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18

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US GENEVA NEGOTIATORS BRIEFING OF THE NAC : 17 SEPTEMBER

SUMMARY

1. AMBASSADORS KAMPELMAN, GLITMAN AND LEHMAN REVIEW MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON EXPERTS' TALKS AND US APPROACH TO ROUND VI. LITTLE NEW ON SPACE AND DEFENCE; GLITMAN REPEATS GROUND COVERED IN YESTERDAY'S SCC; LEHMAN OUTLINES NEW US START PROPOSALS TO BE TABLED IN GENEVA TOMORROW. EMPHASIS IN DISCUSSION ON SRINF. KAMPELMAN CAUTIONS AGAINST TALKING OF A BREAKTHROUGH BUT JUDGES ROUND VI TO BE A CLEAR TEST OF REAL SOVIET INTENTION.

DETAIL

2. KAMPELMAN OUTLINED THE EVENTS LEADING UP TO THE EXPERTS' TALKS IN MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON DURING AUGUST AND SEPTEMBER. THE SEPTEMBER SESSION IN PARTICULAR HAD BEEN SERIOUS AND SUBSTANTIVE. HE THEN INVITED HIS COLLEAGUES TO DESCRIBE DEVELOPMENTS IN THEIR RESPECTIVE AREAS.

3. GLITMAN SET OUT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE INF FIELD AS DESCRIBED TO THE SCC ON 16 SEPTEMBER. AS AN INTERIM STEP BOTH SIDES COULD AGREE TO AN EQUAL INF WARHEAD LEVEL ABOVE ZERO IN EUROPE AND TO EQUAL GLOBAL LIMITS. THE SOVIET SIDE HAD SPECIFIED THE FIGURE OF 100 WARHEADS FOR EUROPE, BUT HAD REFUSED TO REVEAL THE FIGURE AT WHICH THEY WOULD FREEZE ASIAN SS20S. THE US HAD SUGGESTED THAT A GLOBAL LIMIT OF 200, WITH 100 IN EUROPE MIGHT BE ACCEPTABLE. DISAGREEMENT REMAINED ON THE TREATMENT OF ASIAN SYSTEMS (INCLUDING THE US RIGHT TO DEPLOY IN ALASKA), DURATION OF AN AGREEMENT, SHORT RANGE INF, AND THE US RIGHT TO DEPLOY PERSHING TWO AS WELL AS GLCM.

4. THIRD COUNTRY FORCES HAD BEEN MENTIONED IN MOSCOW IN THE CONTEXT OF THE DURATION OF AN AGREEMENT BUT NOT IN WASHINGTON. THE US

RIGHT TO DEPLOY PERSHING TWO AS WELL AS GLCM.

4. THIRD COUNTRY FORCES HAD BEEN MENTIONED IN MOSCOW IN THE CONTEXT OF THE DURATION OF AN AGREEMENT, BUT NOT IN WASHINGTON. THE US WOULD NOT SEEK TO RAISE THE QUESTION IN GENEVA, BUT GLITMAN MADE CLEAR THAT THE US SIDE WOULD CONTINUE TO REBUT FIRMLY ANY SOVIET ATTEMPT TO RE-INTRODUCE THE QUESTION.

5. INTRODUCING THE NEW US START PROPOSALS TO BE TABLED IN GENEVA ON 18 SEPTEMBER LEHMAN RECALLED THAT THE SOVIET 11 JUNE PROPOSALS RETAINED LINKAGE TO SPACE AND DEFENCE, AND CONSTRAINTS ON NON-STRATEGIC SYSTEMS, WHICH THE US WOULD CONTINUE FIRMLY TO REJECT. DURING THE EXPERT TALKS THE SOVIET SIDE HAD INDICATED WILLINGNESS TO SEEK A SEPARATE AGREEMENT ON SLCMS AND SUB LIMITS ON BALLISTIC MISSILE WARHEADS. THE US HAD RESPONDED THAT THEY WOULD CONSIDER SOME AGGREGATION OF SNDVS IN CONJUNCTION WITH SUCH LIMITS, ALTHOUGH THE LEVELS SUGGESTED BY THE SOVIET SIDE REMAIN TOO HIGH.

