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PRIME MINISTER'S TALKS WITH MRS. GRO HARLEM BRUNDTLAND,
PRIME MINISTER OF NORWAY: OSLO, 12 SEPTEMBER 1986

Prime Minister	Mrs. Brundtland
Sir W. Bentley, HM Ambassador	Mr. Frydenlund, Foreign Minister
Mr. Wicks	Mr. Oien, Minister of Petroleum and Energy
Mr. Powell	Mr. Hanisch, State Secretary
Mr. Ingham	Ms. Nordbo, State Secretary
Mr. Short, HM Embassy	Mr. Busch, Ambassador
	Mr. Kolby, Assistant Under Secretary, MFA
	Mr. Wetland, Private Secretary

EAST/WEST RELATIONS

The Prime Minister noted that both the UK and Norway supported a US/Soviet summit but differed in their attitude to the Strategic Defence Initiative. History underlined the lesson that free societies needed to try to keep ahead technologically of any potential aggressors. It should be easier for them because they lived by the free exchange of ideas which stimulated technological progress. This was what was happening in the United States. She supported the SDI and wished Britain to take part in it, both on principle and because of the technological spin-off. At the same time, it was important to maintain the Anti Ballistic Missile Treaty in force. She had expressed this view to President Reagan, suggesting that it might be possible to extend the period of notice of termination beyond the present six months.

The Prime Minister continued that she believed that the Soviet Union wanted a summit. She was, however, appalled at the Danilov affair. The Russians appeared to have misunderstood American psychology. The United Kingdom had been working very hard to improve relations between the Soviet Union and the West, for example the visit of Shevardnaze to London earlier

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this year, and Lord Whitelaw's visit to Moscow. The United Kingdom could make a particular contribution as chairman of the Chemical Warfare negotiations. President Reagan and Chancellor Kohl shared the same general approach to the Soviet Union. Allied consultation was good, and the US record on keeping the Alliance informed on arms control negotiations was exemplary. The West should not give the Russians any single point without getting something in return. We should also use the Helsinki accords to encourage freedom of movement.

Mrs. Brundtland said that Norway strongly agreed that the ABM Treaty must be maintained, and that the West should keep ahead in modern technology. But Norway was concerned about heavy concentration of resources in a field where she did not feel confident that the concept would work. Would SDI in fact add to the means of defending the West? Or would it create an increased pressure for new offensive weapons?

Mrs. Brundtland agreed that Soviet behaviour over Danilov had been strange. This was an unwise move in the lead-up to a summit. It was important that a summit should take place. She had told the Soviet Ambassador in Oslo that the Russians should not think that, if a summit did not take place, the blame would fall on the West and the United States in particular. This was what the Russians apparently did believe. The more open policies in Moscow in the last two years made it possible to believe that there would be a summit. But it was important that it should produce results. She did not think that President Reagan would allow his eight years as President to conclude without a major step forward on East/West relations and arms control. She was heartened to find that, although the United Kingdom and Norway did not see eye to eye on all details, they took the same overall view on the West's strategy towards the Soviet Union.

The Prime Minister referred to the extent to which the Russians themselves were doing research on SDI. This was considerable: they had been working on laser systems longer than the Americans and were modernising their ABM system round

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Moscow, as well as undertaking research into new defensive systems.

Mr. Frydenlund said that the SDI programme was useful as a negotiating card. But if the Americans stuck to it, or it was allowed to stand in the way of progress on arms control, there would be great difficulties in the Alliance. The Prime Minister said that the SDI was certainly more than a negotiating card. Mr. Frydenlund distinguished between research and deployment. The Prime Minister said that the scope for testing under the ABM Treaty was not entirely clear, although the Treaty certainly prevented deployment.

Mrs. Brundtland said that NATO must try to find common ground in interpreting the Treaty.

