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MR RENTON'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON; ARMS CONTROL; CALLS ON IKLE AND
RIDGWAY

SUMMARY

1. DISCUSSION OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL (IKLE'S VIEWS ON CSCE FORUM LESS NEGATIVE THAN MIGHT HAVE BEEN EXPECTED), PRESIDENT'S REYKJAVIK PROPOSAL FOR ELIMINATION OF BALLISTIC MISSILES, CW ARMS CONTROL (IKLE'S VIEW THAT VERIFICATION IMPOSSIBLE) AND NUCLEAR TESTING LIMITATIONS.

CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL

2. IKLE SAID IT WAS NOT CLEAR WHETHER THE ADMINISTRATION WOULD BE ABLE TO FIND COMMON GROUND WITH THE FRENCH. IT WAS NOT ACCEPTABLE THAT CONVENTIONAL ARMS REDUCTIONS IN EUROPE SHOULD BE CAUGHT UP IN THE CSCE PROCESS. THIS WOULD DROWN OUT THE HUMAN RIGHTS ASPECTS OF CSCE. SOME RELATIONSHIP WITH THE CSCE COULD PERHAPS BE ENVISAGED BUT IT WOULD HAVE TO BE A RELATIONSHIP THAT ENSURED FULL ALLIANCE COORDINATION OF WESTERN POSITIONS AND ENABLED THE NEGOTIATIONS TO TAKE PLACE ON A BLOC TO BLOC BASIS WITHOUT INTERFERENCE BY THE NNA. THE FRENCH ALWAYS WANTED THE BEST OF ALL WORLDS. MR RENTON NOTED THAT SHULTZ HAD MADE CLEAR IN THE NAC ON 13 OCTOBER THAT HE WOULD STRONGLY PREFER FRENCH INVOLVEMENT IN THE REDUCTIONS PROCESS BUT THAT THE ROLE OF THE NNA MUST BE SHARPLY CIRCUMSCRIBED. MR RENTON WONDERED WHETHER IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO DEVISE A FORCE REDUCTIONS NEGOTIATION MANDATED BY THE CSCE AND REPORTING BACK TO THE CSCE BUT CONDUCTED ON A BLOC TO BLOC BASIS WITH NO RIGHT OF VETO BY OTHER CSCE COUNTRIES. IT WAS IMPORTANT TO DEVISE SOME SUCH ARRANGEMENTS SINCE FRENCH PARTICIPATION IN THE PROCESS WOULD BE ESSENTIAL IF THE WIDER GEOGRAPHICAL AREA OF THE ATLANTIC TO THE URALS WAS TO BE TAKEN UP. IKLE THOUGHT THAT THESE IDEAS MIGHT BE WORTH EXAMINING.

3. RIDGWAY SAID THAT THE MOST URGENT TASK WAS TO AVOID A PUBLIC SPLIT WITHIN THE ALLIANCE ON THE FORUM QUESTION AT THE OPENING OF THE VIENNA CSCE REVIEW CONFERENCE. WE NEEDED TO EMPHASISE THE PRINCIPLES UNDERLYING OUR APPROACH TO CONVENTIONAL ARMS REDUCTIONS NEGOTIATIONS, ON WHICH THERE WAS AGREEMENT. SHULTZ HAD TWO DIFFICULTIES WITH THE IDEA THAT THE NEGOTIATION SHOULD TAKE PLACE WITHIN THE CSCE. THE FIRST WAS THE PROSPECT OF NNA MEDDLING AND THE SECOND WAS THAT CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL WOULD BECOME

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ENSNARED IN CONTENTIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES. IN ANSWER TO MR RENTON'S QUESTION, RIDGWAY SAID THAT SHE THOUGHT THE ADMINISTRATION MIGHT EVENTUALLY BE ABLE TO ACCEPT A BLOC TO BLOC NEGOTIATION CONDUCTED SEPARATELY FROM THE CSCE BUT MANDATED BY THE CSCE AND REPORTING TO IT. BUT SUCH A SOLUTION PRESENTLY LAY OUTSIDE THE POSITION DECIDED BY THE PRESIDENT. THERE WAS ALSO THE DIFFICULTY OF ACTUALLY DESIGNING SUCH A NEGOTIATION IN A WAY WHICH WOULD INSULATE IT EFFECTIVELY FROM THE NNA. A SPECIFIC AND DETAILED PROPOSAL FROM ONE OF THE ALLIES WOULD BE HELPFUL IN FOCUSING ATTENTION IN WASHINGTON ON A POSSIBLE SOLUTION ON THESE LINES. MR RENTON INDICATED THAT WE MIGHT WISH TO FOLLOW THIS UP.

REYKJAVIK PROPOSALS

4. MR RENTON NOTED TO IKLE THE SERIOUS IMPLICATIONS FOR FLEXIBLE RESPONSE AND FOR UK TRIDENT OF THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL AT REYKJAVIK TO ABOLISH ALL BALLISTIC MISSILES BY 1996. THESE NEEDED TO BE FULLY CONSIDERED AND THOUGHT THROUGH. IKLE NOTED THAT THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL WAS DIFFERENT FROM THE SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR THE ELIMINATION OF ALL STRATEGIC NUCLEAR SYSTEMS. THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL WAS REALISTIC AND VERIFIABLE. THE SOVIET PROPOSAL WAS NEITHER. IF BALLISTIC MISSILES WERE ELIMINATED, THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT WOULD AGAIN RESEMBLE THAT OF THE LATE 1950S EXCEPT THAT THERE WOULD NO LONGER BE A US ADVANTAGE. FLEXIBLE RESPONSE WOULD STILL BE AN APPROPRIATE STRATEGY: IT DID NOT DEPEND IN ANY WAY ON THE PRESENCE OF BALLISTIC MISSILES AS OPPOSED TO AIR-BREATHING NUCLEAR DELIVERY VEHICLES.