6. THE US WOULD PUT FORWARD TWO SETS OF PROPOSALS AS FOLLOWS:

(A) 1,600 ICBMS, SLBMS AND HEAVY BOMBERS WITH A SUB-CEILING OF 6,000 BALLISTIC MISSILE RE-ENTRY VEHICLES AND LONG RANGE ALCMS; FURTHER SUB-LIMITS OF 4,500 BALLISTIC MISSILE RE-ENTRY VEHICLES WITH 3,000 ON ICBMS, WITH ONLY 1,500 OF THESE ON MISSILES OTHER THAN SILO-BASED LIGHT AND MEDIUM ICBMS. ALL OTHER ELEMENTS OF THE PREVIOUS US 50 PERCENT PROPOSAL TO REMAIN INTACT.

(B) AS AN INTERIM STEP TOWARDS 50 PERCENT REDUCTIONS A LIMIT OF 1,600 SNDVS AS DEFINED ABOVE, 7,500 BALLISTIC MISSILE RE-ENTRY VEHICLES AND ALCMS; A SUB-LIMIT OF 5,500 BALLISTIC MISSILE RE-ENTRY VEHICLES OF WHICH NO MORE THAN 3,300 ON ICBMS AND NO MORE THAN 1,650 ON OTHER THAN SILO-BASED LIGHT OR MEDIUM ICBMS.

7. THE US WOULD CONTINUE TO SEEK A 50 PERCENT REDUCTION IN OVERALL SOVIET THROW-WEIGHT DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY AND TO REJECT ANY DIRECT LINKAGE WITH SPACE AND DEFENCE.

8. KAMPELMAN RECALLED THE MAIN FEATURES OF THE PRESIDENT'S JULY LETTER TO GORBACHEV STRESSING THAT THIS WAS NOT A COMMITMENT TO REFRAIN FROM EXERCISING THE RIGHT OF WITHDRAWAL UNDER THE ABM TREATY, BUT INTENDED TO ENSURE THAT THE STRATEGIC DEFENCE PROGRAMME OF BOTH SIDES REMAINED IN COMPLIANCE WITH THE ABM TREATY AT LEAST UNTIL 1991. IT WAS A NATURAL EVOLUTION OF THE US NEGOTIATING POSITION (INCLUDING CAMP DAVID FOUR POINTS) IN RESPONSE TO SOVIET CONCERN. DEFENCE AND SPACE SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO DOMINATE THE TALKS AT THE EXPENSE OF INF AND START.

9. IN CONCLUSION, ALTHOUGH THERE WAS NOT YET A BREAKTHROUGH, ROUND VI WOULD BE IMPORTANT AND ACTIVE. THE SOVIET SIDE WERE NOW GRAPPLING WITH THE KEY ISSUES AND THE FORTHCOMING ROUND WOULD TEST THEIR REAL INTENTIONS.

10. THE MAIN POINTS WHICH AROSE DURING SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSION CONCERNED THE APPARENTLY NEGATIVE SOVIET RESPONSE TO NITZE'S SUMMING UP AFTER HIS MEETING WITH KARPOV (WHICH THE AMERICANS INTERPRETED AS A STANDARD SOVIET NEGOTIATING TACTIC); THE SOVIET FAILURE TO RESPOND TO THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER (KAMPELMAN CONSIDERED IT TOO EARLY TO JUDGE WHETHER OR NOT THIS WAS OF ANY SIGNIFICANCE); THE STATUS OF THE TESTING AND DEVELOPMENT OF STRATEGIC DEFENCES REFERRED TO IN THAT LETTER IN RELATION TO THE ABM TREATY; AND SRINF (THE LATTER EMPHASISED IN PARTICULAR BY ITALY AND BELGIUM).