NORWAY/EC

Mrs. Brundtland said that Norway wished to have the closest possible relationship with the EC, without becoming a member. For example, on counter-terrorism, there should be no barriers between the EC and EFTA. The Prime Minister queried whether there was in fact a barrier. If there was, it must come down. The EC was not meant to be restrictive in that sense at all. Rather, it was an example of what could be done to promote free exchange. Mr. Frydenlund agreed that in the last two years the EC had opened up its relations with Norway. Once a year, there was a meeting with the Commission, and the Norwegian Foreign Minister met the Presidency Foreign Ministers to discuss EPC twice a year. The Prime Minister said that the United Kingdom, as Presidency, would do all it could to promote wider agreement between the EC and EFTA. In GATT, the two organisations should work together against non-tariff barriers. In this regard, it was particularly important to counter Japanese practices. Recent examples were Japanese non-tariff barriers against the import of skis and car safety belts. It was also time to revise the position of NICs, who now received too much preference. Agriculture was a major world problem: there were large surpluses in the United States, Europe and India. She was opposed to the sale of

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surplus EC agricultural produce at bargain prices to the Soviet Union.

Mrs. Brundtland said that she took a special interest in this problem, as leader of the World Commission on Environment and Development. The Commission had been pleased with the declaration of the Tokyo Economic Summit on agriculture.

ACID RAIN

The Prime Minister said that the measures announced by the United Kingdom the previous day were a substantial step forward, although very costly. It was inconsistent to complain about the effects of burning fossil fuel, and in the same breath about the dangers of nuclear energy. Governments had a responsibility to provide energy for their peoples. The Third World in particular would need nuclear energy for its development. The United Kingdom hoped that, following the announcement of their measures, others who were responsible for sulphur emissions would follow suit. This applied especially to Eastern European countries. Mrs. Brundtland said that the British announcement was welcomed. More research was necessary into energy saving. The cost of environmental protection had to be included in the cost of energy. She wondered how far the British measures would take the UK towards achieving the targets set by the 30% Club.

The Prime Minister explained that the UK had in fact already reduced its sulphur emissions by 40% since 1970, but the base year selected by the Community was less favourable to us. Recently there had actually been some increase in emissions because more electricity was being consumed. The three power stations chosen for retro-fitting used the most sulphurous coal and oil. The cost would be added to the cost of electricity.

The Prime Minister continued that the UK would be buying electricity from the French grid and, depending on the results of the Sizewell enquiry, would seek to build more nuclear

power stations. These measures would help reduce emissions from the United Kingdom further. Every form of energy had some disadvantage. Nevertheless, the overriding responsibility of Government was to provide enough energy to meet demand.

Mrs. Brundtland said that all European countries had reduced their output of sulphur in the 1970s, and subsequently many countries had intensified measures to reduce emissions. Although the latest British announcement was welcome, Norway hoped that the UK would take part in further European measures to meet reduced emission targets. The Prime Minister pointed out that many countries other than the UK were responsible for sulphur emission; for example, Norway itself, and the GDR, were each responsible for more pollution in Norway. The FRG produced the most overall. Mrs. Brundtland said that it was important that the UK had accepted the fact that its power stations were causing damage to the environment. The Prime Minister made it clear that this applied only to lakes and fresh water: in forests, other factors were at work.

SOUTH AFRICA

Mr. Frydenlund said that the Nordic countries had for some time operated a number of sanctions against South Africa. Since progress there had not been satisfactory, and black opposition to the regime had become more open, the Norwegians foresaw a bloodbath which the West had a responsibility to try to avert. They therefore thought that pressure on the South African Government should be increased. The Norwegian Parliament would vote for comprehensive sanctions when it reopened. The Government knew that this would not have much practical effect, but thought it would have an important psychological effect on the blacks. There was also a political necessity in the Western world to increase pressure on South Africa. Norway assumed that any resolution in the UN Security Council calling for mandatory sanctions would be vetoed. How would the UK react to a resolution recommending voluntary sanctions?

