

ADVANCE COPIES

15

US/SOVIET ARMS CONTROL TALKS / EAST WEST US / SOVIET RELATIONS

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[HD/NAD SHOULD BE ADDED ON EAST WEST DIST.]

15.1.85

FM WASHINGTON

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 2710

OF 240200Z OCTOBER 86

INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK PRIORITY BONN, PARIS, UKDEL NATO, MOSCOW

IMMEDIATE

MODUK FOR DUS(P)DACU

GENEVA NST: DEVELOPMENTS SINCE REYKJAVIK

SUMMARY

1. NEW INSTRUCTIONS TO US GENEVA NEGOTIATORS ON INF AND ON START 50 PER CENT REDUCTIONS. INSTRUCTIONS ON ELIMINATION OF BALLISTIC MISSILES AND DEFENCE/SPACE DUE TO FOLLOW NEXT WEEK.

2. PRE-EMPTIVE UK ACTION HERE ENVISAGED, AND INSTRUCTIONS SOUGHT. DETAIL

3. NEW POST-REYKJAVIK INSTRUCTIONS HAVE NOW BEEN SENT TO THE US NEGOTIATORS IN GENEVA ON INF AND ON 50 PER CENT START REDUCTIONS. HOLDING INSTRUCTIONS HAVE BEEN SENT ON SPACE/DEFENCE, AND THE NEGOTIATORS HAVE BEEN TOLD TO EXPECT FULL INSTRUCTIONS ON THIS AREA, AND ALSO ON THE US PROPOSAL TO ELIMINATE OFFENSIVE BALLISTIC MISSILES, IN THE WEEK BEGINNING 27 OCTOBER.

4. IN BOTH START AND INF, THE NEGOTIATORS HAVE BEEN INSTRUCTED TO TABLE NEW US PROPOSALS CONTAINING (A) ELEMENTS WHICH THE ADMINISTRATION CONSIDER WERE AGREED AT REYKJAVIK AND (B) ELEMENTS WHICH WERE NOT DISCUSSED THERE OR DISCUSSED INCONCLUSIVELY. THIS HAS BEEN DONE IN THE START GROUP, WHERE US NEGOTIATORS PROPOSED ON 22 OCTOBER THE FOLLOWING POINTS, WHICH THE ADMINISTRATION NOW CONSIDER TO BE AGREED:

- (A) AN SHDV LIMIT OF 1600;
- (B) A WEAPONS LIMIT OF 6000;
- (C) COUNTING RULES FOR BOMBER WEAPONS AS AGREED AT REYKJAVIK (BAND'S TELELETTER OF 21 OCTOBER);
- (D) A COMMITMENT TO FIND A QUOTE MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION UNQUOTE TO THE PROBLEM OF NUCLEAR SLCMS (I.E. THE NITZE/AKHROMEYEV LANGUAGE AGREED AT REYKJAVIK).

THE US NEGOTIATORS ALSO MADE PROPOSALS FOR WEAPONS SUB-LIMITS, WHICH WERE NOT AGREED OR DISCUSSED IN REYKJAVIK. THESE ARE THAT, UNDER THE (OVER-RIDING) 6000 WEAPONS AGGREGATE LIMITS, THERE SHOULD BE SUB-LIMITS OF 4500 FOR BALLISTIC MISSILE RVs, 3000 FOR ICBM RVs, AND 1500 FOR ICBM RVs EXCEPT THOSE ON SILO-BASED LIGHT OR MEDIUM ICBMS WITH 6 RVs OR LESS (THESE ARE OF COURSE THE SUB-LIMITS ALREADY TABLED BY THE US TEAM IN GENEVA IN SEPTEMBER). US NEGOTIATORS HAVE ALSO BEEN GIVEN DISCRETION TO AGREE TO RAISE THESE SUB-CEILINGS TO 4800, 3300, AND 1650 RESPECTIVELY (THE HIGHER SUB-CEILINGS OF 3300 AND 1650 ARE THE SAME AS THOSE ALREADY PROPOSED BY THE US IN GENEVA UNDER THE SEPTEMBER 30 PER CENT REDUCTIONS ALTERNATIVE PROPOSAL).



GENEVA UNDER THE SEPTEMBER 30 PER CENT REDUCTIONS ALTERNATIVE PROPOSAL).

5. IN THE INF GROUP, US NEGOTIATORS SIMILARLY TABLED PROPOSALS ON 23 OCTOBER CONTAINING THE FOLLOWING ELEMENTS WHICH THE ADMINISTRATION BELIEVE WERE AGREED IN REYKJAVIK:

- (A) ZERO-ZERO LRINF IN EUROPE;
- (B) EQUAL GLOBAL CEILINGS OF 100 LRINF WARHEADS, WITH SOVIET WARHEADS TO BE DEPLOYED IN SOVIET ASIA AND US WARHEADS TO BE DEPLOYED IN THE CONTINENTAL US INCLUDING ALASKA;
- (C) AGREED VERIFICATION PRINCIPLES IN 3 MAIN AREAS IE EXCHANGE OF DATA BEFORE AND AFTER REDUCTIONS, ON-SITE OBSERVATION OF DESTRUCTION, AND EFFECTIVE MONITORING ARRANGEMENTS AFTER DESTRUCTION, INCLUDING ON-SITE INSPECTION.

