

US/SOVIET ARMS CONTROL TALKS

13

PS
 PS/LADY YOUNG
 PS/MR RENTON
 PS/PUS
 MR DEREK THOMAS
 MR GOODALL
 MR RATFORD
 MR ~~DAUNT~~ DAUNT
 MR DAVID THOMAS

MR POWELL, NO 10 DOWNING ST

MR D NICHOLLS, DUS(P) } MOD
 S. NPS() }
 DACU }
 CSI }

HD/DEFENCE D
 ED/ACDD
 ED/SOVIET D

RESIDENT CLERK

15.1.85

SECRET

FM UKDEL NATO

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 225

OF 241409Z JUL 86

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, MODUK

INFO ROUTINE UKDEL VIENNA, BONN, PARIS, UKDIS GENEVA

INFO ROUTINE UKDEL CDE STOCKHOLM

MODUK FOR DACU

YOUR TELNO 136: (NOT TO ALL):

NAC BRIEFING: US RESPONSE TO SOVIET ARMS CONTROL PROPOSALS

SUMMARY

1. USEFUL COUNCIL CONSULTATION. GENERAL WELCOME FOR THE PRESIDENT'S APPROACH, ALTHOUGH SOME MISGIVING ON WHETHER THE US IS GOING FAR ENOUGH ON ARM TREATY ASPECTS. ALSO SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES OVER FUTURE BRITISH AND FRENCH PARTICIPATION IN NUCLEAR ARMS REDUCTION TALKS.

DETAIL

2. NITZE BRIEFED A RESTRICTED MEETING OF PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES THIS MORNING ON THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSED REPLY TO GORBACHEV.
3. HE LED OFF BY EXPRESSING HIS PLEASURE AT THIS CONTINUED STEP IN CONSULTATIONS WHICH HAD PROVED MOST BENEFICIAL FROM THE US STANDPOINT QUOTE AS THE DECISION PROCESS EVOLVES ON ISSUES IMPORTANT TO ALLIANCE SECURITY. UNQUOTE THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER WAS INTENDED TO INITIATE A PROCESS AND WOULD BE FOLLOWED BY DISCUSSIONS IN DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS, BETWEEN FOREIGN MINISTERS, AND, ULTIMATELY, BETWEEN THE US AND SOVIET DELEGATIONS IN GENEVA AND ELSEWHERE, AS APPROPRIATE. NITZE THEN OUTLINED THE SUBSTANTIVE US PROPOSALS. (COPY OF HIS STATEMENT FOLLOWS BY BAG).
4. CASSIERS (BELGIUM) WELCOMED THE PROPOSED LETTER. THE BELGIAN GOVERNMENT FULLY UNDERSTOOD ITS IMPORTANCE. HE ASKED WHETHER, IF NO AGREEMENT WERE REACHED ON AN EXTENSION OF THE ABM TREATY UP TO 7-1/2 YEARS, THE SITUATION WOULD REMAIN AS AT PRESENT. NITZE CONFIRMED THAT THIS WOULD BE THE CASE: THE US AND THE USSR WOULD REMAIN FREE TO GIVE 6 MONTHS NOTICE OF THEIR INTENTION TO WITHDRAW.
5. HE THEN SPOKE AS INSTRUCTED, EMPHASISING OUR OVERALL WELCOME FOR THE PROPOSED US RESPONSE AND THE IMPORTANCE WE ATTACHED IN PARTICULAR TO THE POINTS IN SUBPARAGRAPH B) AND C) OF TUR. CURIEN (FRANCE) SAID THAT THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT HAD MADE ITS VIEWS CLEAR TO NITZE DURING HIS VISIT TO PARIS. THEY FAVOURED AN INTENSIFIED US/USSR DIALOGUE, ARMS CONTROL, AND A REDUCTION IN NUCLEAR ARSENALS. THEY ALSO FULLY GRASPED THE COMPLEXITY OF THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSALS. FRANCE BELIEVED THAT THE ABM TREATY CONSTITUTED AN IMPORTANT STABILISING ELEMENT. ITS EXISTENCE HAD BEEN TAKEN FULLY INTO ACCOUNT WHEN THE THEN FRENCH GOVERNMENT HAD DEFINED ITS

PROPOSALS. FRANCE BELIEVED THAT THE ABM TREATY CONSTITUTED AN IMPORTANT STABILISING ELEMENT. ITS EXISTENCE HAD BEEN TAKEN FULLY INTO ACCOUNT WHEN THE THEN FRENCH GOVERNMENT HAD DEFINED ITS POSITION ON ARMS CONTROL IN 1983. ON PARTICIPATION IN NEGOTIATIONS ON REDUCTIONS OF STRATEGIC NUCLEAR ARSENALS BEYOND 50 PERCENT THE FRENCH POSITION WAS SIMILAR TO OUR OWN. WAS IT WISE TO MENTION PARTICIPATION BY OTHER NUCLEAR POWERS? FRANCE, FOR HER PART, HAD NEVER MENTIONED A FIGURE FOR THE POSSIBLE SCALE OF REDUCTIONS IN THE SUPERPOWERS' ARSENALS WHICH WOULD PERMIT HER TO PARTICIPATE IN TALKS ON REDUCING HER OWN.

6. THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT HAD ALSO MADE IT CLEAR THAT IT COULD NOT PARTICIPATE IN ANY SUCH TALKS IF THE DIFFERENCE IN SCALE BETWEEN THE SUPERPOWERS' NUCLEAR ARSENALS AND THAT OF FRANCE WAS QUOTE OF A FUNDAMENTAL NATURE UNQUOTE. EVEN IF THE US AND USSR REDUCED THEIR ARSENALS BY 50 PERCENT, THE LATTER WOULD CONTINUE TO RETAIN 6,000 WARHEADS WHILE FRANCE, ON PRESENT PLANS, WOULD ONLY POSSESS 600. A CO-EFFICIENT OF 1 TO 10. CUTS IN THE MAJOR NUCLEAR ARSENALS WERE NOT, MOREOVER, THE ONLY CONDITION FOR FRENCH PARTICIPATION.

7. CURIEN WENT ON TO STRESS THE IMPORTANCE OF RETAINING THE ALLIANCE GLOBAL INF CRITERION AND REMARKED THAT THE PROPOSED PRESIDENTIAL LANGUAGE ON THE CONVENTIONAL BALANCE AND CHEMICAL ARMS CONTROL WAS QUOTE NOT VERY EXHAUSTIVE UNQUOTE. THESE ISSUES HAD ONLY BEEN LIGHTLY TOUCH ON YET THEY WERE A VERY IMPORTANT COMPONENT IN OVERALL ARMS CONTROL. WOULD IT NOT HAVE BEEN WISE TO PLACE MUCH MORE EMPHASIS ON THE QUESTION OF THE CONVENTIONAL BALANCE?

8. FULCI (ITALY) DESCRIBED THE US POSITION AS EXPRESSED IN THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSED LETTER AS OPEN AND FIRM. ITALY FULLY AGREED WITH THE BASIC PHILOSOPHY BEHIND THE US APPROACH. HE ASKED WHY THERE HAD BEEN NO SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO SRINF AND SOUGHT CLARIFICATION ON THE PRESIDENT'S REFERENCE, IN THE PARAGRAPH ON CONVENTIONAL AND CHEMICAL FORCES, TO SUPPLEMENTARY BILATERAL EXCHANGES AT EXPERT LEVEL. WITZE REPLIED THAT THE US POSITION ON SRINF REMAINED UNCHANGED. THE LANGUAGE ON FORA FOR CONVENTIONAL AND CW DISCUSSIONS WAS NOT MEANT TO FORECLOSE THE CONTINUATION OF PRESENT PRACTICES.

9. HANSEN (FRG) SAID THAT GENSCHER'S TALKS IN MOSCOW HAD CONFIRMED THE GERMAN IMPRESSION THAT THE SOVIET PROPOSALS IN GENEVA REFLECTED A SERIOUS WILL TO NEGOTIATE, PARTICULARLY ON THE OFFENSIVE/DEFENSIVE NUCLEAR BALANCE. A PARTICULARLY REMARKABLE ASPECT WAS THE SOVIET READINESS TO AGREE THAT INITIAL REDUCTIONS IN STRATEGIC NUCLEAR ARSENALS SHOULD NOT DEPEND ON A FINAL SETTLEMENT OF THE SDI ISSUE. THEY WERE NOW WILLING TO ACCEPT A TIME-LIMITED SOLUTION AND NO LONGER INSISTED, AS A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE, THAT SDI RESEARCH SHOULD BE ABANDONED.