The Prime Minister made it clear that Britain was as much opposed to apartheid as any nation. She explained Britain's opposition to comprehensive mandatory sanctions. In sum, she considered that there was no evidence whatever that sanctions would bring apartheid to an end: rather the reverse, as the Rhodesian experience showed. It would be impossible to make sanctions effective; sanctions in the field of military equipment, which were fully supported by Britain, had been in place for many years but evasion of them was widespread. Insofar as sanctions against South Africa would work, they would cause mass starvation and unemployment. This was why a number of black leaders in South Africa itself, and now also some of the Front Line States, did not support sanctions. Not only was the damage which they would do to the black population morally repugnant, they were unacceptable on other grounds: for example, the only two significant sources of platinum in the world were South Africa and the Soviet Union, and it was unacceptable to give the Soviet Union a monopoly in strategic minerals. Sanctions could lead to the loss of 120,000 jobs in the UK. She was passionate about ending apartheid. But undermining the South African economy would not achieve that. Rather, the West should continue with gestures of disapproval and increase pressure on President Botha, who was a stubborn and difficult man and who presided over a split Cabinet. It should also seek the release of Nelson Mandela, which was a pre-requisite of bringing the ANC into negotiations.

Mr. Frydenlund asked how such a policy would work if the South African Government maintained that the end of apartheid amounted to suicide for them. The Prime Minister reiterated that sanctions would not end apartheid. Mrs Brundtland said that she understood the strength of the Prime Minister's convictions on this. She asked about the likely UK attitude to a resolution in the Security Council on voluntary sanctions. The Prime Minister said that the United Kingdom would consider the precise terms of any resolution, in concert with her EC partners, when the time came. Many countries

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advocating sanctions would either not suffer from them or would actually stand to gain.

NORTH SEA OIL

Mrs Brundtland said that it was not true, as claimed in "The Guardian", that the Norwegians had chosen the week of the Prime Minister's visit in which to announce their decision to reduce exports in order to "slap the United Kingdom in the face". The decision had been timed to precede the Ministers of Petroleum and Energy's meeting with Mr. Peter Walker this week and should be positively helpful to the United Kingdom. The Prime Minister said that this subject could be discussed in a friendly manner between two close allies. Mrs Brundtland said that the Norwegians would bear the cost of their decision, and the UK would take the benefit. The Prime Minister recognised that the positions of the two countries were quite different: total Norwegian production was bound to increase, whereas UK production had levelled off and would go down. The United Kingdom's policies would continue unchanged.

C.D.P

C.D. POWELL

18 September 1986

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18 September 1986

PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO NORWAY

I enclose a copy of a formal record of the Prime Minister's talks with Mrs. Brundtland in Oslo on 12 September prepared by our Embassy. I have amended it extensively. May I please leave it to the department to distribute as (or if) necessary.

(C. D. POWELL)

Colin Budd, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

15 September 1986

Dear Colin,

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH THE PRIME MINISTER OF NORWAY
IN OSLO ON FRIDAY 12 SEPTEMBER 1986 AT 0845

The Prime Minister had formal talks with Mrs Brundtland during her visit to Norway on the morning of Friday 12 September. This followed a long talk during the flight from Tromso to Oslo the previous day during which they discussed mainly domestic policy issues. Both sets of talks were notably easy and friendly.

The meeting started tête à tête between the Prime Minister and Mrs Brundtland, providing an opportunity for them to go over the issues which both intended to raise subsequently in a plenary session and agree the broad conclusions which they would reach.

A list of those who took part in the plenary session is attached.

East/West Relations

The Prime Minister said that there were two aspects of East/West relations which she would like to raise with Mrs Brundtland. The first concerned the Strategic Defence Initiative on which the British and Norwegian governments had rather different views. Her own view was based on the conviction that the West must always strive to maintain a scientific and technological lead over the Soviet Union. She therefore believed that the United States were right to go ahead with research on the SDI and she was determined that the United Kingdom should be involved with it, not least in the hope of benefiting from possible civil applications of the research. At the same time it was vital to keep strictly to the terms of the ABM Treaty. We had represented this strongly to the United States, while suggesting that it might be possible to extend the period of notice for withdrawal from the Treaty. This would provide predictability and give added assurance to the Soviet Union that there would not be a sudden break-out to deployment. This concept had been reflected in President Reagan's proposals of last July.

Mrs Brundtland said that she strongly agreed with the Prime Minister about the importance of preserving treaties and also on the value of extending the period of notice for

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withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. But the Norwegian government was not at all convinced that the SDI would work and achieve the aims which had been set for it. They doubted, therefore, whether it made sense to invest so heavily in it. Their main concern was that a decision by the United States to deploy a strategic defence system would only lead the Russians to increase their build-up of offensive weapons. Mr. Frydenlund added that the SDI had served an important purpose in bringing the Soviet Union back to the negotiating table. It was a useful negotiating card but should not be regarded as more than that. If the Americans decided to deploy a strategic defence system or, more immediately, if arms control negotiations broke down on the issue of the SDI, there would be a very difficult situation in the Alliance. The Prime Minister stressed that only research was involved at this stage. The Americans were committed not to deploy a strategic defence system without first negotiating under the ABM Treaty.