THE FOLLOWING PROPOSALS NOT AGREED/DISCUSSED IN REYKJAVIK WERE ALSO TABLED:

- (A) LRINF REDUCTIONS TO BE COMPLETED BEFORE THE END OF 1991;
- (B) THE SOVIET SS20 DEPLOYMENTS IN ASIA TO BE LIMITED TO ONE BASE, KANSK OR BARNAUL, WITH A PREFERENCE FOR KANSK;
- (C) GLOBAL CONSTRAINTS ON SRINF, WITH NEGOTIATIONS ON REDUCTIONS FROM AGREED LEVELS TO BEGIN WITHIN 6 MONTHS OF THE COMPLETION OF AN LRINF AGREEMENT;
- (D) THE LRINF AGREEMENT TO BE OF INDEFINITE DURATION IE TO REMAIN IN FORCE UNTIL REPLACED BY A FURTHER AGREEMENT.

6. ON DEFENCE/SPACE, US NEGOTIATORS IN GENEVA HAVE MERELY FOR THE PRESENT MERELY BEEN BRIEFED ON DEVELOPMENTS AT REYKJAVIK AND TOLD TO AVOID DISCUSSION OF SPECIFICS. BUT A SECOND SET OF INSTRUCTIONS IS IN PREPARATION HERE AND OFFICIALS SAY THAT THEY ARE DUE TO BE APPROVED AND DESPATCHED TO GENEVA EARLY NEXT WEEK. THESE INSTRUCTIONS ARE BEING DESIGNED TO INCORPORATE THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL FOR THE ELIMINATION OF OFFENSIVE BALLISTIC MISSILES AND THE TIGHT LINKAGE BETWEEN THIS PROPOSAL AND THE US POSITION ON SDI AND ABM TREATY CONSTRAINTS. MORE SPECIFICALLY, THE INSTRUCTIONS ARE EXPECTED TO SPELL OUT THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE PROPOSAL TO ELIMINATE OFFENSIVE BALLISTIC MISSILES IN THE NEXT TEN YEARS FOR THE INF NEGOTIATIONS (IE THAT REMAINING SS20S IN ASIA AND ALL SHORTER RANGE BALLISTIC MISSILE SYSTEMS WOULD HAVE TO BE ELIMINATED IN THE PERIOD 1991-96), TO SPELL OUT THE FACT THAT THE INITIAL 50 PERCENT START REDUCTIONS SHOULD BE COMPLETED BY 1991 AND OFFENSIVE BALLISTIC MISSILES ELIMINATED BY 1996; AND TO PROPOSE FORMALLY A 10 YEAR PERIOD OF SDI CONSTRAINT AND COMMITMENT TO THE ABM TREATY BEFORE THE DEPLOYMENT OF STRATEGIC DEFENSIVE SYSTEMS.

7. THE SOVIET NEGOTIATORS IN GENEVA HAD ALREADY ON 15 AND 16 OCTOBER PUT FORWARD THEIR OWN POST-REYKJAVIK PROPOSALS (PARA 18 OF MY TELNO 2666). BUT ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS CONFIRM THAT THESE ARE NO MORE THAN AN ATTEMPT TO DISTIL THE MAIN FEATURES OF GORBACHEV'S TELEVISION SPEECH OF 14 OCTOBER. THEY SAY THAT THE SOVIET NEGOTIATING TEAMS IN GENEVA STILL APPEAR LARGELY UNBRIEFED ON THE REYKJAVIK DISCUSSIONS (THIS WILL PRESUMABLY CHANGE WHEN KARPOV RETURNS TO GENEVA, WHICH HE HAS NOT YET DONE). COMMENT

8. IT WOULD SEEM UNDESIRABLE THAT THE PROPOSAL FOR THE ELIMINATION OF BALLISTIC MISSILES SHOULD BE GIVEN MORE CONCRETE FORM NEXT WEEK. WE ACCORDINGLY PROPOSE TO SUGGEST TO OFFICIALS IN STATE THAT, GIVEN ALLIED CONCERN ABOUT THE PROPOSAL, IT WOULD SEEM INAPPROPRIATE IN ADVANCE OF ALLIED CONSULTATION TO INSTRUCT US NEGOTIATORS IN GENEVA TO FLESH IT OUT (PARA 6 ABOVE), AND UNNECESSARY TO DO SO NEXT WEEK, GIVEN THE CURRENT INACTIVITY OF THE SOVIET NEGOTIATORS (PARA 7 ABOVE). WE WOULD ALSO SUGGEST THAT IF SOME EARLY US STATEMENT IN GENEVA WERE THOUGHT ESSENTIAL, IT SHOULD BE ILLUSTRATIVE RATHER THAN NORMATIVE, AND SHOULD

This is very bad

IT SHOULD BE ILLUSTRATIVE RATHER THAN NORMATIVE, AND SHOULD INCLUDE A REFERENCE TO THE NEED TO CORRECT THE IMBALANCE IN CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE IN PARALLEL WITH THE ELIMINATION OF BALLISTIC MISSILES.

9. THESE SUGGESTIONS WOULD FLOW NATURALLY FROM THE CONVERSATION REPORTED IN MY TELNO 2703(NOT TO ALL). BUT THEY MIGHT CUT MORE ICE IF WE COULD SAY THEY ARE MADE SPECIFICALLY ON INSTRUCTIONS. MAY WE?

10. GRATEFUL FOR REPLY BEFORE THE WEEKEND.

ACLAND

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