10. THE FRG THOUGHT IT IMPORTANT THAT THE PRESIDENT INTENDED TO TAKE UP THE FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPT OF A TIME-LIMITED SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF DEFENSIVE SYSTEMS. THIS WOULD CONSTITUTE A QUOTE SUITABLE UNQUOTE MEANS OF BREAKING THE GENEVA STALEMATE AND COMING CLOSER TO THE COMMON AIM OF DEEP CUTS IN NUCLEAR ARSENALS. IF THE USSR RECEIVED INDICATIONS THAT A QUOTE CALCULABLE ARMS CONTROL FRAMEWORK UNQUOTE MIGHT BE ESTABLISHED FOR A SPECIFIED PERIOD OF TIME, THEY WOULD NO LONGER BE ABLE TO ARGUE THAT REDUCTIONS IN OFFENSIVE ARSENALS SHOULD NOT BEGIN NOW. THE FRG THOUGHT THAT IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF THE PRESIDENT'S DECISION IN OCTOBER 1985 TO MAINTAIN A RESTRICTIVE INTERPRETATION OF THE ABM TREATY COULD BE REAFFIRMED IN HIS LETTER. IT ALSO SEEMED IMPORTANT THAT A POLICY OF QUOTE TRULY MUTUAL RESTRAINT UNQUOTE SHOULD BE CONSISTENTLY FOLLOWED IN RELATION TO OFFENSIVE STRATEGIC SYSTEMS DURING THE PERIOD PROCEEDING ANY AGREEMENT ON REDUCTIONS.

11. ON INF, THE FRG THOUGHT IT ADVISABLE TO AIM AT AN INTERIM SOLUTION AS LONG AS THE USSR WAS NOT PREPARED TO AGREE TO THE ALLIANCE'S AIM OF THE GLOBAL ABOLITION OF LRINF. FINALLY, HANSEN HOPED THAT THE PRESIDENT WOULD EMPHASISE IN HIS LETTER THE IMPORTANCE WHICH THE US, AND THE ALLIANCE AS A WHOLE, ATTACHED TO CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL, A CDE AGREEMENT, PROGRESS IN MBFR, AND THE EARLY CONCLUSION OF AN AGREEMENT TO BAN CHEMICAL WEAPONS. THIS WOULD MAKE IT CLEAR THAT THE WEST WAS PURSUING A COMPREHENSIVE ARMS CONTROL CONCEPT DIRECTED AT THE PREVENTION OF WAR.

THE EARLY CONCLUSION OF AN AGREEMENT TO BAN CHEMICAL WEAPONS. THIS WOULD MAKE IT CLEAR THAT THE WEST WAS PURSUING A COMPREHENSIVE ARMS CONTROL CONCEPT DIRECTED AT THE PREVENTION OF WAR.

12. COMMENTING ON HANSEN'S STATEMENT, WITZE CONFIRMED WHAT HE HAD SAID IN LONDON: THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSED LANGUAGE ON THE EXTENSION OF THE ABM TREATY REFLECTED NO CHANGE IN CURRENT POLICY. WHILE THE BROADER INTERPRETATION OF THE PRESENT TREATY WAS LEGALLY CORRECT, THE US CONTINUED TO CARRY OUT SDI RESEARCH WITHIN THE RESTRICTIVE INTERPRETATION AS A MATTER OF POLICY. ELABORATING ON THE PARAGRAPH ON INF, WITZE SAID THAT THE US CONTINUED TO WANT A GLOBAL SOLUTION. BUT IF THE USSR WERE READY TO MOVE TOWARDS A PARTIAL AGREEMENT, THE LANGUAGE IN THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER WOULD PERMIT ITS CONSIDERATION.

13. THE DUTCH ACTING PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE SAID THAT HIS GOVERNMENT'S VIEWS HAD BEEN CONVEYED TO HOLMES IN THE HAGUE. SDI RESEARCH WAS PRUDENT BUT IT SHOULD BE CARRIED OUT WITHIN THE TERMS OF THE ABM TREATY. WITZE REITERATED THAT THIS WOULD BE SO. IN A SECOND INTERVENTION, CURIEN (FRANCE) ASKED WHETHER THE US WOULD BE PREPARED TO REACH A SEPARATE INF AGREEMENT EVEN IF AGREEMENT COULD NOT BE REACHED ON OTHER ISSUES? WITZE REPLIED THAT THE US WOULD MUCH PREFER AGREEMENTS ON ALL THE MAJOR QUESTIONS NOW AT ISSUE WITH THE USSR. BUT, WHILE REGRETTING IT, HE WOULD NOT EXCLUDE THE POSSIBILITY OF PROGRESS IN ONLY ONE FIELD. MILNE (CANADA) SAID THAT THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER GAVE THE ALLIANCE AN OPPORTUNITY TO REINFORCE WITH WESTERN PUBLIC OPINION THE DEGREE TO WHICH THE ALLIANCE WAS SERIOUS IN ITS APPROACH TO ARMS CONTROL. WESTERN PUBLICS MIGHT SEE THE SOVIET PROPOSAL LINKING DEEP CUTS IN NUCLEAR ARSENALS WITH A 15-20 YEAR EXTENSION OF THE ABM TREATY AS LESS REASONABLE THAN US PROPOSALS FOR SUCH CUTS LINKED TO AN EXTENSION OF ONLY 7-1/2 YEARS.