11. I ASKED IN PARTICULAR WHETHER THE NEGOTIATORS BELIEVED THAT THE RUSSIANS INTENDED TO PLACE INF AT THE TOP OF THEIR LIST (THE AMERICANS SAID THERE WAS NO WAY OF PREDICTING HOW THE NEGOTIATIONS WOULD EVOLVE), AND WHAT THE RISKS WERE OF THE THIRD COUNTRY FORCE ISSUE BEING RESURRECTED (GLITMAN SAID THE RISK WAS THERE BUT THAT IF THE SUBJECT WAS RAISED THE AMERICAN SIDE WOULD RESPOND AS FIRMLY AS BEFORE). ON SRINF I STRESSED THAT ADEQUATE TREATMENT WAS ESSENTIAL BUT THAT I DID NOT BELIEVE THAT THE ALLIANCE'S LONG STANDING NEGOTIATING POSITION SHOULD BE ADJUSTED TO AN EXTENT WHICH MIGHT PUT THE NEGOTIATIONS AT RISK. I WAS SURE THAT OUR AUTHORITIES WOULD WISH, AFTER STUDY, TO WELCOME AND SUPPORT THE NEW US START PROPOSALS; LEHMAN CONFIRMED THAT MOST OF THE FIGURE WORK HAD BEEN REVEALED TO THE RUSSIANS DURING THE EXPERTS' TALKS (AND BY THE NEW

PROPOSALS; LEHMAN CONFIRMED THAT MOST OF THE FIGURE WORK HAD BEEN REVEALED TO THE RUSSIANS DURING THE EXPERTS' TALKS (AND BY THE NEW YORK TIMES).

12. ON SRINF GLITMAN SAID THAT HE HAD TOLD THE RUSSIANS BLUNTLY THAT AN INF AGREEMENT WITHOUT APPROPRIATE SRINF CONSTRAINTS WOULD NOT BE ACCEPTABLE. HE HAD ALSO TOLD THEM HE WAS PREPARED TO CONSIDER FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS GOING BEYOND THE PROPOSAL FOR A FREEZE. THE RUSSIANS HAD NOT RESPONDED. HOWEVER HE CAUTIONED THAT THE ALLIANCE LACK OF PRACTICAL LEVERAGE LIMITED THE DEMANDS WHICH COULD BE MADE OF THE SOVIET SIDE IN THIS AREA. HE DID NOT BELIEVE THAT THE ALLIANCE WOULD WISH TO GO THROUGH ANOTHER DUAL TRACK DECISION NOR THAT MUCH COULD BE OBTAINED BEYOND WHAT WAS ALREADY BEING ASKED FOR.

13. KAMPELMAN CONFIRMED THAT NOTHING IN THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER CHANGED THE CURRENT POSITION REGARDING SDI DEVELOPMENT AND TESTING; THIS WOULD BE CARRIED OUT ON A MORE RESTRICTIVE BASIS THAN THE LEGAL POSITION REQUIRED. KAMPELMAN DID NOT BELIEVE THAT THE FAILURE TO RESPOND TO THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER WAS SIGNIFICANT. THE TIME SINCE THE LETTER WAS SENT WAS FAIRLY SHORT IN TERMS OF THE OVERALL PACE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. SOMETHING MIGHT BE SAID DURING SHEVARDNADZE'S VISIT IN THE US. THE US HAD NO FIRM VIEW ON THE AREA IN WHICH AGREEMENT WAS MOST LIKELY, IT WAS PREPARED FOR AGREEMENT IN ALL THREE. THEIR ONLY CONCERN WAS THAT SPACE AND DEFENCE SHOULD NOT DOMINATE THE OTHERS. FINALLY HE CAUTIONED THAT THE EFFECT ON US SOVIET RELATIONS OF THE DANILOFF CASE SHOULD NOT BE MINIMISED. THIS WOULD BE THE FIRST ITEM ON THE AGENDA WHEN SHULTZ MET SHEVARDNADZE.

ALEXANDER

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FCO PASS SAVING ANKARA, ATHENS, COPENHAGEN, LISBON, LUXEMBOURG
MADRID, OSLO, OTTAWA, REYKJAVIK, UKDEL STOCKHOLM, THE HAGUE
UKDEL VIENNA
UKDEL NATO PASSED SAVING TO BRUSSELS

UBLNAN 0941

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