION
WITH AMBASSADOR NITZE**

Thank you for your letter of 22 July enclosing briefing on arms control for the Prime Minister's meeting with Ambassador Nitze.

In the event, the Prime Minister was able to have only a brief and rather hurried word with Ambassador Nitze. We ought, therefore, to follow this up with a message to President Reagan. I should be grateful if you would let me have a draft, which might include a short and welcoming reference to the President's speech on South Africa.

The Prime Minister made clear to Ambassador Nitze that we objected to the terms in which the President's message referred to the participation of other nuclear weapons' powers in negotiations on reductions in strategic weapons once reductions of 50 per cent in the United States and Soviet arsenals had been secured. It was essential that the long-established United Kingdom position on the conditions for our participation should be spelled out fully. Ambassador Nitze argued that the United States proposal was intended to do more than put down a marker about the participation of other nuclear weapons' powers. It was not for the United States to spell out the terms on which they should participate. It was for the governments concerned to decide whether they wanted to take part and on what terms. The Prime Minister rejected this as an inadequate response. There was a clearly established Alliance position. Either this should be fully reflected in any proposal put to the Russians. Or the reference to "other nuclear powers participating" should be omitted. I subsequently suggested to Ambassador Nitze that there be a reference to it being open to other nuclear powers to participate in the light of their established positions. Nitze did not reject this.

The Prime Minister raised the absence from the United States proposals of any reference to refining the ABM Treaty and clarifying ambiguities in it. Ambassador Nitze said that the United States did not accept that there were any ambiguities.

The Prime Minister said that the reference in the United States proposals to "testing" seemed to suggest that


SECRET

the Americans were moving towards a less restrictive interpretation of the ABM Treaty. This would be a matter for concern. Ambassador Nitze denied this. The Treaty and the negotiating record made clear that certain sorts of testing were permitted. However, the Treaty covered only weapons, which had the specific attributes of a ground-based ABM system. Systems based upon different principles or without these specific attributes fell for discussion under the provisions of Agreed Statement D to the ABM Treaty.

The Prime Minister expressed regret that the United States proposals envisaged reductions of less than 50 per cent in offensive strategic weapons. While it would be for the United States to judge at the end of the day what was negotiable on this score, it would be a pity to set sights too low at this stage.

This short account is compiled from what the Prime Minister and Ambassador Nitze told me - separately - afterwards.

I am copying this letter to John Howe (Ministry of Defence) and Michael Stark (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely,

(C. D. POWELL)

R. N. Culshaw, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.