5. IKLE REMINDED MR RENTON THAT THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL HAD BEEN CONTAINED IN HIS LETTER OF 25 JULY TO GORBACHEV AND ALSO IN HIS UNGA SPEECH. MR RENTON SAID THAT AN IMPORTANT NEW ELEMENT HAD NEVERTHELESS EMERGED AT REYKJAVIK - A SPECIFIC TIMEFRAME OF 10 YEARS. THE IMPLICATIONS OF THIS NEEDED MUCH MORE THOUGHT. HMG MIGHT NOW FIND IT MUCH MORE DIFFICULT TO EXPLAIN THE CASE FOR UK TRIDENT. IKLE WONDERED WHETHER THIS WAS REALLY THE CASE. HE THOUGHT IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE TO ARGUE THAT THE INF NEGOTIATIONS SHOWED THAT NATO DEPLOYMENTS AND MODERNISATION PROGRAMMES WERE NECESSARY TO CREATE AN INCENTIVE FOR THE RUSSIANS TO ENGAGE IN SERIOUS ARMS CONTROL. IT WAS NECESSARY TO NEGOTIATE FROM A POSITION OF STRENGTH. MR RENTON DOUBTED WHETHER THIS LINE OF ARGUMENT WOULD CUT MUCH ICE IN THE UK. THE ISSUE COULD USEFULLY BE TAKEN UP AT THE NPG.

CW ARMS CONTROL

6. IKLE SAID THAT NO VERIFICATION REGIME COULD BE ENVISAGED THAT WOULD BE ADEQUATE TO VERIFY A BAN ON CW. THIS APPLIED AS MUCH TO US PROPOSALS (CD500) AS TO UK PROPOSALS (CD715). DISCUSSIONS IN THE CD COULD CONTINUE BUT WOULD IN DUE COURSE COME TO BE SEEN TO BE UNREALISTIC. A CW ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENT THAT WAS NOT PROPERLY VERIFIABLE WOULD BE VERY DAMAGING BECAUSE IT WOULD NOT CONSTRAIN THE SOVIET UNION AND WOULD FURTHER INHIBIT THE US ABILITY TO MODERNISE ITS CW CAPABILITY.

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7. MR RENTON DISPUTED THIS VIEW. STRINGENT VERIFICATION REGIMES COULD BE DEvised THAT WOULD ENSURE ADEQUATE CONFIDENCE IN COMPLIANCE WITH A CW BAN. HE EXPLAINED WHY THE UK PROPOSALS SET OUT IN CD715 PROVIDED PRECISELY SUCH A REGIME. WE RECOGNISED THAT THERE WERE SOME DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE UK AND US APPROACHES TO CHALLENGE INSPECTION. BUT WE HOPED THAT THE ADMINISTRATION WOULD BE PREPARED TO TAKE A CONSTRUCTIVE PART IN INTERSESSIONAL WORK IN GENEVA IN NOVEMBER. MR RENTON WONDERED WHETHER MINDS IN WASHINGTON WERE NOT TOO CLOSED ON THIS ISSUE THE ALTERNATIVE TO ACHIEVING A CW CONVENTION WAS TO ACCEPT CW PROLIFERATION. THIS WOULD BE VERY DAMAGING. THE NPT SHOWED THAT AN INTERNATIONAL TREATY REGIME PROVIDED STRONG INCENTIVES FOR NATIONS TO BECOME PARTIES.

NUCLEAR TESTING

8. MR RENTON STRESSED TO IKLE THE IMPORTANCE FOR US OF REMAINING VERY CLOSE TO THE ADMINISTRATION AS THEIR THINKING ON NUCLEAR TESTING ISSUES EVOLVED. A PARTICULAR PROBLEM WAS THAT PROPOSALS BY THE ADMINISTRATION FOR A STEP BY STEP PROGRAMME OF FURTHER LIMLTATIONS ON NUCLEAR TESTS TENDED TO IMPLY THAT THE ADMINISTRATION THOUGHT THAT THE VERIFICATION PROBLEMS, ON WHICH THE UK PUBLIC POSITION RELIED, COULD BE SOLVED. IF IT WAS POSSIBLE TO VERIFY THAT NO MORE TESTS WERE BEING CONDUCTED THAN PERMITTED UNDER A CERTAIN QUOTA, THEN IT WAS PRESUMABLY POSSIBLE TO VERIFY THAT NO TESTS WERE TAKING PLACE AT ALL. IKLE SAID THAT TH

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WAS A FAIR POINT. THE ADMINISTRATION'S IDEAS ON THE STEP BY STEP PROGRAMME HAD NOT YET BEEN FULLY WORKED UP. HIS OWN VIEW WAS THAT IT WAS ONLY POSSIBLE TO ENVISAGE QUOTAS ON TESTS ABOVE A CERTAIN YIELD THRESHOLD (EG 100 OR 150 KT). THESE LARGER TESTS COULD BE MONITORED. BUT HE DOUBTED WHETHER IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO LIMIT THE NUMBER OF TESTS BELOW THIS THRESHOLD, WHICH MIGHT NOT BE IDENTIFIABLE.

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