The Prime Minister went on to raise the prospects for a further US/Soviet summit. She very much hoped there would be such a summit this year. Both sides appeared to want it, although the Daniloff case showed the extent to which the Russians tended to misread the psychology of the United States. We had been working hard behind the scenes to encourage a summit and also to secure progress in arms control negotiations, particularly on chemical weapons. There was a general similarity in the approach of the United States, the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany on the main arms control issues. The United States' record on consultation within the Alliance was excellent. She remained optimistic that a summit would take place because she believed that both sides wanted to maintain deterrence at a lower level of weaponry. At the same time it was important to use all our contacts with the Soviet Union to bring pressure to bear on them to implement the Helsinki Agreements.

Mrs Brundtland agreed that Soviet behaviour in the Daniloff case had been very unwise. She feared that it might jeopardise the summit. She had herself recently warned the Soviet Ambassador in Oslo that the Russians should not assume that the Western public opinion would blame the US for failure to hold a summit. Norway did not agree with every position taken by the US Administration but did endorse their general strategic approach in East/West relations. In her own view it was inconceivable that President Reagan would allow eight years of his leadership to end without any arms control agreement in place.

Europe

Mrs Brundtland spoke of the need to eliminate barriers to cooperation in Europe, not just in trade but also on problems such as terrorism. Mr. Frydenlund added that cooperation between the EC and EFTA had improved markedly in recent years. The Prime Minister said that the United Kingdom would do everything possible to promote cooperation and reduce barriers between the EC and EFTA. We hoped that the EC Foreign Affairs Council would shortly adopt a declaration on this. She was

not aware of any obstacles in the way of cooperation in dealing with terrorism: there ought not to be any.

Acid Rain

The Prime Minister gave an account of the decisions recently taken by HMG to reduce sulphur dioxide emissions from power stations, on the basis of new scientific evidence and about the harmful effect of such emissions on soil and freshwaters. These measures were of great significance. They were also very costly. They needed to be matched by improved soil management in countries affected by acid deposition, and also by pressure on East European countries to reduce their emissions. The Prime Minister also drew attention to the inconsistency of some of the environmental lobbies in wanting to put limits both on traditional and nuclear power stations.

Mrs Brundtland said that it was important to find ways to bring down the environmental impact of energy use. The cost of doing so should be incorporated in charges for energy use. More investment was needed in energy saving. She welcomed the recent decisions by HMG on power station emissions but was not quite clear how far they took the United Kingdom towards the target of the 30% Club. The Prime Minister said that we could not guarantee to meet that target, not least because it took no account of the very substantial reductions which we had achieved in sulphurous emissions in the period before 1980. We could not go beyond the recent decisions, though we hoped in the longer term to increase the share of nuclear power in meeting our overall energy needs. Mrs Brundtland said that it was a major step forward that the United Kingdom now accepted that environmental damage was caused by power station emissions. Norway was pleased with the decisions made but still hoped that the United Kingdom would subscribe to the 30% target.

South Africa

Mr. Frydenlund said that the Norwegian government saw no alternative but to increase pressure on the South African government to give black people their rights by imposing economic sanctions. They therefore intended to impose a general trade boycott. They realised that this would not have much political impact, but believed that blacks in South Africa needed evidence of support for their cause. He recognised that the United Kingdom had already adopted a number of measures and might add others. He also recognised that any attempt to impose mandatory economic sanctions through the United Nations would be vetoed. But how would the United Kingdom view a proposal for a Security Council resolution on voluntary sanctions?