14. FOSTERVOLL (NORWAY) SAW POSITIVE ELEMENTS IN THE DRAFT LETTER BUT COULD NOT GIVE SPECIFIC NORWEGIAN VIEWS. HOWEVER, HIS GOVERNMENT BELIEVED THAT THE INTER-RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SDI AND THE SIZE OF STRATEGIC WEAPON ARSENALS SHOULD BE USED TO ACHIEVE DEEP CUTS IN THE LATTER. THE SOVIET PROPOSAL ALSO APPEARED TO BE A USEFUL WAY OF INTRODUCING PREDICTABILITY INTO SDI RESEARCH BY BOTH SIDES. HE ASSOCIATED HIMSELF WITH THOSE WHO HAD EMPHASISED THE NEED TO STRENGTHEN THE ABM REGIME. IT WAS ALSO IMPORTANT THAT THE DEPLOYMENT OF SDI DEFENSIVE SYSTEMS SHOULD BE BANNED AND AN ASAT AGREEMENT REACHED. EFFORTS SHOULD BE INTENSIFIED TO ELIMINATE INF THREATENING TARGETS IN EUROPE. FINALLY, THE NORWEGIAN GOVERNMENT ATTACHED PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE TO REDUCING SLCMS. BUT THEY REALISED THE PROBLEMS OF VERIFICATION INVOLVED.

15. IN HIS CONCLUDING REMARKS, LORD CARRINGTON SAID THAT HE TENDED TO SHARE THE CANADIAN VIEW THAT THE US PROPOSALS MIGHT PROVE QUOTE LESS GLAMOROUS UNQUOTE AS FAR AS WESTERN PUBLIC OPINION WAS CONCERNED. HE ASKED IF THERE WAS ANY INTENTION OF PUBLISHING THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER? WITZE REPLIED IN THE NEGATIVE. THE US WANTED TO END PUBLIC EXCHANGES AND GET DOWN TO THE GIVE AND TAKE INVOLVED IN REAL NEGOTIATIONS. HAPPILY, PRESS SPECULATION ABOUT THE CONTENTS OF THE LETTER HAD SO FAR BEEN WELL OFF THE MARK. HE EMPHASISED THE NEED TO RETAIN CONFIDENTIALITY SO THAT THE PRESIDENT COULD, IF NECESSARY, MODIFY THE LETTER WITHOUT EMBARRASSMENT.

16. WITZE WENT ON TO SAY THAT THE MOST IMPORTANT COMMENTS HE HAD HEARD RELATED TO BRITISH AND FRENCH PARTICIPATION IN NEGOTIATIONS TO REDUCE NUCLEAR ARSENALS ONCE A 50 PERCENT US/SOVIET REDUCTION HAD BEEN ACHIEVED. HE HAD ASSUMED THAT THIS IDEA WOULD BE WELCOMED BY OTHER NUCLEAR POWERS. HE HAD LONG BELIEVED THAT THERE SHOULD BE AN OPPORTUNITY FOR THEM TO PARTICIPATE ONCE A 50 PERCENT REDUCTION HAD BEEN ACHIEVED AND THAT THERE SHOULD BE CONSULTATIONS BEFORE SUCH TALKS TOOK PLACE. THE PRESENT LANGUAGE WAS MEANT TO SHOW THAT THE US WAS NOT MOVING BEYOND QUOTE POSITIONS ALREADY ON THE TABLE UNQUOTE. (LOOKING QUIZICALLY OVER HIS SPECTACLES AT CURIEN AND MYSELF) HE ENQUIRED GENTLY WHETHER THE UK AND THE FRENCH APPROACH WAS WISE. BUT IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO AMEND THE LETTER'S LANGUAGE TO MAKE IT CLEAR THAT OTHER NUCLEAR POWERS WOULD ONLY TAKE PART IF THEY WISHED TO DO SO. THAT SAID, THE US DID NOT WANT TO DO ANYTHING WHICH OTHERS DID NOT SEE AS IN THEIR OWN BEST INTERESTS.

TO MAKE IT CLEAR THAT OTHER NUCLEAR POWERS WOULD ONLY TAKE PART IF
THEY WISHED TO DO SO. THAT SAID, THE US DID NOT WANT TO DO
ANYTHING WHICH OTHERS DID NOT SEE AS IN THEIR OWN BEST INTERESTS.
HE DID NOT BELIEVE THERE WERE ANY DIFFERENCES OVER THE APPROACH TO
CV ISSUES. BUT THERE MIGHT BE DIFFERENCES OVER THE INTERPRETATION
OF THE ABM TREATY. PERHAPS FURTHER DISCUSSIONS WITH ALLIES WERE
NEEDED ON THIS POINT.

P:KE

YYYY

UBLNAN 0792

NNNN