

I have had a go at it



is terrible.

Why does it
need to go so

10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister

urgently
and

These are the proposed
instructions to Washington.

The FCO have included
all your main points,

even though the presentation

is unbelievably prolix and
opaque. But Antony will

clarify them when he

speaks.

I have suggested
some changes, with which I
think the instructions could
issue.

But if you prefer, I could
try to edit them tomorrow (though
they are needed in Washington by
1 p.m. our time). CDP.

CCPC
33
①



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

22 October 1986

EDP
22/11

Dear Charles,

Arms Control: UK/US Exchanges

As requested in your letter of 16 October, I now enclose a draft telegram to HM Ambassador Washington along the lines you proposed. The telegram instructs Sir A Acland to take up with senior US officials a number of key points relevant to the current arms control scene; in this way to set the scene for the Prime Minister's visit to Washington next month; and to indicate to the senior levels of the Administration the range of considerations which the Prime Minister will wish to address when she sees the President. The telegram is consistent with the internal paper on arms control which you commissioned in your second letter of 16 October and which we hope to send you shortly. It does not however go into points of domestic political relevance, which the Prime Minister will no doubt wish to reserve for herself.

The telegram covers a lot of ground and the instructions have been cast in modular form, enabling them to concentrate on those areas to which the Prime Minister herself attaches greatest importance at this stage. For his part the Foreign Secretary believes that we should focus US attention primarily on our concerns about the near term elimination of all strategic ballistic missiles; the need to build on the less difficult elements of potential agreement reached at Reykjavik (INF, and nuclear testing); and the reiteration of our previous message about a US break-out from the SALT II limits.

I wonder if it is really worth preparing this.

/The

SECRET



The Embassy in Washington have warned us that Sir A Acland will need to receive his instructions in the course of tomorrow if he is to be able to secure access to the necessary interlocutors before 28 October.

I am sending copies of this letter to John Howe (MOD) and Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever,

Colin Budd

(C R Budd)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
No 10 Downing St

SECRET

SECRET

DEDIP

IMMEDIATE

ZCZC
SECRET
DEDIP
FM FCO
TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON
TELNO
OF
INFO PRIORITY MOSCOW, UKDEL NATO, MODUK

OVER TAKEN

MOSCOW, UKDEL NATO PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADORS
MODUK FOR PS/Sofs, DUS(P), ACDS(Pol/Nuc), DACU

UK/US EXCHANGES POST REYKJAVIK ON ARMS CONTROL

1. The coming weeks will be crucial in arms control. The Prime Minister will wish to use her visit next month to Washington to chart the course for Alliance strategy post-Reykjavik. ~~Prior to that, it seems likely that Shultz and Shevardnadze at their Vienna meeting will review the respective packages now on the table, and may take the process forward again.~~ The Prime Minister ^{is} ~~and I are~~ ^{is} ~~determined that~~ ^{is} the US Administration and the President ^{is} ~~should~~ be left in no doubt about our own views, our priorities, and in some cases our concerns. In order to set the scene for her visit, and following your useful (but in some respects disturbing) discussion with Shultz last week (your telno 2667), you should therefore arrange to speak as soon as possible to Shultz, Weinberger and Poindexter, drawing on the points below as soon as possible. (Mr Alexander should also make these points as appropriate during his own calls in Washington next week.) In

<<<<

addition, it would be helpful to have an early account of the current thinking of senior US military, and of key figures in Congress.

2. You will be aware from earlier papers ~~and as a result of Kerr's presence here last week,~~ of the background to our current views. You will also know that these have been reflected in recent exchanges at the highest level with the French and Germans. Evidently, account will need to be taken of Kohl's talks in Washington this week. In due course, the Prime Minister may wish to send a message to the President prior to her own visit. At this stage the main points we wish to get across to the Americans are as follows.

3. ~~The Prime Minister is looking forward keenly to her Washington visit next month.~~ This will offer a timely occasion to discuss with the President the full range of arms control issues. In the view of the Prime Minister, Reykjavik indeed amounted to a watershed in arms control. In every area it opened up new prospects for progress: over deep reductions in strategic forces, an interim INF agreement de-linked from SDI, the continuation of strategic defence in accordance with the ABM Treaty, progress towards cuts in conventional weapons and a ban on chemical weapons, and new moves in the area of nuclear testing. In all these areas we believe our own objectives are consistent with those of the US. We are keen to work with them, and in support of their efforts, to achieve our joint goals.