The Prime Minister gave a vigorous account of HMG's views on South Africa on familiar lines. We were as much against apartheid as anyone. We wanted to see Mandela released and the ban on the ANC lifted. But sanctions had never in the past succeeded in changing a country's internal policies and would not improve matters in South Africa, indeed would

probably halt whatever progress there was towards ending apartheid. South Africa was well able to withstand and evade sanctions. Moreover there was nothing moral about depriving blacks of their jobs. South Africa would retaliate, most damagingly against the Front Line States, some of whom realised this and had voiced their opposition to sanctions. Mrs Brundtland concluded rather breathlessly that she recognised the strength and sincerity of the Prime Minister's views.

Oil

Mrs Brundtland referred briefly to the measures recently taken by the Norwegian government to reduce oil exports (but not production). Far from this being an attempt to exert pressure on the United Kingdom, as some newspapers had suggested, it should be seen as helpful to Britain which could be expected to benefit from any resulting move towards higher prices. The Prime Minister commented only that the United Kingdom would continue its present policies.

I am copying this letter to the Private Secretaries to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Secretaries of State for Environment, Energy, Defence, Trade and Industry and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

yours sincerely,
Charles Powell

C.D. POWELL

C.R. Budd, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CFPC



BRITISH EMBASSY

Thomas Heftyegate 8, 0264 Oslo 2 Norway
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16 September 1986

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C D Powell Esq
No 10 Downing Street

Dear Charles,

PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO NORWAY: OFFICIAL TALKS

1. As agreed, I enclose a draft record of the talks on 12 September.
2. We all enjoyed your visit to Norway and I hope that you found it agreeable and useful. We were very sorry to learn about the hoax bomb threat, but relieved that it was no more than that.

Yours ever

R G Short

PRIME MINISTER'S TALKS WITH MRS GRO HARLEM BRUNDTLAND,
PRIME MINISTER OF NORWAY: OSLO, 12 SEPTEMBER 1986

Prime Minister	Mrs Brundtland
Sir W Bentley, HM Ambassador	Mr Frydenlund, Foreign Minister
Mr Wicks, Principal Private Secretary	Mr Øien, Minister of Petroleum and Energy
Mr Powell, Private Secretary	Mr Hanisch, State Secretary
Mr Ingham, Press Secretary	Ms Nordbø, State Secretary
Mr Short, HM Embassy	Mr Busch, Ambassador
	Mr Kolby, Assistant Under Secretary, MFA
	Mr Wetland, Private Secretary

EAST/WEST RELATIONS

1. The Prime Minister noted that both the UK and Norway ^{supported} foresaw the possibility of a US/Soviet summit, structured on NATO's side ^{on} ~~by~~ the continuation of deterrence. ^{but} The ~~two countries differed on SDI.~~ ^{differed in their attitude to the strategic approach.} In the Prime Minister's view, it was necessary to consider the historical perspective. If Hitler had been ^{ahead} ~~the head~~ of the Allies in the development of the atom bomb, these discussions would not be taking place in Oslo today. Thanks to the outstanding courage of both British and Norwegian forces, the heavy water bombing raid had succeeded, and the Allies had acquired the atom bomb before the Nazis. Had they not ^{History unfolded the lesson that free societies needed} done so, the world would have been a vastly different place. One of the duties of a free society was to try to keep ahead technically of any potential aggressors. ^{It should be easier for them because they lived by} This was facilitated in a free society by the free exchange of ideas,

which normally stimulated technological progress. This was what was happening in the United States, and the Prime Minister supported it. She wished Britain to take part in SDI, both on principle and because of the technological spin-off.

2. At the same time, it was important to maintain the Anti Ballistic Missile Treaty in force. There was no system of international law which was as effective as domestic law. The United Nations was not the appropriate forum for such agreements, so that states must have ^{she} Treaties. The Prime Minister had expressed this view to President Reagan, and also stressed to him how important it was to understand the psychology of the Soviet Union. The Russians were not equal to the West in technology, and if they became upset because they were behind the West on SDI, it was important to re-affirm ^{suggesting that it might be possible} the ABM Treaty and, if possible, to extend the period of notice of termination beyond the present six months. This would help to keep the balance between the two super powers.

