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SIC MODUK 4A3A
MIPT: REYKJAVIK SUMMIT: ARMS CONTROL
SUMMARY

1. POINDEXTER BRIEFING ON AREAS OF TENTATIVE AGREEMENT IN ARMS CONTROL AT REYKJAVIK.

DETAIL

2. POINDEXTER GAVE AN ON-THE-RECORD BRIEFING ON 13 OCTOBER TO DESCRIBE PROGRESS IN DISCUSSION OF ARMS CONTROL ISSUES AT THE REYKJAVIK SUMMIT.

SDI/ABM TREATY

3. POINDEXTER SAID THAT GORBACHEV HAD PROPOSED A TEN YEAR COMMITMENT TO THE ABM TREATY. THIS WAS DOWN FROM THE 15-20 YEARS OF THE SOVIET JUNE PROPOSAL IN GENEVA AND THE QUOTE UP TO 15 YEARS UNQUOTE PROPOSED IN GORBACHEV'S LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT DELIVERED BY SHEVARDNADZE IN SEPTEMBER. THE PRESIDENT HAD ACCEPTED THIS ON THE UNDERSTANDING THAT 50 PER CENT CUTS IN STRATEGIC NUCLEAR SYSTEMS WOULD BE ACHIEVED IN THE FIRST FIVE YEARS AND ALL REMAINING BALLISTIC MISSILES WOULD BE ELIMINATED IN THE SECOND FIVE YEARS. THE SIDES WOULD BE PERMITTED TO CONTINUE SDI RESEARCH DEVELOPMENT AND TESTING, AS ALLOWED BY THE ABM TREATY, DURING THIS PERIOD AND WOULD BE FREE TO DEPLOY STRATEGIC DEFENSIVE SYSTEMS AT THE END OF THE TEN YEAR PERIOD IF THEY WISHED AND UNLESS BOTH SIDES AGREED OTHERWISE. GORBACHEV HAD, HOWEVER, INSISTED ON A HIGHLY RESTRICTIVE INTERPRETATION OF THE ABM TREATY THROUGHOUT THE TEN-YEAR PERIOD AND HAD, AT A LATE STAGE, DEFINED THIS AS MEANING THAT ALL RESEARCH DEVELOPMENT AND TESTING OF SPACE BASED STRATEGIC DEFENSE SYSTEMS WOULD BE BANNED EXCEPT ACTIVITIES THAT COULD BE CARRIED OUT IN THE LABORATORY. POINDEXTER STRESSED THAT GORBACHEV WAS NOT TALKING ABOUT THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE QUOTE RESTRICTIVE UNQUOTE AND THE QUOTE BROAD UNQUOTE INTERPRETATION OF THE ABM TREATY BUT ABOUT MODIFYING THE TREATY TO MAKE IT MORE RESTRICTIVE THAN THE QUOTE RESTRICTIVE UNQUOTE INTERPRETATION. THIS HAD BEEN UNACCEPTABLE TO THE PRESIDENT.

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4. AGREEMENT HAD BEEN REACHED (POINDEXTER DID NOT MAKE CLEAR WHETHER THIS WAS IN THE WORKING GROUP OR BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND GORBACHEV) ON A CEILING OF 1600 SNDVS AND 6,000 NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON EACH SIDE. AGREEMENT (UNSPECIFIED) HAD BEEN REACHED ON COUNTING RULES (ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS HAVE TOLD US THAT ICBMS, SLBMS AND BOMBERS WOULD BE INCLUDED IN THE SNDV TOTAL AND RVS, ALCMS AND BOMBER WEAPONS IN THE WEAPONS TOTAL ALTHOUGH BOMBS AND SRAMS WOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED EQUIVALENT TO RVS OR ALCMS). THERE HAD BEEN A DISCUSSION OF SUB-LIMITS UNDER THE WEAPONS TOTAL. NOTHING HAD, HOWEVER, BEEN AGREED THIS ALTHOUGH THE RUSSIANS HAD SAID THAT THEY WERE PREPARED TO MAKE QUOTE SIGNIFICANT CUTS UNQUOTE IN THEIR HEAVY ICBMS.

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5. THE SOVIET OPENING POSITION HAD BEEN FOR ZERO/ZERO INF ON BOTH SIDES IN EUROPE AND A FREEZE ON SOVIET SYSTEMS IN ASIA AND A MATCHING US RIGHT TO DEPLOY AN EQUAL NUMBER OF SYSTEMS IN THE US. THE PRESIDENT HAD REJECTED THIS AND GORBACHEV HAD SUBSEQUENTLY AGREED TO EQUAL GLOBAL LIMITS OF 100 WARHEADS ON EACH SIDE WITH THE SOVIET ENTITLEMENT TO BE DEPLOYED IN ASIA AND THE US ENTITLEMENT TO BE DEPLOYED IN THE US (ADMINISTRATION CONTACTS HAVE CONFIRMED THAT THIS INCLUDES ALASKA). THE RUSSIANS (BUT NOT APPARENTLY, GORBACHEV HIMSELF) HAD ALSO AGREED TO FREEZE THEIR SRINF AND TO INITIATE NEGOTIATIONS ON THESE SYSTEMS FOLLOWING SIGNATURE OF THE LRINF AGREEMENT. THE RUSSIANS HAD DECLINED TO DISCUSS VERIFICATION IN DETAIL BUT HAD INDICATED THAT, IN PRINCIPLE, THEY COULD ACCEPT THE THREE MAJOR POINTS TO WHICH THE US ATTACHED IMPORTANCE, IE EXCHANGE OF DATA BEFORE AND AFTER REDUCTIONS; ON-SITE INSPECTION OF THE DESTRUCTION OF SYSTEMS; AND EFFECTIVE MONITORING ARRANGEMENTS AFTER DESTRUCTION, INCLUDING ON-SITE INSPECTION.

NUCLEAR TESTING

6. THE RUSSIANS HAD AGREED THAT NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD BEGIN ON IMPROVED VERIFICATION PROVISIONS FOR THE TWO UNRATIFIED TREATIES AND THAT, WHEN THESE PROVISIONS HAD BEEN AGREED, NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BEGIN ON FURTHER LIMITATIONS ON NUCLEAR TESTING WITH A CTB AS THE ULTIMATE GOAL. HOWEVER, THERE HAD BEEN DISAGREEMENT ON HOW THESE NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD BE CHARACTERISED THE RUSSIANS HAD WANTED TO DESCRIBE THEM AS NEGOTIATIONS FOR A COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN AND THE US SIDE HAD WANTED TO DESCRIBE THEM AS NEGOTIATIONS ON FURTHER LIMITATIONS ON NUCLEAR TESTING.
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7. POINDEXTER SAID THAT INTERIM RESTRAINT HAD NOT BEEN RAISED AT REYKJAVIK.

LINKAGE

8. POINDEXTER SAID THAT IT SEEMED FAIRLY CLEAR THAT GORBACHEV'S POSITION HAD BEEN THAT FINAL SOVIET AGREEMENT ON ALL OF THESE ISSUES, IE INCLUDING NUCLEAR TESTING, AS WELL AS INF, WAS BEING HELD HOSTAGE TO US AGREEMENT TO SOVIET PROPOSALS ON MODIFICATION/INTERPRETATION OF THE ABM TREATY.

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