4. However, we have a number of points we wish to register pre-Shultz/Shevardnadze. These can be discussed further with the President next month and, we believe, can be accommodated within the present US positions. The new (underlined) proposal for the total elimination of all strategic ballistic missiles within the very limited timespan of ten years causes the Prime Minister considerable concern. The President's March 1983 speech

<<<<

acknowledged that the effort to eliminate all ballistic missiles via SDI would take quote years, probably decades unquote. It is unclear to us why and how the timescale has been so dramatically accelerated. But for the following reasons she believes that the merits of such a proposal are open to very considerable doubt.

3. It is her view and that of her colleagues that nuclear weapons cannot be treated in isolation, without taking account of the overall balance of forces between East and West. The total elimination of strategic ballistic missiles would gravely undermine NATO strategy, and would leave Europe exposed to the undoubtedly superior conventional forces of the Soviet Union. This conventional imbalance has been clearly demonstrated in a range of solid and authoritative US and Allied assessments over the years (cf. the Soviet Military Power documents published by the Pentagon). It cannot be brushed aside now as some Opposition parties in Europe are trying to do. Residual nuclear forces (aircraft, cruise missiles etc) would not, in our view, carry a credible guarantee of deterrence. The current confidence of Western Europe in its security would therefore be gravely threatened. Equally important, the Soviet Union might be tempted to exactly that sort of dangerous risk which the present strategy has successfully prevented for 40 years. Europe would not only be made safer for conventional war. The chances of such a war would have been increased. President Reagan was right therefore to entitle the MX missile the quote peace keeper unquote.] [The prospective total (underlined) elimination of missiles of this type will not help to keep that peace.

α. 6. Secondly, ^{also} We are deeply concerned about the political effect upon our own deterrent. Those in the UK who oppose Alliance strategy will argue that UK Trident is not worth pursuing any longer because it will be undeployable semi-colon and that the case for devoting the money saved to conventional forces is that much stronger with the new importance of a balance in that area.

<<<<

We have heard the view expressed privately by some in the US that we must adjust our approach to accommodate the prospect of all ballistic missiles being eliminated. We do not accept that must be the case. On the contrary, we have grave doubts about Gorbachev's sincerity in backing such an aim, given the importance which his own ballistic missile force represents to the Soviet Union, in both political and strategic terms. It is clear that the French (and Chinese?) have no intention of surrendering theirs. We believe it far more likely therefore that the proposed ten year period will not (not) see the disappearance of all strategic ballistic missiles.

5. 7. But we do fear the political effects in the West in the interim period so long as the debate continues on its new lines. The Soviet Union will use the current concerns within the Alliance to drive wedges between us, to undermine support in the UK for nuclear defence policies and the continued retention of US nuclear bases here, to exploit their own propaganda position, and in the process to do grave damage to the core of Western security.

6. 8. ^{Not over} Thirdly, the ten-year objective seems wholly dependent on achieving the results in the SDI programme which will strengthen its claim as a credible insurance policy. It is not clear to us that the ten-year goal will prove to be realistic in the light of the results over the next few years. But, so long as the US remains committed to the ten-year time-scale, grave damage could have been done to Western security in the meantime. Managing the period of continuing SDI research, until such time as decisions can be made one way or another, will be safer and easier if we do not burden ourselves with a dubiously precise target.

7. 9. We would now welcome guidance on how the US propose to proceed at Geneva. We see great advantage in focusing the talks over the next few months on those areas where potential agreement seems both feasible and desirable. In particular, this means the

<<<<

INF talks, where there must be continuing and united Alliance pressure on the Russians not to sustain their re-linkage with SDI. The outline agreement at Reykjavik on nuclear testing should also be exploited to the full. And we continue to see value in pushing the Russians towards a total ban on chemical weapons, and in clearing our minds on conventional arms control.