^{continued that so}
3. The Prime Minister believed that the Soviet Union wanted a summit. She was, however somewhat appalled at the Danilov affair. There was a danger that the Russians had misunderstood American psychology, and she hoped that they would show restraint. The UK had been working very hard to improve relations between the Soviet Union and the West, for example ^{she} during the visit of Scheverdnaze to London earlier this year, and Lord Whitelaw's visit to Moscow. ^{the UK could make a particular contribution} One point, at which the UK had leverage was

appeared to

^{on} that they were chairman of the Chemical Warfare Commission; ^{reflections} they were able to point out that the UK had destroyed its chemical weapons in 1959, and the US was not developing new CW technology; but this did not apply to the Soviet Union. We could say to the Russians that one agreement which they could negotiate with the West would be the destruction of chemical weapons: otherwise, the only response to new chemical weapons would be nuclear.

4. The Prime Minister believed that President Reagan and Chancellor Kohl shared views very similar to these. ^{to have general approach to the Soviet Union. Allied} ~~Allied~~ consultation was very active, and President Reagan had ^{good} ~~been~~ good in this regard on both ABM and CW. ^{to US record in helping the Alliance defend on arms control negotiations was exemplary. To view} The West should not give the Russians any single point without getting something in return. ^{we should also} The Soviet Union operated a very effective system of subversion, ^{NPS.} ~~was~~ their nature. The West must use the Helsinki accord to encourage freedom of movement. ^{strongly} Mrs Brundtland said that ~~as regards SDI, Norway was very much in agreement~~ that the ABM Treaty must be maintained, It was essential that the UK should continue to hold this view, especially while discussion continued in the United States as to whether the Treaty should be abolished. She agreed that it was necessary for the West to keep ahead ^{and that} ~~on~~ ^{should} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~on~~ ⁱⁿ technology. But Norway was concerned about ~~the~~ heavy ^{of resources in a field} concentration ~~on an area~~ where she did not feel confident that the concept would work. Would SDI in fact ^{add to} ~~be~~ the means of defending the West? Or would it create an increased impetus for ^{new offensive} ~~strategic~~ weapons?

6. ^{Soviet} Mrs Brundtland agreed that ~~the Russians~~ behaviour

over Danilov had been strange. This was an unwise move in the lead-up to a summit. It was important that a summit should take place. She had told the Soviet Ambassador in Oslo that the Russians should not ~~believe~~^{think} that, if a summit did not take place, the blame would fall on the West and the United States in particular. This ~~is~~^{was} what the Russians apparently did believe. The more open policies in Moscow in the last two years made it possible to believe that there would be a summit, ~~but~~ it was important that it should produce results, ~~halfway through President Reagan's second term.~~ *She did not see that* ~~term.~~ *would allow his eight years as President to conclude without a major step forward on European relations & arms control.*

7. Mrs Brundtland agreed that, although the UK and Norway *she was hesitant to see* did not see eye to eye on all details, they took the same *overall* view on the West's strategy towards the Soviet Union. ~~She hoped that it would succeed: it was important to achieve some form of arms negotiation agreement.~~

8. ~~The Prime Minister~~ referred to the extent to which the Russians themselves were researching on SDI. This was considerable: they had been working on laser systems longer than the Americans and there ~~was evidence that they were developing an ABM system outside Moscow, as well as undertaking research into new methods of countering missiles.~~ *modernising their round defensive systems*

9. ~~Even though it might not be possible to conclude a fundamental agreement with the Russians on arms control, it was necessary to seek a way ahead, and to keep up the pressure. In particular, the Russians should be encouraged to emulate the West in allowing their citizens to leave the~~

country freely.

Propose an arms control, there would be great difficulties in the future

10. Mr Frydenlund said that the Norwegians doubted whether the Russians would be willing to use the SDI programme as a factor in the negotiations. This might lead to difficulties. The Prime Minister said that she would not ~~dream~~ ^{contemplate} of using research into SDI as a negotiating card.

Mr Frydenlund distinguished between research and deployment.

The Prime Minister said that it was not clear whether the ABM Treaty prevented testing, although it certainly prevented deployment. Mrs Brundtland said that the NATO

Allies must try to find common ground in interpreting the Treaty.

the scope for testing under the ABM Treaty was not entirely clear

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NORWAY/EC

NORWAY/EC

11. Mrs Brundtland said that Norway wished to have the closest possible relationship with the EC, without becoming a member. For example, on counter-terrorism, there should be no barrier between the EC and EFTA. The Prime Minister queried whether there was, in fact, a barrier: if there was, it must come down. The EC was not meant to be restrictive in that sense at all. Rather, it was an example of what could be done to promote free trade. ^{exchange} Mr Frydenlund agreed that in the last two years the EC had opened up its relations with Norway. Once a year, there was a meeting with the Commission, and the Norwegian Foreign Minister ^{met} ~~lead~~ the Presidency ^{foreign Minister to discuss} ~~on~~ EPC twice a year. The Prime Minister said that the UK, as Presidency, would do all it could to promote wider agreement between the EC and EFTA. In GATT, the two organisations should work together against non-tariff barriers. In this regard, it was particularly important to counter Japanese practices. Recent examples were Japanese non-tariff barriers against the import of skis and car safety belts. It was also time to revise the position of NICs, who now received too much preference. World ⁸² agriculture was a ^{major world} problem: there were large surpluses in the United States, Europe and India. ^{against EC agriculture} The Prime Minister was opposed to the sale of surplus produce at bargain prices to the Soviet Union.

12. Mrs Brundtland said that she took a special interest in this problem, as leader of the World Commission on Environment and Development. The Commission had been

pleased with the declaration of the ^{Tokyo} Economic Summit
on this problem.

ACID RAIN

13. The Prime Minister said that the measures announced by the ^{UK} ~~British Government~~ the previous day were a substantial step forward, and work on each of the three power stations affected would cost £200 million. The Prime Minister thought it was wrong that people should complain about the effects of burning fossil fuel, and in the same breath about the dangers of nuclear energy. Governments ^{had} ~~have~~ a responsibility to provide energy for their peoples. The Third World in particular, would need nuclear energy for its development. The ~~British~~ ^{UK} ~~Government~~ hoped that, following the announcement of their measures, others who were responsible for sulphur emissions would follow suit. This applied especially to Eastern European countries. Mrs Brundtland said that the British announcement was welcomed. More research was necessary in ^{energy saving.} to the reduction of expenditure on energy, and ~~of~~ its environmental damage. The cost of taking ^{environmental} ~~care~~ ^{of} the environment had to be included in the cost of energy. Mrs ^{Slø} ~~Brundtland~~ wondered how far the British measures would take the UK towards a ^{achieving the targets set by} reduction of 30%; and why it was not now possible for the UK to join the 30% Club.

14. The Prime Minister explained that this was because the UK could not accept the arbitrary selection of 1978 as the base year. The UK had in fact already reduced its sulphur emissions by 40%. ^(since 1970, but the base year selected by the community was less favourable to us.) Following this reduction

~~Recently~~ ^{to actually} ~~it~~ ^{in emissions} there had been some increase, because more electricity was being produced, ^{earned} and so the Government had taken extra action to reduce the level once more. The three power stations chosen ^{for retro-fitting} used the most sulphurous coal and oil. The cost would be added to the cost of electricity.

^{continued talk to UK ward}
 13. The Prime Minister referred to the Sizewell enquiry: this had taken ^{three} ~~2~~ years, and the subsequent report ~~another 2~~ ^{three}. The UK was now about to buy nuclear power from France, although the UK had led the way on nuclear power. ^{as the result of the Sizewell enquiry,} If the Sizewell enquiry allowed it, the Government would seek to build more nuclear power stations. Apart from hydro-electricity there were problems with other forms of energy: ^{these measures would help reduce emissions from the UK.} for example, both windmills and the ^{of energy had some disadvantages} seven bore gave rise to environmental difficulties.

Nevertheless, the overriding responsibility of Government was to provide enough energy to meet demand. At the same time, conservation measures could help, and also lower the price of oil.

14. Mrs Brundtland said that all European countries had reduced their output of sulphur in the 1970s, and subsequently many countries had intensified measures to reduce emission. Although the latest British announcement was welcome, Norway hoped that the UK would take part in further European measures to meet reduced emission targets. The Prime Minister pointed out that many countries other than the UK were responsible for sulphur emission; for example, Norway itself, and the GDR, were each responsible for more pollution in Norway.