8. 10. The START area is full of promise, based on the tentative agreement at Reykjavik on 50 per cent cuts over five years. This prospect should continue to be pressed. ~~[And we have no problem with the objective of further reductions thereafter.] [As will be clear, however, we believe it essential that these reductions when attached to the target of zero should not (repeat not) be ascribed a definite timescale. We urge the US instead to return~~

[This seems a hostage to fortune]
 Trust that it will not be a failure

~~to the established Alliance doctrine: that the wholesale elimination of key nuclear weapons must be accompanied by the establishment of a balance in other areas of forces ie conventional weapons as well.~~ We understand that this key caveat was included (albeit unscripted) in Adelman's UN speech on 20 October (UKDis Geneva in New York telno 83). We very much hope that this is now a basic element in the Administration's position.

and by considerable progress in removing the sources of conflict between East & West

11. On SDI the President can still count upon the Prime Minister's firm support for the research programme, not least because of Soviet activities in this field. It would be clearly unacceptable for Soviet research to surge ahead while undue constraints were placed on US work. ~~[However, the Prime Minister attaches equal importance to the US research being conducted under the restrictive interpretation of the ABM Treaty.]~~

[It is quite clear that the US have gone beyond this.]

12. On the details of INF, the Prime Minister earlier this year expressed her anxiety that a zero outcome for Europe would have disadvantages for NATO's deterrence strategy. She recognises now, as she did in her message to the President before Reykjavik, that such an outcome must in the light of previous public

We see no prospect of removing a balance of conventional weapons with possible

SECRET

DEDIP

IMMEDIATE

<<<<

statements be accepted by us if the Russians themselves are ready to accept it. However, if the Russians were to insist on higher levels of forces in Asia for themselves, and this resulted in our maintaining some US LRINF deployments in Europe, then that in practice would be a more comfortable outcome for the Alliance. That will be even more the case as levels of strategic forces were reduced, with the prospect of further cuts in the future. We strongly support the US position that an INF agreement should at the outset be coupled with effective collateral constraints over SRINF systems between 1000 kilometres and the range of the SS23. These constraints must be based on the principle, hitherto accepted by the US Administration, that the Soviet level should be frozen and that the US should have either a right to match their levels or a right to deployment at the US 1982 level of 108 in this range bracket. We also need urgently to address the question of how to handle shorter-range systems.

13. Until now, consultation on arms control within the Alliance has been excellent. It would be a matter of great regret if this record were now to be spoilt as we reach the really important stages. (For defensive use) We cannot accept the allegation (eg by Nitze) that we have in any sense been consulted on the US proposal at Reykjavik to eliminate all strategic missiles within a decade. On the contrary, such a proposal is so far as we are aware wholly new.

12. 14. In these new circumstances the Prime Minister believes a substantive discussion within the Alliance is required. She will wish to discuss with the President how to respond to concerns already expressed by a number of NATO partners, and how best to thrash out within the Alliance, at the December Ministerial meeting and thereafter, the crucial issues which the Reykjavik outcome has raised.

15. US intentions for the strategic modernisation programme this autumn are also of concern in London. The Prime Minister has

[I would omit this para.]

SECRET

DEDIP

IMMEDIATE

<<<<

welcomed the President's policy of quote interim restraint unquote, despite her well-known reservations about his decision in May. She has noted, however, that at that time he undertook to take account of developments in the negotiations which could alter the situation. She believes, for the reasons stated earlier, that a US decision to transcend previous force ceilings, for whatever reason, would be a cause for very serious Alliance damage, most especially in the immediate aftermath of the Reykjavik meeting. The arguments she advanced earlier for not presenting Gorbachev with a propaganda gift have even more force now. And she believes that the progress that was made at Reykjavik justifies the sort of reconsideration indicated in the President's May statement. She therefore trusts that the US will not go beyond the current ceilings at least until after she has had a chance to discuss the matter again personally with the President.

HOWE

YYYY

MAIN

HD/ACDD

HD/DEFENCE DEPT

HD/SOVIET DEPT

HD/PLANNING STAFF

HD/NEWS DEPT

PRIVATE SECRETARY

PS/MR RENTON

PS/PUS

MR HOUSTON

ADDITIONAL

MR MALLABY, CABINET OFFICE

NNNN