^{overall}
In sum, the FRG produced the most. Mrs Brundtland said that it was important that the UK had accepted the fact that ~~they~~ ^{Lib over power stations} were causing damage to the environment. The Prime Minister made it clear that this applied only to lakes and fresh water: in forests, other factors were at work.

SOUTH AFRICA

17. Mr Frydenlund said that the Nordic countries had for some time ~~had in place~~ ^{operated} a number of sanctions against South Africa. Since progress there had not been satisfactory, and black opposition to the regime had become more open, the Norwegians foresaw a bloodbath which the West had a responsibility to try to avert. They therefore thought that pressure on the South African Government should be increased. The Norwegian Parliament would vote for comprehensive sanctions when it reopened. The Government knew that this would not have much practical effect, but thought it would have an important psychological effect on the blacks. There was also a political necessity in the Western world to increase pressure on South Africa. Norway assumed that any resolution in the UN Security Council calling for mandatory sanctions would be vetoed. How would the UK react to a resolution recommending ^{voluntary} sanctions?

18. The Prime Minister made it clear that Britain was as much opposed to apartheid as any nation. She explained Britain's opposition to comprehensive mandatory sanctions. In sum, she considered that there was no evidence whatever that sanctions would bring apartheid to an end: rather the reverse, as the Rhodesian experience showed. It would be impossible to make sanctions effective; sanctions in the field of military equipment,

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which were fully supported by Britain, had been in place for many years and had not worked. ~~but had been evasion of them was widespread~~ Insofar as sanctions against South Africa would work, they would cause mass starvation and unemployment. This was why a number of black leaders in South Africa, ^{irish} and now ^{also of the} some Front Line States, did not support sanctions. They were ^{they were} not only morally utterly repugnant, but unacceptable on ^{other} ~~practical~~ grounds: for example, the only two significant sources of platinum in the world were South Africa and the Soviet Union, and it was unacceptable to give the Soviet Union a monopoly in ~~this~~ strategic minerals. Sanctions would lead to the loss of 120,000 jobs in the UK, and ~~if British investment was withdrawn the white South Africans would be able to buy factories at bargain prices.~~ ^{she} The Prime Minister was passionate about ending apartheid, ~~as she was about ending some military regimes in Africa.~~ But undermining the South African economy would not end apartheid. Rather, the West should continue with gestures of disapproval and increase pressure on President Botha, who was a stubborn and difficult man and who presided over a split Cabinet. Although the Prime Minister approved neither of Winnie Mandela nor of certain members of the African National Congress (ANC) who ~~had advocated more necklace murders,~~ ¹² the West should ^{also} seek the release of Nelson Mandela, ~~He was an old man and his release was a pre-requisite of bringing the ANC into negotiations, which was necessary even though they did not represent all black South Africans.~~

19. Mr Frydenlund asked how such a policy would work if the South African Government maintained that the end of apartheid amounted to suicide for them. The Prime Minister reiterated that sanctions would not end apartheid.

They would do to black population morally

The strength of

Mrs Brundtland said that she understood that the Prime Minister was ~~convinced~~ ^{convinced or} of this. She asked about the likely UK attitude to a ~~recommendatory~~ ^{on whether or not} resolution in the Security Council. The Prime Minister said that the UK would negotiate on the ~~terms~~ ^{terms} of a resolution, in concert with her EC partners, when the time came. She ~~pointed out that~~ ^{many} countries advocating sanctions would either not suffer ^{or would} or would actually stand to gain from them.

NORTH SEA OIL

20. Mrs Brundtland said that it was not true, as claimed in "The Guardian", that the Norwegians had chosen the week of the Prime Minister's visit in which to announce their decision to reduce exports in order to "slap the UK in the face". The decision had been timed to precede the Minister of Petroleum and Energy's meeting with Mr Peter Walker this week. ^{and should actually} The Prime Minister said that this subject could be discussed in a friendly manner between two close allies. Mrs Brundtland said that the Norwegians would bear the cost of their decision, and the UK would take the benefit. The Prime Minister recognised that the positions of the two countries were quite different: total Norwegian production was bound to increase, whereas UK production had levelled off and would go down. She ~~assured Mrs Brundtland that the UK would not create difficulties about the Norwegian decision.~~

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UK's policies would continue unchanged.

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